Stephanie Schofield v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 31, 2020
• Docket: 19A-CR-1751
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jan 31 2020, 8:45 am regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Valerie K. Boots Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Darren Bedwell Attorney General of Indiana Marion County Public Defender Agency Matthew B. MacKenzie Appellate Division Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Stephanie Schofield, January 31, 2020 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-1751 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Appellee-Plaintiff. David Hooper, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49G12-1804-CM-12845

Kirsch, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1751 | January 31, 2020 Page 1 of 6 [1] Stephanie Schofield (“Schofield”) was convicted in a bench trial of criminal

mischief1 as a Class B misdemeanor and raises one issue, which we restate as

whether there was sufficient evidence to support her conviction.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [3] On December 8, 2017, Pamela Hearn (“Hearn”) returned to her home to find

Schofield sitting in her car in Hearn’s driveway. Tr. Vol. 2 at 11-12. Hearn was

familiar with Schofield because Schofield was dating her son John, and

Schofield and John had two children together. Id. at 9-10. When Hearn

arrived, she observed Schofield as she “jumped in her car and backed out of the

driveway at a high rate of speed.” Id. at 12. As Schofield drove away, she

nearly struck Hearn’s vehicle with her own. Id. at 14.

[4] Hearn pulled up to her home, exited her vehicle, and saw that many items

outside were damaged: windows and a window frame were cracked and

broken; siding was cracked and partially removed; a flower pot was knocked

over; a shepherd’s hook lawn ornament was bent at a forty-five degree angle;

her front door was scratched; and a Christmas wreath was broken. Id. at 16-23.

Next to Hearn’s broken window and damaged front door was a car jack that

did not belong to Hearn. Id. at 22-23.

1 See Ind. Code § 35-43-1-2(a).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1751 | January 31, 2020 Page 2 of 6 [5] On April 8, 2018, Schofield was charged with criminal mischief as a Class A

misdemeanor. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 18. The information alleged that

Schofield had damaged the door, window, siding, and lawn ornaments in front

of Hearn’s home. Id.

[6] On June 20, 2018, ten weeks after Schofield was charged, Schofield again came

to Hearn’s house, and the two women talked. Tr. Vol. 2 at 27. Hearn told

Schofield she was not supposed to be at the house and said, “[Y]ou broke my

window.” Id. at 38. Schofield responded, “I’ll pay for that window when John

pays for damages to my house.” Id. at 39.

[7] On May 16, 2019, Schofield was convicted following a bench trial of the lesser-

included offense of Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief following a bench

trial. Id. at 70. The trial court imposed a 180-day suspended sentence and

ordered Schofield to pay restitution to Hearn. Id. at 92; Appellant’s App. Vol. II

at 104-05. Schofield now appeals.

Discussion and Decision [8] Schofield contends the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for

criminal mischief as a Class B misdemeanor. She raises two arguments. First,

Schofield admits that Hearn’s property was damaged but argues the evidence

was insufficient to show that she was the person who damaged Hearn’s

property. She discounts Hearn’s testimony that she saw Schofield leaving

Hearn’s property by contending this testimony establishes only that she was

present at the scene of the crime, which, standing alone, is insufficient to

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1751 | January 31, 2020 Page 3 of 6 support an inference of participation in the crime. See Fox v. State, 179 Ind.

App. 267, 274, 384 N.E.2d 1159, 1165 (1979). Second, Schofield claims that

her statement that she would pay for the damage to Hearn’s window was

inadmissible and should not be considered in determining whether the evidence

to support her conviction was sufficient. Relying on Indiana Rule of Evidence

408, Schofield claims this statement was a statement of negotiation or offer to

compromise and was thus inadmissible. See Ind. Evidence Rule 408(a)(2).

[9] When we review the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d

124, 126 (Ind. 2005). Rather, we will affirm a conviction if we find that any

reasonable factfinder could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

when considering all the facts and inferences that favor the conviction. Bailey v.

State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009). The evidence need not exclude every

reasonable hypothesis of innocence, but it must support a reasonable inference

of guilt to support the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007).

To prove that Schofield committed criminal mischief as a Class B

misdemeanor, the State was required to show that Schofield recklessly,

knowingly, or intentionally damaged or defaced Hearn’s property without

Hearn’s consent. See Ind. Code § 35-43-1-2(a).

[10] The evidence was sufficient to support Schofield’s conviction for Class B

misdemeanor criminal mischief because the evidence reasonably supported an

inference that Schofield damaged Hearn’s home and other property. When

Hearn left her home on the morning of December 8, 2017, it was not damaged.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1751 | January 31, 2020 Page 4 of 6 Tr. Vol. 2 at 20, 21, 23. When Hearn returned home later that day, Schofield

was in Hearn’s driveway, and Hearn’s property was damaged. Id. at 13, 16, 17,

18, 23. A car jack that did not belong to Hearn was found on her property. Id.

at 22. Schofield drove away from Hearn’s residence at a high rate of speed. Id.

at 12, 14. When Hearn later confronted Schofield about Hearn’s broken

window, Schofield said, “I’ll pay for that window when John pays for damages

to my house.” Id. at 39. Viewed most favorably toward the verdict, these facts

support a reasonable inference that Schofield committed Class B misdemeanor

criminal mischief. See Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2015)

(presence at scene in connection with other circumstances that show

participation, and defendant’s conduct before, during, and after the offense may

raise a reasonable inference of guilt).

[11] We reject Schofield’s argument that Hearn’s testimony that Schofield said she

would pay for Hearn’s broken window was inadmissible because it was an offer

of settlement or compromise under Indiana Evidence Rule 408. Schofield

acknowledges that she did not object on this basis in the trial court, so this

argument is waived. See Laird v. State, 103 N.E.3d 1171, 1175 (Ind. Ct. App.

2018), trans. denied. Moreover, Schofield’s statement was admissible under

Indiana Evidence Rule 801(d)(2) as a statement by a party opponent. Finally,

as the State observes, Schofield is entitled to no relief under Indiana Evidence

Rule 408 because her statement was not made “during compromise

negotiations about the claim” with her party opponent, the State of Indiana, but

was instead directed at Hearn, Schofield’s victim.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1751 | January 31, 2020 Page 5 of 6 [12] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1751 | January 31, 2020 Page 6 of 6