Stephen Joseph Wright v. Wisconsin Elections Commission

2023 WI 67, 995 N.W.2d 699

• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
• Decided: October 6, 2023
• Docket: 2023AP001412-OA
• Status: Published

Opinion

2023 WI 67 NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports. No. 2023AP1412-OA

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

Stephen Joseph Wright, Gary Krenz, Sarah J. Hamilton, Jean-Luc Thiffeault, Somesh Jha, Joanne Kane, and Leah Dudley,

Petitioners,

v.

Wisconsin Elections Commission; Don Millis, FILED Robert F. Spindell, Jr., Mark L. Thomsen, Ann S. Jacobs, Marge Bostelmann, Joseph J. Oct. 6, 2023 Czarnezki, in their official capacities as Members of the Wisconsin Elections Commission; Samuel A. Christensen Clerk of Supreme Court and Meagan Wolfe, in her official capacity as Administrator of the Wisconsin Elections Commission,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER OF JUSTICE JANET C. PROTASIEWICZ No. 2023AP1412-OA

Before JANET C. PROTASIEWICZ, J.

¶1 On August 1, 2023, I swore a sacred oath to "faithfully

and impartially discharge the duties of [my] office."1 In taking

that oath, I promised——above all else——to decide cases based only

on the rule of law, not my own personal opinions. Each of my

colleagues has taken the same oath. We all strive to be fair and

impartial in our work: "We're people . . . . We have opinions on

the issues of the day. Once we put the black robe on . . . we put

those opinions aside."2

¶2 Here, individual Wisconsin citizens ask the court to

hear an original action concerning the State's legislative

districts. The Wisconsin Legislature seeks to intervene and has

asked me to recuse.3

See Wis. Stat. § 757.02(1) (2021-22) (setting forth the oath 1

of office for judges and justices). All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated.

Patrick Marley, Election 2016: Bradley, Kloppenburg Clash 2

Again During Debate, Milwaukee J. Sentinel (Mar. 17, 2016) https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/03/1 8/election-2016-bradley-kloppenburg-clash-again-during- debate/84898270 (quoting Rebecca G. Bradley). 3 I refer to the movant as "the Legislature."

2 No. 2023AP1412-OA

¶3 Recusal decisions are controlled by the law. They are

not a matter of personal preference. If precedent requires it, I

must recuse. But if precedent does not warrant recusal, my oath

binds me to participate. As Justice Alito has emphasized: "When

there is no sound reason for a Justice to recuse, the Justice has

a duty to sit."4 That is true even when a case is controversial,

or when my decision may upset those who would rather I step aside.

Respect for the law must always prevail. Allowing politics or

pressure to sway my decision would betray my oath and destroy

judicial independence. As Justice Prosser has warned, unjustified

recusal can affect the integrity of the judicial branch:

"Successful recusal motions alter the composition of the Wisconsin

Supreme Court, so that, in a very real sense, a party moving for

a justice's recusal is trying to change the composition of the

court that will hear its case."5

¶4 Strict adherence to the law is especially important

here. This recusal motion has been filed by a co-equal branch of

government. I take its request seriously. I also appreciate that

4 Moore v. United States, No. 22-800, at 1 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2023) (Statement of Alito, J.). 5 See Appendix B, Justice David T. Prosser's Decision Accompanying Order Denying Mot. for Recusal, State ex rel. Three Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, Nos. 2013AP2504-08-W, at 9 (Wis. July 29, 2015).

3 No. 2023AP1412-OA

this motion has engendered strong feelings in some quarters among

people of good faith.

¶5 In deciding this motion, I have searched the law books—

—and my conscience——to ensure a correct and impartial ruling. I

have reviewed the parties' arguments. I have studied the facts.

And I have examined every relevant precedent. Ultimately, I have

found I must deny the recusal motion. Before turning to my full

analysis, I will summarize why I have reached that conclusion.

I. SUMMARY ¶6 The Legislature first argues that I must recuse because

the Democratic Party of Wisconsin (DPW) made substantial

contributions to my campaign ($9.9 million) and would benefit if

this court were to order the adoption of new maps. In the

Legislature's view, due process prohibits me from hearing this

case because a particular possible resolution may benefit a

campaign donor.6

¶7 This claim lacks merit for two reasons. First, the

Legislature has not cited——and I have not found——any case in which

a judge recused because a political party that was not involved in

the litigation had contributed to their campaign. To the contrary,

The Legislature presses this argument in reliance on 6

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1208 (2009), which I discuss at greater length below.

4 No. 2023AP1412-OA

judges of all political affiliations have denied such motions.7

And justices of this court have repeatedly participated in

redistricting cases despite receiving substantial support from

politically affiliated groups during their campaigns. For

example, no justice recused from Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections

Commission, 2022 WI 19, 401 Wis. 2d 198, 972 N.W.2d 559, even

though many had received outsized partisan or ideological

financial support during their latest campaigns.8

¶8 Here, the Legislature focuses on contributions that I

received from the DPW. But the DPW is not a litigant and plays no

role in this case. Rather, this original action petition has been

filed by citizens who allege violations of their own individual

rights. Those citizens, moreover, are not mere stand-ins for a

political party. As voters, they claim to advance legal interests

in excluding partisan influence of all kinds from the districting

process. Taken at face value, those interests may, in some

circumstances, contradict the interests of the DPW. Thus, for me

7See, e.g., Harper v. Hall, 867 S.E.2d 326 (N.C. 2022); Dickson v. Rucho, 735 S.E.2d 193 (N.C. 2012). 8See Derek Clinger & Robert Yablon, Explainer: Judicial Recusal in Wisconsin and Beyond, State Democracy Research Initiative, at 26-28 (Sept. 5, 2023), available at: https://uwmadison.app.box.com/s/k2bx0l2b9vwsgiqfl4sfoiwt8m3j43qc (discussing examples involving Justices Rebecca Grassl Bradley, Rebecca Frank Dallet, Brian Hagedorn, and Jill J. Karofsky).

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to recuse myself based on campaign contributions from the DPW——a

non-party to this case——would be unprecedented.

¶9 Accepting the Legislature's theory would also raise a

swarm of continuing difficulties for each justice. In recent

Wisconsin Supreme Court races, the victor has received substantial

financial support from a single entity. In 2016, the Wisconsin

Alliance for Reform spent $2.6 million supporting Justice Rebecca

Grassl Bradley's campaign (comprising 46.2 percent of total

spending in that election). In 2018, Greater Wisconsin Committee

spent $940,000 supporting Justice Rebecca Frank Dallet's campaign

(comprising 17 percent of total spending in that election). In

2019, the Republican State Leadership Committee spent $1.25

million supporting Justice Brian Hagedorn's campaign (comprising

15.2 percent of total spending in that election). In 2020, A

Better Wisconsin Together Political Fund spent $1.88 million

supporting Justice Jill J. Karofsky's campaign (comprising 18.8

percent of total spending in that election). And in 2023——where

the total amount of money spent in support of both candidates

obliterated historical records——the DPW spent $9.9 million

supporting my campaign (still comprising only 19.4 percent of total

spending in that election). This trend is likely to persist.9

9 The facts in this paragraph are drawn from Clinger & Yablon, supra note 8, at 26-28.

6 No. 2023AP1412-OA

¶10 It would be unworkable, and again unprecedented, to

conclude that the Due Process Clause requires every elected judge

to recuse whenever their involvement might be predicted (before

they have even cast a vote) to benefit non-parties who supported

their campaign. Indeed, this court would grind to a halt if that

were the constitutional standard for recusal. We would be flooded

with requests for "conservative" or "liberal" justices to recuse

whenever a case involved issues of great social or political

importance to any major campaign funder. See County of Dane v.

Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 2022 WI 61, ¶91, 403 Wis. 2d 306, 976 N.W.2d

790 (Hagedorn, J., concurring) ("We have seen bias and recusal

allegations increase greatly in recent years, turning the

obligation of adjudicator impartiality into a litigation

weapon."). In a system of elected judges, it is inevitable that

outside groups and political parties will support candidates whose

judicial philosophies are hoped to align with their own worldviews.

When those groups participate in a case as litigants, recusal may

well be warranted as a matter of good judgment (though it is not

currently required by Wisconsin law).10 Yet it would turn precedent

on its head, and confound the administration of this court, for

justices to recuse whenever a possible outcome of a case could

10 See SCR 60.04(7).

7 No. 2023AP1412-OA

potentially be seen as beneficial to a non-party campaign

supporter.11

¶11 For that reason alone, the Legislature's argument based

on campaign contributions cannot succeed. But there is a separate,

second reason: under binding United States Supreme Court

precedent, the nature and amount of the DPW's contribution comes

nowhere close to requiring my recusal.

¶12 In this respect, the Legislature's position is

foreclosed by Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., 556 U.S.

868 (2009). Caperton is the first and only decision of the United

States Supreme Court to require judicial recusal based on campaign

contributions. And the facts of that case were "exceptional."

Id. at 884. While a case was pending against his company, a CEO

spent $3 million promoting the election of a judge who won a spot

on West Virginia's highest court by merely 50,000 votes——and who

then cast the deciding vote to overturn a $50 million verdict

against the CEO's company in that very same pending case. Id. at

873-76. The CEO's $3 million in donations, moreover, had totally

11In reaching this conclusion, I do not foreclose the possibility that Caperton could require an elected judge to recuse based on contributions from a non-party. But cases involving campaign contributions from a political party are an especially weak fit for that possibility. Indeed, many states have partisan judicial elections, and it has not been suggested that party- backed judges must recuse from all cases where the outcome could matter to their party.

8 No. 2023AP1412-OA

flattened the field: it vastly exceeded the amount spent by all

other supporters of the judge; it was more than three times the

amount spent by the judge's own campaign committee; and it

surpassed by $1 million the total amount spent by the campaign

committees for both of the candidates combined. See id. at 873.

¶13 Caperton recognized that its rule would apply only in

"rare instances." Id. at 890; see also id. at 887 ("The facts now

before us are extreme by any measure."). Indeed, "nowhere in the

Caperton decision does the Supreme Court state that any lesser

fact situation would have required [the judge's] recusal in that

case, and nowhere does the Supreme Court conclude that he would be

required to recuse himself from an unrelated civil case that

involved different parties." State v. Allen, 2010 WI 10, ¶269,

322 Wis. 2d 372, 778 N.W.2d 863 (Ziegler, J., concurring).

¶14 Here, as explained above, the Legislature seeks recusal

in an "unrelated civil case that involve[s] different parties."

Id. Moreover, this is obviously a "lesser factual situation."

Id. In Caperton, the CEO spent 300 percent more than the judge's

campaign committee; here, the DPW's contribution was only 57

percent of the spending by my campaign committee, and was merely

33 percent of the total spending in support of my campaign. In

Caperton, the CEO's donations fully eclipsed all other spending in

the election; here, the DPW's contribution was just 19 percent of

all spending on the race. In Caperton, the CEO's expenditures

9 No. 2023AP1412-OA

were concerning partly because his favored judge won by only 50,000

votes; here, I defeated Justice Kelly by a decisive 11 percent of

the vote (the very same margin by which Justice Kelly lost to

Justice Karofsky only three years earlier). And in Caperton, the

CEO spent $3 million while his own case was already pending before

the West Virginia courts; here, these original action petitions

were filed months after the election had already concluded.

¶15 Under Caperton, these distinctions make all the

difference. The DPW's contribution was too small a percentage of

my campaign committee's fund, and too small a percentage of the

overall spending on the race, to warrant my disqualification——

especially given that the election was not close and this original

action petition was not even pending at the time. While the total

amount of the DPW's contribution was surely substantial, the 2023

election broke all historical records in Wisconsin. Compared to

total election spending, it falls far short of Caperton's recusal

standard.

¶16 This brings me to the Legislature's second argument:

that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution

requires recusal because, while campaigning, I described the

legislative maps as "gerrymandered," "rigged," and "unfair," and

I expressed disagreement with the Johnson case (which ordered the

adoption of these maps). The Legislature views this as legally

impermissible.

10 No. 2023AP1412-OA

¶17 There are two fundamental issues with the Legislature's

position. The first is factual. While making many of the

statements that the Legislature spotlights, I also emphasized that

these were descriptions of my personal "values," not pledges of

"what I'm going to do on a particular case." Elsewhere, I

explained: "I plan to follow the law. I tell you what my values

are because I think that Supreme Court candidates should share

with the community and the electorate what their values are.

Nonetheless, I will uphold the law [and] follow the Constitution

when I make any decisions. Nothing is prejudged." I also made

clear: "[W]hat my real values are and what's going to happen in

a case can be two different things, right? I mean, follow the

law, you look at the case law, you look at the statutes, you look

at the constitution, and you follow where . . . it leads you."

And again: "I follow laws I don't always necessarily like or agree

with. You follow the law."

¶18 These statements——and there are many of them——expressed

my fundamental commitments as a judge. I will set aside my

opinions and decide cases based on the law. There will surely be

many cases in which I reach results that I personally dislike.

That is what it means to be a judge. See Caperton, 556 U.S. at

891 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("All judges take an oath to uphold

the Constitution and apply the law impartially, and we trust that

they will live up to this promise.").

11 No. 2023AP1412-OA

¶19 The second issue with the Legislature's position is that

it is foreclosed by federal precedent. As two legal experts

recently explained, "[n]o Supreme Court case has ever held that

due process required a judge to recuse because of the judge's

expression of views, whether on the campaign trail or elsewhere.

In fact, the Court has rejected several such claims."12 Thus, "[no]

decision of the [United States Supreme] Court would require us to

hold that it would be a violation of procedural due process for a

judge to sit in a case after he had expressed an opinion as to

whether certain types of conduct were prohibited by law." FTC v.

Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702-03 (1948).

¶20 More recently, the United States Supreme Court struck

down a Minnesota rule that banned judicial candidates from

announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues. See

Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). Writing

for the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia made clear that "[a] judge's

lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a

case has never been thought a necessary component of equal justice,

and with good reason." Id. at 777. "For one thing, it is virtually

impossible to find a judge who does not have preconceptions about

the law." Id. Nor should anybody want to elect such a judge:

"Proof that a Justice's mind at the time he joined the Court was

12 Clinger & Yablon, supra note 8, at 10.

12 No. 2023AP1412-OA

a [blank slate] in the area of constitutional adjudication would

be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias." Id. at

778 (quoted source omitted). The truth is that "avoiding judicial

preconceptions on legal issues is neither possible nor desirable."

Id. And it would violate the First Amendment to "censor what the

people hear as they undertake to decide for themselves which

candidate is most likely to be an exemplary judicial officer."

Id. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

¶21 Consider the point practically. Many other justices

have written opinions expressing strong views on the legality of

the current legislative maps.13 Only a month ago, one justice wrote

an opinion in this very proceeding that describes the mere

consideration of this original action petition as a "mockery of

our justice system."14 No other justice has decided that they must

recuse, even though their prior writings (including from just last

year) might indicate firm preconceptions of certain issues in this

action. And if prejudgment is the concern, their writings are

just as relevant as my campaign remarks. As Justice Scalia

explained, "we doubt . . . that a mere statement of position

13 See generally Johnson, 401 Wis. 2d 198.

See Wright v. Wisconsin Elections Comm'n, No. 2023AP1412- 14

OA, unpublished order (Wis. Aug. 15, 2023) (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting), available at: https://acefiling.wicourts.gov/ document/eFiled/2023AP001412/692191.

13 No. 2023AP1412-OA

enunciated during the pendency of an election will be regarded by

a judge as more binding . . . than a carefully considered holding

that the judge set forth in an earlier opinion." Republican Party,

536 U.S. at 781.

¶22 Simply put: If issuing an opinion does not disqualify

a judge from hearing future cases that involve similar issues,

then neither does expressing agreement with an opinion or

describing my values about political issues. That is particularly

true here, where I made no pledge about the result of any case,

where I repeatedly disavowed any such pledge or promise, where

this case did not even exist during my campaign, and where I made

clear I will vote based only on the rule of law.15

¶23 That leaves only the Legislature's contention that my

recusal is required by Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g) and (f).

Paragraph (g) simply requires me to make the subjective

determination that I can decide this case impartially both in fact

and appearance. I have determined that I can do both. Paragraph

(f) requires me to determine whether I have a "significant personal

interest" in the outcome of this case. The Legislature claims

that I have a personal interest in keeping my word by invalidating

This conclusion follows from all the precedents cited 15

herein and also under an application of the objective "actual bias" standard from the Caperton case (which applies to campaign statements, as well).

14 No. 2023AP1412-OA

Wisconsin's legislative maps. That argument fails because I made

no promise or commitment to voters about how I would decide any

case. I simply expressed my personal opinions as permitted by

Republican Party. When I put on my robe, I put my personal opinions

aside.

¶24 Consistent with the oath I swore, my highest obligation

is to "faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of [my]

office." Those duties include participating in a case when the

law does not require me to recuse. Here, under that legal

standard, I must respectfully deny this motion.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Due Process Clause and Campaign Contributions

1. Facts

¶25 In 2016, Governor Scott Walker appointed Daniel Kelly to

the Wisconsin Supreme Court. After serving four years, he ran to

retain his seat in 2020. His opponent, now Justice Jill J.

Karofsky, won the election by almost 11 points.

¶26 In 2023, I ran for an open seat on the Wisconsin Supreme

Court, and Justice Kelly opposed me. Total spending on the race

smashed all records. Current estimates range from $51 million to

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$56 million, making it the most expensive state supreme court race

in the nation's history.16

¶27 In 2015, the Legislature (led by Republicans) enacted a

law permitting political parties to make unlimited donations

directly to a judicial candidate's campaign committee. See Wis.

Stat. § 11.1104(5). Pursuant to this law, the DPW donated $9.9

million to my campaign committee during the 2023 race.

¶28 Total spending in support of my campaign is currently

estimated to be $29.1 million. This figure includes the estimated

$17.4 million spent by my campaign committee and an estimated $11.7

million spent by outside groups. The DPW's contribution represents

about 33 percent of the total amount spent in support of my

campaign and 57 percent of the amount my campaign committee spent.

¶29 Total spending in support of Justice Kelly's campaign is

estimated to be over $20.5 million.

¶30 The DPW's $10 million contribution to my campaign

currently represents about 19 percent of the approximately $51

million price tag for the 2023 Wisconsin Supreme Court race.

The spending estimates in this section may be found at: 16

Wisconsin Supreme Court Race Cost Record $51M, Wis. Democracy Campaign (July 18, 2023) https://www.wisdc.org/news/press- releases/139-press-release-2023/7390-wisconsinsupreme-court- race-cost-record-51m.

16 No. 2023AP1412-OA

2. Caperton

¶31 The United State Supreme Court has found a due process

violation based on allegations of judicial bias only in

extraordinary circumstances. Prior to Caperton, two types of cases

required a judge to recuse. One was where the judge had financial

incentives to rule one way in a case. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 876

(citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)). The other was where

the judge charged a defendant with criminal contempt and then tried

to preside over the contempt proceedings. Id. at 880 (citing In

re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955)). The first and only time the

Court found a due process violation in the context of a judicial

election is Caperton. Id. at 884. The Court carefully limited

its holding to circumstances it called "extraordinary,"

"exceptional," "rare," and "extreme by any measure." Id. at 884,

887, 890.

¶32 In Caperton, a jury awarded a verdict of over $50 million

against Massey Coal Company. Id. at 872. Two years later, Massey

lost post-verdict motions. Id. Its next logical step was to file

an appeal. At that point, West Virginia held a supreme court of

appeals election. Id. at 873. Don Blankenship, Massey's CEO,

contributed $3 million to Attorney Brent Benjamin's bid to replace

incumbent Justice Warren McGraw on that court. Id. Benjamin won

the election by fewer than 50,000 votes. Id.

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¶33 Once in office, Justice Benjamin cast the deciding vote

to reverse the $50 million verdict against Massey. Id. at 874.

Against this backdrop, Caperton recognized that in "extreme" or

"extraordinary" situations a judge's receipt of a campaign

contribution from a litigant or a lawyer may require his recusal

under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 884, 886-87.

¶34 Caperton noted that "[n]ot every campaign contribution

by a litigant or attorney creates a probability of bias that

requires a judge's recusal." Id. at 884. A campaign contribution

offends due process where "there is a serious risk of actual bias—

—based on objective and reasonable perceptions." Id. That occurs

"when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a

significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on

the case by raising funds or directing the judge's election

campaign when the case was pending or imminent." Id. This test

requires a court to assess: (1) "the contribution's relative size

in comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the

campaign," (2) "the total amount spent in the election," and (3)

"the apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the

election." Id. at 884.

¶35 Applying this test, Caperton found the risk that

Blankenship's influence engendered actual bias was sufficiently

substantial that due process required Benjamin's recusal from the

case. Id. at 886-87. Blankenship donated $3 million to unseat

18 No. 2023AP1412-OA

the incumbent and replace him with Benjamin. Id. at 873.

Specifically, he contributed $1,000 to Benjamin's campaign

committee, almost $2.5 million to a political organization

supporting Benjamin, and $500,000 in independent expenditures to

pay for mailings, solicitations, and advertisements for Benjamin.

Id. Blankenship's contributions exceeded the total amount

contributed by all of Benjamin's other supporters by 300 percent.

Id. He spent $1 million more than the total amount spent by the

campaign committees of both candidates combined. Id. And Benjamin

won by less than 50,000 votes. Id.

¶36 Caperton also found the temporal relationship between

the campaign contributions, the justice's election, and the

pending case troubling. When Blankenship made his donations, it

was reasonably foreseeable that Benjamin would be reviewing a

judgment that cost his biggest donor $50 million. Id. at 886.

Caperton held: "On these extreme facts the probability of actual

bias rises to an unconstitutional level." Id. at 886-87.

3. Application of Caperton

a. "A Person With A Personal Stake In A Particular Case"

¶37 The Legislature's claim that the DPW's donation offends

due process fails for one simple reason: Caperton applies to

campaign spending by a "person with a personal stake in a

particular case." Id. at 884. Unlike Blankenship, who had a

direct personal and financial interest in the judgment against his

19 No. 2023AP1412-OA

company, the DPW is not a party to this case. I am not reviewing

a judgment against the DPW. Neither the petitioners in this case

nor their attorneys are alleged to have contributed to my campaign.

¶38 Nor are the petitioners stand-ins for the DPW. They are

citizens who allege violations of their own individual rights. As

voters, they claim to advance legal interests in excluding partisan

influence of all kinds from the districting process. They want

the maps ungerrymandered. For this reason, their interests may be

contrary to those of the DPW because they could also foreclose a

Democratic gerrymander in the future. To be blunt:

Ungerrymandering the map favors voters, not parties.

¶39 For me to recuse myself based on campaign contributions

from the DPW——a non-party to this case——would be unprecedented.

It would also raise unprecedented problems for my colleagues. In

recent Wisconsin Supreme Court elections, the winning candidate

has received substantial financial support from a single entity.

In 2016, Wisconsin Alliance for Reform spent $2.6 million

supporting Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's campaign, comprising

46.2 percent of total spending in that election. In 2018, Greater

Wisconsin Committee spent $940,000 supporting Justice Rebecca

Frank Dallet's campaign, comprising 17 percent of total spending

in that election. In 2019, the Republican State Leadership

Committee spent $1.25 million supporting Justice Brian Hagedorn's

campaign, comprising 15.2 percent of total spending on that

20 No. 2023AP1412-OA

election. In 2020, A Better Wisconsin Together Political Fund

spent $1.88 million supporting Justice Jill J. Karofsky's

campaign, comprising 18.8 percent of total spending that

election.17

¶40 The Legislature's dramatic expansion of Caperton would

force Wisconsin justices to recuse whenever their involvement in

a case might somehow indirectly benefit groups that provided

substantial support to their campaigns. It would invite litigants

to seek recusal of "conservative" or "liberal" justices whenever

a case involved issues of great social, political, or commercial

importance to any major campaign funder. See County of Dane, 403

Wis. 2d 306, ¶91 (Hagedorn, J., concurring) ("We have seen bias

and recusal allegations increase greatly in recent years, turning

the obligation of adjudicator impartiality into a litigation

weapon."). Instead of being rare, "disqualification would be

routine and even structural. Members of the court would be

prevented from hearing a substantial number of cases for the entire

duration of the terms they were elected by voters to serve, and

the court's ability to do its work would be compromised." See

Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Appellate Ct., No. 117689 at 11 (Ill.

Sept. 24, 2014) (Order of Karmeier, J.).18

17 Clinger & Yablon, supra note 8, at 28. 18 Available at: https://perma.cc/5TYD-ZHCF.

21 No. 2023AP1412-OA

¶41 The supreme court would grind to halt. This is not

hyperbole. As Wisconsin law stands, when a justice recuses, there

is no back-up justice to step in. The court proceeds with less

than a full bench. If even one justice recuses, the remaining six

justices may divide equally on the case, leaving a lower court

decision on an issue of statewide importance unreviewed and

unreviewable. State v. Henley, 2010 WI 12, ¶35, 322 Wis. 2d 1,

778 N.W.2d 853 (Memorandum of Roggensack, J.) (citing Laird v.

Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (Memorandum of Rehnquist, J.)). If two

or more justices recuse, the supreme court may be unable to issue

a majority opinion in the case.

b. "Significant and Disproportionate Influence"

¶42 The Legislature's due process claim also fails under

Caperton's three-factor test for assessing whether campaign

spending had "a significant and disproportionate influence" in

placing a judge on a case. In Caperton, Blankenship bankrolled

Benjamin' campaign. The facts of this case are nowhere close to

those "extreme" and "extraordinary" circumstances.

¶43 First, the DPW's contribution was 57 percent of the

spending by my campaign committee. The relative size of the DPW's

contribution is not unusual for a Wisconsin Supreme Court race.

In 2019, Justice Brian Hagedorn's campaign committee spent an

estimated $1.7 million. The Republican State Leadership Committee

spent $1.25 million (or 73 percent of his committee spending)

22 No. 2023AP1412-OA

supporting his campaign.19 In 2020, Justice Jill J. Karofsky

received about $1.36 million from the DPW, which was about 50

percent the amount spent by her campaign committee.20 Both justices

sat on the last redistricting case, Johnson, 401 Wis. 2d 198.21

¶44 Second, while the total amount of spending in support of

my campaign is unknown, it is currently estimated at $29.1 million.

The DPW's contribution represents about 33 percent of it. Total

spending in support of both candidates is currently estimated to

be $51 million, which means that the DPW's $9.9 million

contribution is just 19 percent of all spending on the race.

19Spending estimates for Justice Hagedorn's campaign and Justice Karofsky's campaign come from: Wisconsin Supreme Court Finance Summaries, Wis. Democracy Campaign (Apr. 26, 2021), available at: https://www.wisdc.org/follow-the-money/31- nonpartisan-candidates/656-wisconsin-supreme-court-finance- summaries. 20The Democratic Party of Wisconsin's contribution is noted in: PAC, Political Committee Contributions More Than Double in Four Years, Wis. Democracy Campaign (Aug. 21, 2020), available at: https://www.wisdc.org/news/press-releases/131-press-release- 2020/6669-pac-political-committee-contributions-more-than- double-in-four-years. 21Again, it is not unusual for justices to sit on redistricting cases despite having received substantial financial support from either the Republican Party or the Democratic Party. See, e.g., Harper v. Hall, 867 S.E.2d 326 (N.C. 2022) (regarding recusal decisions by Justice Anita Earls and Justice Paul Newby); Dickson v. Rucho, 735 S.E.2d 193 (N.C. 2012) (North Carolina Supreme Court's one-sentence order denying the motion for Justice Newby's recusal).

23 No. 2023AP1412-OA

¶45 Third, the 2023 Wisconsin Supreme Court election was not

even close. I won by a landslide. Cf. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 896

(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (questioning whether a contribution

has any effect in a landslide election). The historical record

suggests that the DPW's contribution had no impact on the outcome

of the 2023 election. Justice Kelly has never won a judicial race.

He was appointed to the supreme court. In 2020, he ran to retain

his seat and lost to Justice Karofsky by almost 11 points. In

2023, he lost to me by 11 points. The logical conclusion is that

the DPW's $10 million donation did not move the needle. It had no

discernible influence in placing me on this case.

c. "Temporal Relationship"

¶46 Caperton held that "[t]he temporal relationship between

the campaign contributions, the justice's election, and the

pendency of case is also critical." Id. at 886. Blankenship

contributed $3 million to Benjamin's campaign while Massey's case

was pending but before it filed an appeal. Id. at 873. This

timing made it "apparent that, absent recusal, Justice Benjamin

would review a judgment that cost his biggest donor's company $50

million." Id. at 886.

¶47 Again, the facts of this case are different. When the

DPW contributed to my campaign there was no pending or imminent

case for me to review. Yes, I said that I would enjoy taking a

fresh look at Wisconsin's legislative maps. However, the

24 No. 2023AP1412-OA

Legislature does not allege that I knew the identity of the

petitioners in this case or the nature of their claims. The

petitioners filed their original action four months after the

election. This is not the sort of temporal relationship that

alarmed the Caperton Court.

4. State ex rel. Three Unnamed Petitioners

¶48 My understanding of Caperton is supported by Justice

David Prosser's recusal decision in State ex rel. Three Unnamed

Petitioners v. Peterson, 2015 WI 103, 365 Wis. 2d 351, 875 N.W.2d

49. That case involved a John Doe investigation of alleged illegal

campaign coordination among certain candidates for elected office

and issue-advocacy groups. Several targets of the investigation

spent an estimated $3.3 million in support of Justice Prosser's

reelection effort——nearly eight times the amount spent by his

campaign committee. See Appendix B, Prosser Decision at 6.

¶49 According to Justice Prosser, Caperton did not require

his recusal. Id. at 9. There was no pending or imminent litigation

against the John Doe targets when they financially supported his

campaign several years earlier. Unlike Justice Benjamin, he was

an incumbent. And unlike West Virginia, Wisconsin had no procedure

for replacing a justice who withdraws from a supreme court case.

Justice Prosser observed that "in a very real sense, a party moving

for a justice's recusal is trying to change the composition of the

court that will hear its case." Id. He admitted that the relative

25 No. 2023AP1412-OA

size of the targets' campaign contributions——nearly eight times

the amount spent by his campaign committee——appeared "significant

and disproportionate" under Caperton. Id. at 10. He reasoned

that the contributions were necessary because, under Wisconsin

campaign finance law, there was no other way for his campaign

committee to respond to issue advocacy distorting his record. Id.

¶50 If Caperton did not compel Justice Prosser's recusal, it

certainly does not demand mine. The DPW is not party——or even a

subject of——this case. Its financial support is a fraction of,

not eight times, my campaign committee spending. Wisconsin still

does not have a procedure for replacing a justice who recuses from

a case. The Legislature is simply trying to change the composition

of the court that hears this case.

¶51 In sum, under Caperton, the distinctions above make all

the difference. The DPW's contribution was too small a percentage

of my campaign committee's fund and too small a percentage of the

overall spending on the race to warrant my disqualification——

especially given that the election was not close and this original

action petition was not pending at the time. While the total

amount of the DPW's contribution was surely substantial, the 2023

election broke all historical records in Wisconsin, and compared

to total election spending, the contribution falls short of

Caperton's recusal standard.

26 No. 2023AP1412-OA

B. Due Process And Campaign Statements

¶52 During my campaign, I gave interviews, participated in

candidate forums and debates, and traveled the state to speak with

voters. I expressed my frank opinions on Wisconsin's legislative

maps.22 My remarks at a January 9, 2023 candidate forum are

representative of what I said on the campaign trail:

So let's be clear here——the maps are rigged. Bottom Line. Absolutely positively rigged. They do not reflect the people in this state. They do not reflect accurately, representation in either the state assembly or the state senate. They are rigged. Period. I'm coming right out and saying that. I don't think you could sell to any reasonable person that the maps are fair . . . .

I believe the gerrymandering decision was wrong. But as I indicated to you before I can't ever tell you what I'm going to do on a particular case. But I can tell you my values and common sense tell you that it's wrong . . . .

So as I've indicated, I think those maps are rigged, I think they're unfair. I don't think they fairly reflect the population in our state.23

22The Legislature's brief includes more than 50 footnotes citing nearly 20 articles that quote me. They boil down to just nine instances where I commented on Wisconsin legislative maps: a January 9, 2023 candidate forum; a January 30, 2023 Wisconsin State Journal Candidate Questionnaire; a February 14, 2023 interview on Wisconsin Public Radio's Central Time; a March 1, 2023 Wedge Issues podcast; tweets on March 3, 2023, and March 7, 2023; a PBS interview on March 9, 2023; and a March 21, 2023 candidate debate. I provide citations for my comments on each of the occasions in Appendix A. 23 Wisconsin Supreme Court Candidate Forum. See Appendix A.

27 No. 2023AP1412-OA

¶53 I made very similar comments on other occasions during

my campaign. I also told voters the following:24

I can't ever tell you what I'm going to do on a particular case.25

I'll always be an impartial justice who upholds our Constitution.26

[W]hile I talk about some of the other issues that are important to both me and all Wisconsinites, all of my decisions are going to be rooted in the law. I plan to follow the law. I tell you what my values are because I think that Supreme Court candidates should share with the community and the electorate what their values are. Nonetheless, I will uphold the law [and] follow the Constitution when I make any decisions. Nothing is prejudged.27

[W]hat my real values are and what's going to happen in a case can be two different things, right? I mean, follow the law, you look at the case law, you look at the statutes, you look at the constitution, and you follow where, you know, it leads you.28

[R]emember I'm running for a judicial spot. I can't promise anybody anything. I can tell you what my personal value is.29

But the question is am I able to fairly make a decision on a case. Of course I am. That's what I spent my entire career doing. I follow laws I don't always necessarily like or agree with. You follow the law.

24 I made these statements on occasions noted in Appendix A. 25 Wisconsin Supreme Court Candidate Forum. See Appendix A. 26 Wisconsin State Journal. See Appendix A. 27 Wisconsin Public Radio. See Appendix A. 28 Wedge Issues Podcast. See Appendix A. 29 Pod Save America. See Appendix A.

28 No. 2023AP1412-OA

That's what you do. I can assure you that every single case that I will ever handle will be rooted in the law. One hundred percent.30

¶54 The Wisconsin Judicial Commission investigates and

prosecutes allegations that a judge or judicial candidate has

violated the Wisconsin Code of Judicial Conduct. The commission

received multiple complaints alleging that on several occasions,

including at the January 9, 2023 candidate forum, I violated

several code provisions by stating my personal views on

"contentious political issues."31

¶55 First, I allegedly violated the Preamble to the Code,

which requires me to "respect and honor the judicial office as a

public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in our

legal system."

¶56 Second, I allegedly violated SCR 60.02, which provides,

in part, that a judge shall maintain "high standards of conduct

and shall personally observe those standards so that the integrity

and independence of the judiciary will be preserved."

30 Wisconsin Supreme Court Candidate Debate. See Appendix A. 31The complaint and the Wisconsin Judicial Commission's decision are attached to my September 5, 2023 order for supplemental briefing. See Wright v. Wisconsin Elections Comm'n, No. 2023AP1412-OA, unpublished order (Wis. Sept. 5, 2023), available at: https://acefiling.wicourts.gov/document/eFiled/ 2023AP001412/700504.

29 No. 2023AP1412-OA

¶57 Third, I allegedly violated SCR 60.06(3)(a), which, in

part, requires a candidate for judicial office to

"maintain . . . the dignity appropriate to judicial office and the

integrity and independence of the judiciary" and prohibits a

candidate for judicial office from manifesting "bias or prejudice

inappropriate to judicial office."

¶58 Fourth, I allegedly violated SCR 60.06(3)(b), which

prohibits a candidate for judicial office from making "pledges,

promises, or commitments" "with respect to cases, controversies,

or issues that are likely to come before the court."

¶59 On May 31, 2023, the commission issued a decision stating

it had held a meeting, reviewed the complaints, and "carefully

considered" the Code of Judicial Conduct provisions noted above in

addition to Republican Party, 536 U.S. at 788; Duwe v. Alexander,

490 F. Supp. 2d 968, 976 (W.D. Wis. 2007); and other authorities.

The commission dismissed the complaints without action and

declared the matter "closed." By declining to file a formal

complaint against me, the commission determined that the

allegations against me lacked probable cause. See Wis. Stat.

§ 757.85(3), (5).

2. Due Process and Prejudgment

¶60 The Legislature assails my statements that Wisconsin's

legislative maps are "gerrymandered," "rigged," and "unfair;" that

the Johnson decision was wrong; and that I agree with the dissent

30 No. 2023AP1412-OA

in that case. According to the Legislature, these statements show

that I "promise[d] to 'ma[k]e new law' to achieve a desired

outcome," "clearly prejudged the case" in a way irreconcilable

with the Due Process Clause, and "announced that [my] mind is

firmly made up on the outcome" of this case. Allegedly, when I

"declared [my] prejudgment of the maps, 'it became at once apparent

that, absent recusal,' [I] would be deciding the validity of

something [I] already believed to be invalid."

¶61 There are two fundamental flaws in the Legislature's

position. The first is factual. As noted above, while making the

statements that the Legislature spotlights I also stressed that

these were descriptions of my personal "values," not pledges of

"what I'm going to do on a particular case." My repeated

assurances that I would follow the law where it leads me expressed

opinions and decide cases based on the law. There will surely be

many cases where I reach results that I personally dislike. That

is what it means to be a judge. See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 891

(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("[A]ll judges take an oath to uphold

the Constitution and apply the law impartially, and we trust that

¶62 The second flaw in the legislature's position is that it

is foreclosed by federal precedent. The Due Process Clause

requires "[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal." In re Murchison,

31 No. 2023AP1412-OA

349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). It does not prohibit a judge from

sitting on a case after expressing an opinion on an issue. As two

legal experts recently explained, "[n]o Supreme Court case has

ever held that due process required a judge to recuse because of

the judge's expression of views, whether on the campaign trail or

elsewhere."32 In fact, the Court has rejected such claims. See

FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. at 702-03 ("[No] decision of this

Court would require us to hold that it would be a violation of

procedural due process for a judge to sit in a case after he had

expressed an opinion as to whether certain types of conduct were

prohibited by law."); United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421

(1941) ("That [the Secretary of Agriculture] not merely held but

expressed strong views on matters believed by him to have been in

issue, did not unfit him for exercising his duty in subsequent

proceedings ordered by this Court."); id. (like judges, cabinet

officers charged with adjudicatory functions "are assumed to be

men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging

a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own

circumstances."); see also Franklin v. McCaughtry, 398 F.3d 955,

962 (7th Cir. 2005) ("We are not saying that due process would be

offended if a judge presiding over a case expressed a general

opinion regarding a law at issue in a case before him or her.").

32 Clinger & Yablon, supra note 8, at 10.

32 No. 2023AP1412-OA

¶63 More recently, the United States Supreme Court struck

announcing their views of disputed legal or political issues. See

Republican Party, 536 U.S. 765. Writing for the Court, Justice

Scalia made clear that "[a] judge's lack of predisposition

regarding the relevant legal issues in a case has never been

thought a necessary component of equal justice, and with good

reason." Id. at 777. "For one thing, it is virtually impossible

to find a judge who does not have preconceptions about the law."

Id. Nor would anybody want to elect such a judge: "Proof that a

Justice's mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete

[blank slate] in the area of constitutional adjudication would be

evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias." Id. at 778

(quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (Memorandum of

Rehnquist, J.)). And it would violate the First Amendment to

"censor what the people hear as they undertake to decide for

themselves which candidate is most likely to be an exemplary

judicial officer." Id. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

¶64 Justice Scalia explained that judges "have often

committed themselves on legal issues that they must later rule

upon." Id. at 779 (majority opinion). "Most frequently, of

course, that prior expression will have occurred in ruling on an

earlier case." Id. But before arriving on the bench, judges also

state their views on disputed legal and political issues when

33 No. 2023AP1412-OA

teaching classes, giving speeches, or writing books. Id. Thus,

they cannot be barred from expressing their views while campaigning

for judicial office. Id. at 779-80 (noting that it is permissible

for a judicial candidate to say "I think it is constitutional for

the legislature to prohibit same-sex marriage" during his

campaign).

¶65 Disclosing a predisposition on an issue "is nothing more

than acknowledgement of the inescapable truth that thoughtful

judicial minds are likely to have considered many issues and formed

opinions on them prior to addressing the issue in the context of

a case." Duwe, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 975. In contrast, a pledge,

promise, or commitment "requires affirmative assurance of a

particular action. It is a predetermination of the resolution of

a case or issue. It is not a statement of belief or opinion."

Id. at 976. A judicial candidate violates the prohibition against

pledges, promises, or commitments when she uses phrases like "I

will" or "I will not." See id. "Phrases like 'I believe' or 'It

is my opinion' signal the absence of a commitment." Id. at 976.

¶66 Justice David Wecht of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

recently applied these same principles to a situation closely

resembling this one. See League of Women Voters of Pa. v.

Commonwealth, 179 A.3d 1080 (Pa. 2018). After the court declared

the state's legislative maps an unlawful partisan gerrymander, the

legislative respondents sought to disqualify him from the case.

34 No. 2023AP1412-OA

They asserted a due process violation based on Justice Wecht's

campaign statements calling gerrymandering "an absolute

abomination," "a travesty," "insane," and "deeply wrong." Id. at

1084. Justice Wecht said: "[e]xtreme gerrymandering

is . . . antithetical to the concept of one person, one vote."

Id. He had also described how Pennsylvania's maps favored

Republicans and said: "I challenge anybody to look at a map of

our districts and deem them to be compact and contiguous." Id.

¶67 Applying the Due Process Clause, Republican Party, and

Duwe, Justice Wecht held that his campaign statements "expressed

[his] thoughts on the topic, something manifestly distinct from a

clear commitment to rule in a certain way if presented with a

specific challenge based upon a well-developed factual record and

the benefit of full and fair advocacy." Id. He admitted that his

campaign rhetoric was "sometimes ardent" and that he "did not

always qualify [his] statements to clarify that [he] would view

each case on its individual merits." Id. at 1091. But he concluded

that the circumstances of his case were "wholly unlike" the narrow

situations in which the United States Supreme Court has mandated

recusal based on the Due Process Clause. Id. at 1092.

¶68 Now consider the practical implications of the

Legislature's argument. Many current justices on the Wisconsin

Supreme Court have written opinions expressing strong views on the

35 No. 2023AP1412-OA

legality of the current legislative maps.33 Only a month ago, one

justice wrote an opinion in this very proceeding that describes

the mere consideration of the petitioners' claims as a "mockery of

our justice system" and "degrad[ing] this court as an

institution."34 No other justice has decided that they must recuse,

even though their prior opinions might appear to indicate clear

preconceptions of certain issues here. And if prejudgment is the

concern, their opinions are just as relevant as my campaign

remarks. As Justice Scalia wrote, "[w]e doubt . . . that a mere

statement of position enunciated during the pendency of an election

will be regarded by a judge as more binding . . . than a carefully

considered holding that the judge set forth in an earlier opinion."

Republican Party, 536 U.S. at 780-81.

¶69 Simply put: If issuing an opinion does not disqualify

a judge from hearing future cases that involve similar issues,

describing my values about political issues. That is particularly

true here, where I made no pledge about the result of any case,

where I repeatedly disavowed any such pledge or promise, where

33 See generally Johnson, 401 Wis. 2d 198.

See Wright v. Wisconsin Elections Comm'n, No. 2023AP1412- 34

OA, unpublished order (Wis. Aug. 15, 2023) (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting), available at: https://acefiling.wicourts.gov/ document/eFiled/2023AP001412/692191.

36 No. 2023AP1412-OA

this case did not even exist during my campaign, and where I made

clear I will vote based only on the rule of law.

3. Caperton and Prejudgment

¶70 Lacking a single case holding that the Due Process Clause

requires a judge to recuse based on her campaign statements, the

Legislature again resorts to Caperton. As far as I can tell, no

court has ever applied Caperton in that way. In fact, some

justices on the Wisconsin Supreme Court dismissed an attempt to do

just that. See State v. Allen, 2010 WI 10, 322 Wis. 2d 372, 778

N.W.2d 863. Allen had filed a collateral attack on his criminal

conviction. On appeal, he asked the supreme court to disqualify

Justice Michael Gableman from the case due to his many campaign

statements portraying himself as a judge who will support the

prosecution over the defense in criminal cases and expressing bias

against people accused of crimes, the lawyers who defend them, and

the judges who uphold their rights.35

¶71 Justice Ziegler regarded the facts of Allen so far

removed from Caperton that the prisoner had no due process claim.

"[T]he allegations in Allen involve a judicial peer and fail to

state a due process claim because no 'person with a personal stake'

in Allen 'had a significant and disproportionate influence' in

35See Mot. for Recusal, Allen, 322 Wis. 2d 372 (Apr. 17, 2009), available at: https://perma.cc/8TAA-D7MU.

37 No. 2023AP1412-OA

placing Justice Gableman on the case 'by raising funds to directing

[his] election campaign when the case was pending or imminent."

Allen, 322 Wis. 2d 372, ¶271 (Ziegler, J., concurring) (quoting

Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884). "[N]owhere in the Caperton decision

does the Supreme Court state that any lesser fact situation would

have required Justice Benjamin's recusal in that case, and nowhere

does the Supreme Court conclude that he would be required to recuse

himself from an unrelated civil case that involved different

parties." Id., ¶269.

¶72 Requiring recusal when neither Allen nor the state had

any influence in placing Justice Gableman on the court, Justice

Ziegler reasoned, would "invent new law and . . . invite recusal

motions based upon 'spin' instead of whether a justice can be fair

and impartial." Id. By making allegations that "fail to state a

due process claim as set forth in Caperton, Allen's efforts

effectively amount to 'judge shopping.'" Id., ¶262. "'[J]udge

Shopping' damages this court as an institution, inappropriately

politicizes the court, and nullifies the votes of the electorate."

Id.

¶73 Justice Roggensack interpreted Caperton's holding even

more narrowly. She agreed that "Allen's allegations do not even

begin to approach a due process violation." Id., ¶231 (Opinion of

Roggensack, J.). She explained that his claim "is not comparable

to the claim made in Caperton. Caperton was based on claims of

38 No. 2023AP1412-OA

particularized bias against a party in a pending case because of

actions taken by the other party. . . . Those actions were alleged

to have directly benefitted a justice who at the time was about to

decide" the case. Id., ¶238 (citing Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884,

886).

¶74 The Legislature has likewise failed to state a claim

that my campaign statements about Wisconsin's legislative maps

violate due process under Caperton. Its motion is an attempt "to

invent new law" and amounts to judge shopping, which

inappropriately politicizes this court and attempts to nullify the

votes of the electorate. I decline to extend Caperton's holding

that far.

4. The Effect of the Wisconsin Judicial Commission's Decision

¶75 Finally, the Wisconsin Judicial Commission's May 31,

2023 decision provides the death blow to the Legislature's due

process argument. Codes of judicial conduct are the "principal

safeguard against judicial campaign abuses." Caperton, 566 U.S.

at 889 (quoted source omitted). "The Due Process Clause demarks

only the outer boundaries of judicial qualifications." Id.

"Because the codes of judicial conduct provide more protection

than due process requires, most disputes over disqualification

will be resolved without resort to the Constitution." Id. at 890;

see also State v. Hermann, 2015 WI 84, ¶120, 364 Wis. 2d 336, 867

N.W.2d 772 (Ziegler, J., concurring).

39 No. 2023AP1412-OA

¶76 The commission rejected claims that my campaign

statements undermined the integrity and independence of the

judiciary; demonstrated bias or prejudice; or committed me to a

decision on a case, controversy, or issue that was likely to come

before me.36 That disposes of the Legislature's claims that my

campaign statements violate due process.

¶77 For the sake of completeness, I want to clarify two

campaign statements that, as far as I can tell, the commission's

decision did not directly address. First, on the campaign trail

I said: "I would anticipate that I would enjoy taking a fresh

look at the gerrymandering question."37 Allegedly, this "invited

a legal challenge" to replace Wisconsin's maps. The Legislature

omits my qualification of that statement. I explicitly stated

that whether the issue "will come to the court is a completely

different question."38

¶78 Similarly, the Legislature isolates my comment

"[p]recedent changes when things need to change to be fair"39 from

my full remarks and calls it a "promise to 'ma[k]e new law' to

36 See supra note 31. 37 Wedge Issues Podcast. See Appendix A. 38 Wedge Issues Podcast. See Appendix A. 39 Wisconsin Supreme Court Candidate Debate. See Appendix A.

40 No. 2023AP1412-OA

achieve a desired outcome." I made this comment about precedent

in response to a general question about stare decisis. I was

talking about Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). I was not

referring to Johnson.40

¶79 Like my other campaign statements about Wisconsin's

legislative maps, my expressed desire to take a fresh look at the

maps and my explanation of stare decisis show that I had opinions

on political and legal issues of the day. Nothing more.

C. Wisconsin Law

1. Recusal Under Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g)

¶80 The Legislature contends that under § 757.19(2)(g) I

must recuse due to my campaign statements. Section 757.19(2)(g)

provides that "[a]ny judge shall disqualify himself or herself

from any civil or criminal action or proceeding . . . [when] a

judge determines that, for any reason, he or she cannot, or it

appears that she or she cannot, act in an impartial manner."

¶81 This determination is purely subjective. The judge

alone decides whether she can be impartial, and whether there is

an appearance of partiality. Section 757.19(2)(g) "does not

require disqualification in a situation where one other than the

judge objectively believes there is an appearance that the judge

is unable to act in an impartial manner" or in a situation where

40 Wisconsin Supreme Court Candidate Debate. See Appendix A.

41 No. 2023AP1412-OA

"the judge's impartiality 'can reasonably be questioned' by

someone other than the judge." State v. Am. T.V. & Appliance of

Madison, Inc., 151 Wis. 2d 175, 183, 443 N.W. 662 (1989); see also

Donohoo v. Action Wis. Inc., 2008 WI 110, ¶24, 314 Wis. 2d 510,

754 N.W.2d 480.

¶82 When a justice decides that, both in fact and in

appearance, she can act in a fair and impartial manner, the supreme

court's role is limited to determining that she went through the

required exercise of making the subjective determination.

Donohoo, 314 Wis. 2d 510, ¶24; State v. Harrell, 199 Wis. 2d 654,

663-64, 546 N.W.2d 115 (1996); Am. T.V., 151 Wis. 2d at 182-84.

¶83 In Donohoo, the appellant, citing § 757.19(2)(g) and the

Wisconsin Code of Judicial Conduct, moved to disqualify Justice

Louis Butler from a lawsuit against an organization dedicated to

protecting the civil rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and

transgender people. Justice Butler had received campaign

contributions from two board members of a political action

committee for the organization and a reelection endorsement by the

organization's attorney. He also gave a speech at a fundraiser

for a political action committee that supported LGBTQ equality.

Donohoo, 314 Wis. 2d 510, ¶¶8-14.

¶84 Despite these facts, Justice Butler declined to recuse

himself from the case. In a letter to the parties, he said that

he had consulted the Executive Director of the Judicial Commission

42 No. 2023AP1412-OA

about these matters. He disclosed the campaign contributions and

concluded: "Because campaign contributions will in no way affect

my judgment as to the outcome of this proceeding, I am writing to

advise you of my decision to participate in this case." Id., ¶32.

Donohoo held that by sending the letter and continuing to

participate in the case "Justice Butler clearly determined that he

could be impartial. That is all that is required by

§ 757.19(2)(g)." Id., ¶25.

¶85 Similarly, in Three Unnamed Petitioners the state moved

for Justice Prosser's recusal based partly on § 757.19(2)(g).

Despite having received $3.3 million in campaign support from the

targets of the John Doe investigation under review, he determined

that he could decide the case impartially and it would not appear

otherwise to a reasonable person who understands the facts.41

¶86 I likewise find no basis for my recusal under

§ 757.19(2)(g). I was a circuit court judge for 10 years before

becoming a supreme court justice. I have decided many difficult

cases. I approached them with an open mind and decided them based

on the facts and the law. I approach supreme court cases the same

way. In fact, during my campaign, I assured voters that "I will

always be an impartial justice who upholds the Constitution," "I

follow laws I don't always necessarily agree with," and that "every

41 See Appendix B, Prosser Decision at 2.

43 No. 2023AP1412-OA

single case that I handle will be rooted in the law." At my

investiture I solemnly swore that I would "faithfully and

impartially discharge the duties of the office to the best of my

ability so help me God." I meant what I said. I have considered

all of the facts and legal authorities presented for and against

recusal under § 757.19(2)(g). I determine that I can, in fact and

appearance, act in an impartial manner in this case.

2. Recusal Under Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(f)

¶87 The Legislature also contends that § 757.19(2)(f)

requires my recusal. Section 757.19(2)(f) provides that a judge

shall disqualify herself from a case when she "has a significant

financial or personal interest in the outcome of the matter." The

Legislature does not claim that I have a "financial interest" in

this case. It argues that because I "repeatedly declared to voters

how [I] would vote on the merits of this case" I have "a substantial

interest in keeping [my] word and preserving [my] reputation among

voters by invalidating the maps."

¶88 A recusal motion based on § 757.19(2)(f) is different

from a motion based on § 757.19(2)(g). Whereas § 757.19(2)(g)

requires the judge to make a subjective determination about her

ability to be impartial in fact and appearance, § 757.19(2)(f)

requires the judge to make an objective determination that she

does or does not have significant personal interest in the outcome

of a case as established by evidence and reasonable inferences.

44 No. 2023AP1412-OA

State ex rel. Dressler v. Cir. Ct. for Racine Cnty., 163 Wis. 2d

622, 643, 472 N.W.2d 532 (Ct. App. 1991). If the evidence and

inferences establish that the judge does have a significant

personal interest in a case, § 757.19(2)(f) requires her recusal.

¶89 The Legislature cites no case where a judge's campaign

statements were held to create a "significant personal interest"

in the outcome of a case thereby requiring recusal under

§ 757.19(2)(f). Moreover, the Legislature does not cite a single

instance during my campaign where I "declared to voters how [I]

would vote on the merits of this case." This case did not even

exist during my campaign. The petitioners filed it four months

after the election.

¶90 During my campaign, I told voters my personal values and

beliefs about Wisconsin's legislative maps and said that I would

enjoy taking a fresh look at them——as permitted by the First

Amendment and Republican Party. I did not say "I will" or "I will

not" decide this case or any other case a certain way. See Duwe,

490 F. Supp. 2d at 976. To the contrary, I repeatedly told voters

that I could not say how I would decide any particular case and

that I must follow the law where it leads me, even if I disagree

with it.

¶91 While Republican Party did not concern § 757.19(2)(f),

it considered and rejected the premise of the Legislature's

argument. In that case, Justice Scalia responded to the argument

45 No. 2023AP1412-OA

that campaign statements pose a special threat to open-mindedness

because once the candidate becomes a judge he will feel reluctant

to contradict them. Republican Party, 536 U.S. at 780. He

observed that this "might be plausible, perhaps, with regard to

campaign promises. A candidate who says 'if elected, I will vote

to uphold the legislature's power to prohibit same-sex marriages'

will positively be breaking his word if he does not do so." Id.

(emphasis in original). But it is not true that a judge who states

his position on issues during a campaign will feel compelled to

rule in accordance with them. Justice Scalia explained:

We doubt, for example, that a mere statement of position enunciated during the pendency of an election will be regarded by a judge as more binding——or as more likely to subject him to popular disfavor if reconsidered——than a carefully considered holding that a judge set forth in an earlier opinion denying some individual's claim to justice.

Id. at 780-781.

¶92 The Legislature offers no facts establishing or creating

a reasonable inference that my campaign statements created a

"significant personal interest" in the outcome of this case. Nor

does it cite any case to support that argument. I therefore

objectively determine that § 757.19(2)(f) does not require my

recusal.

¶93 The Legislature makes one passing reference to SCR

60.04(1)(b) without developing an argument. Rule 60.04(1)(b)

provides in part that "a judge may not be swayed by partisan

46 No. 2023AP1412-OA

interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism." It does not

support recusal under § 757.19(2)(f) because "a judge's propensity

to decide cases consistent with statements made or opinions

expressed during a campaign tend to demonstrate that he or she is

acting on personal principles previously stated and not deciding

the pending case on the basis of 'partisan interests, public clamor

or fear of criticism.'" Duwe, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 973. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Recuse filed by proposed

intervenor Wisconsin Legislature is denied.

47 Appendix A

APPENDIX A Campaign Statement Sources

1. Wisconsin Supreme Court Candidate Forum – Jan. 9, 2023

a. WisPolitics State Supreme Court Election Forum, WisconsinEye (Jan. 9, 2023), available at: https://wiseye.org/2023/01/09/wispolitics-state- supreme-court-election-forum.

2. Wisconsin State Journal – Jan. 30, 2023

a. Alexander Shur, Candidate Q&A: Wisconsin Supreme Court, Wis. State J. (Jan. 30, 2023), available at: https://madison.com/news/local/govt-and- politics/elections/candidate-q-a-wisconsin-supreme- court/article_fb416ee5-a99e-5a8f-b43d- d4652861a65e.html [https://perma.cc/EE2H-ZKZB].

3. Wisconsin Public Radio – Feb. 14, 2023

a. Jonah Beleckis, Janet Protasiewicz Thinks Judicial Candidates Should Be Open About Their Values, Wis. Pub. Radio (Feb. 14, 2023), available at: https://www.wpr.org/janet-protasiewicz-wisconsin- supreme-court-justice-primary-election [https://perma.cc/C9V6-N9C8].

4. Wedge Issues Podcast – Mar. 2, 2023

a. Jessie Opoien & Jack Kelly, Janet Protasiewicz Discusses Supreme Court Bid On Wedge Issues Podcast, Cap Times (Mar. 2, 2023), available at: https://captimes.com/news/government/janet- protasiewicz-discusses-supreme-court-bid-on-wedge- issues-podcast/article_111d3475-e040-5e43-a932- 06819cadc036.html.

5. X (f.k.a. Twitter) – Mar. 3, 2023

a. @janetforjustice, X (Mar. 3, 2023, 5:31PM), https://x.com/janetforjustice/status/16317996097511178 25?s=46&t=9FuOdnLF34m1gMWomZ5G-g. 6. X (f.k.a. Twitter) – Mar. 7, 2023

a. @janetforjustice, X (Mar. 7, 2023, 1:15PM), https://x.com/janetforjustice/status/16331847362636963 86?s=20.

7. PBS Wisconsin – Mar. 9, 2023

a. Zac Schultz, Janet Protasiewicz, Daniel Kelly On Wisconsin Redistricting, PBS Wis. (Mar. 9, 2023), available at: https://pbswisconsin.org/news- item/janet-protasiewicz-daniel-kelly-on-wisconsin- redistricting [https://perma.cc/4HH9-PXHP].

8. Pod Save America – Mar. 20, 2023

a. Pod Save America: Mugshots and Milk Shots (Live from Wisconsin!), Crooked Media (Mar. 20, 2023), available at: https://crooked.com/podcast/mugshots-and-milk- shots-live-from-wisconsin.

9. Wisconsin Supreme Court Candidate Debate – Mar. 21, 2023

a. State Bar of Wisconsin, WISC-TV, WisPolitics.com Supreme Court Debate, WisconsinEye (Mar. 21, 2023), available at: https://wiseye.org/2023/03/21/state-bar- of-wisconsin-wisc-tv-wispolitics-com-supreme-court- debate.