Steve Garrison v. U.S. Judicial Commission, et al.

Opinion

STEVE GARRISON, Case No. 25-cv-00866-EKL

Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING CASE v. WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND

U.S. JUDICIAL COMMISSION, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 1, 2 Defendants.

Self-represented Plaintiff Steve Garrison filed this action and an application to proceed in forma pauperis. See ECF No. 1 (“Complaint”), No. 2 (“IFP Application”). Having considered Plaintiff’s IFP application, the application is GRANTED. In this Order, the Court screens the complaint and finds that it must be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Garrison claims that three cases he previously filed in the Northern District of California “were dismissed [without] a summons” and “in violation of FRCP 4.” Compl. at 3-4. Garrison contends that issuance and service of a summons was mandatory in his prior cases, id. at 4, and that only a grand jury can dismiss a case, id. at 7. Garrison seeks $2.5 billion in damages, ECF No. 1-1, and an injunction ordering service of the summons in the prior cases, see Compl. at 7. Garrison identifies three prior cases that, in his view, were improperly dismissed. The first case, Garrison v. Brown, No. 11-cv-1901 (N.D. Cal.), was dismissed on January 8, 2013. On January 27, 2014, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal, holding that the district court “properly dismissed Garrison’s action because Garrison failed to allege sufficient facts in his Second Amended Complaint showing that defendants violated his constitutional rights.” Mem. at Garrison v. Davila, No. 13-cv-5862 (N.D. Cal.), was initially dismissed because Garrison asserted claims against defendants who were immune from liability. Order of Dismissal at 1, ECF No. 26. The case was finally dismissed on November 5, 2014, for failure to prosecute after Garrison failed to amend his complaint. Id. at 4. The third case, Garrison v. Trump, No. 17-cv-5104 (N.D. Cal.), was dismissed on December 15, 2017, after Garrison became non-responsive and failed to update his address as required by Civil Local Rule 3-11. Order of Dismissal, ECF No. 8. In his complaint, Garrison asserts claims under the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and 22 U.S.C. § 7102.1 These claims are brought against the “U.S. Judicial Commission,” District Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, and District Judge James Donato. The “U.S. Judicial Commission” is not a real entity, and the complaint includes only one conclusory allegation that the Commission is “responsible” for his cases being dismissed. Compl. at 4. Judge Gonzalez Rogers presided over Garrison’s Davila and Trump cases. The complaint lacks allegations against Judge Donato, who did not preside over any case referenced in the complaint.2 Section 1915(e)(2) requires the Court to screen complaints filed by persons proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Here, the Court finds that the complaint must be dismissed for three reasons: for failure to state a claim, because Garrison’s claims are untimely, and because his claims are barred by judicial immunity.

1 Garrison does not specify which title of the 1964 Civil Rights Act he is invoking, and the Court cannot identify any title that may be relevant to Garrison’s allegations. Separately, the statutory provision that Garrison cites, 22 U.S.C. § 7102, does not provide a private right of action. Rather, it defines certain terms that are used in other statutes. Because Garrison references “human trafficking” in the complaint, see Compl. at 5, the Court infers that Garrison seeks to bring a claim under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (“TVPA”). First, the complaint does not allege any facts that plausibly state a claim under the 1964 Civil Rights Act, RICO, or the TVPA. Garrison does not allege any form of discrimination that could give rise to a claim under any title of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Garrison does not allege an enterprise as required for his RICO claim. See Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009) (stating requirements for a RICO enterprise); Doan v. Singh, 617 F. App’x 684, 686 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal where plaintiff failed to allege “how Defendants associated together for a common purpose”). Finally, Garrison does not allege that he is a victim of human trafficking as required for his TVPA claim. See 18 U.S.C. 1595(a) (providing a civil remedy for victims of trafficking). Second, with one possible exception, Garrison’s claims are untimely. See Rivera v. Peri & Sons Farms, Inc., 735 F.3d 892, 902 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that dismissal is appropriate when the expiration of the limitations period is “apparent on the face of the complaint”). TVPA claims must be brought within “10 years after the cause of action arose,” 18 U.S.C. 1595(c)(1), which is the longest limitations period of the claims Garrison asserts here.3 The complaint was filed on January 27, 2025, which is more than ten years after the Davila and Brown cases were dismissed.4 Therefore, all Garrison’s claims arising from dismissal of the Davila and Brown cases are time- barred. The Trump case was dismissed more than seven years before this action was filed, thus Garrison’s RICO and TVPA claims arising from dismissal of that case are time-barred. Third, because Garrison seeks monetary damages and retrospective injunctive relief, his claims are barred by judicial immunity. Lund v. Cowan, 5 F.4th 964, 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 900 (2022); see also Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (“Judges and those performing judge-like functions are absolutely immune from 3 “The statute of limitations for civil RICO actions is four years.” Pincay v. Andrews, 238 F.3d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 2001). The statutes of limitations for claims under the 1964 Civil Rights Act vary, but no relevant limitations period exceeds four years. 4 The Court may take judicial notice of facts that are apparent from the dockets in the prior cases – including dismissal dates – because those cases give rise to the claims here. See United States v. Aguilar, 782 F.3d 1101, 1103 n.1 (9th Cir. 2015) (Courts “may take notice of proceedings in other damage liability for acts performed in their official capacities.”). Judicial immunity applies to judicial acts, and the dismissal of a case is a quintessential judicial act entitled to immunity. See Lund, 5 F.4th at 971 (discussing factors used to determine whether an act is judicial). Additionally, judicial immunity bars Garrison’s claims against the “U.S. Judicial Commission” because Garrison seeks to hold this entity vicariously liable for judicial acts of immune Defendants. Id. at 973 (rejecting proposed claims against another entity because those claims “stem from the conduct” of a judge “who enjoys judicial immunity”). For the foregoing reasons, Garrison’s complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Court concludes that the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. In making this determination, the Court considers factors such as “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the [Plaintiff], repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, and futility of amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The Court also considers “the number of times the plaintiff has already been allowed to amend.” Schwartz v. Miller, 153 F.4th 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2025). Here, the Court finds that dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate because amendment would be futile, as Garrison’s claims are legally deficient. Kroessler v. CVS Health Corp., 977 F.3d 803, 815 (9th Cir. 2020) (“If no amendment would allow the complaint to withstand dismissal as a matter of law, courts consider amendment futile.”); Lamoon, Inc. v. Lamour Nail Prods., Inc., 373 F. App’x 795, 797 (9th Cir. 2010) (When a plaintiff’s “claims have underlying legal deficiencies that cannot be cured, amendment would be futile.”). First, amendment would be futile to the extent that Garrison’s claims are time-barred, and no additional facts could render the claims timely. Hoang v. Bank of Am., N.A., 910 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 2018) (Leave to amend need not be granted “when the claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.”). Second, amendment would be futile because Defendants are absolutely immune 1 30, 2025) (affirming dismissal of claims “on the basis of judicial immunity” without leave to 2 amend); Ezor v. Duffy-Lewis, 857 F. App’x 412, 413 (9th Cir. 2021) (same); Keliihuluhulu v. 3 Strance, 692 F. App’x 406, 407 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal without leave to amend of 4 claims “barred by judicial immunity because amendment would have been futile”); Middleton v. 5 Martingale Investments, LLC, 621 F. App’x 396, 396-97 (9th Cir. 2015) (same). Under these 6 circumstances, dismissal without granting leave to amend is warranted. 7 IV. CONCLUSION 8 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES Garrison’s complaint with prejudice. 9 The Clerk is directed to close this case. The Clerk is also directed to unseal the record in this 10 ] case.° a 12 Dated: December 22, 2025

Eumi K. Lee IS United States District Judge 16

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Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 \Is The docket in this case was sealed when the complaint was filed because Garrison indicated that 2g || his complaint raised a claim under the False Claims Act, ECF No. 1-1, which is incorrect. Therefore, sealing is not necessary.