Stephen A. Dobson v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: November 21, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01448
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 11 STEPHEN A. DOBSON, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01448-TL 12 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION FOR MORE v. DEFINITE STATEMENT 13 INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF 14 THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES et al., 15 Defendants. 16

17 This matter is before the Court on Local 15 Defendants’ motion for a more definite 18 statement. Dkt. No. 30. Having reviewed the motion, Plaintiff’s response (Dkt. No. 31), Local 15 19 Defendants’ reply (Dkt. No. 38), and the relevant record, the Court DENIES the motion. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 This is a case brought by a union member against his union. See generally Dkt. No. 18 22 (First Amended Complaint). Plaintiff Stephen A. Dobson is proceeding pro se. Plaintiff, a 23 member of the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, Moving Picture 24 Technicians, Artists and Allied Crafts of the United States, Its Territories and Canada 1 (“IATSE”), Local 15 (“Local 15”), alleges violations of the Labor–Management Reporting and 2 Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”) and National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). See id. at 10–21. In 3 his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiff names 15 Defendants—IATSE and its 4 International President Matthew Loeb (“IATSE Defendants”) and Local 15 and thirteen Local 15

5 officers (“Local 15 Defendants”). See id. at 4–9. 6 On August 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed his original complaint (Dkt. No. 1), along with a 7 motion to appoint counsel (Dkt. No. 14). On October 15, 2025, Plaintiff amended his complaint 8 as a matter of course. Dkt. No. 18; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). The FAC added further factual 9 allegations that had not been included in the original complaint. Compare Dkt. No. 18 at 10–21, 10 with Dkt. No. 1 at 8–16. 11 On October 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed an amended application for Court-appointed counsel. 12 Dkt. No. 21. On November 13, 2025, the Court referred the case to the Civil Rights Case 13 Screening Committee for Non-Incarcerated Litigant Cases of the Western District of 14 Washington’s Pro Bono Panel (“Screening Committee”). Dkt. No. 35 at 1. Noting the

15 complexity of the LMRDA and the “dense factual narrative” pleaded in the FAC, the Court 16 “conclude[d] that Plaintiff may benefit from the assistance of counsel in determining whether his 17 allegations support any viable causes of action.” Id. at 3. The Court directed the Screening 18 Committee to review the FAC and to make a recommendation to the Court as to whether 19 appointment of pro-bono counsel is warranted in this case. Id. at 3–4. The Court’s Order 20 contemplates that any appointed counsel will serve the limited purpose of drafting a second 21 amended complaint. See id. at 3 (citing Cruz-Droz v. Marquis, No. C17-1291, 2017 WL 22 6614256, at *5 (D. Conn. Dec. 27, 2017)). The Court expects to receive the Screening 23 Committee’s recommendation by December 15, 2025. See id. at 3.

24 1 Prior to the Court’s referral of the case to the Screening Committee, on October 31, 2025, 2 the Local 15 Defendants filed the instant Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement. Dkt. 3 No. 30. On November 3, 2025, Plaintiff responded to the motion by way of a motion to strike 4 (Dkt. No. 31), which he later clarified was intended as an opposition to Local 15 Defendants’

5 Rule 12(e) motion, not as an independent motion to strike. See Dkt. No. 34. On November 7, 6 2025, Plaintiff filed what he later termed an “updated response submission.” Dkt. No. 33.1 7 Two weeks later, on November 14, 2025, the IATSE Defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(6) 8 motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Dkt. No. 36. 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), “[a] party may move for a more definite 11 statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or 12 ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” “Rule 12(e) motions attack the 13 intelligibility of the complaint, not the lack of detail, and are properly denied where the 14 complaint notifies the defendant of the substance of the claims asserted.” United States v. Sequel

15 Contractors, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 2005). “Motions for a more definite 16 statement are viewed with disfavor, and are rarely granted.” Cellars v. Pac. Coast Packaging, 17 Inc., 189 F.R.D. 575, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999). “[T]he proper test in evaluating a motion under Rule 18 12(e) is whether the complaint provides the defendant with a sufficient basis to frame his 19

20 1 Strictly speaking, Plaintiff’s “updated response submission” (Dkt. No. 33) is an impermissible surreply. See LCR 7(b)(2); Zhai v. Jaddou, No. C23-1892, 2024 WL 1701973, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 19, 2024). The Court’s 21 November 5, 2025, minute order (Dkt. No. 32) was not an invitation for Plaintiff to file an updated version of his opposition brief (Dkt. No. 31) to Local 15 Defendants’ motion. Indeed, Plaintiff recognized as much in a short 22 submission filed on November 7, 2025. See Dkt. No. 34 at 2. The Court therefore disregards the “updated response submission” at Docket No. 33 and reminds Plaintiff that “it is axiomatic that pro se litigants, whatever their ability level, are subject to the same procedural requirements as other litigants.” Munoz v. United States, 28 F.4th 973, 978 23 (9th Cir. 2022). In any event, the primary difference between the response and updated response is that the latter requests that the Court sanction the Local 15 Defendants. See Dkt. No. 33 at 7–8. The Court finds nothing improper 24 about Local 15 Defendants’ motion and finds no grounds for sanctions. 1 responsive pleadings.” Harrell v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State. Univ., 710 F. Supp. 3d 742, 746 (N.D. 2 Cal. 2024) (quoting Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Musacchio, 695 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (N.D. 3 Cal. 1988) (internal quotation marks removed). 4 III. DISCUSSION

5 A. Motion for More Definite Statement 6 Local 15 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s pleading(s) “offer[] a lengthy narrative but no 7 indication as to what each Defendant is alleged to have done that is a violation of either” the 8 LMRDA or NLRA. Dkt. No. 30 at 2. Defendants summarize the original complaint as alleging 9 26 instances of wrongdoing committed by various Defendants. See id. at 2–4. The FAC, 10 Defendants assert, adds seven more. See id. at 4–5. Defendants assert that “[n]either Plaintiff’s 11 Complaint nor his Amended Complaint have a cause of action section where he explains which 12 facts relate to which cause of action.” Id. at 5. 13 Local 15 Defendants advance two arguments in support of their motion. First, they argue 14 that the FAC “is so vague that it cannot be answered.” Id. at 6. Second, they make a prudential

15 argument, asserting that a “more particular pleading would further the disposition of the action.” 16 Id. at 8. Neither sufficiently addresses a fundamental problem with the motion, which is that, 17 simply put, the FAC is coherent, articulate, and—inarguably—intelligible. 18 In making their vagueness-based argument, Local 15 Defendants utilize the pleading 19 standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). See Dkt. 20 No. 30 at 5, 7. But Iqbal (and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)) governs 21 motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), not motions for a more definite statement under Rule 22 12(e). Courts do not apply the Twombly–Iqbal standard to Rule 12(e) motions. See, e.g., Comm. 23 for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma Cnty. v. County of Sonoma, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1190–91

24 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (applying Iqbal to Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, but not to Rule 12(e) 1 || motion for more definite statement filed in the alternative). “Rule 12(e) motions properly target 2 incomprehensible claims rather than imprecisely pleaded claims.” Briah v. Doe, No. C15-403, 3 WL 9948210, at *2 (D. Or. Dec. 22, 2015). The Court concludes that Local Defendants do 4 need a more definite statement to answer Plaintiff’s pleading. 5 As to Local 15 Defendants’ argument that it would be more pragmatic to address the 6 || FAC’s “who did what” problem now, before discovery and further motion practice, Local 15 7 || Defendants do not provide any authority that demonstrates the propriety of taking such an 8 || approach. Although the line between Rules 12(e) and 12(b)(6) might not always be clear, courts 9 || routinely locate it, see Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 843 (9th Cir. 2000) 10 || (Reinhardt, J., concurring), and the Court is not aware of any case law in this Circuit that permits 11 || a court to construe a Rule 12(e) motion as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion on the basis of judicial 12 || economy. 13 IV. CONCLUSION 14 Accordingly, Local 15 Defendants’ Motion for More Definite Statement (Dkt. No. 30) is 15 || DENIED. 16 17 Dated this 21st day of November, 2025.

19 Tana Lin United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24