BARNES, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress certain evidence, introduced at a trial wherein appellant and two others were charged with two counts of counterfeiting and three counts of possession of counterfeiting equipment. Appellant was convicted on five counts, and sentenced to five years imprisonment, to run concurrently as to each count. (18 U.S.C. §§ 471 and 474.) The district court had jurisdiction (18 U.S.C. § 3231), as do we on this appeal (28 U. S.C. §§ 1291 and 1294).
The appellant was convicted and his guilt is not raised on this appeal. The appeal involves but one question: Was the trial judge correct in ruling that there was no unlawful search and seizure of the evidence which was the subject of the motion ?
Authorities were notified that appellant and his two codefendants were counterfeiting United States currency (ten dollar bills) at Precision Products Company, 3330 South Atlantic Avenue in Long Beach, California.
The government conceded that the informant “does not have any prior or previous reliability as far as the government is concerned.” (Tr. p. 43, II. 13-15.)
The premises described above (wherein the counterfeiting equipment was located and from which it was taken) were entered by the officers by force and without a search warrant. They did this immediately after the arrest of appellant without a warrant, as he was getting into his automobile in the street in the front of said premises.
The search was lawful only if it was reasonable in view of the situation then and there existing and incidental to a lawful arrest.
The arrest without a warrant was lawful only if there existed probable cause for the belief by the officers that counterfeiting by defendants was going on on the said premises. A secret service officer
(and these were) may arrest without a warrant and con-
duct a search incidental thereto if he has probable cause within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and United States Code, Title 18, § 3056.
Did the Treasury Department officers have probable cause for the arrest and accompanying search? They did not, says appellant, (a) because the informant was unknown originally to the officers, and had no previously proven reliability; (b) the subsequent information acquired by the officers subsequent to the “tip” and prior to the arrest were all of “innocent” facts,
i. e.,
as consistent with innocence as with guilt; (c) the government refused to name the informant.
The latter point is the first urged by appellant. We see no relevance in it to the sole matter here under inquiry — was there probable cause ? The reluctance of the government to name its informers probably increases each time the known reliability of its previous tip is established. But this subsequent reluctance cannot alter the facts the officers had before them when their determination of reliability and probable cause was made.
The first ground urged is more substantial, but not controlling. The arresting officer did not act on the bare “tip” alone, but on the tip (accepted as being-one from an informant of unknown reliability) plus certain confirming facts. These obviously and admittedly were required to establish the reliability of the-information originally secured.
Whether this subsequent information is made up of “innocent” and “lawful” acts is of little consequence. The question is what probative force they have; not individually, but collectively, and as they fit into the jigsaw pattern of the entire picture.
The trial judge here had the following facts in mind, all of which were alleged to have had some small or great influence on the totality of the information in the officers’ possession when they came to the conclusion there was probable cause for the arrest of Newcomb.
This information as set forth in the margin is, as stated by the government, not disputed by the appellant.
Thus, the following1 facts gave
some
corroboration, at the least, to the “tip,” and consequently to the reliability of the informant:
(1) The individuals named were conducting some operations at 3330 South Atlantic Avenue, Long Beach, California.
(2) Whatever they were doing was business conducted in an unusual manner.
(a) The doors were kept locked during business hours.
(b) The rear windows were twelve feet above the ground.
(c) The front blinds were kept drawn.
(d) Lights were kept on after ordinary hours, and until 1:30 A.M.
(e) There appeared to be no transactions taking place relating to the announced retail business of selling doors, window sills, plywood, and other construction items.
(3) The accuracy of “two defendants having police records” was established, (a) Defendant Newcomb had two previous felony convictions, one for robbery
and one for statutory rape, with a sentence of six months to fifty years, (b) Defendant Harding had a previous felony conviction for burglary.
(4) It was discovered through the police records that defendant Newcomb was a “lithographer.”
(5) The informant’s information as to the three ears used by defendants— their types, makes, registrations, years and colors (even that one had no license plates) was confirmed by ofiicers’ observance thereof.
(6) The observations of the officers at 24 Sixth Place, Long Beach, at 9:30 P.M. disclosed the use by Brining and New-comb of Brining’s Chevrolet pickup truck to move large cardboard boxes from an apartment. At the least this disclosed activity between two of the defendants apart from that usually associated with ordinary daytime business; and, additionally, confirmed the accuracy of some of the informant’s statements.
(7) Probably most significant of all, independent investigation disclosed the purchase by Precision Products, through appellant, of 1000 sheets of
81/2
by 11, No. 20 Lancaster 100% rag bond paper on May 11, 1963.
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BARNES, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress certain evidence, introduced at a trial wherein appellant and two others were charged with two counts of counterfeiting and three counts of possession of counterfeiting equipment. Appellant was convicted on five counts, and sentenced to five years imprisonment, to run concurrently as to each count. (18 U.S.C. §§ 471 and 474.) The district court had jurisdiction (18 U.S.C. § 3231), as do we on this appeal (28 U. S.C. §§ 1291 and 1294).
The appellant was convicted and his guilt is not raised on this appeal. The appeal involves but one question: Was the trial judge correct in ruling that there was no unlawful search and seizure of the evidence which was the subject of the motion ?
Authorities were notified that appellant and his two codefendants were counterfeiting United States currency (ten dollar bills) at Precision Products Company, 3330 South Atlantic Avenue in Long Beach, California.
The government conceded that the informant “does not have any prior or previous reliability as far as the government is concerned.” (Tr. p. 43, II. 13-15.)
The premises described above (wherein the counterfeiting equipment was located and from which it was taken) were entered by the officers by force and without a search warrant. They did this immediately after the arrest of appellant without a warrant, as he was getting into his automobile in the street in the front of said premises.
The search was lawful only if it was reasonable in view of the situation then and there existing and incidental to a lawful arrest.
The arrest without a warrant was lawful only if there existed probable cause for the belief by the officers that counterfeiting by defendants was going on on the said premises. A secret service officer
(and these were) may arrest without a warrant and con-
duct a search incidental thereto if he has probable cause within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and United States Code, Title 18, § 3056.
Did the Treasury Department officers have probable cause for the arrest and accompanying search? They did not, says appellant, (a) because the informant was unknown originally to the officers, and had no previously proven reliability; (b) the subsequent information acquired by the officers subsequent to the “tip” and prior to the arrest were all of “innocent” facts,
i. e.,
as consistent with innocence as with guilt; (c) the government refused to name the informant.
The latter point is the first urged by appellant. We see no relevance in it to the sole matter here under inquiry — was there probable cause ? The reluctance of the government to name its informers probably increases each time the known reliability of its previous tip is established. But this subsequent reluctance cannot alter the facts the officers had before them when their determination of reliability and probable cause was made.
The first ground urged is more substantial, but not controlling. The arresting officer did not act on the bare “tip” alone, but on the tip (accepted as being-one from an informant of unknown reliability) plus certain confirming facts. These obviously and admittedly were required to establish the reliability of the-information originally secured.
Whether this subsequent information is made up of “innocent” and “lawful” acts is of little consequence. The question is what probative force they have; not individually, but collectively, and as they fit into the jigsaw pattern of the entire picture.
The trial judge here had the following facts in mind, all of which were alleged to have had some small or great influence on the totality of the information in the officers’ possession when they came to the conclusion there was probable cause for the arrest of Newcomb.
This information as set forth in the margin is, as stated by the government, not disputed by the appellant.
Thus, the following1 facts gave
some
corroboration, at the least, to the “tip,” and consequently to the reliability of the informant:
(1) The individuals named were conducting some operations at 3330 South Atlantic Avenue, Long Beach, California.
(2) Whatever they were doing was business conducted in an unusual manner.
(a) The doors were kept locked during business hours.
(b) The rear windows were twelve feet above the ground.
(c) The front blinds were kept drawn.
(d) Lights were kept on after ordinary hours, and until 1:30 A.M.
(e) There appeared to be no transactions taking place relating to the announced retail business of selling doors, window sills, plywood, and other construction items.
(3) The accuracy of “two defendants having police records” was established, (a) Defendant Newcomb had two previous felony convictions, one for robbery
and one for statutory rape, with a sentence of six months to fifty years, (b) Defendant Harding had a previous felony conviction for burglary.
(4) It was discovered through the police records that defendant Newcomb was a “lithographer.”
(5) The informant’s information as to the three ears used by defendants— their types, makes, registrations, years and colors (even that one had no license plates) was confirmed by ofiicers’ observance thereof.
(6) The observations of the officers at 24 Sixth Place, Long Beach, at 9:30 P.M. disclosed the use by Brining and New-comb of Brining’s Chevrolet pickup truck to move large cardboard boxes from an apartment. At the least this disclosed activity between two of the defendants apart from that usually associated with ordinary daytime business; and, additionally, confirmed the accuracy of some of the informant’s statements.
(7) Probably most significant of all, independent investigation disclosed the purchase by Precision Products, through appellant, of 1000 sheets of
81/2
by 11, No. 20 Lancaster 100% rag bond paper on May 11, 1963.
(8) This paper was the type used to print bonds and stock certificates and was frequently used by counterfeiters of United States currency, as “the best available stock” for their efforts; in fact a purchase of this type of paper was a generally recognized “red flag” insofar as the investigation of counterfeiting by government secret service agents was concerned.
(9) The date of sale of such 100% rag bond, being forty-nine days prior to
the receipt of the information, confirmed the “three months period” during which the alleged counterfeiting was taking place.
(10) Later in May, appellant had purchased 2500 sheets of
8^4
by 11 25% rag bond or ivory paper. This type was “sometimes” used by counterfeiters.
(11) The delivery of 100% or 25% rag bond paper in such quantities was in each instance an unusual delivery to a business supposedly selling doors, window sills, and plywood.
(12) The defendant Newcomb, just prior to his arrest, left the premises, placed a box in his car
and prepared to leave in his auto.
The surveilling officers had concluded they had sufficient cause to obtain a search warrant, and search the premises. An officer went to a nearby telephone to ask for it of an Assistant United States Attorney when the remaining officers saw the defendant Newcomb about to leave the premises with the box, large enough to have contained a substantial sum of counterfeit money.
Rather than risk the possible placing of an undetermined amount of counterfeit currency in circulation they arrested defendant Newcomb. One agent went to the locked front door and rattled it, calling to the officer arresting Newcomb to obtain his (Newcomb’s) keys to the front door. At that moment someone inside parted the curtains, saw New-comb’s arrest (Newcomb’s hands were above his head) and quickly closed the curtains. The officer at the front door then forced it open, arresting Brining inside on suspicion of counterfeiting and searched the premises, discovering the counterfeiting equipment which is the subject of the motion to suppress.
We cannot hold the trial court was in error in concluding that there existed in the minds of the arresting officers probable cause for belief in the reliability of the informant who had told them the defendants were counterfeiting ten dollar bills on the premises; or, that one defendant was about to leave the locality. Having probable cause to rely on the reliability of the informant, the officers had probable cause (a) to seek a warrant of arrest, and (b) to arrest without a warrant where a chance to escape, or to destroy evidence, existed. The officers, in view of the circumstances existing at the time of Newcomb’s arrest and the action of his associates, had probable cause to forcefully enter the premises in order to prevent escape and to forestall the destruction of evidence by the defendants other than Newcomb. The search of the immediate premises, then, being incidental to a lawful arrest, was proper and the evidence disclosed and discovered thereby admissible if relevant and material, as it most surely was.
The order of the district court denying the motion to suppress the evidence, and appellant’s conviction based thereon, are each affirmed. ,