Stepping Stones Associates v. Seymour

Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York

Stepping Stones Associates v. Seymour

184 Misc. 2d 990, 712 N.Y.S.2d 266, 2000 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 314

CourtAppellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York

DecidedMay 26, 2000

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 184 Misc. 2d 990 (Stepping Stones Associates v. Seymour) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Stepping Stones Associates v. Seymour, 184 Misc. 2d 990, 712 N.Y.S.2d 266, 2000 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 314 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2000).

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Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

Final judgment unanimously reversed without costs and [991]*991matter remanded to the court below for further proceedings.

The City Court erred in denying tenant a trial and in entering judgment against him based upon his default in making a court-ordered deposit (RPAPL 745 [1]; Lipkis v Gilmour, 158 Misc 2d 609; Eversman v Collodo, 88 Misc 2d 86). The final judgment, although entered upon tenant’s “default” in making the court-ordered deposit, is nevertheless directly appealable. A default in making a payment is not an acquiescence within the meaning of the rule that a defaulting party acquiesces in the entry of the order or judgment (Flake v Van Wagenen, 54 NY 25, 27), and a judgment entered upon such a default is appealable (see, e.g., Malvin v Schwartz, 65 AD2d 769, affd 48 NY2d 693).

DiPaola, P. J., Floyd and Palella, JJ., concur.

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OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

Final judgment unanimously reversed without costs and [991]*991matter remanded to the court below for further proceedings.

The City Court erred in denying tenant a trial and in entering judgment against him based upon his default in making a court-ordered deposit (RPAPL 745 [1]; Lipkis v Gilmour, 158 Misc 2d 609; Eversman v Collodo, 88 Misc 2d 86). The final judgment, although entered upon tenant’s “default” in making the court-ordered deposit, is nevertheless directly appealable. A default in making a payment is not an acquiescence within the meaning of the rule that a defaulting party acquiesces in the entry of the order or judgment (Flake v Van Wagenen, 54 NY 25, 27), and a judgment entered upon such a default is appealable (see, e.g., Malvin v Schwartz, 65 AD2d 769, affd 48 NY2d 693).

DiPaola, P. J., Floyd and Palella, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

184 Misc. 2d 990, 712 N.Y.S.2d 266, 2000 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 314, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stepping-stones-associates-v-seymour-nyappterm-2000.

Opinion

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