24CA1915 Stetson v Poudre Valley 07-24-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1915 Larimer County District Court No. 24CV30421 Honorable Laurie K. Dean, Judge
Jacqleen Stetson,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Poudre Valley Health Care, Inc. D/B/A Poudre Valley Health System and D/B/A UCHealth Mountain Crest Behavioral Health; and Ashley Barnhart, RN,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Tow and Yun, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 24, 2025
Law Offices of J.M. Reinan, P.C., Jerome M. Reinan, Jordana Griff Gingrass, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Caplan and Earnest, L.L.C., W. Stuart Stuller, Laura M. Wassmuth, Travis J. Miller, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee Poudre Valley Health Care, Inc.
Childs McCune, LLC, Steven A. Michalek, Corinne C. Miller, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee Ashley Barnhart, RN ¶1 Plaintiff, Jacqleen Stetson, appeals the district court’s order
granting the special motion to dismiss jointly filed by defendants,
Ashley Barnhart, RN, and Poudre Valley Health Care, Inc., d/b/a
Poudre Valley Health System and d/b/a UCHealth Mountain Crest
Behavioral Health (Mountain Crest), under Colorado’s anti-SLAPP
statute, section 13-20-1101, C.R.S. 2024. We affirm the court’s
order and remand the case with directions.
I. Background
¶2 We take the following facts from Stetson’s district court
complaint and her opposition to Barnhart and Mountain Crest’s
joint special motion to dismiss.
¶3 In July 2022, Stetson, a nurse practitioner, was admitted to
Mountain Crest on an involuntary short-term mental health
certification after suffering escalating mental health issues,
including extreme paranoia and psychosis with increased agitation.
During her second day of treatment at Mountain Crest, Stetson
broke off a pointed, four-inch piece of plastic from medical
equipment that had been left in her room and used it as a weapon.
Mountain Crest staff attempted to physically restrain Stetson, but
she managed to push past them and grabbed Barnhart, a nurse at
1 the facility. Stetson then placed her arm around Barnhart’s neck,
pulled her toward the exit, and demanded to be released from the
facility. Mountain Crest staff eventually separated Stetson from
Barnhart, removed the weapon from Stetson’s possession, and
placed her in a restraint chair.
¶4 After consulting with other staff members, Barnhart contacted
the police department to report the incident. While making her
report, Barnhart said she had felt she was in a “hostage situation,”
but she also explained that she didn’t believe that Stetson had
acted purposefully, attributing her behavior to her psychiatric
illness. According to Stetson, Barnhart reported the incident to law
enforcement based on her “personal belief” that Stetson should no
longer be allowed to practice as a nurse practitioner.
¶5 Two days later, Mountain Crest discharged Stetson after she
showed signs of improvement and was no longer actively psychotic.
But as she was leaving the facility, police officers arrested Stetson
for her attack on Barnhart. Stetson later came to believe that
Mountain Crest staff, including Barnhart, had “arranged” for police
officers to arrest Stetson by continuing to communicate with law
enforcement after the incident. Mountain Crest staff explained to
2 the arresting officers that they hadn’t informed Stetson about her
imminent arrest because they were worried that it would upset her
and make her “unmanageable.”
¶6 Stetson was charged with multiple crimes arising out of her
attack on Barnhart. She ultimately pleaded guilty to a lesser
charge — third degree assault — in lieu of proceeding to trial.
¶7 Stetson later filed a civil complaint and jury demand against
Mountain Crest and Barnhart, alleging claims for extreme and
outrageous conduct, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy.1
Mountain Crest and Barnhart filed a joint special motion to dismiss
these claims under Colorado’s anti-SLAPP statute. After holding
oral argument, the district court granted Barnhart and Mountain
Crest’s special motion to dismiss in a detailed written order. As
relevant to this appeal, the court determined that (1) Stetson’s
claims arose from acts in furtherance of Barnhart’s and Mountain
1 Stetson also filed (1) an abuse of process claim against both
Barnhart and Mountain Crest, which she later withdrew; and (2) a negligence claim against Mountain Crest only. Mountain Crest answered the negligence claim, which is currently stayed pending resolution of this interlocutory appeal.
3 Crest’s protected rights to free speech and (2) Stetson hadn’t shown
a reasonable likelihood of success on her claims.
¶8 Stetson appeals the district court’s dismissal order under
section 13-20-1101(7).
II. Discussion
¶9 Stetson contends that the district court erred by determining
that (1) Barnhart’s initial call to the police constituted free speech
concerning an important public issue; (2) Barnhart’s and Mountain
Crest’s post-call conduct was related to Barnhart’s initial call and
therefore immunized from civil liability; and (3) Stetson hadn’t
shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on her claims. We
review each contention in turn.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 10 The anti-SLAPP statute’s purpose is to “encourage and
safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak
freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government to
the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, to
protect the rights of persons to file meritorious lawsuits for
demonstrable injury.” § 13-20-1101(1)(b).
4 ¶ 11 The statute balances these rights by providing a mechanism
for weeding out, at an early stage, nonmeritorious lawsuits brought
in response to a person’s petitioning or speech activities. Tender
Care Veterinary Ctr., Inc. v. Lind-Barnett, 2023 COA 114, ¶ 12 (cert.
granted in part Sept. 3, 2024). A party, typically a defendant, may
file a special motion to dismiss a cause of action “arising from any
act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or
free speech under the United States constitution or the state
constitution in connection with a public issue.” § 13-20-1101(3)(a);
see Salazar v. Pub. Tr. Inst., 2022 COA 109M, ¶¶ 15-18 (describing
a special motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute). But if
the plaintiff establishes a “reasonable likelihood” that they will
prevail on the claim, then the court must deny the special motion to
dismiss. § 13-20-1101(3)(a).
¶ 12 Given this statutory framework, the resolution of a special
motion to dismiss follows a two-step process. Tender Care
Veterinary Ctr., ¶ 13. First, the defendant bears the burden of
showing that the conduct underlying the plaintiff’s claims arises
from the defendant’s exercise of their right of petition or free
speech. Id. If the defendant fails to satisfy their step-one burden,
5 the court must deny the special motion to dismiss. Id. at ¶ 14. But
if the defendant satisfies this burden, the analysis proceeds to the
second step. Id. At the second step, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the
claim. Id. If the plaintiff fails to make such a showing, the court
must grant the special motion to dismiss.2 Id.
¶ 13 We review an order granting or denying a special motion to
dismiss de novo, applying the same two-part test as the district
court. Coomer v. Salem Media of Colo., Inc., 2025 COA 2, ¶ 16.
¶ 14 With these principles in mind, we turn to Stetson’s
contentions.
2 Divisions of this court have lacked consensus on whether to treat
the plaintiff’s proffered evidence as true at the second step. See Jogan Health, LLC v. Scripps Media, Inc., 2025 COA 4, ¶¶ 62-63 (Berger, J., specially concurring) (discussing the inconsistent holdings in Salazar v. Pub. Tr. Inst., 2022 COA 109M, ¶ 21, and L.S.S. v. S.A.P., 2022 COA 123, ¶ 23); Coomer v. Salem Media of Colorado, Inc., 2025 COA 2, ¶ 120 (Tow, J., specially concurring) (same). We need not resolve this question because, even giving Stetson the benefit of accepting her evidence as true, we conclude for the reasons below that she has failed to satisfy her step-two burden.
6 B. Analysis
1. Step One
¶ 15 Under step one, we first address Barnhart’s initial call to law
enforcement authorities before turning to Barnhart’s and Mountain
Crest’s post-call conduct.
a. Barnhart’s Initial Report to Law Enforcement
¶ 16 The anti-SLAPP statute protects, as relevant here, “[a]ny
written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative,
executive, or judicial proceeding or any other official proceeding
authorized by law.” § 13-20-1101(2)(a)(I). This provision
encompasses communications that are preparatory to or in
anticipation of commencing official proceedings, including
statements meant to prompt action by law enforcement agencies.
L.S.S. v. S.A.P., 2022 COA 123, ¶ 28. Barnhart’s initial call to law
enforcement was clearly intended to prompt action by the police,
rendering it protected speech.
¶ 17 We aren’t persuaded otherwise by Stetson’s argument that
Barnhart’s report to law enforcement was “fraudulent and
untruthful.” According to Stetson, Barnhart, a psychiatric nurse,
“knew” that Stetson was suffering from psychosis at the time and
7 was therefore “incapable” of distinguishing right from wrong. But a
plaintiff’s mere allegation that the defendant’s otherwise-protected
statement is false doesn’t prevent the defendant from satisfying step
one. Id. at ¶ 31. Were that the case, a plaintiff could evade the
purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute simply by alleging falsity. Id.
As a result, a defendant is precluded from using the anti-SLAPP
statute to dismiss a plaintiff’s action only when the defendant
concedes, or the evidence conclusively establishes, that the
assertedly protected speech or petition activity was illegal as a
matter of law. Id. at ¶ 30. When the plaintiff’s allegations of
making a false report are controverted, they are insufficient to
render the alleged conduct unlawful as a matter of law. Id.
¶ 18 In this case, Barnhart vigorously disputed Stetson’s
allegations that she knowingly submitted a false report to police.
And Stetson’s guilty plea to third degree assault confirms, at
minimum, that Barnhart’s report wasn’t “conclusively” fraudulent
or untruthful. Id.
¶ 19 Stetson additionally argues that Barnhart’s report fell outside
the anti-SLAPP statute’s protection because it violated (1) certain
federal and state privacy laws and (2) Colorado’s prohibition on
8 discriminating against persons who have received an evaluation or
treatment for a mental health disorder, section 27-65-117, C.R.S.
2024.
¶ 20 We reject the first of these contentions because whether
Barnhart unlawfully disclosed confidential or privileged information
is “irrelevant” at step one of the anti-SLAPP inquiry. Moreau v. U.S.
Olympic & Paralympic Comm., 641 F. Supp. 3d 1122, 1136 (D. Colo.
2022) (citing Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr.
2d 906, 918 (Ct. App. 2001)).
¶ 21 As to the second contention, Stetson asserts that Barnhart
violated section 27-65-117 by discriminating against her based on
her occupation as a nurse practitioner, alleging that Barnhart didn’t
make similar criminal complaints against previous patients who
also assaulted her. But section 27-65-117 doesn’t protect Stetson’s
position as a nurse practitioner. Rather, it prohibits only
discrimination against individuals who have received an evaluation
or treatment for a mental health disorder. Thus, even accepting
Stetson’s allegations as true, the anti-discrimination provision in
section 27-65-117 doesn’t support Stetson’s argument.
9 ¶ 22 Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Barnhart
satisfied step one as it pertains to her initial report to law
enforcement authorities.
b. Barnhart’s and Mountain Crest’s Post-Call Conduct
¶ 23 We reach the same conclusion with respect to Barnhart’s and
Mountain Crest’s post-call conduct. Stetson argues that Barnhart
and Mountain Crest staff continued to communicate with law
enforcement authorities after Barnhart’s initial call, thus facilitating
her eventual arrest after she was discharged. But the anti-SLAPP
statute protects “any act . . . in furtherance” of a person’s right of
petition or free speech. § 13-20-1101(3)(a) (emphasis added). Given
the statute’s expansive scope, we perceive no reason why these
post-call communications with law enforcement should receive any
less protection than Barnhart’s initial report. See Proactive Techs.,
Inc. v. Denver Place Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 141 P.3d 959, 961 (Colo.
App. 2006) (the adjective “any” generally means “all” and is a “term
of expansion without restriction or limitation”).
¶ 24 Stetson also argues that Barnhart and Mountain Crest
withheld information from her related to the ongoing criminal
investigation, going so far as to perpetuate the “ruse” that she
10 would be discharged home to her husband. In Stetson’s view,
Barnhart’s and Mountain Crest’s concealment of the truth was
wholly unrelated to the initial law enforcement report and therefore
unprotected.
¶ 25 Even assuming that Barnhart’s and Mountain Crest’s alleged
concealment of information wasn’t “in furtherance” of their
protected communications with law enforcement, § 13-20-
1101(3)(a), we still discern no basis to reverse. Under step one of
the anti-SLAPP analysis, a plaintiff can’t survive a special motion to
dismiss “simply by ‘combining allegations’ of protected and
nonprotected activity ‘under the label of one cause of action.’”
Moreau, 641 F. Supp. 3d at 1137 (quoting Fox, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
918). Instead, when a claim is based on a mixture of “allegedly
protected and unprotected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute,”
id. at 1135, the court must examine the “principal thrust or
gravamen” of the plaintiff’s claim. Id. (quoting Freeman v. Schack,
64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 867, 873 (Ct. App. 2007)). Unless the allegedly
protected activity is “‘merely incidental’ to the unprotected
conduct,” the court may still determine that the defendant has
satisfied their step-one burden as to the “mixed” claim and proceed
11 to step two. Id. (quoting Haight Ashbury Free Clinics, Inc. v.
Happening House Ventures, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 129, 139 (Ct. App.
2010)).
¶ 26 We agree with the district court that the principal thrust or
gravamen of each of Stetson’s claims centered around Barnhart’s
and Mountain Crest’s protected communications with law
enforcement. In her intentional infliction of emotional distress and
breach of fiduciary duty claims, Stetson alleged that Barnhart and
Mountain Crest caused her to be prosecuted and criminally
punished, abused their power over her, caused her medical
information to be exposed, favored Barnhart’s desire to prevent
Stetson from practicing her profession, failed to keep Stetson safe,
and intentionally traumatized her by discharging her into police
custody rather than to her husband. In her civil conspiracy claim,
Stetson similarly alleged that Barnhart’s coworkers encouraged
Barnhart to (1) abuse her power over Stetson; (2) contact law
enforcement; (3) make a “paper trail”; and (4) follow through on her
plan to deprive Stetson of her career.
¶ 27 Although the specific details vary, the principal thrust or
gravamen of each of these claims is that Barnhart and Mountain
12 Crest allegedly breached various duties owed to Stetson by
communicating with law enforcement without her knowledge and
then discharging her into police custody. Barnhart’s and Mountain
Crest’s protected communications with law enforcement are integral
to each of these claims. Indeed, Barnhart’s and Mountain Crest’s
alleged concealment of information regarding the police
investigation couldn’t have occurred if Barnhart hadn’t contacted
law enforcement in the first place. As a result, Barnhart’s and
Mountain Crest’s protected communications with law enforcement
weren’t “merely incidental” to the unprotected conduct alleged in
Stetson’s complaint. Moreau, 641 F. Supp. 3d at 1135 (citation
omitted).
¶ 28 Accordingly, we conclude that Barnhart and Mountain Crest
satisfied their step-one burden as to their post-call conduct.
2. Step Two
¶ 29 Turning to step two of the anti-SLAPP statute’s analysis, we
conclude as a matter of law that Stetson failed to satisfy her burden
of establishing a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on her claims.
We base this conclusion on the broad civil immunity afforded to
those who report alleged crimes to law enforcement authorities.
13 ¶ 30 In Colorado, any person or corporation who has “reasonable
grounds” to believe that a crime has been committed has a duty “to
report promptly the suspected crime to law enforcement
authorities.” § 18-8-115, C.R.S. 2024. “When acting in good faith,
such corporation or person shall be immune from any civil liability
for such reporting or disclosure.” Id.; see also § 16-3-202(4), C.R.S.
2024 (“Private citizens, acting in good faith, shall be immune from
any civil liability for reporting to any police officer or law
enforcement authority the commission or suspected commission of
any crime or for giving other information to aid in the prevention of
any crime.”).
¶ 31 Barnhart’s and Mountain Crest’s communications with law
enforcement fell squarely within the civil immunity provided by
section 18-8-115. All agree that Stetson placed her arm across
Barnhart’s neck and wielded a sharp piece of plastic as a weapon to
bargain for her release from the facility. Barnhart and Mountain
Crest therefore had “reasonable grounds” to believe that Stetson
had committed a crime. § 18-8-115. Indeed, Stetson later pleaded
guilty to third degree assault. See § 18-3-204, C.R.S. 2024.
14 ¶ 32 Similar to her step-one argument, Stetson nonetheless argues
that Barnhart and Mountain Crest lacked a good faith belief that
Stetson was criminally culpable based on their awareness of her
psychosis and resulting inability to form the requisite mental state.
But nothing in section 18-8-115 required either Barnhart or
Mountain Crest to investigate or confirm Stetson’s mental state
before reporting Stetson’s attack to authorities. The statute
requires only that the reporter have “reasonable grounds” to believe
that a crime has been committed. § 18-8-115. Stetson’s wielding of
a weapon against Barnhart provided more than ample grounds to
report her to law enforcement authorities.
¶ 33 Moreover, contrary to Stetson’s implicit argument, a victim’s
report to law enforcement authorities doesn’t lose its protected
status simply because the victim is aware, or suspects, that the
alleged assailant is incapable of distinguishing between right and
wrong. Victims aren’t expected to know or evaluate the precise legal
consequences that flow from an assailant’s impaired mental state.
That task falls to investigators, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and,
ultimately, the fact finder at trial. See Lunsford v. W. States Life
Ins., 919 P.2d 899, 901 (Colo. App. 1996) (Section 18-8-115 doesn’t
15 require “the degree of certainty on the part of the citizen reporting
the commission of a crime as does the probable cause standard
that police officers are held to in making warrantless arrests.”).
¶ 34 Thus, based on the broad civil immunity afforded to Barnhart
and Mountain Crest under section 18-8-115, we conclude as a
matter of law that Stetson didn’t satisfy her step-two burden of
showing a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on her claims.
¶ 35 We aren’t convinced otherwise by Stetson’s remaining step-two
arguments. Stetson again emphasizes that Barnhart and Mountain
Crest concealed their communications with law enforcement from
her and conspired to discharge her into police custody. But Stetson
cites no authority that requires an individual who reports a crime,
either generally or specifically within the behavioral health field, to
inform the assailant that their alleged crime has been reported to
law enforcement authorities. In our view, imposing such a
requirement would undermine section 18-8-115’s underlying crime-
reporting goals by affording the assailant an opportunity to flee or
conceal evidence of their wrongdoing.
¶ 36 Nor are we persuaded that Stetson is reasonably likely to
prevail based on Barnhart’s and Mountain Crest’s alleged violations
16 of certain federal and state privacy laws. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512
(2024); 42 C.F.R. § 2.12 (2024); §§ 27-65-119(1)(n), 27-65-123(1),
C.R.S. 2024. The privacy laws relied on by Stetson carve out
exceptions from their confidentiality provisions for reports of
criminal conduct made to law enforcement. Under a regulation
promulgated under the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, for example, a covered entity “may
disclose to a law enforcement official protected health information
that the covered entity believes in good faith constitutes evidence of
criminal conduct that occurred on the premises of the covered
entity.”3 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(5); see also 42 C.F.R. § 2.12(c)(5)
(similar exception for substance use disorder patient records).
¶ 37 Similarly, with exceptions not pertinent here, information
regarding a patient’s mental health disorder isn’t treated as
privileged or confidential under Colorado law if it concerns
(1) “observed behavior that constitutes a criminal offense committed
upon the premises of any facility providing services” for a mental
3 Although the regulation limits this exception to reports made by a
covered entity operating in good faith, we have already rejected Stetson’s argument that Barnhart and Mountain Crest lacked good faith when reporting to law enforcement.
17 health disorder; or (2) “any criminal offense committed against any
person while performing or receiving services” for a mental health
disorder. § 27-65-123(3)(a).
¶ 38 Barnhart’s and Mountain Crest’s communications with law
enforcement fit comfortably within these exceptions. Thus, the
privacy laws cited by Stetson don’t support her argument that she
is reasonably likely to prevail on her claims.
¶ 39 Accordingly, Stetson failed to meet her step-two burden of
establishing a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on her claims.
Given our conclusion, we perceive no error in the district court’s
decision granting Barnhart and Mountain Crest’s special motion to
dismiss.
III. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs
¶ 40 Barnhart and Mountain Crest jointly request their reasonable
attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal. “[A] prevailing
defendant on a special motion to dismiss is entitled to recover the
defendant’s attorney fees and costs.” § 13-20-1101(4)(a). Because
Barnhart and Mountain Crest have prevailed on appeal, we grant
their request. Creekside Endodontics, LLC v. Sullivan, 2022 COA
145, ¶ 54. Exercising our discretion under C.A.R. 39.1, we remand
18 the case to the district court to determine the amount of their
reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs.
IV. Disposition
¶ 41 We affirm the district court’s order granting Barnhart and
Mountain Crest’s special motion to dismiss and remand the case to
the district court to determine the amount of Barnhart’s and
Mountain Crest’s reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs.
JUDGE TOW and JUDGE YUN concur.