Stendal v. Memorial Health Services

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 13, 2024
• Docket: 23-3561
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 13 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AMY L. STENDAL, individually and on No. 23-3561 behalf of herself and all others similarly D.C. No. situated., 2:23-cv-01380-ODW-PD Plaintiff - Appellee, MEMORANDUM* v.

MEMORIAL HEALTH SERVICES, a California Nonprofit Corporation; LONG BEACH MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER, a California Nonprofit Corporation,

Defendants - Appellants,

and

MILLER CHILDRENS HOSPITAL LONG BEACH AUXILIARY, INC., a California Nonprofit Corporation, DOES, 1-50, inclusive,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Otis D. Wright II, District Judge, Presiding

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Submitted December 2, 2024** Pasadena, California

Before: BEA, LEE, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

Memorial Health Services and Long Beach Memorial Medical Center

(Defendants) appeal the district court’s order denying their motion to compel

arbitration. We have jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B), and we vacate and

remand.

In early 2023, Amy Stendal, a registered nurse, filed two proposed class action

lawsuits against the Defendants in Los Angeles Superior Court. The Defendants

removed the case to federal district court, and Stendal’s two proposed class actions

were consolidated. The Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to

an arbitration provision in the collective bargaining agreement that governed the

terms of Stendal’s working conditions, wages, and hours of work. Stendal opposed

the motion to compel arbitration on several grounds. Rather than determining the

arbitrability of Stendal’s claims, the district court denied the motion to compel

arbitration and sent the case to arbitration for the arbitrator to determine arbitrability.

1. We first must ascertain that we have jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Section 16(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) allows appeals from a

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

2 23-3561 district court’s order “denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order

arbitration to proceed.” 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B). Under a plain reading of the text of

the FAA, this appeal falls squarely within the statute as an order denying a motion

to compel arbitration. To be sure, the denial of the motion to compel arbitration was

on mootness grounds and without prejudice, making the denial “nonfinal.” But such

a denial does not rob our court of jurisdiction. Cf. Hansen v. LMB Mortg. Servs.,

Inc., 1 F.4th 667, 671 (9th Cir. 2021).

In Hansen, our court held that we have jurisdiction over nonfinal rulings on

motions to compel arbitration. Id. We explained that a “denial of a motion to compel

arbitration is immediately appealable” and the calculus does not change “even if the

district court ‘intended to reconsider the question of arbitrability following further

fact-finding.’” Id. at 671–72 (citing Boomer v. AT & T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 412 (7th

Cir. 2002)). The Hansen court also echoed the textual interpretation of the FAA

stated above, explaining “the more natural reading of § 16(a)(1)(B) is to treat all

orders declining to compel arbitration as reviewable.” Id. at 672 (cleaned up). All

told, the district court’s order denying the Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration

is appealable.

2. Turning to the merits, we hold that the district court erred in denying the

Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration without first determining arbitrability. A

district court’s decision to “grant or deny a motion to compel arbitration is reviewed

3 23-3561 de novo.” Bushley v. Credit Suisse First Bos., 360 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2004).

Under established Supreme Court precedent, “the question of whether the

parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.” AT & T

Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986). Unless there is

clear and unmistakable evidence the parties agreed the arbitrator would determine

arbitrability, “courts should not assume the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.”

First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). Here, the

relevant arbitration provision requires “binding arbitration with and pursuant to the

rules of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.” The Federal Mediation

and Conciliation Service rules provide that the arbitrator “will not decide the merits

of a claim by either party that a dispute is not subject to arbitration.” 29 C.F.R.

§ 1404.10. Because the arbitration provision incorporates the rule barring the

arbitrator from determining arbitrability, the provision precludes delegation of the

threshold question of arbitrability to the arbitrator. We thus vacate the order denying

the motion to compel arbitration and remand the case for the district court to

determine whether Stendal’s claims are arbitrable.

VACATED and REMANDED.

4 23-3561