Case: 19-14185 Date Filed: 05/27/2020 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 19-14185 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:19-cv-60900-RKA
STEVE WEIL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CAROL-LISA PHILLIPS, CARLOS A. RODRIGUEZ, WILLIAM J. HAURY, JR., SANDRA PEARLMAN, THOMAS LYNCH, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(May 27, 2020)
Before WILSON, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 19-14185 Date Filed: 05/27/2020 Page: 2 of 7
Steve Weil appeals the district court’s dismissal of his second amended
complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Weil alleged in his complaint that six state court judges, along with other state
actors, violated his due process and equal protection rights and committed civil theft,
obstruction of justice, and conspiracy related to the adjudication of a state court
breach of contract action against him. Weil moved to proceed in forma pauperis,
but the district judge dismissed Weil’s complaint without prejudice for failure to
state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically, the district judge found that
Weil’s complaint was a shotgun pleading, “contain[ing] multiple counts [where]
each count adopt[ed] the allegations of all preceding counts.”
Weil moved for reconsideration and attached his amended complaint. The
district judge, without explanation, denied the motion. Weil moved to disqualify the
district judge, withdrew his first amended complaint, and filed a second amended
complaint listing the district judge as a defendant. The district judge recused
himself. A successor district judge found that Weil’s second amended complaint
suffered the same flaws and dismissed the complaint. Weil moved to set aside the
order, and to disqualify the successor district judge. The successor district judge
recused herself. The second successor district judge refused to set aside the
dismissal. Weil appealed.
2 Case: 19-14185 Date Filed: 05/27/2020 Page: 3 of 7
DISCUSSION
Weil argues that the district court erred in dismissing his second amended
complaint for failure to state a claim. In particular, he argues that his complaint was
not a shotgun pleading because “there are [twenty] defendants named in the
complaint, [and it] is impossible to adequately put those [defendants] on notice that
there’s a claim upon which . . . relief [can be granted] without being somewhat
complicated.”
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for
failure to state a claim, accept the allegations in the complaint as true, and apply the
same standards that govern dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1253 (11th Cir. 2017). To
survive a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This “requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complainant must “plead[] factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.
3 Case: 19-14185 Date Filed: 05/27/2020 Page: 4 of 7
When we have a pro se complainant, as here, we give a “liberal construction
to which pro se pleadings are entitled.” Holsomback v. White, 133 F.3d 1382, 1386
(11th Cir. 1998). But this leeway is not limitless. We cannot serve as “de facto
counsel for a party, or . . . rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain
an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014)
(citation omitted).
Shotgun pleadings do not adhere to these basic requirements. Estate of Bass
v. Regions Bank, Inc., 947 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir. 2020); see also Anderson v.
Dist. Bd. of Trs. Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366–67 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting
that a shotgun pleading does not satisfy the pleading requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure). They “fail . . . to give the defendants adequate notice of
the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland v.
Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015). In Weiland,
we identified four categories of shotgun pleadings. Id. at 1321. A complaint is a
shotgun pleading if it: (1) “contain[s] multiple counts where each count adopts the
allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that
came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint”; (2) “is
. . . replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to
any particular cause of action”; (3) does not “separat[e] into a different count each
cause of action or claim for relief”; or (4) “assert[s] multiple claims against multiple
4 Case: 19-14185 Date Filed: 05/27/2020 Page: 5 of 7
defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which
acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.” Id. at
1321–23.
We conclude, as the district court did, that Weil’s complaint failed to state a
claim because it was a shotgun pleading. Weil’s complaint, boiled down, is an
across-the-board allegation that every defendant conspired against him in allowing
his state-court adversary to submit a sham pleading. In his complaint, after he
discussed general allegations against the defendants, Weil divided his complaint into
sections addressing specific allegations against each defendant. But the first
paragraph of each section “adopt[ed] and realleg[ed]” every antecedent allegation in
the complaint. “By the time a reader of the pleading gets to the final [section], it is
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to know which allegations pertain to that
[section] (according to its label), to separate the wheat from the chaff.” See Keith v.
DeKalb Cty., 749 F.3d 1034, 1045 n.39 (11th Cir. 2014).
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Case: 19-14185 Date Filed: 05/27/2020 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 19-14185 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:19-cv-60900-RKA
STEVE WEIL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CAROL-LISA PHILLIPS, CARLOS A. RODRIGUEZ, WILLIAM J. HAURY, JR., SANDRA PEARLMAN, THOMAS LYNCH, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(May 27, 2020)
Before WILSON, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 19-14185 Date Filed: 05/27/2020 Page: 2 of 7
Steve Weil appeals the district court’s dismissal of his second amended
complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Weil alleged in his complaint that six state court judges, along with other state
actors, violated his due process and equal protection rights and committed civil theft,
obstruction of justice, and conspiracy related to the adjudication of a state court
breach of contract action against him. Weil moved to proceed in forma pauperis,
but the district judge dismissed Weil’s complaint without prejudice for failure to
state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically, the district judge found that
Weil’s complaint was a shotgun pleading, “contain[ing] multiple counts [where]
each count adopt[ed] the allegations of all preceding counts.”
Weil moved for reconsideration and attached his amended complaint. The
district judge, without explanation, denied the motion. Weil moved to disqualify the
district judge, withdrew his first amended complaint, and filed a second amended
complaint listing the district judge as a defendant. The district judge recused
himself. A successor district judge found that Weil’s second amended complaint
suffered the same flaws and dismissed the complaint. Weil moved to set aside the
order, and to disqualify the successor district judge. The successor district judge
recused herself. The second successor district judge refused to set aside the
dismissal. Weil appealed.
2 Case: 19-14185 Date Filed: 05/27/2020 Page: 3 of 7
DISCUSSION
Weil argues that the district court erred in dismissing his second amended
complaint for failure to state a claim. In particular, he argues that his complaint was
not a shotgun pleading because “there are [twenty] defendants named in the
complaint, [and it] is impossible to adequately put those [defendants] on notice that
there’s a claim upon which . . . relief [can be granted] without being somewhat
complicated.”
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for
failure to state a claim, accept the allegations in the complaint as true, and apply the
same standards that govern dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1253 (11th Cir. 2017). To
survive a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This “requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complainant must “plead[] factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.
3 Case: 19-14185 Date Filed: 05/27/2020 Page: 4 of 7
When we have a pro se complainant, as here, we give a “liberal construction
to which pro se pleadings are entitled.” Holsomback v. White, 133 F.3d 1382, 1386
(11th Cir. 1998). But this leeway is not limitless. We cannot serve as “de facto
counsel for a party, or . . . rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain
an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014)
(citation omitted).
Shotgun pleadings do not adhere to these basic requirements. Estate of Bass
v. Regions Bank, Inc., 947 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir. 2020); see also Anderson v.
Dist. Bd. of Trs. Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366–67 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting
that a shotgun pleading does not satisfy the pleading requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure). They “fail . . . to give the defendants adequate notice of
the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland v.
Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015). In Weiland,
we identified four categories of shotgun pleadings. Id. at 1321. A complaint is a
shotgun pleading if it: (1) “contain[s] multiple counts where each count adopts the
allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that
came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint”; (2) “is
. . . replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to
any particular cause of action”; (3) does not “separat[e] into a different count each
cause of action or claim for relief”; or (4) “assert[s] multiple claims against multiple
4 Case: 19-14185 Date Filed: 05/27/2020 Page: 5 of 7
defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which
acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.” Id. at
1321–23.
We conclude, as the district court did, that Weil’s complaint failed to state a
claim because it was a shotgun pleading. Weil’s complaint, boiled down, is an
across-the-board allegation that every defendant conspired against him in allowing
his state-court adversary to submit a sham pleading. In his complaint, after he
discussed general allegations against the defendants, Weil divided his complaint into
sections addressing specific allegations against each defendant. But the first
paragraph of each section “adopt[ed] and realleg[ed]” every antecedent allegation in
the complaint. “By the time a reader of the pleading gets to the final [section], it is
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to know which allegations pertain to that
[section] (according to its label), to separate the wheat from the chaff.” See Keith v.
DeKalb Cty., 749 F.3d 1034, 1045 n.39 (11th Cir. 2014). Weil’s complaint failed
to notify each defendant of the specific claims against him or her and the grounds
upon which each claim rests. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323.
Weil’s argument––that, given the number of defendants, it was impossible for
his complaint to put them all on notice––is meritless. It is Weil’s responsibility to
“plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
[each] defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678;
5 Case: 19-14185 Date Filed: 05/27/2020 Page: 6 of 7
see also Anderson, 77 F.3d at 367 (“Experience teaches that, unless cases are pled
clearly and precisely, issues are not joined, discovery is not controlled, the trial
court’s docket becomes unmanageable, the litigants suffer, and society loses
confidence in the court’s ability to administer justice.”). Although the district court
was required to liberally construe Weil’s pro se complaint, it was not required to
rewrite Weil’s complaint to allege a proper claim for relief. See Campbell, 760 F.3d
at 1168–69. The district court explicitly told Weil the problem with his complaint
and gave him an opportunity to amend it to fix the problem, but, instead, he did the
same thing––alleging a shotgun pleading––in his second amended complaint. See
Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018) (“In the special
circumstance of non-merits dismissals on shotgun pleading grounds, we have
required district courts to sua sponte allow a litigant one chance to remedy such
deficiencies. . . . In these cases, even if the parties do not request it, the district court
should strike the complaint and instruct [the plaintiff] to replead the case . . . . This
initial repleading order comes with an implicit notion that if the plaintiff fails to
comply with the court’s order—by filing a repleader with the same deficiency—the
court should strike his pleading or . . . dismiss his case . . . .” (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted)). For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s
dismissal of Weil’s complaint.
6 Case: 19-14185 Date Filed: 05/27/2020 Page: 7 of 7
AFFIRMED.1
1 Weil moved to disqualify a member of this court who is not involved in the disposition of this appeal. We deny the motion as moot. 7