Steven Abel v. Southern Shuttle Services, Inc.

301 F. App'x 856
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedNovember 28, 2008
Docket08-13412
StatusUnpublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 301 F. App'x 856 (Steven Abel v. Southern Shuttle Services, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Steven Abel v. Southern Shuttle Services, Inc., 301 F. App'x 856 (11th Cir. 2008).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff Steven Abel appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to his former employer, Southern Shuttle Services, Inc. (“Southern Shuttle”), on his claim for unpaid overtime brought pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. The district court concluded as a matter of law that Southern Shuttle’s airport shuttle service fell within the “taxicab exemption” to the FLSA’s overtime provisions and Abel was not entitled to overtime compensation. After review, we reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are not in dispute.

A. Southern Shuttle’s Airport Service

Southern Shuttle operates “Super Shuttle” vans that transport people to and from three airports: Miami International Airport (“MIA”), Palm Beach International Airport (“PBIA”) and Fort LauderdaleHollywood International Airport (“FLHIA”). 1 Super Shuttle (the “Shuttle”) transports customers in large, nine- and ten-passenger vans. The Shuttle is “a shared-ride airport shuttle service,” which means passengers share the ride to or from the airport with other passengers. The Shuttle’s website touts its “shared ride” service as a way to offer “prices that are more economical than a taxi or limo.... ”

Shuttle vans pick up passengers at any location in the area (such as their home, office or hotel) and transport them to one of the three area airports or take passengers from the airport to any location in the area. Shuttle drivers are not allowed to transport passengers from any location to any other location; they can transport passengers only to or from one of the three airports. The Shuttle uses “stands” at the three airports and is available to the gen *858 eral public. 2

Southern Shuttle advertises its services under the heading “Airport Transportation” in telephone books. Taxicab companies, limousine services and town car services also advertise under this heading. Southern Shuttle does not advertise under the heading “Taxicabs.”

Passengers contact the Shuttle directly. Passengers can either make reservations ahead of time by phone or schedule a trip at the airport. Passengers traveling to the airport schedule a fifteen-minute pickup window. Passengers traveling from the airport check in either at an airport kiosk or counter or at curbside with a Shuttle representative (not a driver) and wait to be assigned to a van waiting in a “holding lot.” The Shuttle’s “dispatch office” sends the vans to pick up passengers traveling to the airport and “routes” airport passengers with others traveling to the same geographical area and assigns them to vans. Shuttle drivers are not permitted to transport passengers who “hail” them on the street. Rather, they are allowed to transport only passengers who have prearranged transportation through the Shuttle’s dispatch office or a kiosk or counter inside the airport.

The Shuttle charges passengers a flat rate based on zip codes organized into zones, a common practice in South Florida for both airport shuttles and some taxicabs. Shuttle vans do not have meters or charge metered fares. Shuttle drivers are paid commission and may accept tips. Some, but not all, Shuttle drivers have “hack” licenses, which taxicab drivers also possess.

From December 19, 2005 to June 24, 2007, Plaintiff Abel worked for Southern Shuttle as a driver of vans to and from the three airports. Abel was paid commission and tips, but no overtime compensation. For any period in which Abel’s commission and tips was less than minimum wage, Southern Shuttle paid Abel the additional amount needed to reach minimum wage.

B. District Court Proceedings

Abel filed this action on behalf of himself and other similarly situated employees and former employees, alleging violation of the FLSA’s overtime provisions. Following discovery, Southern Shuttle moved for summary judgment, arguing that Abel was exempt from receiving overtime compensation because Southern Shuttle was in the business of operating taxicabs. The district court agreed and granted the summary judgment motion.

Abel filed this appeal. Abel argues the district court erred in concluding as a matter of law that Southern Shuttle’s airport shuttle service fell within the “taxicab exemption.” 3

*859 II. DISCUSSION

Generally, the FLSA requires an employer to pay overtime compensation at one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate for all hours worked in excess of forty per week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). The FLSA exempts from its overtime pay requirements “any driver employed by an employer engaged in the business of operating taxicabs----”29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(17). Neither the FLSA nor the Code of Federal Regulations defines the phrase “the business of operating taxicabs.” When interpreting an FLSA exemption, we look to the plain language of the statute itself and give words of the statute “their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” Anderson v. Cagle’s Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 955 (11th Cir.2007) (quotation marks omitted). Given the remedial nature of the FLSA, we construe exemptions narrowly against the employer. Alvarez Perez v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 515 F.3d 1150, 1157 (11th Cir.2008).

The Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) field operations handbook does contain a section on § 213(b)(17)’s taxicab exemption, which at least discusses the common features of a taxicab:

“Business of operating taxicabs ”. The taxicab business consists normally of common carrier transportation in small motor vehicles of persons and such property as they may carry with them to any requested destination in the community. The business operates without fixed routes or contracts for recurrent transportation. It serves the miscellaneous and predominantly local transportation needs of the community. It may include such occasional and unscheduled trips to and from transportation terminals as the individual passengers may request, and may include stands at the transportation terminals as well as at other places where numerous demands for taxicab transportation may be expected.

Dep’t of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Field Operations Handbook § 24h01. We have said the field operations handbook is not entitled to Chevron deference, but may be persuasive. Klinedinst v. Swift Investments, Inc., 260 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir.2001). The employer bears the burden to show by “clear and affirmative evidence” that an exemption applies. Birdwell v. City of Gadsden,

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Related

Munoz-Gonzalez v. D.L.C. Limousine Serv., Inc.
904 F.3d 208 (Second Circuit, 2018)
Abel v. SOUTHERN SHUTTLE SERVICES, INC.
620 F.3d 1272 (Eleventh Circuit, 2010)

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Bluebook (online)
301 F. App'x 856, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/steven-abel-v-southern-shuttle-services-inc-ca11-2008.