Stephens-Adamson Manufacturing Co. v. Bigelow

Supreme Court of New Jersey

Stephens-Adamson Manufacturing Co. v. Bigelow

87 A. 74, 84 N.J.L. 585, 55 Vroom 585, 1913 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 84

DecidedJune 9, 1913

StatusPublished

This text of 87 A. 74 (Stephens-Adamson Manufacturing Co. v. Bigelow) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Stephens-Adamson Manufacturing Co. v. Bigelow, 87 A. 74, 84 N.J.L. 585, 55 Vroom 585, 1913 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 84 (N.J. 1913).

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Opinion

The opinion of the court ivas delivered by

Voorhees, J.

In the trial of a District Court suit founded upon a written contract, dated May 12th. 1911, for [586]*586the sale and purchase of machinery, the following clause occurred : “The time of delivery (which is to .be the date of shipment from our works at Aurora, Illinois), to be about * * * from receipt by us of your acceptance of this proposal and final information necessary for completion of order.”

There was a plea of recoupment. The court heard parol testimony regarding the time of delivery, but finally struck it out as not admissible. Naumberg v. Young, 15 Vroom 331, is in point upon this question. It holds that the written agreement, if complete, is the only evidence of the contract between the parties, and that parol evidence of such contract is admissible only where the writing is not complete and does not purport to cover the whole contract.

The contract under review left in blank the time of delivery <jf the purchased machinery, and so it appears that the consideration of the testimony of witnesses as to it was clearly within the rule. See also the following cases: Bruce v. Pearsall, 30 Vroom 62; Emmett v. Penoyer, 151 N. Y. 564; Camden Iron Works v. Fox, 34 Fed. Rep. 200; Dunnett v. Slack & Gibson, 78 Vt. 439. The action of the court, therefore, in excluding it amounted to error as far as defendants' base was concerned and is sufficient to warrant a reversal.

But again the court found an acceptance of the goods within a reasonable time except as to the large pulley, and that the plaintiff had credited the value of this article at the contract price made by the parties, but ignored the testimony which tended to prove the purchase of another pulley at- a cost of $129.12. The court thereupon found for the plaintiff, allowing to the defendants the credit given them by the plaintiff on the state of demand. I think this was a question of fact and should have been treated as such. It was not so done, but the credit was considered as establishing between the parties all that the defendants could claim. This again was error.

There must be a reversal and a new trial ordered.

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The opinion of the court ivas delivered by

Voorhees, J.

In the trial of a District Court suit founded upon a written contract, dated May 12th. 1911, for [586]*586the sale and purchase of machinery, the following clause occurred : “The time of delivery (which is to .be the date of shipment from our works at Aurora, Illinois), to be about * * * from receipt by us of your acceptance of this proposal and final information necessary for completion of order.”

There was a plea of recoupment. The court heard parol testimony regarding the time of delivery, but finally struck it out as not admissible. Naumberg v. Young, 15 Vroom 331, is in point upon this question. It holds that the written agreement, if complete, is the only evidence of the contract between the parties, and that parol evidence of such contract is admissible only where the writing is not complete and does not purport to cover the whole contract.

The contract under review left in blank the time of delivery <jf the purchased machinery, and so it appears that the consideration of the testimony of witnesses as to it was clearly within the rule. See also the following cases: Bruce v. Pearsall, 30 Vroom 62; Emmett v. Penoyer, 151 N. Y. 564; Camden Iron Works v. Fox, 34 Fed. Rep. 200; Dunnett v. Slack & Gibson, 78 Vt. 439. The action of the court, therefore, in excluding it amounted to error as far as defendants' base was concerned and is sufficient to warrant a reversal.

But again the court found an acceptance of the goods within a reasonable time except as to the large pulley, and that the plaintiff had credited the value of this article at the contract price made by the parties, but ignored the testimony which tended to prove the purchase of another pulley at- a cost of $129.12. The court thereupon found for the plaintiff, allowing to the defendants the credit given them by the plaintiff on the state of demand. I think this was a question of fact and should have been treated as such. It was not so done, but the credit was considered as establishing between the parties all that the defendants could claim. This again was error.

There must be a reversal and a new trial ordered.

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87 A. 74, 84 N.J.L. 585, 55 Vroom 585, 1913 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 84, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stephens-adamson-manufacturing-co-v-bigelow-nj-1913.

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