Stern v. United States

3 Ct. Cust. 124, 1912 WL 19593, 1912 CCPA LEXIS 72
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedApril 1, 1912
DocketNo. 663
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 3 Ct. Cust. 124 (Stern v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stern v. United States, 3 Ct. Cust. 124, 1912 WL 19593, 1912 CCPA LEXIS 72 (ccpa 1912).

Opinion

De Vries, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Appeal from a decision of the Board of General Appraisers involving the dutiable classification of a variety of stone jardinieres, vases, and figures.

The case involves the application of a very narrow line of distinction between wbat does and does not constitute a sculpture, as that term is used and modified in paragraph 470 of the tariff act of 1909.

The board, as to the merchandise the subject of this appeal, which was but part of that covered by the invoice, overruled the protest of the importers.

While a number of such articles are the subject of this appeal, those concerning which, in our opinion, the same is well taken will be enumerated. As to all others, from the conceded description by appellant, the importer below, in their brief, we think the decision of the board correct.

Those enumerated are as follows:

1. Those jardinieres in cases 716 and 717, as designated upon the invoice, valued at $212.30 each, carved in semicircular shape out of a solid block of stone, each having carved upon it a bead which is a composite design combining a human, lion’s, and ram’s bead.

2. The single vase contained in case 718 of the invoice, with base therefor in case 730, 24 inches high by 15 inches in width, valued at $260.55, carved and surrounded or entwined by garlands of leaves chiseled out of stone.

3. Vases of like size to the foregoing in cases 721, 722, and 723, with covers and bases in cases 728 and 729, valued at $144.75 each, and each made of solid blocks of stone having carved on each a figure of a woman on one side and that of an alligator on the other.

4. The contents of cases 724 and 725, consisting of two carved balls of solid blocks of stone 2 feet in diameter, designed with tracery [125]*125of rushes or other vegetation reaching up the sides, and each ball resting upon a carved boa constrictor or reptile.

The competing paragraphs of the tariff law involved in the issue here presented are as follows:

114. Freestone, granite, sandstone, limestone, and all other monumental or building stone, except marble, breccia, and onyx, not specially provided for in this section, hewn, dressed, or polished, or otherwise manufactured, fifty per centum ad valorem; unmanufactured, or not dressed, hewn, or polished, ten cents per cubic foot.
470. * * * And sculptures, not specially provided for in this section, * * * but the term “sculptures” as used in this act shall be understood to include only such as are cut, carved, or otherwise wrought by hand from a solid block or mass of marble, stone, or alabaster, or from metal, and as are the professional production of a sculptor only * * *.

It will be noted that the articles not being of marble, breccia, onyx, alabaster, or jet, paragraph 112 of the act providing for such manufactured wholly or partly in monuments, benches, and vases, and into other articles, is not invoked, and the sole competing paragraph is the one of lesser specificátions, 114, sufra.

The crucial point in the case, however, is whether or not the articles are within the terms of paragraph 470, as disclosed by this record and the proofs therein contained, including the photographs of the articles accompanying the same.

In order to be included within the terms of paragraph 470, it is obvious that the importation must be, first, in character, design, and merit of artistic production fer se, a “sculpture;” and, secondly, being deemed such by reason of its intrinsic artistic character, that it must be “the professional production of a sculptor only.” The protestant, in cases such as these where the articles have been returned for duty by the collector as not such, has thereby imposed upon him the duty of proving by convincing evidence the affirmative of these two propositions.

The Board of General Appraisers did not consider or decide whether of not it was shown by the record that these articles were the professional production of a sculptor only, but seems to have rested decision upon the proposition that such articles were not “sculptures.”

While the enumerated articles may be of an inferior class of sculptures, we think they fairly come within the accepted legal and lexicographic definition of that term. Of course, not every product of a professional sculptor would be classed as a sculpture. Limitations of this kind were defined by this court in the recent case of Lazarus, Rosenfeld & Lehmann v. United States (2 Ct. Cust. Appls., 508; T. D. 32247). An instructive discussion of the subject is found in the opinion of the Board of General Appraisers in that case, G. A. 7174 (T. D. 31331). The board, speaking through Judge Waite, said.:

We do not conceive that every piece of carving which is made under the supervision of a professional sculptor or by his hand is brought within the meaning of the term “sculptures” in this act. We conceive it to mean that which is cut or carved into [126]*126some artistic desiga deserving a place in the higher order of art objects. Indeed, we think we are authorized in saying, having in mind the definitions of “sculptures” given in the dictionaries and by the various writers upon the subject, that the term “sculptures” in this act is intended to cover only those works of art which portray objects representing human or animal forms, as distinguished from architectural specimens and conventional designs. We are unable to find that it was the intention of the lawmakers to include within the terms of this paragraph all forms of carving in marble made in the atelier of a professional sculptor by artisans, with or without the aid of mechanical devices, including such articles as.are in question in this case.
The dividing line between what is intended to be covered by the word “sculptures ” in the law and that which is excluded may well be, we think, where the representations of human or animal forms end.

We are not prepared to assent to the doctrine that sculpture is confined to a representation of human or animal figures or statues alone. It is notably true that some of the most magnificent productions of professional sculptors which have attracted the attention and admiration of the world were found in the buildings and museums of countries the beliefs of which teach it a sacrilege to portray human forms.

The history of sculpture teaches us that the influence of the various ages and times upon the arts of the day varied the character of the contemporary sculpture. Thus because it partook of idolatry sculpture in the round during the fourth and fifth century was indeed rare. In the sixth century Byzantine art confined itself to, we are told, splendor and sumptuousness rather than monumental imagery. In the Encyclopedia Britannica, eleventh edition, article “Sculpture,” wherein the history is treated, it is stated:

Sculpture in the round, with its suggestion of idol worship which was offensive to the Christian spirit, was practically nonexistent during this and the succeeding centuries, although there are a few notable exceptions, like the large bronze statue of St. Peter in the nave of St. Peter’s in Rome, which is probably of fifth-century workmanship and has much of the repose, dignity, and force of antique sculpture.
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Bluebook (online)
3 Ct. Cust. 124, 1912 WL 19593, 1912 CCPA LEXIS 72, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stern-v-united-states-ccpa-1912.