Stephen Muccio v. Global Motivation, Inc.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: August 25, 2023
• Docket: 23-10081
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 23-10081 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 08/25/2023 Page: 1 of 3

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 23-10081 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

STEPHEN MUCCIO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus GLOBAL MOTIVATION, INC., JORDAN R. BELFORT,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________ USCA11 Case: 23-10081 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 08/25/2023 Page: 2 of 3

2 Opinion of the Court 23-10081

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 9:22-cv-81004-AMC ____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BLACK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Stephen Muccio appeals from the dismissal of his amended complaint for lack of Article III standing. Muccio brought this pu- tative class action against Global Motivation, Inc. and its owner, Jordan Belfort, alleging Global Motivation sent him and at least 100 other individuals five unsolicited text messages using automated computer systems to solicit the sale of consumer goods or services. He asserted two counts under the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act (FTSA), Florida Statute § 501.059, and three counts under the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (TCPA). Global Motivation and Belfort moved to dismiss the com- plaint for lack of Article III standing, and the district court agreed. Citing Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2019), and Drazen v. Pinto, 41 F.4th 1354 (11th Cir. 2022), vacated, 61 F.4th 1297 (11th Cir. 2023) (Drazen I), the district court found Muccio could not es- tablish a concrete harm, notwithstanding Muccio’s attempts to dis- tinguish our prior precedent based on the number of text messages he received and on the language of the FTSA. USCA11 Case: 23-10081 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 08/25/2023 Page: 3 of 3

23-10081 Opinion of the Court 3

After Muccio appealed from the dismissal, however, we va- cated the panel opinion in Drazen I and reheard it as a full court. We then explained “the Constitution empowers Congress to de- cide what degree of harm is enough so long as that harm is similar in kind to a traditional harm.” Drazen v. Pinto, __ F.4th __, No. 21- 10199, slip op. at 17, (11th Cir. July 24, 2023) (en banc) (Drazen II). “[T]he harm associated with an unwanted text message shares a close relationship with the harm underlying the tort of intrusion upon seclusion.” Id. at 17. As a result, “the receipt of an unwanted text message causes a concrete injury.” Id. at 18. And, like Con- gress did with the TCPA, the Florida Legislature “has used its law- making powers to recognize a lower quantum of injury necessary to bring a claim under the [FTSA].” Id. We do not fault the district court’s reliance on Salcedo and Drazen I when it dismissed the case in December 2022. Neverthe- less, we review standing issues de novo, Muransky v. Godiva Choco- latier, Inc., 979 F.3d 917, 923 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc), and with the benefit of Drazen II, we conclude Muccio has standing to bring his claims. We REVERSE the district court’s dismissal for lack of stand- ing and REMAND for further proceedings.