Steven Benedict and Rayma Benedict v. Tonya Hill and Charles Edward Hill, Jr.
This text of Steven Benedict and Rayma Benedict v. Tonya Hill and Charles Edward Hill, Jr. (Steven Benedict and Rayma Benedict v. Tonya Hill and Charles Edward Hill, Jr.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-24-00307-CV
Steven Benedict and Rayma Benedict, Appellants
v.
Tonya Hill and Charles Edward Hill, Jr., Appellees
FROM THE 274TH DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY NO. 23-1108, THE HONORABLE SHERRI TIBBE, JUDGE PRESIDING
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM
This is an appeal involving the dismissal of appellants Steven and
Rayma Benedict’s petition to modify the parent-child relationship. On February 7, 2022,
appellee Tonya Hill filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that the Benedicts lacked standing
and their petition should therefore be dismissed. In her plea, Hill also requested an award of
attorney’s fees. On April 29, 2024, the trial court signed an order granting Hill’s plea to the
jurisdiction. The Benedicts appealed from that order, resulting in the proceeding currently
before us.
However, the court’s April 29 order did not dispose of Hill’s request for
attorney’s fees. Instead, the order expressly states that the court was “making no ruling on relief
requested by [appellees], if any, at this time.” Accordingly, the Clerk of this Court sent a letter to the parties informing them that the trial court’s order did not appear to be final and that this
Court may lack jurisdiction over this appeal. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191,
195 (Tex. 2001). The Benedicts responded, contending that the only affirmative relief sought in
this case was their own and therefore, the court’s dismissal of their petition resulted in an
adjudication of all claims and parties. In the alternative, the Benedicts asked that we abate this
appeal to allow the trial court to render a final order. See Tex. R. App. P. 27.2 (“The appellate
court may allow an appealed order that is not final to be modified so as to be made final . . . .”).
Because we conclude that the finality of the trial court’s order is ambiguous, we abate and
remand for clarification. See Bella Palma, LLC v. Young, 601 S.W.3d 799, 801 (Tex. 2020)
(per curiam) (“If the appellate court is uncertain about the intent of the order, it can abate the
appeal to permit clarification by the trial court.” (quoting Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 206));
see also Morath v. Elizondo, No. 03-23-00125-CV, 2025 WL 270611, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin
Jan. 23, 2025) (per curiam) (mem. op. & order) (exercising this discretion by requesting that trial
court clarify whether its order was intended to be final).
This Court is obligated to determine, sua sponte, whether we lack jurisdiction
over an appeal. Freedom Commc’ns, Inc. v. Coronado, 372 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Tex. 2012).
Generally, unless the Legislature confers jurisdiction by statute, we do not have jurisdiction over
an interlocutory appeal. Sabre Travel Int’l, Ltd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 567 S.W.3d 725, 736
(Tex. 2019). Absent a conventional trial on the merits, a judgment “is final for purposes of
appeal if and only if either it actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court,
regardless of its language, or it states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all
claims and all parties.” Lehmann, 309 S.W.3d at 192–93.
2 Here, the order being appealed meets neither of these criteria. The order grants
Hill’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismisses the Benedicts’ claims, but it does not contain any
indicia of finality from which we can infer the trial court’s intentions. See In re Guardianship of
Jones, 629 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. 2021) (per curiam) (explaining that although talismanic
phrases are not required, “[a] statement like, ‘This judgment finally disposes of all parties and all
claims and is appealable’, would leave no doubt about the court’s intention.” (quoting Lehmann,
39 S.W.3d at 206)). Instead, the order expressly provides that the court was “making no ruling
on relief requested by” Hill, “if any, at this time.”
When an order lacks clear and unequivocal language demonstrating its finality,
we look to the record to determine whether the trial court actually disposed of all claims and
parties. See In re R.R.K., 590 S.W.3d 535, 543–44 (Tex. 2019). The trial court’s order does not
dispose of Hill’s request for attorney’s fees. Generally, a judgment that does not include finality
language and that fails to rule on a party’s claim for attorney’s fees is not final for purposes of
appeal. See McNally v. Guevara, 52 S.W.3d 195, 196 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam) (“Because the
judgment does not appear final on its face, and because it did not dispose of the defendant’s
claim for attorney fees, it was not an appealable judgment.”); In re M.B., No. 01-20-00003-CV,
2021 WL 4095252, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sep. 9, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(order granting adoptive parents’ motion to strike for lack of standing was not final where it did
not rule on parents’ request for attorney’s fees).
However, after the trial court issued its order granting Hill’s plea to the
jurisdiction, it issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. This suggests that the trial court
may have intended its order to be final and appealable. See Tex. R. App. P. 28.1 (providing that
trial court may but “need not file findings of fact and conclusions of law” when order being
3 appealed is interlocutory); De Los Salmones v. Anchor Dev. Grp., LLC, No. 14-20-00720-CV,
2022 WL 1218541, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 26, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Thus, rather than dismiss the appeal, we believe the appropriate course of action is to abate the
appeal to allow the trial court to clarify its intent. See D.L.J. v. M.D.S., No. 03-25-00696-CV,
2025 WL 3247111, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 21, 2025, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op. &
order); see also McNally, 52 S.W.3d at 196.
We therefore abate and remand this appeal. Upon remand, the trial court may
modify its order, issue an amended order, or take any other action necessary to clarify its intent,
including holding a hearing on the matter. See D.L.J., 2025 WL 3247111, at *2. A supplemental
clerk’s record containing any additional actions taken in the trial court regarding the order being
appealed, along with a supplemental reporter’s record of any hearing on that issue, shall be filed
with this Court on or before May 5, 2026. This appeal will be reinstated after the supplemental
records are filed.
It is ordered on April 9, 2026.
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Crump and Ellis
Abated and Remanded
Filed: April 9, 2026
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