Sterow, LLC v. The Town of Hilton Head Island

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

Sterow, LLC v. The Town of Hilton Head Island

DecidedMarch 12, 2010

Docket2010-UP-201

StatusUnpublished

This text of Sterow, LLC v. The Town of Hilton Head Island (Sterow, LLC v. The Town of Hilton Head Island) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Sterow, LLC v. The Town of Hilton Head Island, (S.C. Ct. App. 2010).

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THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Sterow, LLC, Appellant,

v.

The Town of Hilton Head Island, Respondent.

Appeal From Beaufort County
Honorable Marvin H. Dukes, III, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-201
Submitted March 1, 2010 Filed March 12, 2010

AFFIRMED

Edwin W. Rowland, of Okatie, for Appellant.

Gregory M. Alford and Scott M. Wild, of Hilton Head Island, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Sterow, LLC, filed suit against the Town of Hilton Head Island (Town) sounding in gross negligence for the Town's arbitrary and capricious denial of a business license to Sterow's tenant. Sterow appeals, arguing the master erred in granting the Town's motion for summary judgment because the Town's denial of the special exception constituted gross negligence as a matter of law and because Sterow made its claims within the applicable statute of limitations. Sterow also argues the master erred by failing to address in its final order each and every one of the arguments supporting the Town's motion for summary judgment. We affirm^[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the master erred in granting the Town's motion for summary judgment on the ground Sterow failed to make its claims within the applicable statute of limitations: S.C. Code Ann. §15-78-110 (2005) ("[A]ny action brought pursuant to [the Tort Claims Act] is forever barred unless an action is commenced within two years after the date the loss was or should have been discovered. . . ."); Wiggins v. Edwards, 314 S.C. 126, 128, 442 S.E.2d 169, 170 (1994) (requiring an injured party to "act with some promptness where the facts and circumstances of an injury would put a person of common knowledge and experience on notice that some right of his has been invaded or that some claim against another party might exist").

2. As to Sterow's remaining issues: Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an appellate court need not review remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive of the appeal).

AFFIRMED.

PIEPER and GEATHERS, JJ., and CURETON, A.J., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

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THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Sterow, LLC, Appellant,

v.

The Town of Hilton Head Island, Respondent.

Appeal From Beaufort County
Honorable Marvin H. Dukes, III, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-201
Submitted March 1, 2010 Filed March 12, 2010

AFFIRMED

Edwin W. Rowland, of Okatie, for Appellant.

Gregory M. Alford and Scott M. Wild, of Hilton Head Island, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Sterow, LLC, filed suit against the Town of Hilton Head Island (Town) sounding in gross negligence for the Town's arbitrary and capricious denial of a business license to Sterow's tenant. Sterow appeals, arguing the master erred in granting the Town's motion for summary judgment because the Town's denial of the special exception constituted gross negligence as a matter of law and because Sterow made its claims within the applicable statute of limitations. Sterow also argues the master erred by failing to address in its final order each and every one of the arguments supporting the Town's motion for summary judgment. We affirm^[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the master erred in granting the Town's motion for summary judgment on the ground Sterow failed to make its claims within the applicable statute of limitations: S.C. Code Ann. §15-78-110 (2005) ("[A]ny action brought pursuant to [the Tort Claims Act] is forever barred unless an action is commenced within two years after the date the loss was or should have been discovered. . . ."); Wiggins v. Edwards, 314 S.C. 126, 128, 442 S.E.2d 169, 170 (1994) (requiring an injured party to "act with some promptness where the facts and circumstances of an injury would put a person of common knowledge and experience on notice that some right of his has been invaded or that some claim against another party might exist").

2. As to Sterow's remaining issues: Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an appellate court need not review remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive of the appeal).

AFFIRMED.

PIEPER and GEATHERS, JJ., and CURETON, A.J., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

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