Stephens v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: September 14, 2023
• Docket: 2:22-cv-00862
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Cody Alan Stephens No. CV-22-00862-PHX-SMB

10 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 11 Commissioner of Social Security 12 Administration,

13 Defendant.

14 At issue is the denial of Plaintiff Cody Alan Stephens’ Application for Social 15 Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits by the Social Security Administration 16 (“SSA”) under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). Plaintiff filed a Complaint, (Doc. 1), 17 and an Opening Brief, (Doc. 11), seeking judicial review of that denial. Defendant SSA 18 filed an Answering Brief, (Doc. 12), to which Plaintiff replied, (Doc. 13). The Court has 19 reviewed the parties’ briefs, the Administrative Record, (Doc. 9), and the Administrative 20 Law Judge’s (“ALJ’s”) decision, (Doc. 9-3 at 16-43) and will affirm the ALJ’s decision 21 for the reasons addressed herein. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff filed an Application for SSDI benefits in June of 2019, alleging a disability 24 beginning in May of 2016. (Doc.9-3.) Plaintiff’s claim was initially denied in October 21 25 of 2019. (Doc. 9-3 at 20.) A hearing was held before ALJ Bettye Rutledge on January 14, 26 2021 (Id.) After considering the medical evidence and opinions, the ALJ determined that 27 Plaintiff suffered from severe impairments including “epilepsy, status post cerebrovascular 28 accident (CVA); deep vein thrombosis (DVT); major depressive disorder (MDD); and 1 anxiety disorder.” (Doc. 9-3 at 2.) However, the ALJ concluded that, despite these 2 impairments, Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary 3 work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a). (Doc. 9-3 at 26.) Consequently, 4 Plaintiff’s Application was again denied by the ALJ on April 7, 2021. (Doc. 9-3 at 36.) 5 Thereafter, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s Request for Review of the ALJ’s 6 decision—making it the final decision of the SSA Commissioner (the “Commissioner”)— 7 and this appeal followed. 8 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 9 An ALJ’s factual findings “shall be conclusive if supported by substantial 10 evidence.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2019). The Court may set aside 11 the Commissioner’s disability determination only if it is not supported by substantial 12 evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). 13 Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate 14 to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. Generally, “[w]here the 15 evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the 16 ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 17 954 (9th Cir. 2002). In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court 18 reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 19 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). 20 III. DISCUSSION 21 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed harmful error in evaluating Plaintiff’s 22 symptom testimony and in weighing the medical opinion evidence. (Doc. 11.) The 23 Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s opinion is supported by the record as a whole and free 24 of harmful error. (Doc. 12.) The Court has reviewed the medical and administrative 25 records and agrees with the Commissioner for the following reasons. 26 A. Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony 27 An ALJ performs a two-step analysis to evaluate a claimant’s testimony regarding 28 pain and symptoms. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014). First, the 1 ALJ evaluates whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an 2 impairment that “could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms 3 alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. 4 Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, 5 absent evidence of malingering, an ALJ may only discount a claimant’s allegations for 6 reasons that are “specific, clear and convincing” and supported by substantial evidence. 7 Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 8 “[T]he ALJ must specifically identify the testimony she or he finds not to be credible 9 and must explain what evidence undermines the testimony.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 10 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001). General findings are insufficient. Id. “Although the 11 ALJ’s analysis need not be extensive, the ALJ must provide some reasoning in order for 12 [the Court] to meaningfully determine whether the ALJ’s conclusions were supported by 13 substantial evidence.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th 14 Cir. 2014). “[T]he ALJ may consider inconsistencies either in the claimant’s testimony or 15 between the testimony and the claimant’s conduct.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112. For 16 instance, the ALJ may consider “whether the claimant engages in daily activities 17 inconsistent with the alleged symptoms.” Id. (quoting Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1040). 18 Plaintiff argues the ALJ committed materially harmful error by rejecting his 19 symptoms testimony without specific, clear, and convincing reasons supported by 20 substantial record evidence when Plaintiff’s testimony showed it is impossible for him to 21 perform sustained work. (Doc. 11 at 14.) The Commissioner argues the ALJ gave valid 22 reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, including that his testimony was 23 inconsistent with the medical record and that Plaintiff’s daily activities contradicted his 24 allegations. (Doc. 12 at 16.) 25 Here, after comparing Plaintiff’s subjective allegations with the objective medical 26 and other evidence, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s subjective testimony regarding his 27 symptoms was not entirely consistent with the medical record. (Doc. 9-3 at 31.); 20 C.F.R. 28 § 404.1529(c)(2); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (“While 1 subjective pain testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully 2 corroborated by objective medical evidence, the medical evidence is still a relevant factor 3 in determining the severity of the claimant’s pain and its disabling effects.”). The ALJ 4 noted that Plaintiff alleged he is unable to work due to mental problems stemming from his 5 initial injury including anxiety; PTSD; problems maintaining conversations; poor memory; 6 and seizures. (Doc. 9-3 at 27.) The ALJ also noted Plaintiff alleged physical problems 7 from the injury including issues lifting, squatting, standing, kneeling, and climbing; 8 hearing, completing tasks, and concentrating. (Id.) The ALJ also pointed to the seizure 9 questionnaire which summarized that Plaintiff has had 11 accounted for seizures since his 10 2011 stroke but the most recent record from 2020 shows that his brain MRI was unchanged, 11 and the seizures have been controlled with medicine. (Id. at 27, 29.) 12 Additionally, the ALJ pointed to a 2020 visit with Plaintiff’s psychiatrist where, 13 despite symptoms, Plaintiff was reported to be “in good spirits and his mood much 14 improved.” (Id. at 31.) Further, Plaintiff himself also testified that he was able to do 15 activities such as go to the store, care for his cat, make his bed, do laundry, and use public 16 transportation. (Id. at 27.) As the Commissioner also points out, therapy notes from 2019 17 report that Plaintiff did not want to seek out employment, although he had applied for some 18 jobs previously, because he did not want to “jeopardize” his ability to receive disability 19 benefits. (Doc. 9-21 at 133, Doc. 9-22 at 58.) 20 Ultimately, despite Plaintiff’s testimony and evidence showing he could be 21 reasonably expected to have symptoms from his impairments, medical evidence showed 22 that he “has no significant residual effects from his stroke,” his DVT is controlled with 23 anticoagulants, he has not had a seizure in over a year, and his mental state is able to 24 improve with methadone maintenance and medication. (Id.) These are all valid reasons, 25 supported by the record, to discount Plaintiff’s testimony. Therefore, the Court finds that 26 substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings as to Plaintiff’s symptoms. See Biestek, 27 139 S. Ct. at 1153. 28 B. Evaluation of Medical Testimony 1 While “[t]he ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence,” there is a hierarchy 2 among the sources of medical opinions. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th 3 Cir. 2008). Those who have treated a claimant are treating physicians; those who examined 4 but did not treat the claimant are examining physicians; and those who neither examined, 5 nor treated the claimant are non-examining physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 6 (9th Cir. 1995). “As a general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating 7 source than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant.” Id. This is so because 8 treating physicians have the advantage of in-person interaction and typically a longer 9 history of treatment than a claimant’s other doctors, and their “subjective 10 judgments . . . . are important, and properly play a part in their medical evaluations.” 11 Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988). 12 An ALJ “may only reject a treating or examining physician’s uncontradicted 13 medical opinion based on ‘clear and convincing reasons.’” Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. 14 Sec., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 830–31). “Where 15 such an opinion is contradicted, however, it may be rejected for ‘specific and legitimate 16 reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.’” Id. (quoting Lester, 81 17 F.3d at 830). An ALJ meets this standard by “setting out a detailed and thorough summary 18 of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making 19 findings.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). 20 For claims filed after March 27, 2017, the rule that previously gave deference to 21 opinions from treating physicians has been rescinded. Additionally, the changes in 22 regulations “displace our longstanding case law requiring an ALJ to provide ‘specific and 23 legitimate’ reasons for rejecting an examining [or treating] doctor’s opinion.” Woods v. 24 Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2022). However, the court held that “an ALJ cannot 25 reject an examining or treating doctor’s opinion as unsupported or inconsistent without 26 providing an explanation supported by substantial evidence”. Id. at 792. The revised 27 regulations require that the ALJ explain only how she considered the supportability and 28 consistency of a medical opinion when assessing its persuasiveness. Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. 1 § 404.1520c. This claim was originally filed on June 14, 2019; therefore, these new rules 2 apply. 3 Plaintiff argues the ALJ committed materially harmful error by rejecting Dr. 4 McCall’s assessment without sufficient explanation supported by substantial evidence. 5 (Doc. 13.) The Commission argues that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 6 assessment of Dr. McCall’s medical opinion. (Doc. 12 at 6.) 7 Here, Dr. McCall’s 2020 assessment noted that because of certain medications 8 Plaintiff was prescribed for his injury, he may have fatigue, lethargy, dizziness, and 9 cognitive slowing which could impact his ability to work. ( Doc 9-41 at 28.) He also 10 testified that Plaintiff would likely be unable to work four or more days out of a month 11 because of his condition, would face extreme difficulty functioning in several capacities 12 needed in a workplace, and is “easily overwhelmed by minimal stressors” which would 13 make it difficult for him to work at a regular job on a sustained basis. (Id. at 30–32.) 14 The ALJ noted that although Dr. McCall was one of Plaintiff’s treating providers, 15 his opinion “grossly” overstated Plaintiff’s limitations, and was not supported by his own 16 treatment records. (Doc. 9-3 at 33.) Plaintiff also argues the ALJ lacked sufficient 17 specificity in discounting Dr. McCall’s testimony. The Court disagrees. The ALJ, 18 although also referencing the whole record, pointed to Dr. McCall’s own treatment records 19 to show that his opinion was inconsistent. (Id.) The ALJ also pointed to Plaintiff’s own 20 testimony as a reason for discounting Dr. McCall’s report. (Id.) Although Plaintiff may 21 disagree with how the ALJ weighed Dr. McCall’s testimony against all other medical and 22 testimony evidence, the Court finds that the ALJ opinion meets the “substantial evidence” 23 requirement by “setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting 24 clinical evidence” and offering her interpretation of those facts. Colvin, 759 F.3d at 1012. 25 In her opinion, the ALJ sufficiently explained how she considered the supportability 26 and consistency of Dr. McCall’s opinion when assessing its persuasiveness. See 20 C.F.R. 27 § 404.1520c. Therefore, the Court finds there was no error in how the ALJ weighed the 28 persuasiveness of Dr. McCall’s assessment. 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 Therefore, 3 IT IS ORDERED affirming the April 7, 2021, decision of the ALJ, as upheld by 4|| the Appeals Council. 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter final judgment 6 || consistent with this Order and close this case. 7 Dated this 13th day of September, 2023. 8 9 “Se ss > SO fonorable Susan M. Brnovich = 11 United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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