Supreme Court of Florida THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 2018
CASE NO.: SC17-869 Lower Tribunal No(s).: 481996CF005639000AOX
STEVEN MAURICE EVANS vs. STATE OF FLORIDA
Appellant(s) Appellee(s)
Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing is hereby denied.
LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.
PARIENTE, J., concurring in result.
I concur in the denial of rehearing because I recognize that this Court’s
decisions regarding Hurst1 retroactivity are final.2 I write separately to emphasize
how this case demonstrates the unconstitutional arbitrariness created by this
1. Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017); see Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
2. See, e.g., Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017); Asay v. State (Asay V), 210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 41 (2017). CASE NO.: SC17-869 Page Two
Court’s Ring3 cutoff. See Evans v. State, 43 Fla. L. Weekly S29 (Fla. Jan. 24,
2018).
BACKGROUND
Evans was convicted of first-degree murder for crimes committed on April
26, 1996, and sentenced to death following a jury’s nonunanimous
recommendation for death. Evans v. State, 800 So. 3d 182, 185-86 (Fla. 2001).
This Court’s opinion on direct appeal in October 2001 affirmed Evans’ first-degree
murder conviction and sentence of death. Id. at 187. This Court denied rehearing
in December 2001. Id.
Following this Court’s opinion on direct appeal, Evans’ counsel, George
Burden, an assistant public defender who has handled many capital appeals,
attempted to file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme
Court. According to a letter from the United States Supreme Court to Mr. Burden
dated April 22, 2002, the Supreme Court received the petition on March 20, 2002,
but returned it for failure to comply with several Supreme Court rules. The
Supreme Court’s letter gave Mr. Burden sixty days to “correct and resubmit” the
3. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). CASE NO.: SC17-869 Page Three
petition; otherwise, “the petition [would] not be filed.” Sixty days from the date of
the Supreme Court’s letter was June 22, 2002. For “unknown reasons,” neither
Evans nor Mr. Burden submitted a corrected petition to the United States Supreme
Court. Mot. for Reh’g at 2. As a result, this Court determined in its January 24,
2018, opinion that Evans’ sentence of death became final in March 2002. Evans,
43 Fla. L. Weekly at S29; see Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1). Accordingly, this Court
denied Evans’ claim to Hurst relief pursuant to Hitchcock. Id.
ANALYSIS
In his motion for rehearing, Evans argues that this Court should grant
rehearing for two reasons: (1) this Court’s January 24, 2018, opinion incorrectly
determined that his sentence of death became final in March 2002, and (2) “[a]t the
very least, this Court should remand this case for an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether [Evans’] mental illness was a factor in the non-refiling of the
certiorari petition” with the United States Supreme Court. Mot. for Reh’g at 2.
Each is addressed in turn below.
1. Date Evans’ Sentence of Death Became Final
First, Evans argues that this Court should have determined that his sentence
of death became final on June 22, 2002—the deadline given by the United States CASE NO.: SC17-869 Page Four
Supreme Court for refiling Evans’ petition for a writ of certiorari from this Court’s
opinion on direct appeal. Evans further argues that this Court’s Ring cutoff for
determining Hurst retroactivity is arbitrary and capricious because, had Mr.
Burden refiled the petition by the Supreme Court’s deadline, it would have been
pending when the Supreme Court decided Ring days later. Resp. to This Ct’s
Order to Show Cause at 2. In turn, Evans argues, this Court would have applied
Hurst retroactively to his sentence of death. See Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248,
1283 (Fla. 2016). While I believe that the Court properly determined that Evans’
sentence became final in March 2002 due to the absence of a properly filed petition
for a writ of certiorari, I also agree with Evans that his case rises and falls on “a
fatal accident of timing” that demonstrates the unconstitutional arbitrariness
created by this Court’s Ring cutoff. Resp. to This Ct’s Order to Show Cause at 8.
Two days after the Supreme Court’s sixty-day deadline in Evans’ case, on
June 24, 2002, the Supreme Court decided Ring. Had Evans or Mr. Burden
properly sought certiorari in March or corrected the petition by the June 22
deadline, the date of the United States Supreme Court’s subsequent decision,
assuming it was a denial of certiorari, would have served as the date Evans’
conviction and sentence became final. Presumably, under either of these CASE NO.: SC17-869 Page Five
circumstances, Evans would have fallen on the other side of this Court’s Ring
cutoff and would, therefore, be entitled to the retroactive application of Hurst.
Thus, Evans’ case shows how this Court’s Ring cutoff for Hurst retroactivity
creates arbitrariness that has no proper place in death penalty jurisprudence.
As Justice Perry explained, dissenting in Asay V, the majority’s retroactivity
decisions determined “that in capital cases where the Sixth Amendment rights of
hundreds of persons were violated, it is appropriate to arbitrarily draw a line
between June 23 and June 24, 2002—the day before and the day after Ring was
decided.” 210 So. 3d at 38 (Perry, J., dissenting). Likewise, in my concurring in
part and dissenting in part opinion in Asay V, I explained that “[t]he majority’s
conclusion results in an unintended arbitrariness as to who receives relief
depending on when the defendant was sentenced or, in some cases, resentenced.”
Id. at 36 (Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
When the Court applied its retroactivity decision from Asay V to the Eighth
Amendment rights announced in Hurst, I dissented, explaining:
To deny . . . relief when other similarly situated defendants have been granted relief amounts to a denial of due process. The Eighth Amendment and due process arguments presented here and not addressed by the majority in Asay [V], in addition to the Sixth Amendment right announced in Hurst v. Florida and Hurst, “create[ ] the rare situation in which finality yields to fundamental fairness in CASE NO.: SC17-869 Page Six
order to ensure that the constitutional rights of all capital defendants in Florida are upheld.” [Asay V], 210 So. 3d 1, 35 (Fla. 2016) (Pariente, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Witt v.
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Supreme Court of Florida THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 2018
CASE NO.: SC17-869 Lower Tribunal No(s).: 481996CF005639000AOX
STEVEN MAURICE EVANS vs. STATE OF FLORIDA
Appellant(s) Appellee(s)
Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing is hereby denied.
LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.
PARIENTE, J., concurring in result.
I concur in the denial of rehearing because I recognize that this Court’s
decisions regarding Hurst1 retroactivity are final.2 I write separately to emphasize
how this case demonstrates the unconstitutional arbitrariness created by this
1. Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017); see Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
2. See, e.g., Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017); Asay v. State (Asay V), 210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 41 (2017). CASE NO.: SC17-869 Page Two
Court’s Ring3 cutoff. See Evans v. State, 43 Fla. L. Weekly S29 (Fla. Jan. 24,
2018).
BACKGROUND
Evans was convicted of first-degree murder for crimes committed on April
26, 1996, and sentenced to death following a jury’s nonunanimous
recommendation for death. Evans v. State, 800 So. 3d 182, 185-86 (Fla. 2001).
This Court’s opinion on direct appeal in October 2001 affirmed Evans’ first-degree
murder conviction and sentence of death. Id. at 187. This Court denied rehearing
in December 2001. Id.
Following this Court’s opinion on direct appeal, Evans’ counsel, George
Burden, an assistant public defender who has handled many capital appeals,
attempted to file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme
Court. According to a letter from the United States Supreme Court to Mr. Burden
dated April 22, 2002, the Supreme Court received the petition on March 20, 2002,
but returned it for failure to comply with several Supreme Court rules. The
Supreme Court’s letter gave Mr. Burden sixty days to “correct and resubmit” the
3. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). CASE NO.: SC17-869 Page Three
petition; otherwise, “the petition [would] not be filed.” Sixty days from the date of
the Supreme Court’s letter was June 22, 2002. For “unknown reasons,” neither
Evans nor Mr. Burden submitted a corrected petition to the United States Supreme
Court. Mot. for Reh’g at 2. As a result, this Court determined in its January 24,
2018, opinion that Evans’ sentence of death became final in March 2002. Evans,
43 Fla. L. Weekly at S29; see Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1). Accordingly, this Court
denied Evans’ claim to Hurst relief pursuant to Hitchcock. Id.
ANALYSIS
In his motion for rehearing, Evans argues that this Court should grant
rehearing for two reasons: (1) this Court’s January 24, 2018, opinion incorrectly
determined that his sentence of death became final in March 2002, and (2) “[a]t the
very least, this Court should remand this case for an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether [Evans’] mental illness was a factor in the non-refiling of the
certiorari petition” with the United States Supreme Court. Mot. for Reh’g at 2.
Each is addressed in turn below.
1. Date Evans’ Sentence of Death Became Final
First, Evans argues that this Court should have determined that his sentence
of death became final on June 22, 2002—the deadline given by the United States CASE NO.: SC17-869 Page Four
Supreme Court for refiling Evans’ petition for a writ of certiorari from this Court’s
opinion on direct appeal. Evans further argues that this Court’s Ring cutoff for
determining Hurst retroactivity is arbitrary and capricious because, had Mr.
Burden refiled the petition by the Supreme Court’s deadline, it would have been
pending when the Supreme Court decided Ring days later. Resp. to This Ct’s
Order to Show Cause at 2. In turn, Evans argues, this Court would have applied
Hurst retroactively to his sentence of death. See Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248,
1283 (Fla. 2016). While I believe that the Court properly determined that Evans’
sentence became final in March 2002 due to the absence of a properly filed petition
for a writ of certiorari, I also agree with Evans that his case rises and falls on “a
fatal accident of timing” that demonstrates the unconstitutional arbitrariness
created by this Court’s Ring cutoff. Resp. to This Ct’s Order to Show Cause at 8.
Two days after the Supreme Court’s sixty-day deadline in Evans’ case, on
June 24, 2002, the Supreme Court decided Ring. Had Evans or Mr. Burden
properly sought certiorari in March or corrected the petition by the June 22
deadline, the date of the United States Supreme Court’s subsequent decision,
assuming it was a denial of certiorari, would have served as the date Evans’
conviction and sentence became final. Presumably, under either of these CASE NO.: SC17-869 Page Five
circumstances, Evans would have fallen on the other side of this Court’s Ring
cutoff and would, therefore, be entitled to the retroactive application of Hurst.
Thus, Evans’ case shows how this Court’s Ring cutoff for Hurst retroactivity
creates arbitrariness that has no proper place in death penalty jurisprudence.
As Justice Perry explained, dissenting in Asay V, the majority’s retroactivity
decisions determined “that in capital cases where the Sixth Amendment rights of
hundreds of persons were violated, it is appropriate to arbitrarily draw a line
between June 23 and June 24, 2002—the day before and the day after Ring was
decided.” 210 So. 3d at 38 (Perry, J., dissenting). Likewise, in my concurring in
part and dissenting in part opinion in Asay V, I explained that “[t]he majority’s
conclusion results in an unintended arbitrariness as to who receives relief
depending on when the defendant was sentenced or, in some cases, resentenced.”
Id. at 36 (Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
When the Court applied its retroactivity decision from Asay V to the Eighth
Amendment rights announced in Hurst, I dissented, explaining:
To deny . . . relief when other similarly situated defendants have been granted relief amounts to a denial of due process. The Eighth Amendment and due process arguments presented here and not addressed by the majority in Asay [V], in addition to the Sixth Amendment right announced in Hurst v. Florida and Hurst, “create[ ] the rare situation in which finality yields to fundamental fairness in CASE NO.: SC17-869 Page Six
order to ensure that the constitutional rights of all capital defendants in Florida are upheld.” [Asay V], 210 So. 3d 1, 35 (Fla. 2016) (Pariente, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1980)), petition for cert. filed, No. 16–9033 (U.S. Apr. 29, 2017). . . . .... For the same reasons I conclude that the right announced in Hurst under the right to jury trial (Sixth Amendment and article I, section 22, of the Florida Constitution) requires full retroactivity, I would conclude that the right to a unanimous jury recommendation of death announced in Hurst under the Eighth Amendment requires full retroactivity. As I stated in Asay [V], “To avoid . . . arbitrariness and to ensure uniformity and fundamental fairness in Florida’s capital sentencing, our opinion in Hurst should be applied retroactively to all death sentences. [Id. at 36] (Pariente, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (emphasis added). In addition to the arbitrariness of the imposition of the death penalty as described by Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, this Court imposes another layer of arbitrariness in determining which defendants will receive relief, based on the critical right to a jury trial and a unanimous jury recommendation.
Hitchcock, 226 So. 3d at 220-21 (Pariente, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
Evans’ case, in which Hurst retroactivity depends on a mere three months or
three days, shows precisely why I believe the majority’s approach to Hurst
retroactivity violates the United States and Florida Constitutions, as I have
explained numerous times.
2. Evidentiary Hearing
Evans next argues that this Court should grant an evidentiary hearing to CASE NO.: SC17-869 Page Seven
consider whether his mental illness contributed to the failure to refile the petition
for a writ of certiorari. Because this Court has previously considered Evans’
mental health, both on direct appeal and postconviction, where Evans did not argue
that counsel was ineffective for failing to refile the petition for a writ of certiorari, I
agree with the Court that Evans is not entitled to rehearing or an evidentiary
hearing on this claim. Evans v. State, 975 So. 2d 1035, 1040-41 (Fla. 2007);
Evans, 800 So. 2d at 188, 197.
CONCLUSION
Recognizing that Asay V and Hitchcock are final, I agree with the denial of
rehearing but write to emphasize, as fully explained above, that this case
demonstrates the unconstitutional arbitrariness created by this Court’s Ring cutoff
for Hurst retroactivity.
A True Copy Test: CASE NO.: SC17-869 Page Eight
so Served:
DAVID DIXON HENDRY JAMES L. DRISCOLL JR. GREGORY W. BROWN DORIS MEACHAM HON. TIFFANY MOORE RUSSELL, CLERK HON. LISA TAYLOR MUNYON, JUDGE KENNETH SLOAN NUNNELLEY HON. FREDERICK J. LAUTEN, CHIEF JUDGE