Stephen L. Hopkins, Sr. v. Robert C. Kuehm

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJune 30, 1999
Docket03-98-00514-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Stephen L. Hopkins, Sr. v. Robert C. Kuehm (Stephen L. Hopkins, Sr. v. Robert C. Kuehm) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stephen L. Hopkins, Sr. v. Robert C. Kuehm, (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN




NO. 03-98-00514-CV

Stephen L. Hopkins, Sr., Appellant


v.



Robert C. Kuehm, Appellee



FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 97-09593, HONORABLE JERRY DELLANA, JUDGE PRESIDING

Appellant Stephen L. Hopkins, Sr. sued appellee Robert C. Kuehm for legal malpractice arising from Kuehm's representation of Hopkins in a divorce proceeding. Kuehm filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i), claiming that Hopkins produced no evidence in support of two essential elements of his legal malpractice claim. The trial court granted Kuehm's motion. On appeal, Hopkins asserts in four points of error that the trial court erred in granting Kuehm's motion for summary judgment. We will affirm.

BACKGROUND

Kuehm represented Hopkins at the nonjury trial of Hopkins's divorce action in October 1993. On May 17, 1994, following a May 10, 1994 hearing on a motion for judgment, the trial court signed a draft of a final judgment without the parties' knowledge. A second hearing on the motion was held on June 28, 1994, at which time the trial court notified counsel that he mistakenly signed the May 17, 1994 final judgment; he then proceeded to sign a clean form of judgment provided by one of the parties. Kuehm, representing Hopkins, appealed the June 28 judgment. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the May 17 judgment was final.

Hopkins filed his pro se legal malpractice action against Kuehm on July 8, 1996. After the case had been pending for twenty-two months and Hopkins failed to identify an expert on the issues of liability, causation, and damages in response to Kuehm's written discovery requests, Kuehm moved for summary judgment under rule 166a(i) on the grounds that there was no evidence that he was negligent in his representation of Hopkins with respect to Hopkins's reimbursement claim in the divorce proceeding or that any of the alleged acts or omissions of negligence by Kuehm was the proximate cause of any damage to Hopkins. The only evidence offered by Hopkins in response to Kuehm's motion was his own affidavit. Kuehm asserted several objections to the affidavit on the grounds that certain statements were not based on personal knowledge and that Hopkins was not competent or qualified to make statements of opinions on issues of law.

A hearing on the summary judgment motion was held on June 11, 1998, which Hopkins did not attend. Following the hearing, the trial court sustained Kuehm's objections, striking those portions of the affidavit as part of Hopkins's summary judgment evidence, and granted Kuehm's motion for summary judgment, rendering a take-nothing judgment against Hopkins.

DISCUSSION

Courts of appeals review no-evidence summary judgments under rule 166a(i) (1) with the same legal sufficiency standard applied to directed verdicts. See Moore v. K Mart Corp., 981 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1998, no pet.); Jackson v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Tex. App.--Austin 1998, no pet.). "Like a directed verdict, then, the task of the appellate court is to determine whether the plaintiff has produced any evidence of probative force to raise fact issues on the material questions presented." Jackson, 979 S.W.2d at 70. All evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the party against whom the no-evidence summary judgment was rendered, with every reasonable inference indulged and any doubts resolved in favor of the nonmovant. Id.

A trial court properly grants a no-evidence summary judgment when the nonmovant fails to bring forth more than a scintilla of evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to one or more essential elements of the nonmovant's claim on which the nonmovant would have the burden of proof at trial. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1799 (1998); Jackson, 979 S.W.2d at 70-71; Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). More than a scintilla of evidence exists if the evidence rises to a level that would enable reasonable, fair-minded persons to differ in their conclusions. See Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 711; Jackson, 979 S.W.2d at 71. When the evidence is "so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion" of a fact, then less than a scintilla of evidence exists, and the legal effect is that there is no evidence. Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983); Jackson, 979 S.W.2d at 71.



Adequate time for discovery

In his third point of error, Hopkins contends that the trial court erred in granting the no-evidence summary judgment motion before adequate time for discovery had been allowed. Twenty-two months passed between Hopkins's filing of his original petition and Kuehm's filing of the no-evidence summary judgment motion. Hopkins did not object that there was inadequate time for discovery, nor did he file a motion for continuance requesting additional time for discovery. He raises this issue for the first time on appeal. Accordingly, he has waived error on the issue. See City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 675 (Tex.1979); see also McConnell v. Southside I.S.D., 858 S.W.2d 337, 343 (Tex. 1993). Hopkins's third point of error is overruled.



Hopkins's affidavit

Hopkins contends in his second point of error that the trial court improperly sustained Kuehm's objections to certain portions of his affidavit filed in response to Kuehm's no-evidence summary judgment motion. Specifically, Hopkins argues that the opinions and conclusions he makes in his affidavit do not require expert knowledge because, under the facts of this case, the issue of negligence is sufficiently clear so as to be determinable by a layperson or concluded as a matter of law, whether or not the breach of duty involves a complex legal issue requiring expert explanation. We disagree.

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(f) requires that in summary judgment proceedings, supporting and opposing affidavits "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(f). When a party relies on expert testimony, this requirement includes proof of the expert's qualification. See United Blood Servs. v. Longoria, 938 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tex. 1997).

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Related

Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc.
650 S.W.2d 61 (Texas Supreme Court, 1983)
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner
953 S.W.2d 706 (Texas Supreme Court, 1997)
City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority
589 S.W.2d 671 (Texas Supreme Court, 1979)
McConnell v. Southside Independent School District
858 S.W.2d 337 (Texas Supreme Court, 1993)
Moore v. K Mart Corp.
981 S.W.2d 266 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1998)
United Blood Services v. Longoria
938 S.W.2d 29 (Texas Supreme Court, 1997)
Cosgrove v. Grimes
774 S.W.2d 662 (Texas Supreme Court, 1989)
Jackson v. Fiesta Mart, Inc.
979 S.W.2d 68 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1998)
Peeler v. Hughes & Luce
909 S.W.2d 494 (Texas Supreme Court, 1995)
In Re Mohawk Rubber Co.
982 S.W.2d 494 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1998)
Victor Garland Works v. Arlington Memorial Hospital
782 S.W.2d 309 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1989)

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Stephen L. Hopkins, Sr. v. Robert C. Kuehm, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stephen-l-hopkins-sr-v-robert-c-kuehm-texapp-1999.