COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Annunziata
STEVEN CHAMBERS, S/K/A STEVEN LAMONT CHAMBERS MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 1103-94-2 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. OCTOBER 17, 1995 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY William L. Wellons, Judge (James E. Ghee, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.
(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General; John H. McLees, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on brief.
Steven Chambers appeals from a conviction for distribution
of cocaine. He contends that the trial judge erred in admitting
into evidence a laboratory certificate of analysis and an array
of photographs. We affirm the conviction.
The evidence at trial proved that Larry Wilson was acting as
a police informant when he asked Brian Edmonds where he could buy
cocaine. Edmonds led Wilson to a trailer park, went alone to a
trailer, and accompanied a man to Wilson's automobile. The man,
an individual unknown to Wilson, entered Wilson's automobile and
directed Wilson to turn on the interior light. As Edmonds waited
outside the automobile, the man negotiated a price for cocaine
and sold Wilson a "rock" in a clear plastic bag. * Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication. Three days after the sale, a police officer showed Wilson an
array of eleven photographs in an album. Wilson identified from
those eleven photographs a photograph of the man who sold him the
substance. The police officer told him the person he identified
was Steven Chambers.
Wilson testified that he made another drug purchase from
Chambers several days after identifying the photograph. During
his testimony in court, Wilson identified Chambers as the person
who negotiated the price for cocaine and sold the "rock" to him. The Certificate of Analysis
The evidence at trial proved that when the officer received
the substance from Wilson, neither the officer nor Wilson knew
the name of the man who sold the substance to Wilson. The
officer placed the substance in an evidence package and enclosed
a request for analysis in the package indicating the name Brian
Edmonds and an unknown person. The officer sealed the package
and later mailed it to the laboratory. The evidence seal and the
mailing certificate contain the same two case numbers. The
officer wrote Edmonds' name on his offense report beside one of
the two numbers on the evidence seal. After Wilson identified
Chambers from the photograph, the officer wrote Chambers' name on
his offense report opposite the other number.
The certificate of analysis was sent from the laboratory and
put in the Chambers file by the clerk of the court. The
certificate stated that the solid substance was cocaine,
- 2 - contained the offense number listed on the officer's mailing
receipt, and contained the following identification: Suspect(s):
EDMONDS, Brian UNIDENTIFIED
Chambers contends that the trial judge erred in admitting
the certificate of analysis of the substance because the
certificate did not contain his name. We disagree.
By statute, the certificate is admissible "provided (i) the
certificate of analysis is filed with the clerk of the court
hearing the case at least seven days prior to the hearing or
trial and (ii) a copy of such certificate is mailed or delivered
by the clerk or attorney for the Commonwealth to counsel of
record for the accused at least seven days prior to the hearing
or trial upon request of such counsel." Code § 19.2-187.
Although this statute requires strict compliance by the
Commonwealth, Gray v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 943, 945, 265 S.E.2d
705, 706 (1980), Chambers does not contend that the letter of the
law was not observed. He argues that implicit in the statute is
a requirement that his name appear on the face of the
certificate.
The purpose of Code § 19.2-187 is to "ensure that the
certificate to be used in evidence is lodged timely in a secure
and appropriate place, accessible to the accused, and available
to him upon request." Stokes v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 550,
552, 399 S.E.2d 453, 454 (1991). The statutory filing
- 3 - requirements were fulfilled and the purpose was served. Although
Chambers' name was not on the certificate, the certificate did
contain the designations "Unidentified" and "Brian Edmonds."
Chambers was not prevented from making an inquiry when he saw the
certificate in the file.
Implicit in Chambers' objection to the admissibility of the
certificate is the assertion that the proper foundation for the
admissibility of the certificate was not laid because his name
was not on the certificate. The record proved, however, that the
substance sent to the laboratory was identified by a case number
that corresponded to a case number assigned to the incident
involving Chambers and Edmonds. Because the evidence linked the
substance to Chambers through a chain of possession, see Rogers
v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 527, 531, 90 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1955), and
the evidence proved the relevance of the substance, the trial
judge did not err in admitting the certificate of analysis. See
Harshaw v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 69, 427 S.E.2d 733 (1993).
Evidence is admissible if it tends to prove a matter that is
properly at issue in the case and if its probative value
outweighs any prejudicial effect. Evans-Smith v. Commonwealth, 5
Va. App. 180, 196, 361 S.E.2d 436, 441 (1987). The
Commonwealth's evidence proved that the certificate reported the
analysis of the cocaine purchased from Chambers. Furthermore,
Chambers has shown no prejudice that outweighs the probative
value of the evidence.
- 4 - The Photographic Identification
Wilson identified Chambers from a group of eleven
photographs three days following the cocaine purchase. After
this identification, Wilson purchased cocaine from Chambers a
second time. Wilson then identified Chambers in court as the
individual who had twice sold him cocaine. Chambers argues the
trial judge erred in allowing evidence of the basis for
identification because the procedure was unduly suggestive. The
admissibility of the photographs themselves is not at issue
because the Commonwealth never introduced them. The defense
introduced the photographs. However, the Commonwealth's evidence
established that Wilson initially identified Chambers through the
photographs. Thus, Chambers argues that evidence of the
photographic identification, not the pictures themselves, should
be suppressed. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that
impermissibly suggestive photographic displays may be suppressed
and may also require suppression of eyewitness identifications at
trial. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
Convictions based on photographic displays and later
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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Annunziata
STEVEN CHAMBERS, S/K/A STEVEN LAMONT CHAMBERS MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 1103-94-2 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. OCTOBER 17, 1995 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY William L. Wellons, Judge (James E. Ghee, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.
(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General; John H. McLees, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on brief.
Steven Chambers appeals from a conviction for distribution
of cocaine. He contends that the trial judge erred in admitting
into evidence a laboratory certificate of analysis and an array
of photographs. We affirm the conviction.
The evidence at trial proved that Larry Wilson was acting as
a police informant when he asked Brian Edmonds where he could buy
cocaine. Edmonds led Wilson to a trailer park, went alone to a
trailer, and accompanied a man to Wilson's automobile. The man,
an individual unknown to Wilson, entered Wilson's automobile and
directed Wilson to turn on the interior light. As Edmonds waited
outside the automobile, the man negotiated a price for cocaine
and sold Wilson a "rock" in a clear plastic bag. * Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication. Three days after the sale, a police officer showed Wilson an
array of eleven photographs in an album. Wilson identified from
those eleven photographs a photograph of the man who sold him the
substance. The police officer told him the person he identified
was Steven Chambers.
Wilson testified that he made another drug purchase from
Chambers several days after identifying the photograph. During
his testimony in court, Wilson identified Chambers as the person
who negotiated the price for cocaine and sold the "rock" to him. The Certificate of Analysis
The evidence at trial proved that when the officer received
the substance from Wilson, neither the officer nor Wilson knew
the name of the man who sold the substance to Wilson. The
officer placed the substance in an evidence package and enclosed
a request for analysis in the package indicating the name Brian
Edmonds and an unknown person. The officer sealed the package
and later mailed it to the laboratory. The evidence seal and the
mailing certificate contain the same two case numbers. The
officer wrote Edmonds' name on his offense report beside one of
the two numbers on the evidence seal. After Wilson identified
Chambers from the photograph, the officer wrote Chambers' name on
his offense report opposite the other number.
The certificate of analysis was sent from the laboratory and
put in the Chambers file by the clerk of the court. The
certificate stated that the solid substance was cocaine,
- 2 - contained the offense number listed on the officer's mailing
receipt, and contained the following identification: Suspect(s):
EDMONDS, Brian UNIDENTIFIED
Chambers contends that the trial judge erred in admitting
the certificate of analysis of the substance because the
certificate did not contain his name. We disagree.
By statute, the certificate is admissible "provided (i) the
certificate of analysis is filed with the clerk of the court
hearing the case at least seven days prior to the hearing or
trial and (ii) a copy of such certificate is mailed or delivered
by the clerk or attorney for the Commonwealth to counsel of
record for the accused at least seven days prior to the hearing
or trial upon request of such counsel." Code § 19.2-187.
Although this statute requires strict compliance by the
Commonwealth, Gray v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 943, 945, 265 S.E.2d
705, 706 (1980), Chambers does not contend that the letter of the
law was not observed. He argues that implicit in the statute is
a requirement that his name appear on the face of the
certificate.
The purpose of Code § 19.2-187 is to "ensure that the
certificate to be used in evidence is lodged timely in a secure
and appropriate place, accessible to the accused, and available
to him upon request." Stokes v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 550,
552, 399 S.E.2d 453, 454 (1991). The statutory filing
- 3 - requirements were fulfilled and the purpose was served. Although
Chambers' name was not on the certificate, the certificate did
contain the designations "Unidentified" and "Brian Edmonds."
Chambers was not prevented from making an inquiry when he saw the
certificate in the file.
Implicit in Chambers' objection to the admissibility of the
certificate is the assertion that the proper foundation for the
admissibility of the certificate was not laid because his name
was not on the certificate. The record proved, however, that the
substance sent to the laboratory was identified by a case number
that corresponded to a case number assigned to the incident
involving Chambers and Edmonds. Because the evidence linked the
substance to Chambers through a chain of possession, see Rogers
v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 527, 531, 90 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1955), and
the evidence proved the relevance of the substance, the trial
judge did not err in admitting the certificate of analysis. See
Harshaw v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 69, 427 S.E.2d 733 (1993).
Evidence is admissible if it tends to prove a matter that is
properly at issue in the case and if its probative value
outweighs any prejudicial effect. Evans-Smith v. Commonwealth, 5
Va. App. 180, 196, 361 S.E.2d 436, 441 (1987). The
Commonwealth's evidence proved that the certificate reported the
analysis of the cocaine purchased from Chambers. Furthermore,
Chambers has shown no prejudice that outweighs the probative
value of the evidence.
- 4 - The Photographic Identification
Wilson identified Chambers from a group of eleven
photographs three days following the cocaine purchase. After
this identification, Wilson purchased cocaine from Chambers a
second time. Wilson then identified Chambers in court as the
individual who had twice sold him cocaine. Chambers argues the
trial judge erred in allowing evidence of the basis for
identification because the procedure was unduly suggestive. The
admissibility of the photographs themselves is not at issue
because the Commonwealth never introduced them. The defense
introduced the photographs. However, the Commonwealth's evidence
established that Wilson initially identified Chambers through the
photographs. Thus, Chambers argues that evidence of the
photographic identification, not the pictures themselves, should
be suppressed. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that
impermissibly suggestive photographic displays may be suppressed
and may also require suppression of eyewitness identifications at
trial. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
Convictions based on photographic displays and later
identifications in court will only be set aside if the
"photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly
suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification." Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384. A
court must balance the suggestiveness of the photo display and
- 5 - reliability to determine if the identification is admissible.
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). If an eyewitness
had the opportunity to carefully observe the defendant, then
suggestiveness may be overcome. Id.
In the present case, Chambers' claim of suggestiveness
relies on the presence of a baseball hat in Chambers' photograph.
After Wilson purchased cocaine from Chambers, Wilson described
Chambers to the officer. He testified that Chambers wore a
baseball cap at that time. When the officer showed the eleven
photographs to Wilson, only Chambers' photograph depicted him
wearing a baseball hat. Chambers alleges the presence of the
baseball hat made the identification "all but inevitable." We
disagree. The record is unclear whether Wilson's oral description of
Chambers to the officer included a baseball hat. Furthermore,
Wilson purchased the cocaine while sitting close to Chambers in
the front seat of an automobile. Wilson had the opportunity to
look directly at Chambers. Wilson also had other dealings with
Chambers after the initial sale. Considering the totality of the
circumstances, as required by Brathwaite, we conclude the evidence proved that Wilson had the opportunity to make an
accurate identification during the initial drug sale. 432 U.S.
at 113. Thus, Chambers has not proven that there was a
"substantial likelihood of misidentification." Neil v. Biggers,
409 U.S. 188, 201 (1972).
- 6 - For these reasons, we affirm the conviction.
Affirmed.
- 7 -