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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 STEVEN LOJEK, 9 Plaintiff, Case No. C25-2449-SKV 10 v. ORDER RE: PENDING MOTIONS 11 HENAN OCEAN POWER HOUSEWARES CO. LTD., et al., 12 Defendants. 13
14 Plaintiff Steven Lojek, who proceeds pro se in this patent infringement action, filed a 15 Motion to Seal Exhibits to the Complaint, Dkt. 4, and Motion for Leave to Serve Defendants by 16 Alternative Means Under Rule 4(f)(3), Dkt. 5. Having considered the motions, and the balance 17 of the record, the Court herein DENIES the motion for leave to serve by alternative means, Dkt. 18 5, and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the motion to seal, Dkt. 4. 19 BACKGROUND 20 Plaintiff brings patent infringement claims against Defendants Henan Ocean Power 21 Housewares Co., Ltd, Henan Dongzhi Value Trading Co., Ltd., Fugu County Northwest Star 22 Trading Co., Ltd., Fugu County Yongle Grain & Oil Purchasing and Marketing Co., Ltd., 23 Shanghai Kangkeduo Sports Goods Co., Ltd., Yiwu Weihe Sports Goods Co., Ltd., Bengbu 1 Qiangshi Sports Goods Co., Ltd., Rizhao Fangbu Fitness Equipment Co., Ltd., and Yiwu Feide 2 Sports Goods Co., Ltd. See Dkt. 1 at 2-3. He alleges each named Defendant is located in China 3 and actively conducts business with customers in the United States through Amazon.com and/or 4 Alibaba.com, and that those sales include direct offers to sell and ship infringing weight-stack
5 pin products. See generally Dkt. 1. 6 Plaintiff seeks to serve Defendants by e-mail. See Dkt. 5. He provides registered 7 addresses and contact information for each Defendant, including both physical and email 8 addresses, that Plaintiff identified through “State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) 9 records, Qichacha Records, United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) records, third 10 party verification methods for identification of Alibaba Sellers, Amazon seller business profiles, 11 Alibaba seller business profiles, Amazon seller messaging, and Alibaba seller messaging[.]” 12 Dkt. 5 at 3; see also Dkts. 1-2, Exs. B-F, K. 13 Plaintiff also seeks leave to file under seal certain exhibits attached to his Complaint. See 14 Dkt. 4. Per Plaintiff, those exhibits include: (1) personally identifiable information and sensitive
15 foreign contact data for the named Defendants, including email addresses, phone numbers, 16 Unified Social Credit Codes, Qichacha reports, and SAMR registration documents that contain 17 non-public corporate details and government-issued identification numbers; (2) “[i]nternal 18 teardown photographs, proprietary engineering views, and detailed claim-chart analyses 19 revealing confidential product architecture and litigation strategy[;]” (3) private communications 20 with Defendants obtained through email, Alibaba chats, and Amazon messaging tools which 21 include non-public email addresses, chat history, and communications; and (4) non-public 22 USPTO account information, trademark-correspondence email addresses, and application 23 information tied to particular sellers.” Id. at 2. 1 DISCUSSION 2 A. Motion for Alternative Service 3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h)(2) authorizes service of process on a foreign 4 business entity in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(f). Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink,
5 284 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002). Rule 4(f) permits service by: (1) “internationally agreed 6 means of service . . . reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague 7 Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents” (hereinafter “Hague 8 Convention”); (2) if there is no internationally agreed means, in accordance with the foreign 9 country’s law; or (3) “by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court 10 orders.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f). 11 While Rule 4(f) does not favor any service methods, it does “prohibit[ courts] from 12 issuing a Rule 4(f)(3) order in contravention of an international agreement, including the Hague 13 Convention referenced in Rule 4(f)(1).” Rio Props., Inc., 284 F.3d at 1015 & n.4. Absent an 14 international agreement’s applicability or prohibition, courts have discretion to “determin[e]
15 when the particularities and necessities of a given case require alternate service of process under 16 Rule 4(f)(3).” Id. at 1016. “[A] method of service of process must also comport with 17 constitutional notions of due process.” Id. “To meet this requirement, the method of service 18 crafted by the district court must be ‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to 19 apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present 20 their objections.’” Id. at 1016-17 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 21 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). 22 Plaintiff moves the Court for leave to serve Defendants by email because service through 23 the Hague Convention would cause substantial delay and expense, and because “service by 1 email, Alibaba messaging, and Amazon seller messaging is reasonably calculated to provide 2 actual notice.” Dkt. 5 at 2 (emphasis removed). Plaintiff states that service through the Hague 3 Convention “would require translation of all pleadings into Mandarin and would likely take 4 several months, with no guarantee of delivery or confirmation.” Id. at 4. He asserts that the
5 “delay would materially prejudice [his] ability to obtain timely relief.” Dkt. 5-1, ¶8. He further 6 asserts that each Defendant maintains active, monitored electronic contact addresses through 7 which they conduct regular business with buyers in the United States, that he identifies at least 8 two verified electronic communication channels for each Defendant used to conduct business 9 and to communicate with customers, and that he has personally communicated directly with all 10 Defendants via email, Alibaba chat messaging, and Amazon seller chat messaging. Dkt. 5 at 2- 11 3; see also Dkts. 1-2, Exs. B-F, K. 12 Under Rule 4(f)(3), the Court must first consider whether an international agreement 13 applies and, if so, whether it prohibits service by e-mail. The Court, as discussed below, finds 14 both that the Hague Convention applies and that it prohibits service by email.
15 The Hague Convention applies “in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there 16 is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad.” Hague 17 Convention art. 1. However, the Hague Convention expressly “shall not apply where the address 18 of the person to be served with the document is not known.” Id. The Supreme Court has 19 recognized that “compliance with the [Hague] Convention is mandatory in all cases to which it 20 applies” in view of the Article 1 exclusivity provision and the Convention’s purpose. See 21 Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699, 705 (1988) (citations omitted) 22 (construing Article 1’s language as “mandatory”) (citing Société Nationale Industrielle 23 1 Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 534 & n.15 (1987));1 Water 2 Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 581 U.S. 271, 273 (2017) (citing Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 699). 3 Both China and the United States are signatories to the Hague Convention. See Status 4 Table, Hague Conference on Private International Law, https://www.hcch.net/en/
5 instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=17 (last visited Feb. 2, 2026). Also, because Plaintiff 6 identifies physical addresses for all named Defendants, see, e.g., Dkts. 1-2, Ex. B, there is no 7 basis for concluding that the addresses of Defendants are not known. Accordingly, the Hague 8 Convention applies. 9 Because the Hague Convention applies, alternative service by e-mail can only be granted 10 pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3) if it would not violate the Convention. The Court looks to the “approved 11 methods of service” specified by the Hague Convention for that insight, cognizant that the treaty 12 “‘pre-empts inconsistent methods of service’ wherever it applies.” Water Splash, Inc., 581 U.S. 13 at 273 (quoting Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 699). 14
16 1 In Société Nationale, the Supreme Court construed language in the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (“Hague Evidence Convention”) as making 17 available optional, as opposed to mandatory, procedures. The Supreme Court reached that conclusion by contrasting the Hague Evidence Convention’s language with that of the Hague Service Convention, 18 reasoning that
19 the Hague Conference on Private International Law’s omission of mandatory language in the preamble [of the Hague Evidence Convention] is particularly significant in light of 20 the same body’s use of mandatory language in the preamble to the Hague Service Convention[.] . . . Article 1 of the Service Convention provides: “The present Convention shall apply in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit 21 a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad.” . . . [T]he Service Convention was drafted before the Evidence Convention, and its language provided a model 22 exclusivity provision that the drafters of the Evidence Convention could easily have followed had they been so inclined. Given this background, the drafters’ election to use 23 permissive language instead is strong evidence of their intent.
Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 534 n.15 (citations omitted). 1 The Hague Convention delineates several approved service methods. It requires each 2 State Party to establish a central authority to receive service requests from abroad, arrange for 3 service via a method authorized under, or compatible with, its internal law, and provide 4 certificates of service. See Hague Convention arts. 2, 5–6. Service may also be effected through
5 diplomatic or consular agents, see id. arts. 8–9, or by other means agreed to by State Parties, see 6 id. art. 11. State Parties may also permit, pursuant to their domestic laws, service from abroad 7 upon individuals in their territory via methods not authorized by the Hague Convention. See id. 8 art. 19. Finally, “[p]rovided the State of destination does not object” the Hague Convention does 9 “not interfere with . . . the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to 10 persons abroad[.]” Id. art. 10(a). 11 E-mail is not a service method expressly provided for by the Hague Convention. As it 12 was drafted before e-mail existed, that omission is not surprising. Courts have split on whether 13 the Article 10(a) “freedom to send judicial documents[] by postal channels[]” nonetheless 14 encompasses electronic channels, including e-mail, and the scope of State Parties’ objections to
15 Article 10. Id. art. 10(a). Some courts, in view of the Hague Convention’s exclusivity, have 16 held e-mail is not a permissible method of service where State Parties have objected to Article 10 17 nor a method to which signatories must affirmatively object. See, e.g., Amazon.com Inc. v. 18 Robojap Techs. LLC, No. C20-694-MJP, 2021 WL 4893426, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 20, 2021) 19 (“If a form of service is not expressly permitted by the Convention, then it is otherwise 20 impermissible and prohibited. . . . Because the Convention does not expressly permit email 21 service, India had no reason or need to affirmatively reject it for it to be considered prohibited.”); 22 Facebook, Inc. v. 9 Xiu Network (Shenzhen) Tech. Co., 480 F. Supp. 3d 977, 983 (N.D. Cal. 23 2020) (“The Convention[] . . . doesn’t simply offer options for service abroad[] . . . that plaintiffs 1 can resort to or not at their discretion. Rather, unless an exception applies, the Convention- 2 delineated methods of service (along with the methods that countries unilaterally and bilaterally 3 agree to under Articles 11 and 19) are exclusive. . . . China affirmatively objected to service ‘by 4 postal channels’ because service ‘by postal channels’ is expressly permitted by the Convention,
5 absent objection. The same is not true of service by e-mail. The Convention doesn’t offer service 6 by e-mail as an option, so there was no reason for China to affirmatively object to it.”). Other 7 courts have determined that the Hague Convention and State Parties’ Article 10(a) objections’ 8 silence as to e-mail service indicates it is not explicitly prohibited and thus can be authorized 9 under Rule 4(f)(3). See, e.g., Akerson Enter. LLC v. Shenzhen Conglin E-Com. Co., Ltd., C24- 10 0506, 2024 WL 3510934, at *3 (W.D. Wash. July 23, 2024) (“Given the lack of binding 11 precedent on this issue and the Court’s agreement with the majority view of courts in this 12 district, the Court finds that e-mail service to a foreign defendant in China is allowed under Rule 13 4(f)(3) because the Hague Convention does not expressly prohibit it.”). 14 Recently, both this Court, in Dongguan Naquan E-Commerce Co., Ltd. v. Binovo
15 Manufacturing Co., Ltd., C25-1169-SKV, slip op. (W.D. Wash. Aug. 15, 2025), and the Second 16 Circuit, in Smart Study Co., Ltd v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi, No. 24-313, ___ F.4th 17 ___, 2025 WL 3672740, at *4-6 (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 2025), concluded that service by email on 18 defendants in China is prohibited by the Hague Convention. The Court again finds as such and 19 explains the basis for that conclusion.2 20
21 2 In Dongguan Naquan, the Court noted the split in this district’s decisions and found the first approach described above more persuasive for reasons previously articulated by the Honorable Marsha J. 22 Pechman. Dongguan Naquan E-Commerce Co., Ltd., C25-1169-SKV, slip op. at 6 n.4. In Robojap, Judge Pechman explains that decisions concluding that the Hague Convention does not prohibit e-mail 23 service on residents of countries with Article 10(a) objections 1 In July 2024, the Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the 1965 Service, 2 1970 Evidence, and 1980 Access to Justice Conventions (“SC”) issued Conclusions and 3 Recommendations resolving the ambiguity surrounding e-mail service.3 See Special 4 Commission on the Practical Operation of the 1965 Service, 1970 Evidence and 1980 Access to
5 Justice Conventions, Conclusions and Recommendations (C&R) ¶ 105 (July 2024) [hereinafter 6 2024 Conclusions and Recommendations], https://assets.hcch.net/docs/6aef5b3a-a02c-408f- 7 8277-8c995d56f255.pdf. The “SC noted that Article 10(a) includes transmission and service by 8 e-mail, insofar as such method is provided by the law of the State of origin and permitted under 9 the law of the State of destination.” Id. The Commission further noted “that a Contracting Party, 10 rather than filing a blanket opposition to the use of postal channels under Article 10(a), is 11 allowed to make a qualified declaration stating the conditions in which that Contracting Party 12 13 generally consider only the broad language in Rio [Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 14 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002)] about Rule 4(f)(3) without any analysis of the structure and nature of the Hague Convention. As the Ninth Circuit expressly pointed out in Rio, its 15 decision did not resolve the question of whether email service is permitted under Rule 4(f)(3) when the Hague Convention also applies. Yet many . . . decisions . . . rely on Rio as having somehow decided this issue. This renders them unpersuasive. Similarly, these 16 decisions fail to acknowledge or reconcile their determinations with the Supreme Court’s explanation that when the Convention applies, it provides the exclusive and limited 17 methods of completing international service.
18 Robojap, 2021 WL 4893426, at *3 (internal citations omitted). This Court agrees. After all, “when there is tension between a federal statute or federal rule, on the one hand, and a treaty like the Convention, on 19 the other, the two are to be interpreted ‘to avoid conflicts.’” Facebook, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 985–86 (quoting Saleh v. Bush, 848 F.3d 880, 891–92 & n. 9 (9th Cir. 2017)). In this Court’s view, the Hague 20 Convention’s exclusivity cannot be squared with a reading of Rule 4(f)(3) that grants license to employ any service methods on which the Hague Convention is silent. Cf. Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 705 (“[W]e do not think that this country, or any other country, will draft its internal laws deliberately so as to 21 circumvent the Convention in cases in which it would be appropriate to transmit judicial documents for service abroad.”). 22 3 The Special Commission is a body that meets “to review the practical operation of” the Hague 23 Convention and “adopt[s] Conclusions & Recommendations . . . aimed at promoting best practices and improving [the Hague Convention’s] operation.” Post Convention Work, Hague Conference on Private International Law, https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/post-convention-projects (last visited Feb. 2, 2026). 1 accepts incoming transmissions[.]” Id. ¶ 107. In view of State Parties’ recent consensus on 2 Article 10(a)’s scope, the Hague Convention is best read as not barring sending of service 3 documents directly to persons abroad via e-mail if permitted under the laws of the states of origin 4 and destination, unless the state of destination objects. See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S.
5 1, 12 (2014) (emphasizing courts’ “responsibility to read . . . treat[ies] in a manner consistent 6 with the shared expectations of the contracting parties.” (quoting Olympic Airways v. Husain, 7 540 U.S. 644, 650 (2004))); Water Splash, 581 U.S. at 283 (looking to the SC’s Conclusions and 8 Recommendations to interpret Article 10’s scope); Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 803 (9th 9 Cir. 2004) (looking to the handbook summarizing SC meetings to interpret Article 10’s scope). 10 China, the putative destination State here, filed a blanket objection to Article 10(a). See 11 Declaration/Reservation/Notification, Hague Conference on Private International Law, 12 https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/notifications/ 13 ?csid=393&disp=resdn (last visited Feb. 2, 2026) (China “oppose[s] the service of documents in 14 the territory of the People’s Republic of China by the methods provided by Article 10 of the
15 Convention.”). China has not narrowed its objection since the SC’s 2024 meeting, in which it 16 participated, or the publication of the 2024 Conclusions and Recommendations. See 2024 17 Conclusions and Recommendations at 1 n.1. The Court therefore construes China’s objection to 18 cover service by e-mail. 19 Plaintiff acknowledges China’s Article 10 objection, but asserts that service by email is 20 permissible because China has not expressly objected to service by electronic means. Dkt. 5 at 21 5. Plaintiff also notes that courts in this district have approved email service to defendants in 22 China. Id. However, neither Plaintiff’s assertion, nor the existence of varying decisions from 23 courts in this district provides a basis for altering the Court’s conclusion. The Court, instead and 1 for the reasons discussed above, concludes that service by email on Defendants in China is 2 prohibited by the Hague Convention. 3 The Court further notes that, even if the Hague Convention were not applicable or some 4 exception cognizable, Plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to justify alternative service
5 under Rule 4(f)(3). For the Court to authorize alternative service, a plaintiff must “demonstrate 6 that the facts and circumstances of the present case necessitate[] the district court’s intervention.” 7 Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1016. Courts consider a variety of factors when assessing need, 8 “including whether the plaintiff identified a physical address for the defendant, whether the 9 defendant was evading service of process, . . . whether the plaintiff had previously been in 10 contact with the defendant,” and efforts taken to identify a physical address for the defendant. 11 Dongguan Zhouda Tech. Co. v. Dai, C25-0536-TL, 2025 WL 1772099, at *2 (W.D. Wash. June 12 26, 2025) (quoting Rubie’s Costume Co. v. Yiwu Hua Hao Toys Co., C18-1530, 2019 WL 13 6310564, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 25, 2019)); see Cong v. Zhao, C21-1703-TL, 2022 WL 14 3447531, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 17, 2022) (denying alternative service by e-mail where the
15 “[p]laintiff ha[d] not alleged that [the d]efendant’s physical address [was] unknown after making 16 reasonable efforts to find an alternative address[] and . . . ha[d] not documented any other efforts 17 to find a physical address to serve Defendant.”). 18 Here, Plaintiff has physical addresses for Defendants and describes no efforts to serve 19 them, nor any facts suggesting they are attempting to evade service. Plaintiff explains his 20 request for service by email as based on the expenses he would incur and the delay that would 21 result from service under the Hague Convention. See Dkt. 5; Dkt. 5-1, ¶8. However, the desire 22 to avoid expense and delay, while understandable, does not justify alternative service. See, e.g., 23 Molloy v. Triwin, Inc., C23-4317, 2023 WL 11979757, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2023) (“The 1 Hague Convention exists for a reason. If a plaintiff could avoid its effect simply because of an 2 assertion— justified or not—that service pursuant thereto would be impractical, expensive, or 3 would take time, it would be little more than an internationally agreed-upon dead letter.”); 4 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Tian, No. C21-0159-TL, 2022 WL 486267, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 17,
5 2022) (“Rule 4’s various requirements for service of process are more than mere ‘technicalities,’ 6 and the desire for expedience and efficiency alone is not sufficient to justify alternative service.”) 7 (internal and other citations omitted). The Court therefore would not, under these circumstances, 8 find intervention necessary. For this reason and for the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s motion 9 for alternative service is denied. 10 B. Motion to Seal 11 “There is a strong presumption of public access to the court’s files.” Local Civil Rule 12 (LRC) 5(g). However, the presumption is not absolute and may be overcome. See Kamakana v. 13 City and Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006). The party seeking to overcome 14 the strong presumption in favor of public access must “‘articulate[] compelling reasons
15 supported by specific factual findings’ that outweigh the general history of access and the public 16 policies favoring disclosure[.]” Id. at 1178-79 (alteration in original; internal citations omitted).4 17
18 4 The Ninth Circuit “‘carved out an exception’” to the compelling reasons standard for materials filed in connection with non-dispositive motions that are only “tangentially related to the underlying 19 cause of action.” Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1097-99 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoted and cited sources omitted). Such records may be sealed upon a “particularized showing” of good 20 cause. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 (quoted source omitted). While the Ninth Circuit has not specified the standard applicable to a complaint, courts in the Ninth Circuit have in many instances applied the compelling reasons standard to pleadings. See, e.g., Benanav v. Healthy Paws Pet Ins. LLC, C20-0421- 21 LK, 2023 WL 8648962, at 5, n.5 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 14, 2023); In re Zillow Grp., Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., C17-1568-JCC, 2019 WL 3428664, at *1 (W.D. Wash. July 30, 2019). See also Carroll Shelby 22 Licensing, Inc. v. Halicki, C20-1344, 2020 WL 10574168, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2020) (applying compelling reasons standard to motion to seal portions of complaint and an attachment, and stating: 23 “Because a complaint is ‘the foundation of a lawsuit,’ it cannot be described as only tangentially related to the underlying cause of action.”) (citations omitted). The Court here, like Plaintiff, see Dkt. 4, applies the compelling reasons standard. 1 The Court, in turn, must balance the competing interests of the public and the party seeking to 2 restrict access, and must base a decision to keep records under seal “on a compelling reason and 3 articulate the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Id. at 4 1179 (quoted source omitted). “What constitutes a compelling reason is best left to the sound
5 discretion of the trial court.” Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 6 1097 (9th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up and quoted source omitted). 7 In addition, under this Court’s Local Civil Rules, the party seeking to keep materials 8 under seal must provide “a specific statement of the applicable legal standard and the reasons for 9 keeping a document under seal,” including explanation of “i. the legitimate private or public 10 interests that warrant the relief sought; ii. the injury that will result if the relief sought is not 11 granted; and iii. why a less restrictive alternative to the relief sought is not sufficient.” LCR 12 5(g)(3)(B). “Evidentiary support from declarations must be provided where necessary.” Id. 13 Plaintiff seeks leave of Court to file nine exhibits attached to his Complaint under seal, 14 see Dkts. 4 & 4-1 (addressing Exhibits B-G, K, M-N to Dkts. 1 & 2), described by Plaintiff in a
15 declaration as follows. “Exhibits B-F contain unredacted business-license documents, Chinese 16 [SAMR] filings, Qichacha reports, Unified Social Credit Codes, registry numbers, physical 17 addresses, email addresses, and other internal corporate identifiers for the foreign defendants.” 18 Dkt. 4-1, ¶2. Plaintiff asserts that these documents “include sensitive information not ordinarily 19 public in the United States and which could expose individuals or companies to privacy and 20 security risks if filed unsealed.” Id. “Exhibit G includes proprietary product photographs, 21 teardown images, detailed claim-chart analyses, and comparison images of Plaintiff’s patented 22 device.” Id., ¶3. Plaintiff asserts that these materials “reveal internal structure, confidential 23 engineering details, and litigation strategy used to map the accused products to each claim 1 limitation[,]” and that “[p]ublic disclosure would provide foreign sellers with the ability to alter 2 their products or adjust their listing to evade enforcement.” Id. “Exhibits K and M contain 3 private communications, including email addresses, internal Alibaba and Amazon messaging 4 accounts, and contact information that is not publicly listed[,]” as well as “screenshots that
5 display usernames, message IDs, timestamps, internal account identifiers, and other personally 6 identifiable information.” Id., ¶4. Finally, “Exhibit N includes private communications and non- 7 public USPTO application numbers and other sensitive data tied to foreign sellers.” Id., ¶5. 8 Plaintiff asserts that the Complaint and publicly filed redacted exhibits provide the full 9 substance of his claims, that he narrowly limited the sealed materials to only those portions 10 containing confidential business records, private contact information, technical teardown images, 11 or detailed claim-chart analysis, and that all “non-sensitive content is filed publicly in the 12 redacted versions. Id., ¶7. He argues that, consistent with LCR 5(g), compelling reasons support 13 sealing the identified exhibits in order to protect confidential and sensitive information from 14 unnecessary public exposure. He also argues that redaction of the exhibits would be
15 “impracticable without rendering the exhibit unintelligible[,]” and states that he would provide 16 unredacted versions to any appearing Defendant and consent to a protective order if deemed 17 appropriate. Dkt. 4 at 4. The Court finds that, with one exception discussed below, Plaintiff fails 18 to satisfy the compelling reasons standard. 19 Plaintiff here asserts that information and records associated with the business entities he 20 sues in this matter and his communications with those entities and third parties, see Dkts. 1 & 2, 21 Exs. B-F, K, M-N, are not appropriate for public disclosure because they contain commercially 22 sensitive, private, confidential, and/or personally identifiable information, and that disclosure of 23 these materials could create “privacy and security risks” for both those entities and various 1 individuals. Dkt. 4 at 3; Dkt. 4-1, ¶2. These assertions are not borne out by review of the 2 materials at issue. See id. Most, if not all, of the business information and records included in 3 Exhibits B-F, K, M, and N appear to be accessible to the public. Nor is it clear that Plaintiff’s 4 communications with Defendants, their employees, or third parties, including Amazon and
5 Alibaba, as contained in Exhibits K, M, and N, contain the type of private information the Court 6 might find properly restricted from public view. See, e.g., B.F. v. Amazon.com, Inc., C19-0910- 7 RAJ-MLP, 2019 WL 4597492, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 23, 2019) (allowing for redaction of the 8 email addresses of the minor plaintiffs’ guardians in order to protect their privacy interest and 9 prevent exposure to harm or identity theft). 10 As noted above, a party seeking to file materials under seal is required to explain the 11 interest warranting relief, the injury that will result, and why a less restrictive alternative to 12 sealing the documents is not sufficient. LCR 5(g)(3)(B). Plaintiff has not sufficiently explained 13 how or why the materials in Exhibits B-F, K, M, and N should be considered commercially 14 sensitive or private, how Defendants or others could be harmed by their disclosure, or why a less
15 restrictive alternative, such as targeted redactions, would not suffice. His bare assertions as to 16 the content of the materials, the risks posed by their disclosure, and the absence of any 17 alternative does not provide the necessary compelling reason to override the public’s interest in 18 disclosure. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1182 (conclusory statements about the content of 19 documents – “that they are confidential” and that their disclosure would “in general” cause harm 20 – did “not rise to the level of ‘compelling reasons” sufficiently specific to bar the public access 21 to the documents.”). These exhibits are therefore not properly filed under seal. 22 Plaintiff offers a greater showing in relation to Exhibit G. This exhibit contains a “Claim 23 Chart Showing Infringement of Claim 1 of US 9,468,791.” Dkts. 1 & 2, Ex. G. Plaintiff 1 describes this document as containing proprietary engineering information, internal teardown 2 photographs of Plaintiff’s patented device, and detailed claim-chart mappings and analyses that 3 foreign sellers could use to alter their products or adjust their listings to evade infringement. See 4 Dkt. 4 at 2-3; Dkt. 4-1, ¶3. Plaintiff asserts that the public filing of this document would also
5 unnecessarily disclose litigation strategy at the earliest stage of these proceedings. See id. 6 The potential that a court record could be used as a source of “business information that 7 might harm a litigant’s competitive standing[]” may serve as a compelling reason to allow the 8 filing of a document under seal. See Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1097 (quoting Nixon v. 9 Warner Commnc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1978)). See also Apple, Inc. v. Samsung, Elecs. 10 Co., Ltd., 727 F.3d 1214, 1221 (9th Cir. 2013) (“One factor that weighs in favor of sealing 11 documents is when the release of the documents will cause competitive harm to a business.”). 12 The Court finds that Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing, at least at this juncture, that Exhibit 13 G contains business information the disclosure of which has the potential to harm Plaintiff’s 14 competitive standing. The Court also finds that a less restrictive alternative to sealing this
15 document would not be practical. The Court, as such, finds a compelling reason to override the 16 public’s interest in disclosure to allow the filing of Exhibit G under seal. The Court, however, 17 notes that, given the early stage of these proceedings, this issue could be revisited, and that this 18 exhibit would, as Plaintiff appears to concede, likely be subject to a protective order. 19 CONCLUSION 20 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Serve 21 Defendants by Alternative Means Under Rule 4(f)(3), Dkt. 5, and GRANTS in part and DENIES 22 in part Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal Exhibits to the Complaint, Dkt. 4. Docket Number 2, which 23 1 includes Exhibit G, shall remain under seal until further order of the Court. Plaintiff is 2 ORDERED to file a public version of Exhibits B-F, K, M, and N within fourteen (14) days from 3 the date of this Order. 4 Dated this 3rd day of February, 2026.
5 A 6 S. KATE VAUGHAN United States Magistrate Judge 7
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