Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed November 5, 2025.
________________
No. 3D23-880 Lower Tribunal No. 04-11813 ________________
Steve Ferguson, Appellant,
vs.
The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, et al., Appellees.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Reemberto Diaz, Judge.
León Cosgrove Jiménez LLP, and Scott B. Cosgrove and William A. O'Leary; The Law Office of Stephen James Binhak, P.L.L.C., and Stephen J. Binhak; Ropes & Gray LLP, and Douglas Hallward-Driemeier and Isaac C.H. Sommers (Washington, DC) and Philip P. Ehrlich (Chicago, IL), for appellant.
White & Case LLP, and Raoul G. Cantero and James N. Robinson and Ryan A. Ulloa and Wyatt R. Smith (New York, NY), for appellees.
Before LOGUE, GORDO and LOBREE, JJ. ON MOTION FOR REHEARING, REHEARING EN BANC, AND CERTIFICATION
LOBREE, J.
We deny Appellant’s motion for rehearing, rehearing en banc, and
certification but withdraw our previous opinion and substitute the following
opinion in its stead.
Following nineteen years of litigation, with six related interlocutory
proceedings and a month-long trial, Steve Ferguson (“Ferguson”) appeals
from a final judgment rendered upon a jury verdict finding that he committed
civil fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, and violated Florida’s Civil Remedies
for Criminal Practices Act, sections 772.103(3) and (4), Florida Statutes
(portions of “Florida’s Civil RICO Act”). Upon our thorough review of the
voluminous record evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the jury
verdict, we affirm on all grounds. See Alvarez v. All Star Boxing, Inc., 258
So. 3d 508, 512 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“We review the jury’s award . . . to see
if it is supported by substantial competent evidence viewing the facts and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict.”). We write
simply to address Ferguson’s argument that no domestic injury to the
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, et al. (the “Republic”) occurred.1
1 While the concurrence asserts that this is a case of first impression as to whether Florida’s Civil RICO Act may be applied extra-territorially, this is not
2 Florida’s Civil RICO Act is patterned after its federal counterpart, so
Florida courts look to federal cases for guidance. See Palmas Y Bambu, S.A.
v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 881 So. 2d 565, 570 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA
2004). Federal civil RICO claims require a “domestic injury.” See
Yegiazaryan v. Smagin, 599 U.S. 533, 543–44 (2023) (“[D]etermining
whether a plaintiff has alleged a domestic injury [for purposes of RICO] is a
context-specific inquiry that turns largely on the particular facts alleged in a
complaint.” (quoting Smagin v. Yegiazaryan, 37 F.4th 562, 570 (9th Cir.
2022))). “Specifically, courts should look to the circumstances surrounding
the alleged injury to assess whether it arose in the United States. . . . [T]hat
means looking to the nature of the alleged injury, the racketeering activity
that directly caused it, and the injurious aims and effects of that activity.” Id.
Here, domestic injury was shown where many parts of the conspiracy
and racketeering activity occurred in Florida. Most importantly, the payment
how Ferguson presented the issue to the trial court. Instead, Ferguson contended that the Republic failed to prove it suffered a domestic injury. Because the specific issue was not raised below, we decline to address whether Florida’s Civil RICO Act may be applied extra-territorially. See Sunset Harbour Condo. Ass’n v. Robbins, 914 So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. 2005) (“In order to be preserved for further review by a higher court, an issue must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal or review must be part of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved.” (emphasis added) (quoting Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1985))).
3 of the overinflated bids and bribes to co-conspirators Raul Guiterrez and
Brian Kuei Tung, and the destruction of evidence. Ferguson hatched the
conspiracy in Miami, and executed parts of the conspiracy in Miami, where
he met with conspirators to ensure selection of the project consultant,
concealed transfers through an agreement that he fabricated, reviewed
documents relating to conspirators’ illicit payments, and transferred over $1
million to Miami accounts held by Gutierrez. Among other things, the
evidence showed that Ferguson’s co-conspirators lived in and orchestrated
the scheme from Florida, where fake invoices and backdated contracts were
created and a hard drive containing incriminating evidence was destroyed.
Florida-based companies pushed through overpriced bids and funneled
kickbacks to Miami-based accounts, and co-conspirator Gutierrez funneled
millions of dollars from accounts in Miami to Ferguson’s shell accounts at a
Bahamian bank and paid another co-conspirator using checks from a
business located in Miami. Thus, we hold that a domestic injury occurred in
Florida where, over multiple years, wrongful acts and plans were devised,
initiated, and carried out through acts and communications initiated in and
directed towards Florida. See Yegiazaryan, 599 U.S. at 545–46.
Affirmed.
GORDO, J., concurs.
4 Ferguson v. Republic of Trinidad and Tobago Case No. 3D23-0880
LOGUE, J., concurring
Florida’s Civil Remedies for Criminal Practices Act (“Florida Civil
RICO”), section 772.104, Florida Statutes, contains no language limiting its
extraterritoriality. Nor does it contain language requiring proof of a “domestic
injury.” As framed in his initial brief, however, Ferguson argues that “Florida
Civil RICO, which is patterned after federal RICO, . . . incorporates the same
presumption against extraterritoriality” as its federal counterpart and
therefore requires proof of a “domestic injury.” This is the necessary premise
to his further argument that Trinidad and Tobago failed to prove a domestic
injury.
In making this argument, Ferguson relies on RJR Nabisco, Inc. v.
European Community, 579 U.S. 325 (2016). In RJR Nabisco, Justice Samuel
Alito, writing for the majority, found that the federal counterpart to Florida Civil
RICO had no extraterritorial application and therefore required proof of a
domestic injury. Id. at 346. In doing so, he set forth “a two-step framework for
analyzing extraterritoriality issues.” Id. at 337. “At the first step,” he held, “we
ask whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted—
that is, whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies
5 extraterritorially.” Id. “If the statute is not extraterritorial,” he wrote, “then at
the second step we determine whether the case involves a domestic
application of the statute,” i.e. a “domestic injury.” Id.
Whether this same analysis applies to Florida Civil RICO is a case of
first impression for a district court in Florida. Accordingly, while I concur with
my colleagues that the judgment should be affirmed, I believe a discussion
of the “two-step framework for analyzing extraterritoriality issues” is
warranted.
BACKGROUND
Steve Ferguson appeals a final judgment after a jury trial in the amount
of $131,318,840.47. The jury found that Ferguson and his co-defendants
engaged in a decades-long scheme to fraudulently overcharge the Republic
of Trinidad and Tobago for contracts to build a new airport.
Because this appeal comes to us after a jury trial, the facts are viewed
in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. In 1996, Trinidad and Tobago
decided to build a new airport in Port of Spain—the Piarco International
Airport. The project was funded by Trinidad and Tobago and was supervised
by its entities.
Appellant Ferguson is a citizen and resident of Trinidad and Tobago.
Among other things, he heads a group of companies known as the Maritime
6 Group. From 1996 to 2001, while the airport was being built, he served as
Chairman of Trinidad and Tobago’s National Gas Company, which provided
Trinidad and Tobago most of its revenues. In Miami, Ferguson recruited Birk
Hillman Consulting, a Florida corporation, to apply to become the lead
consultant on the airport project. Ferguson then used his political and
economic influence to assist Birk Hillman in being awarded the contract.
Having steered Birk Hillman to the consulting contract, Ferguson
warned Birk Hillman that it could “still lose the deal” and demanded a
kickback of $1 million. During the course of the arrangement, Birk Hillman or
its principals paid Ferguson over $1.1 million. At Ferguson’s direction, Birk
Hillman or its principals took pains to conceal the payments by transferring
the moneys through front firms owned by them to front firms owned by
Ferguson.
Regarding a contract to build certain interiors at the airport, a
consultant of Trinidad and Tobago estimated the cost to be $20 million. The
conspirators arranged to have Northern Construction Corporation, based in
Miami, submit an inflated bid for $29 million. Ferguson directed Birk Hillman
to recommend the inflated bid despite the price differential. On Birk Hillman’s
advice, the bid was accepted.
7 After receiving the contract, Northern then paid $2 million to a
Bahamian shell company controlled by Ferguson. Ferguson transferred
$335,000 of that money “for no apparent legitimate reason” to one of Trinidad
and Tobago’s officials who voted to award the contract to Northern. Ferguson
also used that money to buy two residential properties for that official in
Miami. That official, Brian Kuei Tung, was one of Ferguson’s co-defendants
in this case.
Regarding a contract to obtain and build systems like baggage
handling and jet bridges, a consultant of Trinidad and Tobago estimated the
cost to be $15 million. The conspirators arranged to have Calmaquip
Engineering Corporation, a Florida corporation, submit an inflated bid for $30
million. To make this bid appear reasonable, they had a Florida subsidiary of
Soares da Costa SDC, a Portuguese company, present a larger bid of $35
million. The Florida subsidiary used faux corporate stamps to make it appear
the Portuguese company was making the bid rather than its Florida
subsidiary. The Florida subsidiary that submitted the faux bid was thirty
percent owned by Calmaquip, shared space with Calmaquip in Miami, and
had as a director the principal of Calmaquip. Ferguson provided the required
bond for this faux bid. Although Hillman-Waller, a principal of Birk Hillman,
later testified “there was no justification for a price that high for either bid,”
8 the consulting firm recommended Trinidad and Tobago accept Calmaquip’s
$30 million bid for what was in essence $15 million worth of work.
After receiving the contract, the principal of Calmaquip transferred
millions of dollars to various shell accounts owned by Ferguson in the
Bahamas. The principal of Calmaquip, Raul Gutierrez, was a co-defendant
in this case. He pled guilty to federal charges of criminal conspiracy for his
part in this arrangement and was sentenced to six years in prison. At trial in
the instant civil case, he testified at length and admitted that his involvement
in this bid-rigging was “probably the biggest mistake in my life.”
Regarding another contract concerning maintenance, the jury
ultimately found Trinidad and Tobago overpaid by $8.7 million due to similar
fraudulent collusion. During construction, moreover, the companies with
contracts sometimes paid subcontractors inflated prices in return for
kickbacks shared with the other conspirators.
Over time, payments made to Ferguson exceeded $12 million which
Ferguson then funneled in part to various government officials and members
of the conspiracy. When United States law enforcement began investigating
this matter, the parties began creating fake invoices and back-dated
contracts to explain the payments. Ferguson directed various individuals to
destroy evidence.
9 During the time at issue, the principals met routinely in Miami to
coordinate their efforts. Many of the actions taken to effectuate the
conspiracy occurred in Miami. And many of the payments to advance the
conspiracy were wired from Miami or to Miami, and sometimes from accounts
in Florida to other accounts in Florida. Members of the conspiracy, including
one of Ferguson’s co-defendants, were charged in federal court in Florida
with, and pled guilty to, violating federal laws against fraud.
To pay for part of the project, Trinidad and Tobago obtained a loan in
the form of a letter of credit from a bank in Miami. The letter of credit was an
asset of Trinidad and Tobago located in Miami and depleted in part by the
conspiracy in which Ferguson played a central role.
In 2004, Trinidad and Tobago filed the lawsuit at issue. The operative
fifth amended complaint named over 40 defendants. As the case proceeded,
all but three settled or were dismissed. The case ultimately went to trial
against Ferguson and two co-defendants. The four causes of action against
Ferguson were: (1) pattern of criminal activity to obtain proceeds in violation
of section 772.103(3), Florida Statutes; (2) conspiracy to obtain proceeds
through criminal activity in violation of section 772.103(4), Florida Statutes;
(3) common law fraud; and (4) conspiracy to commit fraud.
10 The case was tried before a jury for a month. During the trial, Ferguson
preserved the issue on appeal that I discuss below by moving for a directed
verdict, which was denied. The jury ultimately entered a verdict finding
Ferguson and his co-defendants liable on all four causes of action. The jury
assessed damages in the amount of $32,385,988, for which Ferguson and
his two co-defendants were jointly and severally liable. As section 772.104(1)
provides for treble damages, the trial court entered a judgment awarding
Trinidad and Tobago $97,157,964, plus an additional $38,792,567.72 in
prejudgment interest. The trial court offset that amount by $4,631,691.25
from paid settlements and restitution provided to Trinidad and Tobago.
Accordingly, the total judgment was entered for $131,318,840.47. This
appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Ferguson raises multiple points. While the panel affirms on
all grounds, I write only to address his claim, as he framed it in his initial brief,
that “Florida Civil RICO, which is patterned after federal RICO, . . .
incorporates the same presumption against extraterritoriality” as its federal
counterpart and therefore requires proof of a “domestic injury.”
11 A. Florida Civil RICO
Florida Civil RICO authorizes a civil cause of action with threefold
damages for any person injured by a violation of its substantive prohibitions.
§ 772.104(1), Fla. Stat. Florida Civil RICO’s substantive provisions provide it
is unlawful for any person to use the proceeds “from a pattern of criminal
activity.” §§ 772.103(1), (4), Fla. Stat. A “[p]attern of criminal activity” is
defined as “engaging in at least two incidents of criminal activity that have
the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of
commission . . . and are not isolated incidents . . . .” § 772.102(4), Fla. Stat.
Florida Civil RICO is modeled after the federal Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (“federal RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964.
Florida, however, separated its version of the federal RICO into two parts
located in different chapters of the Florida Statutes. The part at issue here
provides damages in actions brought by private parties and has been named
by the Legislature as Florida’s “Civil Remedies for Criminal Practices Act.”
§§ 772.101-.19, Fla. Stat. For convenience, this act is referred to as “Florida
Civil RICO.” The other part provides criminal penalties, forfeitures, and civil
remedies in proceedings commenced, for the most part, by investigative
agencies and has been named by the Legislature as “Florida RICO
12 (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) Act.” §§ 895.01-.06, Fla.
Stat. The name “RICO,” however, is often applied to both laws in the caselaw.
Thus, the “Florida RICO statute requires the same elements as a
federal RICO claim, but ‘violation of the Florida RICO statute requires
allegations of predicate acts that violated Florida law, rather than Federal
law.’” Drummond v. Zimmerman, 454 F. Supp. 3d 1210, 1217 n.1 (S.D. Fla.
2020) (quoting Asbury v. Slider, No. 8:19-cv-874-T-36SPF, 2020 WL 871097,
at *3 n.1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2020)). “The elements of a RICO offense under
the Florida RICO Act have been described as (1) the existence of an
enterprise, which the defendant was employed by or associated with in
committing the crimes, (2) a pattern of racketeering activity, and (3) at least
two ‘incidents’ of racketeering or racketeering conduct that have the same or
similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission, or
that are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not
isolated incidents.” Shimek v. State, 610 So. 2d 632, 634–35 (Fla. 1st DCA
1992) (footnote omitted). Without belaboring the point, I believe the evidence
before the jury, interpreted in the light most favorable to its verdict, contains
sufficient competent substantial evidence to support a finding that these
three elements were established.
13 B. Extraterritoriality
Because the Florida laws are modeled after federal law, court
interpretations of one often shed light on understanding the others. Mese v.
State, 824 So. 2d 908, 912 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (“[T]he Florida RICO statute
is patterned after the federal RICO statute, [and] Florida courts look to federal
courts for guidance in construing RICO provisions.”); Moorehead v. State,
383 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. 1980) (“The Florida legislature incorporated the
federal case law by explicitly defining ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ to
include interrelated incidents that are not isolated.”). As Ferguson points out,
Florida’s reliance on federal interpretations of the federal RICO statute raises
another point. Under federal RICO, claims for damages brought by private
parties are barred if those claims “rest entirely on injury suffered abroad.”
RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S. at 354.
In RJR Nabisco, the Supreme Court dismissed a claim filed by the
European Union for triple damages under federal RICO. The European
Union alleged RJR Nabisco allowed its tobacco products to be used as a
method of payment for illegal drugs trafficked into Europe. RJR Nabisco
responded by arguing that the federal RICO statute providing for civil
damages did not apply extraterritorially to its conduct at issue which occurred
outside the territory of the United States. Its argument was based on the
14 canon of statutory construction that “[a]bsent clearly expressed
congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be construed to have
only domestic application.” Id. at 335.
The Court assumed, without deciding, that the European Union’s
allegations of the involvement by American companies and the use by the
alleged conspirators of “the U.S. mails and wires,” among other things,
sufficiently alleged ties to American commerce to bring the extraterritorial
racketeering activity of the conspiracy within the reach of U.S. criminal laws
at issue without offending the presumption against extraterritoriality. Id. at
345. The U.S. criminal laws at issue served as the required predicate
offenses necessary for application of RICO’s civil remedy including the
substantive criminal prohibitions contained in RICO itself. Id.
Regarding the federal RICO’s civil remedy for damages, however, the
Court conducted a different analysis. Writing for the majority, Justice Alito
found that the federal counterpart to Florida Civil RICO had no extraterritorial
application and therefore required proof of a domestic injury. Id. at 346. In
doing so, he set forth “a two-step framework for analyzing extraterritoriality
issues.” Id. at 337. “At the first step,” he held, “we ask whether the
presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted—that is, whether
the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially.”
15 Id. “If the statute is not extraterritorial,” he wrote, “then at the second step we
determine whether the case involves a domestic application of the statute.”
Id.
The Court went on to hold the presumption against extraterritoriality
required the conclusion that the federal RICO’s civil remedy had no
extraterritorial reach. Therefore, federal RICO’s civil remedy was not
available for damage claims that “rest entirely on injury suffered abroad.” Id.
at 354. Because federal civil RICO had no extraterritoriality reach, to obtain
the civil remedy of damages, a private plaintiff must “allege and prove a
domestic injury.” Id. at 346.
Having determined that the federal civil RICO is not extraterritorial, the
Court then proceeded to “the second step,” namely whether “the case
involves a domestic application of the statute.” In RJR Nabisco, the plaintiffs
had waived any claim of a domestic injury. Therefore, the Court held that the
claim against RJR Nabisco was properly dismissed. Id. at 354. Ferguson
argues that this analysis applies to Florida Civil RICO.
Like Congress, Florida’s sovereign powers allow it to legislate
extraterritorially, provided its action is not preempted by federal law and does
not run afoul of federal Constitutional limitations: “If the United States may
control the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas, we see no reason why
16 the State of Florida may not likewise govern the conduct of its citizens upon
the high seas with respect to matters in which the State has a legitimate
interest and where there is no conflict with acts of Congress.” Skiriotes v.
Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77 (1941) (recognizing Florida’s legislative authority to
limit the use of diving equipment “for the purpose of taking commercial
sponges from the Gulf of Mexico, or the Straits of Florida” outside Florida
waters). See S.E. Fisheries Ass’n v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 453 So. 2d 1351,
1354 (Fla. 1984) (“At the outset we recognize that the state can regulate and
control the operation of vessels and the acts of its citizens in waters outside
Florida’s territorial limits, provided, however, that the federal government has
not preempted state regulation.”). Indeed, the Florida Legislature continues
to legislate extraterritorially in some instances.1
1 See, e.g., § 379.365(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2025) (“A person may not use an expired tag or a stone crab trap tag not issued by the [Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission] or possess or use a stone crab trap in or on state waters or adjacent federal waters without having a trap tag required by the commission firmly attached thereto.”); § 379.3671(2)(c)1., Fla. Stat. (2025) (“A person may not possess or use a spiny lobster trap in or on state waters or adjacent federal waters without having affixed thereto the trap tag required by this section.”); § 847.0135(7), Fla. Stat. (2025) (“A person is subject to prosecution in this state pursuant to chapter 910 [of the Florida Statutes] for any conduct proscribed by this section which the person engages in, while either within or outside this state, if by such conduct the person commits a 17 Like the United States, however, Florida has a presumption against
extraterritoriality. See, e.g., Young v. Norwegian Seafarers' Union, 138 So.
3d 1189, 1192 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (citing to federal decisions based on the
presumption against extraterritoriality and holding, “we similarly decline to
extend Florida statutory or common law to reach such disputes, absent an
express statement by the Legislature otherwise”); Burns v. Rozen, 201 So.
2d 629, 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967) (“Extraterritorial effect of an enactment is
not to be found by implication.”).
Like the federal civil RICO statute, the Florida Civil RICO statute has
no express indication that it is intended to apply extraterritorially. Following
the reasoning of the Supreme Court and applying Florida’s own presumption
against extraterritoriality, the Florida Civil RICO statute does not extend
extraterritorially. Because it does not extend extraterritorially, we recognize
that the Florida Civil RICO statute, like its federal counterpart, does not apply
to claims that rest entirely on injury suffered abroad. Therefore, a plaintiff
seeking damages under Florida Civil RICO must show a “domestic injury.”
violation of this section involving a child, a child’s guardian, or another person believed by the person to be a child or a child’s guardian.”).
18 C. Proof of Domestic Injury
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court in RJR Nabisco did not
examine the nature of the required domestic injury because that issue was
waived. The Court, however, did address the nature of the required domestic
injury in Yegiazaryan v. Smagin, 599 U.S. 533 (2023). Smagin was a resident
of Russia. He obtained a multi-million dollar judgment in California against
Yegiazaryan who lived in California. Smagin ultimately sued Yegiazaryan
under federal RICO for alleged racketeering activities occurring in part in the
United States but mainly occurring abroad to hide assets to prevent Smagin’s
ability to collect the California judgment. Yegiazaryan argued that Smagin
failed to allege a domestic injury because the purely economic injury to
Smagin occurred where he lived – in Russia.
The Court rejected such “a bright-line rule . . . that locates a plaintiff’s
injury at the plaintiff’s residence.” Id. at 543. Instead, the Court held that the
analysis to determine if a plaintiff has alleged a domestic injury under RICO
“means looking to the nature of the alleged injury, the racketeering activity
that directly caused it, and the injurious aims and effects of that activity.”
Id. at 544 (footnote omitted). The Court ultimately determined that Smagin
had alleged a domestic injury given “Smagin’s interests in his California
judgment against Yegiazaryan, a California resident, were directly injured by
19 racketeering activity either taken in California or directed from California, with
the aim and effect of subverting Smagin’s rights to execute on that judgment
in California.” Id. at 546. Because interpretations of federal RICO guide this
Court’s interpretation of Florida’s RICO statutes, this federal analysis also
applies to the Florida statutes.
Turning from this law to the instant case, one of the first, major acts to
advance the conspiracy occurred in Miami—Ferguson’s meeting with and
recruiting of Birk Hillman, a Florida corporation, to apply to be Trinidad and
Tobago’s lead consultant on the airport construction. The conspiracy was
advanced by meetings among the key conspirators in Florida occurring
regularly throughout the conspiracy. Key evidence was located and
destroyed in Florida. Some payments to advance the conspiracy occurred
entirely in Florida and funds to advance the conspiracy flowed into and out
of Florida. The conspiracy involved United States citizens and United States
firms. Finally, to pay for part of the project, Trinidad and Tobago obtained a
loan in the form of a letter of credit from a bank in Miami. The letter of credit
was an asset of Trinidad and Tobago located in Miami and depleted in part
by the conspiracy. These circumstances establish that the injury at issue did
not “rest entirely on injury suffered abroad.” RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S. at 354.
20 Florida is a world destination for finance, business, and construction.
In interpreting Florida’s presumption against extraterritoriality, the sovereign
state of Florida has a clear interest in preventing, punishing, and providing a
remedy for those damaged in part in Florida and in part abroad, as occurred
here, by this type of criminal enterprise operating out of Florida. Here,
Trinidad and Tobago sufficiently established a domestic injury under Florida
Civil RICO.