Steven Ahearn v. Carolyn Colvin

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 9, 2024
• Docket: 23-35572
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 9 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEVEN T. AHEARN, No. 23-35572

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:22-cv-05948-DWC

v. MEMORANDUM** CAROLYN W. COLVIN,* Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington David W. Christel, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 22, 2024 Portland, Oregon

Before: HAMILTON,*** VANDYKE, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff Steven T. Ahearn appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for supplemental

* We have substituted Acting Commissioner Carolyn W. Colvin as defendant-appellee pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c). ** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. *** The Honorable David F. Hamilton, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation. security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Ahearn argues that the

administrative law judge (ALJ) erred in considering pre-onset medical opinions,

rejected inappropriately a medical opinion, relied improperly on findings from

non-examining state psychologists, and evaluated incorrectly Ahearn’s own

testimony and a lay witness account of the extent of his impairments. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s decision de

novo, Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2021), but we review the

ALJ’s decision deferentially under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We may reverse “only if

the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a

whole or if the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard.” Ahearn, 988 F.3d at 1115

(quoting Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2012)). We affirm.

1. Pre-Onset Medical Evidence: Ahearn has filed two prior applications for

social security disability benefits. The first was denied by an ALJ in December

2014, and Ahearn did not appeal further. The second was denied by an ALJ in

August 2017 and was ultimately affirmed by this court in Ahearn, 988 F.3d at

1114. In support of his third application, at issue here, Ahearn argues that the ALJ

erred by failing to articulate findings based on medical opinions in the record that

limited their focus to dates prior to the alleged disability onset date of May 27,

2020. We disagree. The ALJ acknowledged the presence of these assessments in

the record and explained that she did not evaluate their persuasiveness because

2 23-35572 they were from “well before” the alleged disability onset date and were

accordingly “not helpful in evaluating [Ahearn’s] functioning during the relevant

period.” The agency must assess a claimant’s residual functional capacity based

on “all the relevant evidence in [the claimant’s] case record.” 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.945(a)(1). Yet the ALJ “does not need to discuss every piece of evidence.”

Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 383, 386 (8th Cir.

1998)). The four earlier medical opinions about Ahearn (Wilkinson, 2013;

Ruddell, 2015; Wilkinson, 2019; and Eisenhauer, 2019) explicitly limited their

assessments to times before the alleged onset date for this application. It was not

error for the ALJ to decline to articulate findings based on these opinions with such

limited relevance. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155,

1165 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Medical opinions that predate the alleged onset of disability

are of limited relevance.”); accord, Ahearn, 988 F.3d at 1117–18 (finding no error

where ALJ gave limited weight to medical assessment from three and a half years

prior to alleged onset date). Also, the earlier ALJ decisions considered opinions

from Drs. Wilkinson, Wingate, and Ruddell and gave them little weight.

2. Medical Evidence: The ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Wilkinson’s 2020

opinion was supported by substantial evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)

(explaining that ALJ must “articulate ... how persuasive [she] find[s] all of the

3 23-35572 medical opinions” from each source, and “explain how [she] considered the

supportability and consistency factors”). The ALJ found that Dr. Wilkinson’s

opinion was consistent with evidence indicating that Ahearn’s conditions were

“fairly well controlled with medication management and therapy” and with

Ahearn’s ability to cook, shop, do chores, and socialize. The ALJ’s treatment of

Dr. Wilkinson’s opinion as “partially persuasive” was thus supported by

substantial evidence. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Kijakazi, 82 F.4th 732, 740 (9th Cir.

2023) (affirming ALJ’s decision to discount doctor’s opinion when inconsistent

with that same doctor’s note that claimant was “engaged, alert and oriented, and

only ‘slightly anxious’” during office visits); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035,

1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that ALJ properly discounted a medical opinion that

was inconsistent with the medical record).

3. State Psychologists: The ALJ also did not err by relying on findings

from non-examining state agency psychologists. See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th

785, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2022) (noting that 2017 amendments to regulations do not

require deference to treating physicians); Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th

Cir. 2020) (approving ALJ’s rejection of treating physician’s opinion because it

was contradicted by opinions from two non-examining physicians). Ahearn does

not cite any specific piece of evidence in the record that is inconsistent with those

findings. The non-examining psychologists’ findings were also consistent with

4 23-35572 other evidence in the record, including evidence that Ahearn socializes, cooks, uses

public transportation, and manages his finances. See Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th

489, 496 (9th Cir. 2022) (affirming ALJ’s rejection of medical opinion based on

documented daily activities). We therefore defer to the ALJ’s interpretation of that

evidence. See, e.g., Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154 (“If the evidence is susceptible to more

than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.”

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

4. Ahearn’s Subjective Symptom Testimony: Substantial evidence supports

the ALJ’s discounting of Ahearn’s subjective symptom testimony. The ALJ noted

Ahearn’s testimony that he struggled to maintain employment due to his cognitive

limitations but cited “inconsistent statements regarding [Ahearn’s] work history” in

the record when discounting his claims. The record showed that Ahearn performed

under-the-table yardwork during the period at issue and reported that he stopped

working in 2012 because “[t]here wasn’t enough work” and “[i]t didn’t pay

enough.” This evidence was sufficient to support the ALJ’s conclusion. See Burch

v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding ALJ’s judgment when

evidence could point in either direction and ALJ found claimant was “quite

functional” and could care for her own personal needs, cook, clean, shop, and

interact with others); Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1995)

(affirming ALJ’s decision to discredit subjective symptom testimony based on

5 23-35572 reasons similar to those in this case, including inconsistency with claimant’s

activities of daily living). The ALJ also properly noted that Ahearn voluntarily

stopped taking Zoloft – which had been helping him with his symptoms – in

support of her conclusion that Ahearn’s impairments did not require a finding of

disability. See Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th

Cir. 2006) (“Impairments that can be controlled effectively with medication are not

disabling for the purpose of determining eligibility for [supplemental security

income] benefits.”). These reasons were sufficiently “clear and convincing” to

support the ALJ’s discounting of Ahearn’s testimony. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin,

806 F.3d 487, 493–94 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that an ALJ must provide “clear

and convincing” reasons for finding a claimant’s testimony not credible, and

remanding where requirement was not satisfied).

5. Lay Evidence: Assuming that, after the 2017 amendments to the relevant

regulations, ALJs must still offer reasons “germane to each witness” in order to

reject lay evidence, see Bruce v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996)), the ALJ satisfied

that obligation here. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(d) (after 2017 amendments to

regulations, ALJ does not need to articulate assessment of non-medical evidence

using standards for medical evidence); Fryer v. Kijakazi, No. 21-36004, 2022 WL

17958630, at *3 n.1 (9th Cir. Dec. 27, 2022) (noting that ALJ’s obligations

6 23-35572 regarding lay evidence are unsettled after 2017 amendments).

The ALJ here noted the interview of Ahearn conducted by agency

interviewer C. Hann. While the ALJ did not articulate findings based on that

evidence, she considered it, noted the interviewer’s conclusion that Ahearn did not

exhibit “physical or mental health difficulties” other than with comprehension, and

concluded that it did not change her assessment of Ahearn’s overall functional

capacity. Because the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for rejecting

Ahearn’s subjective testimony about his comprehension limitations, the ALJ also

gave germane reasons for rejecting the interviewer’s statement about those

limitations. See Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir.

2009) (noting that when ALJ provides clear and convincing reasons to reject a

claimant’s testimony, and the lay witness testimony is similar, “it follows that the

ALJ also gave germane reasons for rejecting” the lay witness testimony).

6. Residual Functional Capacity: Finally, the ALJ also did not err in her

assessment of Ahearn’s residual functional capacity or in posing her hypothetical

questions to the vocational expert. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169,

1175 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In arguing the ALJ’s hypothetical was incomplete,

[claimant] simply restates her argument that the ALJ’s [residual functional

capacity] finding did not account for all her limitations….”). Because the ALJ’s

determination of Ahearn’s limitations appropriately weighed the evidence, her

7 23-35572 residual functional capacity determination – which accounted for Ahearn’s

limitations – was not legally flawed. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that ALJ did not err in determining

residual functional capacity when she “permissibly discounted” evidence from

treating physicians and provided clear and convincing reasons for rejecting a

claimant’s subjective symptom testimony).

AFFIRMED.

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