Steven Hughes v. Kenton County Detention Center

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: January 24, 2025
• Docket: 2023-CA-1333
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: JANUARY 24, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2023-CA-1333-MR

STEVEN HUGHES APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE MARY K. MOLLOY, JUDGE ACTION NO. 22-CI-01220

KENTON COUNTY DETENTION CENTER AND MARC FIELDS APPELLEES

OPINION AFFIRMING

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BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; CETRULO AND COMBS, JUDGES.

CETRULO, JUDGE: Appellant Steven Hughes (“Hughes”), pro se, appeals a

Kenton Circuit Court order dismissing his complaint that sought reimbursement of

jail fees charged during his incarceration by the Appellees, Kenton County

Detention Center (“KCDC”) and Jailer Mark Fields (“Jailer Fields”). For reasons

set forth below, we affirm. In 2023, Hughes sought reimbursement of more than $3,000 deducted

from his jail canteen fund during various stays at KCDC from 2010 to 2021. In his

complaint, Hughes asserted that while he was incarcerated, he was wrongfully

assessed jail fees. He asserted violations of Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”)

441.265, KRS 532.358, and his due process rights under both the United States

Constitution and Kentucky Constitution. Hughes also challenged the

constitutionality of KRS 441.265. Jailer Fields filed an answer to his complaint

and in Hughes’s response, he repeated his assertions that the KCDC violated both

his state and federal constitutional rights. Jailer Fields then moved to dismiss the

complaint arguing that 1) Hughes failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; 2)

he failed to properly notify the Commonwealth’s Attorney General of his

constitutional challenges; and 3) KCDC was permitted to charge and collect fees

under the current KRS 441.265 and the prior version of that statute. In July 2023,

the circuit court dismissed Hughes’s complaint because he failed to notify the

Attorney General of his constitutional challenge as required by KRS 418.075 and

because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

As this ruling is only a question of law, our review is de novo. See

Mosley v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., 626 S.W.3d 579, 584-85 (Ky. 2021) (citation

omitted).

-2- On appeal, Hughes first asserts he never intended to challenge the

constitutionality of a statute so as to require notification to the Attorney General.

Yet, despite his assertions on appeal, Hughes has repeatedly made constitutional

challenges. In fact, his pleadings below (both complaint and response) clearly set

forth such contentions, and he repeats those assertions on appeal. The record does

not demonstrate that either the complaint or the notice of appeal was served on the

Attorney General. KRS 418.075 requires notice be given to the Attorney General

of any constitutional challenge to a statute. Compliance with KRS 418.075 is

mandatory. Evans v. Baptist Health Madisonville, 643 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Ky. App.

2022) (citing A.H. v. Louisville Metro Gov’t, 612 S.W.3d 902, 913 (Ky. 2020)).

We have long demanded strict compliance with KRS 418.075 and its notice

requirements. See id.; see also Couch v. Commonwealth, 686 S.W.3d 172, 179

(Ky. 2024) (citation omitted).

Even if Hughes’s procedural defect did not exist, his appeal fails on

substantive grounds. KRS 441.265 allows jails to seek reimbursement for

expenses incurred by reason of a prisoner’s confinement. Hughes challenges the

constitutionality of the current and former (prior to 2022) versions of KRS

441.265, but this statute has withstood scrutiny time and again. See Jones v.

Commonwealth, 385 S.W.3d 22, 33-34 (Ky. 2011); see also Cole v. Warren Cnty.,

495 S.W.3d 712, 714 (Ky. App. 2015).

-3- Also, Hughes argues that a fee-specific order is required before those

jail fees may be collected, but KRS 441.265 does not include language mandating

a court order prior to collecting those fees. Further, as made clear by 2015

precedent, “[u]nder KRS 441.265, county jails are permitted to confiscate cash and

checks belonging to prisoners at booking, deposit and retain those proceeds, and

automatically deduct required fees without an order of a sentencing court.” Cole

v. Warren Cnty., 495 S.W.3d at 714 (emphasis added).

Hughes argues the “order” language in KRS 532.358 has the effect of

imposing an order requirement on KRS 441.265, but that is a misreading of the

statutes. KRS 532.358 instructs prisoners who have completed their sentence to

pay restitution and/or reimbursement for incarceration. True, KRS 532.358 allows

a court to order such payments, but that statute does not impose an order

requirement for jail fees collected pursuant to KRS 441.265.

Hughes asserts precedent supports his contention that a sentencing

order is required before a jail may seek reimbursement, citing Jones v. Clark

County, 635 S.W.3d 54 (Ky. 2021). Yet again, Hughes misreads our caselaw. In

Jones, the prisoner was arrested, booked, housed at the jail, and fees were collected

and continued to accumulate. Id. at 55-56. All criminal charges against the

prisoner were then dismissed without prejudice, but he was not reimbursed for the

jail fees nor were additional accumulated fees dismissed. Id. Our Supreme Court

-4- ultimately held that while a jail may automatically deduct fees pursuant to KRS

441.265, those fees must be returned to the former prisoner if the prisoner was

never convicted. Id. at 60. Yet here, Hughes’s situation is factually distinct.

Hughes was convicted and concedes that fact. Thus, no reimbursement is

necessary.

For the foregoing reasons, the Kenton Circuit Court order dismissing

Hughes’s complaint is AFFIRMED.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Steven Hughes, pro se Christopher S. Nordloh Covington, Kentucky Covington, Kentucky

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