Steshenko v. Board of Trustees of Foothill-De Anza Community College District

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 GREGORY NICHOLAS STESHENKO, Case No. 24-cv-06126-SVK (HSG)

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO WITHDRAW CONSENT 9 v. Re: Dkt. No. 28 10 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF FOOTHILL- DE ANZA COMMUNITY COLLEGE 11 DISTRICT, et al.,

12 Defendants.

13 14 On April 8, 2025, Magistrate Judge Susan van Keulen partially granted Defendants’ 15 motion to dismiss and motion for sanctions. Dkt. No. 24. Afterward, pro se Plaintiff Gregory 16 Steshenko filed a document purporting to decline magistrate judge jurisdiction. See Dkt. No. 26. 17 He then filed a motion to withdraw consent. Dkt. 28. Judge van Keulen referred Plaintiff’s 18 motion to withdraw consent to this Court as the general duty judge for resolution. Dkt. No. 29. 19 Since the referral, Plaintiff has filed additional documents seemingly in support of the motion to 20 withdraw consent. Plaintiff filed a document styled as “objections” to Judge van Keulen’s April 8 21 order and a request for relief from the order under Civil L.R. 72-2, Dkt. No. 30, as well as an 22 amendment to these objections, Dkt. No. 31. The Court directed Defendants to file a response to 23 these filings. Dkt. No. 32. Having considered the parties’ filings, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s 24 motion to withdraw consent. Dkt. No. 28. 25 Generally “[a] party to a federal civil case has, subject to some exceptions, a constitutional 26 right to proceed before an Article III judge.” Dixon v. Ylst, 990 F.2d 478, 479 (9th Cir. 1993). 27 However, “[t]his right can be waived, allowing parties to consent to trial before a magistrate 1 judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the reference can be withdrawn only by the district court, and 2 only ‘for good cause shown on its own motion, or under extraordinary circumstances shown by 3 any party.’” Id. at 480 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4)). “[G]ood cause” and “extraordinary 4 circumstances” are “high bar[s] that [are] difficult to satisfy,” and are “intended to prevent 5 gamesmanship.” See Branch v. Umphenour, 936 F.3d 994, 1004 (9th Cir. 2019) (quotations 6 omitted). “Neither mere dissatisfaction with a magistrate judge’s decisions, nor unadorned 7 accusations that such decisions reflect judicial bias, will suffice.” Id. As the Ninth Circuit has 8 made clear, “[t]here is no absolute right, in a civil case, to withdraw consent to trial and other 9 proceedings before a magistrate judge” once a referral has been made under § 636(c). See Dixon, 10 990 F.2d at 480. 11 When this case was first filed, the Court informed the parties that the case was randomly 12 assigned to a magistrate judge “who, with written consent of all parties, may conduct all 13 proceedings in a case, including all pretrial and trial proceedings, entry of judgment and post-trial 14 motions, with appeal directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.” See 15 Dkt. No. 2. The initial case order contained resources with more information about consenting to 16 magistrate judge jurisdiction. See id. It also directed the parties to complete and file the “Consent 17 or Declination to Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction” form. Id. The form provided the option to either 18 “consent to” or “decline” magistrate judge jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and further 19 explained the parties’ rights and the voluntary nature of the magistrate judge assignment. See id. 20 Plaintiff filed his written consent on November 26, 2024, checking the “consent” box, signing, and 21 dating the form. See Dkt. No. 11. Defendants, in turn, filed their consent on December 16, 2024. 22 Dkt. No. 13. 23 Plaintiff has not shown good cause or presented evidence of any “extraordinary 24 circumstances” warranting the withdrawal of his consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction. 25 Although Plaintiff asserts that he was not informed of the consequences of signing the consent 26 form, Dkt. No. 28 at 2–3, this simply is not true. As explained above, Plaintiff received ample 27 information about the consequences of consenting to magistrate judge jurisdiction under § 636(c) 1 somehow biased against him as a pro se party and did not provide him with sufficient due process. 2 || See id. at 3-4. Plaintiff provides no support for this claim, and it is not supported by the record. 3 Notably, Plaintiff only attempted to withdraw his consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction months 4 |} later, after Judge van Keulen partially granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Dkt. No. 24. It 5 is clear that Plaintiff disagrees with Judge van Keulen’s recent order. See Dkt. No. 28 at 3-4; see 6 || also Dkt. Nos. 30-31. But under clear and well-established controlling precedent, such 7 || disagreement is not a sufficient reason to withdraw consent. The Court accordingly DENIES the 8 || motion to withdraw consent.’ Dkt. No. 28. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 || Dated: 5/5/2025 11 Aleipurrd 8 Abel HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 12 United States District Judge as General Duty Judge

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Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 ' The Court notes that Plaintiff’s “objections” to Judge van Keulen’s order under Federal Rule of 07 Civil Procedure 72(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), Dkt. Nos. 30-31, do not provide a basis for withdrawing his consent either. Rule 72(a) and § 636(b)(1)(A) only apply when a district judge 2g || refers a matter to a magistrate judge for a limited purpose. As explained above, that is not the case here, where Plaintiff consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction for all purposes under § 636(c).