Stephen M. Sneade v. Commonwealth of Virginia
This text of Stephen M. Sneade v. Commonwealth of Virginia (Stephen M. Sneade v. Commonwealth of Virginia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bumgardner, Frank and Humphreys Argued at Richmond, Virginia
STEPHEN M. SNEADE MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 1105-99-2 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III OCTOBER 10, 2000 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BRUNSWICK COUNTY Robert G. O'Hara, Jr., Judge
Peter D. Eliades (Eliades & Eliades, on brief), for appellant.
Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
A jury convicted Stephen M. Sneade, age sixteen, of capital
murder, robbery, and use of a firearm in the commission of a
murder and in the commission of a robbery. The defendant
contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
his confession. On appeal, he contends he was in custody when
he made his confession and should have been given his Miranda
rights. 1 He also argues that because he was a juvenile and the
focus of an investigation, he required the presence of a
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication. 1 We find no merit in the defendant's argument that he should have been given Miranda warnings even if not in custody because he was a juvenile. guardian ad litem or counsel when he confessed. 2 Finding no
error, we affirm.
The proprietor of Anderson's Grocery in Brunswick County
was robbed and murdered March 6, 1997. The state police
executed a search warrant at the defendant's home in Prince
George County twelve days later. After the search, the police
took the defendant to the police station for questioning. They
advised the defendant of his Miranda rights, which he invoked
without incident. The defendant left the police station when
his attorney arrived for him.
Eric Young was a detective with the Prince George Police
Department assigned as a juvenile officer. He worked primarily
with juvenile cases and had his office in the court services
office rather than in the police department building. While
Young had assisted executing the search warrant at the
defendant's home and had occasional contact with the defendant,
he had never discussed the Brunswick County case with him.
On January 12, 1998, Detective Young met with Shelby Fuller
to discuss her school attendance. Fuller told him she was
dating the defendant. Young told her that he had contact with
the defendant in the past, and suggested that if the defendant
ever felt "the need to talk . . . please have him give me a
2 We find no merit in the argument that the defendant was coerced psychologically because he was a juvenile.
- 2 - call, . . . or come by the office at any time." That evening,
Fuller contacted Detective Young and advised that the defendant
wanted to speak to him.
The next day, the defendant and Fuller went to Young's
office as arranged. Because the office was crowded, the three
walked to a park adjacent to the courthouse complex. Young
asked the defendant if he wanted "to talk about anything" but
noted it was entirely up to the defendant. The defendant said
he did not care. Young commented that the defendant had had a
rough year and suggested it would be in the defendant's best
interest to tell his side of the story if he knew about the
Brunswick incident. Young informed the defendant that he was
not investigating the case and the most he could do for the
defendant was to "put in a good word" with the Brunswick police.
The three of them left the park and drove to the police
department because it was too cold to remain outside. They
continued talking in a private room at the police department.
Young again asked the defendant if he wanted to talk and
again advised him that it was completely up to him. The
defendant stated, "he'd rather write than talk." For forty to
forty-five minutes, the defendant wrote his confession. Young
and the defendant did not confer while he wrote, and Young did
not make suggestions about what he should write. Fuller was
present the entire time.
- 3 - When the defendant finished writing, he gave his statement
to Young, who asked permission to read it. After the defendant
consented, Young read it and had the defendant sign and date
each page. Young told the defendant he would have to contact
the Brunswick authorities and would put in a good word for him.
Young took the defendant and Fuller back to their car, and they
left the complex.
When we review the voluntariness of a confession, we must
conduct "an independent examination of the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether the statement is the product
of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker, or
whether the maker's will has been overborne and his capacity for
self-determination critically impaired." Bailey v.
Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 236, 239, 456 S.E.2d 144, 145 (1995)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
Miranda warnings are required when a defendant is in
custody and is being interrogated. See Blain v. Commonwealth, 7
Va. App. 10, 13, 371 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1988). Police are not
required to give Miranda warnings every time they question a
suspect, even when the interrogation takes place at the police
station, see Bailey v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 723, 745-46, 529
S.E.2d 570, 583 (2000), petition for cert. filed, ___ U.S.L.W.
___, (Sept. 6, 2000) (No. 00-6045), or "the investigation has
focused on the defendant." Bosworth v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App.
- 4 - 567, 573, 375 S.E.2d 756, 759 (1989) (citation omitted). "No
single factor determines custody for this purpose." Id. When
the defendant initiates the conversation with the police, there
is no interrogation. See Ronald J. Bacigal, Virginia Criminal
Procedure § 7-5, at 162 (4th ed. 1999). Nor does the fact that
the defendant's attorney was not present during his statement to
police invalidate his confession. See Bailey, 20 Va. App. at
239-40, 456 S.E.2d at 145.
The trial court ruled that the defendant knowingly waived
his Miranda rights, that his written statement was voluntarily
made and a product of his own free will, and that Detective
Young did not exert pressure to overcome the defendant’s will.
Credible evidence supports those findings.
Here, the defendant was neither in custody nor
interrogated; the requirements to invoke Miranda did not exist.
The defendant initiated contact with Detective Young through his
girlfriend. The two voluntarily went to Young's office the next
day and met with him. During the meeting, the defendant and his
girlfriend were always together. They were free to leave at any
time, and the physical surroundings permitted them to leave by
simply walking off. The defendant wrote his statement and took
forty-five minutes to complete it. He handed it to Detective
Young, who asked permission before reading it. As the trial
court noted, the defendant understood his Miranda rights and
- 5 - asserted them previously without incident. This evidence
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