Sterngass v. Cember

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Sterngass v. Cember

117 A.D.2d 594, 498 N.Y.S.2d 374, 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 52865

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 3, 1986

StatusPublished

This text of 117 A.D.2d 594 (Sterngass v. Cember) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Sterngass v. Cember, 117 A.D.2d 594, 498 N.Y.S.2d 374, 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 52865 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1986).

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Opinion

—In an action for indemnification, defendant [595]*595appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Edelstein, J.), entered October 31, 1984, as denied his cross motion for summary judgment on the grounds of the Statute of Limitations and laches.

Order affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Plaintiffs’ action for indemnification was not time barred since it was instituted after payment was made but before the applicable six-year Statute of Limitations had run (see, Bay Ridge Air Rights v State of New York, 44 NY2d 49, 54-55; State of New York v Stewart’s Ice Cream Co., 64 NY2d 83). Moreover, plaintiffs’ suit was not barred by laches, since plaintiffs were not guilty of delay which prejudiced defendant (see, Sorrentino v Mierzwa, 25 NY2d 59, 63). Mollen, P. J., Thompson, Rubin and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.

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—In an action for indemnification, defendant [595]*595appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Edelstein, J.), entered October 31, 1984, as denied his cross motion for summary judgment on the grounds of the Statute of Limitations and laches.

Order affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Plaintiffs’ action for indemnification was not time barred since it was instituted after payment was made but before the applicable six-year Statute of Limitations had run (see, Bay Ridge Air Rights v State of New York, 44 NY2d 49, 54-55; State of New York v Stewart’s Ice Cream Co., 64 NY2d 83). Moreover, plaintiffs’ suit was not barred by laches, since plaintiffs were not guilty of delay which prejudiced defendant (see, Sorrentino v Mierzwa, 25 NY2d 59, 63). Mollen, P. J., Thompson, Rubin and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

117 A.D.2d 594, 498 N.Y.S.2d 374, 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 52865, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sterngass-v-cember-nyappdiv-1986.

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