Sterling Edward Newcomb v. United States

327 F.2d 649
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMarch 13, 1964
Docket18791
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 327 F.2d 649 (Sterling Edward Newcomb v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sterling Edward Newcomb v. United States, 327 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1964).

Opinion

BARNES, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress certain evidence, introduced at a trial wherein appellant and two others were charged with two counts of counterfeiting and three counts of possession of counterfeiting equipment. Appellant was convicted on five counts, and sentenced to five years imprisonment, to run concurrently as to each count. (18 U.S.C. §§ 471 and 474.) The district court had jurisdiction (18 U.S.C. § 3231), as do we on this appeal (28 U. S.C. §§ 1291 and 1294).

The appellant was convicted and his guilt is not raised on this appeal. The appeal involves but one question: Was the trial judge correct in ruling that there was no unlawful search and seizure of the evidence which was the subject of the motion ?

Authorities were notified that appellant and his two codefendants were counterfeiting United States currency (ten dollar bills) at Precision Products Company, 3330 South Atlantic Avenue in Long Beach, California.

The government conceded that the informant “does not have any prior or previous reliability as far as the government is concerned.” (Tr. p. 43, II. 13-15.)

The premises described above (wherein the counterfeiting equipment was located and from which it was taken) were entered by the officers by force and without a search warrant. They did this immediately after the arrest of appellant without a warrant, as he was getting into his automobile in the street in the front of said premises.

The search was lawful only if it was reasonable in view of the situation then and there existing and incidental to a lawful arrest. 1 The arrest without a warrant was lawful only if there existed probable cause for the belief by the officers that counterfeiting by defendants was going on on the said premises. A secret service officer 2 (and these were) may arrest without a warrant and con- *651 duct a search incidental thereto if he has probable cause within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and United States Code, Title 18, § 3056. 3

Did the Treasury Department officers have probable cause for the arrest and accompanying search? They did not, says appellant, (a) because the informant was unknown originally to the officers, and had no previously proven reliability; (b) the subsequent information acquired by the officers subsequent to the “tip” and prior to the arrest were all of “innocent” facts, i. e., as consistent with innocence as with guilt; (c) the government refused to name the informant.

The latter point is the first urged by appellant. We see no relevance in it to the sole matter here under inquiry — was there probable cause ? The reluctance of the government to name its informers probably increases each time the known reliability of its previous tip is established. But this subsequent reluctance cannot alter the facts the officers had before them when their determination of reliability and probable cause was made.

The first ground urged is more substantial, but not controlling. The arresting officer did not act on the bare “tip” alone, but on the tip (accepted as being-one from an informant of unknown reliability) plus certain confirming facts. These obviously and admittedly were required to establish the reliability of the-information originally secured.

Whether this subsequent information is made up of “innocent” and “lawful” acts is of little consequence. The question is what probative force they have; not individually, but collectively, and as they fit into the jigsaw pattern of the entire picture.

The trial judge here had the following facts in mind, all of which were alleged to have had some small or great influence on the totality of the information in the officers’ possession when they came to the conclusion there was probable cause for the arrest of Newcomb.

This information as set forth in the margin is, as stated by the government, not disputed by the appellant. 4

*652 Thus, the following1 facts gave some corroboration, at the least, to the “tip,” and consequently to the reliability of the informant:

*653 (1) The individuals named were conducting some operations at 3330 South Atlantic Avenue, Long Beach, California.

(2) Whatever they were doing was business conducted in an unusual manner.

(a) The doors were kept locked during business hours.
(b) The rear windows were twelve feet above the ground.
(c) The front blinds were kept drawn.
(d) Lights were kept on after ordinary hours, and until 1:30 A.M.
(e) There appeared to be no transactions taking place relating to the announced retail business of selling doors, window sills, plywood, and other construction items.

(3) The accuracy of “two defendants having police records” was established, (a) Defendant Newcomb had two previous felony convictions, one for robbery 5 and one for statutory rape, with a sentence of six months to fifty years, (b) Defendant Harding had a previous felony conviction for burglary.

(4) It was discovered through the police records that defendant Newcomb was a “lithographer.”

(5) The informant’s information as to the three ears used by defendants— their types, makes, registrations, years and colors (even that one had no license plates) was confirmed by ofiicers’ observance thereof.

(6) The observations of the officers at 24 Sixth Place, Long Beach, at 9:30 P.M. disclosed the use by Brining and New-comb of Brining’s Chevrolet pickup truck to move large cardboard boxes from an apartment. At the least this disclosed activity between two of the defendants apart from that usually associated with ordinary daytime business; and, additionally, confirmed the accuracy of some of the informant’s statements.

(7) Probably most significant of all, independent investigation disclosed the purchase by Precision Products, through appellant, of 1000 sheets of 81/2 by 11, No. 20 Lancaster 100% rag bond paper on May 11, 1963.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Gazzara
587 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. New York, 1984)
United States v. Bryant
406 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Michigan, 1975)
United States v. Terry Smith
499 F.2d 251 (Seventh Circuit, 1974)
United States v. Failla
343 F. Supp. 831 (W.D. New York, 1972)
United States v. Brown
305 F. Supp. 299 (S.D. Georgia, 1969)
Stephens v. Lindsey
304 F. Supp. 203 (S.D. Georgia, 1969)
Cook v. Smith
303 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Georgia, 1969)
United States v. Barnett
407 F.2d 1114 (Sixth Circuit, 1969)
United States v. Kenneth Wayne Cleaver
402 F.2d 148 (Ninth Circuit, 1968)
Jimmie O. Wooten v. United States
380 F.2d 230 (Fifth Circuit, 1967)
United States v. James Thacker
382 F.2d 732 (Sixth Circuit, 1967)
State v. Jackson
226 A.2d 804 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1966)
Murray v. State
203 A.2d 908 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1964)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
327 F.2d 649, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sterling-edward-newcomb-v-united-states-ca9-1964.