Case: 18-15172 Date Filed: 10/15/2019 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-15172 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cv-10139-JEM
STEPHEN DANIEL LEONARD,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
MONROE COUNTY FLORIDA, official capacity, LT. LANARES JOSEPH, official and individual capacity, CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC, official capacity, JORGE DOMINICIS, Chief Executive Officer of C.C.S., LLC., official capacity, RAUL CANER, M.D., official and individual capacities, et al.,
Defendants - Appellees. Case: 18-15172 Date Filed: 10/15/2019 Page: 2 of 7
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(October 15, 2019)
Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff Stephen Leonard, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se,* appeals the
district court’s sua sponte dismissal -- pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) --
of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil action. Plaintiff also appeals the denial of his motion
to recuse both the district court judge and the magistrate judge. No reversible error
has been shown; we affirm.
Plaintiff’s complaint arises from events that occurred while Plaintiff was
confined at the Monroe County Detention Facility (“Detention Facility”). Plaintiff
named as defendants Monroe County, Florida; officers employed by the Monroe
County Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”); members of the Detention Facility’s medical
staff; and the Florida Department of Health. Briefly stated, Plaintiff alleged that
* We construe liberally pro se pleadings. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). 2 Case: 18-15172 Date Filed: 10/15/2019 Page: 3 of 7
MCSO officers (1) denied Plaintiff access to the courts by refusing to mail (at the
Detention Facility’s expense) Plaintiff’s legal mail on grounds that Plaintiff had
exceeded his monthly postage allowance and (2) placed Plaintiff in administrative
confinement in retaliation for Plaintiff’s filing of grievances. Plaintiff also alleged
that members of the Detention Facility’s medical staff “misdiagnosed” Plaintiff
with Hepatitis C and refused to provide follow-up medical care.
The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) in which
he recommended that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). After considering Plaintiff’s objections
to the R&R, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and
dismissed (without prejudice) Plaintiff’s complaint. The district court also set a
deadline by which Plaintiff was permitted to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff,
however, appealed the district court’s dismissal without filing an amended
complaint.
Plaintiff had also moved to recuse the district court judge and the magistrate
judge, each of whom had issued unfavorable rulings against Plaintiff in prior cases.
In the R&R, the magistrate judge recommended denying the motion; the district
court denied the motion.
3 Case: 18-15172 Date Filed: 10/15/2019 Page: 4 of 7
I.
We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal under section
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d
1248, 1253 (11th Cir. 2017). In reviewing a dismissal under section
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), we apply the same standard that applies to dismissals under Fed.
R. Civ. P 12(b)(6). Id.
To survive dismissal, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). To state a plausible claim
for relief, plaintiffs must offer “factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
To state a claim for denial of meaningful access to the courts, a plaintiff
must allege an “actual injury” by demonstrating that his “efforts to pursue a
nonfrivolous claim were frustrated or impeded” by the complained-of conduct.
Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff must describe
4 Case: 18-15172 Date Filed: 10/15/2019 Page: 5 of 7
within his complaint the underlying cause of action in specific enough terms to
show that the underlying claim is “arguable” and “nonfrivolous.” Christopher v.
Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415-16 (2002).
Here, Plaintiff alleged no facts supporting his conclusory allegation that
Defendants’ failure to send his legal mail caused him injury. Nor did Plaintiff
describe the underlying cause of action that was purportedly frustrated or impeded
by Defendants’ conduct. The district court thus committed no error in concluding
that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for the denial of his right to meaningful access
to the courts.
The district court also concluded correctly that Plaintiff failed to state a
claim for unlawful retaliation. Plaintiff made only a conclusory assertion that he
was placed in administrative confinement in retaliation for filing grievances. But
Plaintiff’s complaint contained no factual allegations that would allow a reasonable
inference that a causal connection existed between Plaintiff’s protected speech and
his placement in administrative confinement. Plaintiff’s unsupported conclusory
assertion about a retaliatory motive is not enough to state a plausible claim for
relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Plaintiff has also failed to state a plausible claim for deliberate indifference
to a serious medical need. Plaintiff alleged only that he was “misdiagnosed” with
Hepatitis C and was denied follow-up medical care. Plaintiff, however, alleged no
5 Case: 18-15172 Date Filed: 10/15/2019 Page: 6 of 7
facts about his medical condition or symptoms. Nor did Plaintiff allege facts that
would support a finding that Defendants had subjective knowledge of Plaintiff’s
purported serious medical need or that Defendants disregarded consciously a
substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff’s health. See Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d
1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007) (discussing the elements of an Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claim).
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Case: 18-15172 Date Filed: 10/15/2019 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-15172 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cv-10139-JEM
STEPHEN DANIEL LEONARD,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
MONROE COUNTY FLORIDA, official capacity, LT. LANARES JOSEPH, official and individual capacity, CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC, official capacity, JORGE DOMINICIS, Chief Executive Officer of C.C.S., LLC., official capacity, RAUL CANER, M.D., official and individual capacities, et al.,
Defendants - Appellees. Case: 18-15172 Date Filed: 10/15/2019 Page: 2 of 7
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(October 15, 2019)
Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff Stephen Leonard, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se,* appeals the
district court’s sua sponte dismissal -- pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) --
of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil action. Plaintiff also appeals the denial of his motion
to recuse both the district court judge and the magistrate judge. No reversible error
has been shown; we affirm.
Plaintiff’s complaint arises from events that occurred while Plaintiff was
confined at the Monroe County Detention Facility (“Detention Facility”). Plaintiff
named as defendants Monroe County, Florida; officers employed by the Monroe
County Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”); members of the Detention Facility’s medical
staff; and the Florida Department of Health. Briefly stated, Plaintiff alleged that
* We construe liberally pro se pleadings. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). 2 Case: 18-15172 Date Filed: 10/15/2019 Page: 3 of 7
MCSO officers (1) denied Plaintiff access to the courts by refusing to mail (at the
Detention Facility’s expense) Plaintiff’s legal mail on grounds that Plaintiff had
exceeded his monthly postage allowance and (2) placed Plaintiff in administrative
confinement in retaliation for Plaintiff’s filing of grievances. Plaintiff also alleged
that members of the Detention Facility’s medical staff “misdiagnosed” Plaintiff
with Hepatitis C and refused to provide follow-up medical care.
The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) in which
he recommended that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). After considering Plaintiff’s objections
to the R&R, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and
dismissed (without prejudice) Plaintiff’s complaint. The district court also set a
deadline by which Plaintiff was permitted to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff,
however, appealed the district court’s dismissal without filing an amended
complaint.
Plaintiff had also moved to recuse the district court judge and the magistrate
judge, each of whom had issued unfavorable rulings against Plaintiff in prior cases.
In the R&R, the magistrate judge recommended denying the motion; the district
court denied the motion.
3 Case: 18-15172 Date Filed: 10/15/2019 Page: 4 of 7
I.
We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal under section
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d
1248, 1253 (11th Cir. 2017). In reviewing a dismissal under section
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), we apply the same standard that applies to dismissals under Fed.
R. Civ. P 12(b)(6). Id.
To survive dismissal, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). To state a plausible claim
for relief, plaintiffs must offer “factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
To state a claim for denial of meaningful access to the courts, a plaintiff
must allege an “actual injury” by demonstrating that his “efforts to pursue a
nonfrivolous claim were frustrated or impeded” by the complained-of conduct.
Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff must describe
4 Case: 18-15172 Date Filed: 10/15/2019 Page: 5 of 7
within his complaint the underlying cause of action in specific enough terms to
show that the underlying claim is “arguable” and “nonfrivolous.” Christopher v.
Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415-16 (2002).
Here, Plaintiff alleged no facts supporting his conclusory allegation that
Defendants’ failure to send his legal mail caused him injury. Nor did Plaintiff
describe the underlying cause of action that was purportedly frustrated or impeded
by Defendants’ conduct. The district court thus committed no error in concluding
that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for the denial of his right to meaningful access
to the courts.
The district court also concluded correctly that Plaintiff failed to state a
claim for unlawful retaliation. Plaintiff made only a conclusory assertion that he
was placed in administrative confinement in retaliation for filing grievances. But
Plaintiff’s complaint contained no factual allegations that would allow a reasonable
inference that a causal connection existed between Plaintiff’s protected speech and
his placement in administrative confinement. Plaintiff’s unsupported conclusory
assertion about a retaliatory motive is not enough to state a plausible claim for
relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Plaintiff has also failed to state a plausible claim for deliberate indifference
to a serious medical need. Plaintiff alleged only that he was “misdiagnosed” with
Hepatitis C and was denied follow-up medical care. Plaintiff, however, alleged no
5 Case: 18-15172 Date Filed: 10/15/2019 Page: 6 of 7
facts about his medical condition or symptoms. Nor did Plaintiff allege facts that
would support a finding that Defendants had subjective knowledge of Plaintiff’s
purported serious medical need or that Defendants disregarded consciously a
substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff’s health. See Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d
1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007) (discussing the elements of an Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claim).
We also reject Plaintiff’s contention that the district court failed to review de
novo the disputed portions of the R&R, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). First,
the district court said expressly that it had “reviewed the entire file and record,
[and] made a de novo review of the issues” presented in Plaintiff’s objections to
the R&R. Moreover, the structure of the district court’s order reflects that the
district court considered properly Plaintiff’s objections. The district court
explained -- correctly -- that all but one of Plaintiff’s objections had already been
addressed adequately by the R&R. In context, that the district court discussed in
detail only one of Plaintiff’s objections inadequately supports that the district court
failed to give due consideration to Plaintiff’s other arguments.
6 Case: 18-15172 Date Filed: 10/15/2019 Page: 7 of 7
II.
We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s rulings on a motion for
recusal. United States v. Bailey, 175 F.3d 966, 968 (11th Cir. 1999). We will
affirm a judge’s refusal to recuse unless “the impropriety is clear and one which
would be recognized by all objective, reasonable persons.” Id.
In his motion to recuse, Plaintiff asserted that the district court judge and the
magistrate judge were biased and prejudiced against pro se litigants generally and
against Plaintiff in particular. As evidence of the judges’ purported bias, Plaintiff
identified six earlier-filed civil actions (over which one or both judges presided) in
which Plaintiff says his claims were “dismissed for some technical or procedural
loophole.” We have said, however, that a judge’s adverse ruling -- without more --
is insufficient to demonstrate the requisite pervasive bias and prejudice against a
party that would mandate recusal. See Hamm v. Members of Bd. of Regents, 708
F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983). On this record, we see no abuse of discretion in
denying Plaintiff’s recusal motion.
We affirm the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to section
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and the denial of Plaintiff’s motion to recuse.
AFFIRMED.