Stephanie Elizabeth Way v. State

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedNovember 23, 2015
DocketA16E0016
StatusPublished

This text of Stephanie Elizabeth Way v. State (Stephanie Elizabeth Way v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stephanie Elizabeth Way v. State, (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).

Opinion

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________ November 13, 2015

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A16E0016. WAY v. THE STATE.

Stephanie Way brings this emergency motion from the trial court’s order denying her a supersedeas bond in the wake of its revocation of some of her probated sentence as to her conviction on 64 counts of violating OCGA § 20-2-690.1, Georgia’s compulsory school attendance law.

Way’s motion shows that on November 15, 2013, pursuant to a negotiated guilty plea, she was sentenced under Accusations No. R130977 and R146590 to 30 days on each of the 64 counts to which she pled guilty, with this sentence suspended pending her service of 22 months probation. On July 16, 2015, and again pursuant to a negotiated plea, Way’s sentence was increased to 42 months of probation. On September 15, 2015, and after a hearing, the trial court revoked 12 months of Way’s probation.

On October 13, 2015, Way filed a motion to vacate her sentence, arguing that because the State failed to allege that the date of each violation of the school attendance law was a material averment, she could be sentenced under only one count in each of the accusations. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying Way’s motion on November 3, 2015. On that day, Way filed a notice of appeal as well as a motion for supersedeas bond. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for supersedeas bond. Way now moves this Court to direct the trial court to grant her motion for supersedeas bond, arguing that she has a right of direct appeal from the trial court’s denial of her motion to vacate her sentence as void. A direct appeal may lie from an order denying a motion to vacate or correct a void sentence, but only if the defendant raises a colorable claim that the sentence is, in fact, void. See Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 217 n. 1 (1) (686 SE2d 786) (2009). Burg v. State, 297 Ga. App. 118, 119 (676 SE2d 465) (2009). Way has not raised such a claim here. Without a right of direct appeal, she is not entitled to a supersedeas bond. Way’s emergency motion is therefore DENIED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia 11/13/2015 Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________ I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

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Related

Harper v. State
686 S.E.2d 786 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 2009)
Burg v. State
676 S.E.2d 465 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 2009)

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Bluebook (online)
Stephanie Elizabeth Way v. State, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stephanie-elizabeth-way-v-state-gactapp-2015.