Stephanie Tisby v. Wal-Mart, Inc., Wal-Mart Claims Services, Inc., and Wal-Mart Louisiana, LLC

District Court, W.D. Louisiana·Decided June 8, 2026·No. 5:24-cv-00893·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA SHREVEPORT DIVISION

STEPHANIE TISBY CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-0893

VERSUS JUDGE ALEXANDER C. VAN HOOK

WAL-MART, INC., ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING

Stephanie Tisby (“Tisby”) filed a petition for damages against Wal-Mart, Inc., Wal-Mart Claims Services, Inc., and Wal-Mart Louisiana, LLC (collectively, “Walmart”) after she fell in a store parking lot. Record Document 1-2, at 1. After Walmart removed the petition to federal court, Tisby’s original counsel, Jacqueline Scott, withdrew her representation. Record Documents 12, 13. A few weeks later, Matthew Donald Hemmer (“Hemmer”) enrolled as counsel for Tisby. Record Documents 14, 15. About a year after litigation began, on August 11, 2025, Walmart served an offer of judgment (“Offer of Judgment”) on Tisby through her counsel, Hemmer. Record Document 41-4, at 1. The Offer of Judgment, Record Document 41-3, stated: Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants, Wal-Mart, Inc., Wal-Mart Claims Services, Inc. and Wal-Mart Louisiana, LLC, offer to allow judgment to be taken against them in this action in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000). This offer of judgment includes interest and attorney’s fees accrued to the date of acceptance, exclusive of costs. Defendants agree to pay plaintiff’s court costs accrued to the date of acceptance. This offer of judgment is made for the purposes specified in Rule 68 and is not to be construed as an admission of liability or that the plaintiff has suffered any damage.

Walmart later gave Tisby an extension until August 29, 2025 to respond to the Offer of Judgment. See Record Document 41-4. Over the following days, Hemmer attested that he and Tisby extensively discussed the Offer of Judgment. See Record Document 48, at 2-3. Then, on August 26, 2025, Tisby told Hemmer through email: “Please go ahead and settle the case.” Record Document 48-5, at 2. Out of caution, Hemmer gave Tisby a “cooling off” period of more than twenty-four hours for her to reconsider whether she wanted to accept the settlement offer. Id. at 1-2. Hemmer asked Tisby again: “[a]re you certain that you are instructing me to accept the settlement offer of $100,000 consistent with my prior emails?” Id. Tisby unequivocally responded: “Yes okay to settle.” Id. at 1. On August 29, 2025, before the Offer of Judgment expired, Hemmer notified

counsel for Walmart that Tisby had “authorized me to accept the offer of judgment and instructed me to do so right away.” Record Document 41-4, at 3. Hemmer then said: “I accept your offer of judgment to settle Ms. Tisby’s case.” Id. Ten minutes later, counsel for Walmart responded and requested that Tisby execute a document titled Full and Final Confidential Settlement, Release of All Claims and Indemnity Agreement (“Release Agreement”). Id. at 4; see also Record Document 41-2, at 1. Walmart said it needed that Release Agreement executed “prior to delivery of the

[settlement] check.” Record Document 41-4, at 4. Ultimately, before the closing of business on August 29, 2025, Walmart filed with the clerk of court a notice of settlement. Record Document 39. On September 2, 2025, the Court issued an order of dismissal (“Order of Dismissal”) that provided: “this action is hereby dismissed, without prejudice to the right, upon good cause shown within ninety (90) days of the signing of this Order, to

reopen the action if settlement is not consummated.” Record Document 40 (emphasis removed). Ultimately, Tisby refused to sign the Release Agreement and then terminated Hemmer’s representation. Record Document 48-8 (“I refuse to sign this fraudulent [Release Agreement] that you and Walmart attorneys drafted up. As of today, I no longer want you to represent me. You are terminated for the reason above.”); Record Document 43-3. Pending before the Court is an omnibus Motion to Enforce

Settlement Agreement or Enter Judgment Pursuant to Rule 68 and Motion to Deposit Settlement Funds into Registry of Court filed by Walmart. Record Document 41. Tisby, proceeding pro se, has responded to the pending motion, complaining about Hemmer’s communication and effectiveness and otherwise arguing the merits of her action.1 The Court begins, as it must, by determining whether it has jurisdiction to

consider the pending motion. Federal courts have limited jurisdiction and “possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute…which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Enforcing a settlement agreement “is more than just a continuation or

1 Because the Court found certain attachments in Hemmer’s sealed pleading, Movant’s Response to Defendants’ Motion to Enforce Settlement, Record Document 48, necessary to render this ruling, which is public, the Court will direct that the clerk of court unseal only those attachments that the Court has relied upon in the ruling. renewal of the dismissed suit and hence requires its own basis for jurisdiction.” Id. at 378. Nonetheless, a federal court has ancillary jurisdiction over a settlement agreement “if it explicitly retains jurisdiction over the agreement or incorporates the

agreement in its dismissal order.” Gilbert v. Greenwich Ins. Co., No. 20-336, 2021 WL 2954422, at *3 (W.D. La. June 29, 2021) (citing Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377). Here, the Order of Dismissal established that the Court retained jurisdiction for a period of ninety days to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement. The Order of Dismissal was issued on September 2, 2025, and Walmart filed the pending motion on September 29, 2025. Accordingly, because Walmart filed the pending motion well within the ninety-day period of retained jurisdiction, this Court has the authority to

enforce their settlement. In its omnibus motion, Walmart asks the Court to either enforce the Release Agreement or enter the Offer of Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 (“Rule 68”). Record Document 41, at 1. Under either circumstance, Walmart also requests leave to deposit the settlement funds into the registry of the Court and to be dismissed with prejudice from the action. Id. at 1-2. If Rule 68 applies, a federal court

has “no discretion whether or not to enter judgment,” so the Court begins its analysis there. Ramming v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 390 F.3d 366, 370 (5th Cir. 2004). Under Rule 68, the defendant in an action may serve upon the plaintiff an irrevocable offer of judgment. Ramming, 390 F.3d at 370. In turn, the plaintiff may “unconditionally accept the offer” within fourteen days through “written notice” to the defendant. Id. (discussing the ten day period of acceptance effective before the 2009 amendment); Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. If the plaintiff accepts the offer of judgment, either party may file the offer and acceptance with the clerk of court who “shall then enter the judgment.” Ramming, 390 F.3d at 370. As such, a “Rule 68 Offer of

Judgment is usually considered self-executing.” Id. Like all contracts, an effective Rule 68 offer of judgment requires an agreement between the parties through offer and acceptance. Mallory v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273, 1280 (6th Cir.

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Stephanie Tisby v. Wal-Mart, Inc., Wal-Mart Claims Services, Inc., and Wal-Mart Louisiana, LLC, (W.D. La. 2026).

Stephanie Tisby v. Wal-Mart, Inc., Wal-Mart Claims Services, Inc., and Wal-Mart Louisiana, LLC (Stephanie Tisby v. Wal-Mart, Inc., Wal-Mart Claims Services, Inc., and Wal-Mart Louisiana, LLC) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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Mallory v. Eyrich
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