1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 Case No.: 22-cv-01213 DMS (DDL) RANDALL HENRI STEINMEYER,
11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S EX 12 v. PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 13 LABORATORY CORPORATION OF ORDER AMERICA HOLDINGS, a Delaware 14 corporation; GEORGE MAHA, an 15 individual; Hon. GARY BUBIS, as Judge of Superior Court of San Diego; ROB 16 BONTA, as Attorney General of 17 California, 18 Defendants. 19 20 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s ex parte application for temporary 21 restraining order (“TRO”) against Defendants Laboratory Corporation of America 22 Holdings (“Labcorp”) and George Maha. (ECF No. 37.) For the following reasons, 23 Plaintiff’s application for TRO or a preliminary injunction is DENIED. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 In 2017, Plaintiff was deemed the biological father of a minor child in an action in 26 San Diego Superior Court. (First Amended Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 71, ECF No. 4). In March 27 2017, Defendant Labcorp administered a “motherless 2 person test[]” pursuant to a state 28 court order, which Plaintiff alleges violated the requirements of the California Family 1 Code. (FAC ¶¶ 53, 141.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants Labcorp and Maha lied 2 to Plaintiff about the validity of the paternity test they administered, (FAC ¶ 74), and 3 Defendant Maha “caused or otherwise induced a judge . . . to hide the material DNA and 4 therefore the paternity evidence.” (FAC ¶ 185.) The paternity test showed that Plaintiff 5 was the father of the child. (FAC ¶ 71). Accordingly, San Diego Superior Court issued 6 several Income Withholding Orders against Plaintiff for child support between 2018 and 7 2022. (See Def. Bubis Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. D, ECF No. 8-2.) 8 Plaintiff filed this action on August 18, 2022 (ECF No. 1) and filed the FAC on 9 November 8, 2022. (See generally FAC.) Plaintiff brought various state law causes of 10 actions against Defendants Labcorp and Maha, including alleged violations of California 11 Family Code § 7552.5(a). (FAC ¶¶ 238–43; Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Ex Parte Appl. for 12 TRO (“Pl.’s Mem.”) at 12–13, ECF No. 37-1.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Labcorp 13 and Maha have concealed some portion of the paternity test or generated fictitious test 14 results. (FAC ¶¶ 196, 203, 205–08.) Plaintiff also brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 15 against Defendants Attorney General Bonta and Judge Bubis. (FAC ¶¶ 279–86.) 16 Defendants Labcorp, Maha, Bubis, and Bonta have filed motions to dismiss. (See ECF 17 Nos. 6, 8, 9, 36.) On February 10, 2023, plaintiff filed an ex parte application for TRO 18 against Defendant Bonta. (ECF No. 28.) This Court denied the application for lack of 19 jurisdiction. (ECF No. 27.) On March 1, 2023, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause 20 why his claim against Defendant Bonta should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter 21 jurisdiction. (ECF No. 34.) On March 2, 2023, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a 22 second amended complaint. (ECF No. 35.) 23 In this ex parte application for a TRO, plaintiff argues that the California Family 24 Code requires that “a copy of the results of all genetic tests performed . . . shall be served 25 upon all parties.” (Pl’s Mem. in Supp. of Ex Parte Appl. for TRO (“Pl.’s Mem.”) at 12– 26 13, ECF No. 37-1, quoting Cal. Fam. Code § 7552.5(a).) Alleging that Defendants Labcorp 27 and Maha have concealed some portions of the paternity test they administered and 28 1 analyzed in 2017, Plaintiff asks the Court to issue a TRO to “forc[e]” Defendants to 2 disclose “all results, not a subset.” (Pl’s Mem. at 16 n.8, ECF 37-1.) 3 II. LEGAL STANDARD 4 A party seeking preliminary injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 65 must show (1) “that he is likely to succeed on the merits,” (2) “that he is likely to suffer 6 irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,” (3) “that the balance of equities tips 7 in his favor,” and (4) “that an injunction is in the public interest.” Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. 8 City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. 9 Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). The standard governing the issuance of a TRO and 10 a preliminary injunction are “substantially identical,” Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. 11 Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001), except that a court may only issue a 12 TRO “without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney” when (1) “specific 13 facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable 14 injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in 15 opposition”; and (2) “the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give 16 notice and the reasons why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). Preliminary 17 injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear 18 showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. 19 Irreparable harm is a necessary element. Id. (“[P]laintiffs seeking preliminary 20 relief” must “demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.”) 21 Although the Ninth Circuit evaluates the likelihood of success and the balance of equities 22 on a “sliding scale,” a federal court may not grant a TRO or preliminary injunction unless 23 plaintiff shows he is likely to suffer irreparable harm. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. 24 Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2011). 25 III. DISCUSSION 26 “Plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in order to 27 obtain a preliminary injunction.” Id. at 1131. Plaintiff first alleges that he will suffer 28 “monetary” irreparable harm if the TRO is not issued because Defendant “Bonta takes bi- 1 monthly from Plaintiff” and “Bonta cannot be sued for damages . . . due to the realities of 2 absolute immunity.” (Pl’s Mem. at 18–19, ECF 37-1.) Ordinarily, however, monetary 3 harm is not irreparable because money damages usually provide adequate compensation 4 for monetary harm. L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 5 1202 (9th Cir. 1980). Although Plaintiff argues that this monetary injury is “continuing” 6 (Pl’s Mem. at 19), he fails to show that extraordinary circumstances are present here 7 requiring injunctive relief. See, e.g., hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 31 F.4th 1180, 8 1188–89 (9th Cir. 2022) (monetary damages threatening the survival of plaintiff’s 9 business); McGirr v. Rehme, 891 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2018) (“substantial chance” that 10 defendant will become insolvent before a judgment can be collected). 11 Further, it is unclear how the relief Plaintiff seeks is traceable to the defendants 12 against whom Plaintiff brings this action.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 Case No.: 22-cv-01213 DMS (DDL) RANDALL HENRI STEINMEYER,
11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S EX 12 v. PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 13 LABORATORY CORPORATION OF ORDER AMERICA HOLDINGS, a Delaware 14 corporation; GEORGE MAHA, an 15 individual; Hon. GARY BUBIS, as Judge of Superior Court of San Diego; ROB 16 BONTA, as Attorney General of 17 California, 18 Defendants. 19 20 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s ex parte application for temporary 21 restraining order (“TRO”) against Defendants Laboratory Corporation of America 22 Holdings (“Labcorp”) and George Maha. (ECF No. 37.) For the following reasons, 23 Plaintiff’s application for TRO or a preliminary injunction is DENIED. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 In 2017, Plaintiff was deemed the biological father of a minor child in an action in 26 San Diego Superior Court. (First Amended Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 71, ECF No. 4). In March 27 2017, Defendant Labcorp administered a “motherless 2 person test[]” pursuant to a state 28 court order, which Plaintiff alleges violated the requirements of the California Family 1 Code. (FAC ¶¶ 53, 141.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants Labcorp and Maha lied 2 to Plaintiff about the validity of the paternity test they administered, (FAC ¶ 74), and 3 Defendant Maha “caused or otherwise induced a judge . . . to hide the material DNA and 4 therefore the paternity evidence.” (FAC ¶ 185.) The paternity test showed that Plaintiff 5 was the father of the child. (FAC ¶ 71). Accordingly, San Diego Superior Court issued 6 several Income Withholding Orders against Plaintiff for child support between 2018 and 7 2022. (See Def. Bubis Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. D, ECF No. 8-2.) 8 Plaintiff filed this action on August 18, 2022 (ECF No. 1) and filed the FAC on 9 November 8, 2022. (See generally FAC.) Plaintiff brought various state law causes of 10 actions against Defendants Labcorp and Maha, including alleged violations of California 11 Family Code § 7552.5(a). (FAC ¶¶ 238–43; Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Ex Parte Appl. for 12 TRO (“Pl.’s Mem.”) at 12–13, ECF No. 37-1.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Labcorp 13 and Maha have concealed some portion of the paternity test or generated fictitious test 14 results. (FAC ¶¶ 196, 203, 205–08.) Plaintiff also brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 15 against Defendants Attorney General Bonta and Judge Bubis. (FAC ¶¶ 279–86.) 16 Defendants Labcorp, Maha, Bubis, and Bonta have filed motions to dismiss. (See ECF 17 Nos. 6, 8, 9, 36.) On February 10, 2023, plaintiff filed an ex parte application for TRO 18 against Defendant Bonta. (ECF No. 28.) This Court denied the application for lack of 19 jurisdiction. (ECF No. 27.) On March 1, 2023, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause 20 why his claim against Defendant Bonta should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter 21 jurisdiction. (ECF No. 34.) On March 2, 2023, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a 22 second amended complaint. (ECF No. 35.) 23 In this ex parte application for a TRO, plaintiff argues that the California Family 24 Code requires that “a copy of the results of all genetic tests performed . . . shall be served 25 upon all parties.” (Pl’s Mem. in Supp. of Ex Parte Appl. for TRO (“Pl.’s Mem.”) at 12– 26 13, ECF No. 37-1, quoting Cal. Fam. Code § 7552.5(a).) Alleging that Defendants Labcorp 27 and Maha have concealed some portions of the paternity test they administered and 28 1 analyzed in 2017, Plaintiff asks the Court to issue a TRO to “forc[e]” Defendants to 2 disclose “all results, not a subset.” (Pl’s Mem. at 16 n.8, ECF 37-1.) 3 II. LEGAL STANDARD 4 A party seeking preliminary injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 65 must show (1) “that he is likely to succeed on the merits,” (2) “that he is likely to suffer 6 irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,” (3) “that the balance of equities tips 7 in his favor,” and (4) “that an injunction is in the public interest.” Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. 8 City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. 9 Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). The standard governing the issuance of a TRO and 10 a preliminary injunction are “substantially identical,” Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. 11 Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001), except that a court may only issue a 12 TRO “without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney” when (1) “specific 13 facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable 14 injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in 15 opposition”; and (2) “the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give 16 notice and the reasons why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). Preliminary 17 injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear 18 showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. 19 Irreparable harm is a necessary element. Id. (“[P]laintiffs seeking preliminary 20 relief” must “demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.”) 21 Although the Ninth Circuit evaluates the likelihood of success and the balance of equities 22 on a “sliding scale,” a federal court may not grant a TRO or preliminary injunction unless 23 plaintiff shows he is likely to suffer irreparable harm. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. 24 Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2011). 25 III. DISCUSSION 26 “Plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in order to 27 obtain a preliminary injunction.” Id. at 1131. Plaintiff first alleges that he will suffer 28 “monetary” irreparable harm if the TRO is not issued because Defendant “Bonta takes bi- 1 monthly from Plaintiff” and “Bonta cannot be sued for damages . . . due to the realities of 2 absolute immunity.” (Pl’s Mem. at 18–19, ECF 37-1.) Ordinarily, however, monetary 3 harm is not irreparable because money damages usually provide adequate compensation 4 for monetary harm. L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 5 1202 (9th Cir. 1980). Although Plaintiff argues that this monetary injury is “continuing” 6 (Pl’s Mem. at 19), he fails to show that extraordinary circumstances are present here 7 requiring injunctive relief. See, e.g., hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 31 F.4th 1180, 8 1188–89 (9th Cir. 2022) (monetary damages threatening the survival of plaintiff’s 9 business); McGirr v. Rehme, 891 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2018) (“substantial chance” that 10 defendant will become insolvent before a judgment can be collected). 11 Further, it is unclear how the relief Plaintiff seeks is traceable to the defendants 12 against whom Plaintiff brings this action. Plaintiff explains that Defendant Bonta is 13 causing his monetary injury, yet he seeks a TRO against Defendants Labcorp and Maha. 14 The injunctive remedy Plaintiff seeks is an “Order forcing Defendants” to disclose “all 15 results, not a subset.” (Pl’s Mem. at 16 n.8, ECF 37-1.) Plaintiff does not explain why he 16 is “likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence” of such an order. Winter, 555 U.S. at 17 20. It is not clear to the Court what connection there is between the remedy sought and the 18 harm alleged. 19 Plaintiff further argues that he will suffer “legal” irreparable harm if the TRO is not 20 issued. (Pl.’s Mem. at 19.) To the extent that Plaintiff describes the legal irreparable harm 21 as a continual “tak[ing] from Plaintiff with no stopping in sight,” the Court interprets this 22 as a repetition of the “monetary” irreparable harm argument rejected above. Plaintiff 23 explains that Defendant Judge Bubis caused this “legal” irreparable harm, yet he seeks a 24 TRO against Defendants Labcorp and Maha. It is again unclear to the Court why Plaintiff 25 is “likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of,” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20, the relief he 26 requests. For example, Plaintiff does not argue that the child support order would 27 immediately cease to operate as soon as Defendants release the alleged true or complete 28 results he claims they are concealing. 1 Lastly, Plaintiff appears to argue that he will suffer “societal” irreparable harm if the 2 TRO is not issued. (Pl.’s Mem. at 20.) Plaintiff suggests that he will suffer a stigmatic 3 injury caused by the release of the allegedly erroneous paternity results because members 4 of the public are “conditioned to believe conclusions” of paternity test results. But the 5 harm Plaintiff complains of here occurred nearly six years ago when his paternity results 6 were first announced in April 2017. (FAC ¶ 71.) Thus, he has not identified any irreparable 7 harm that he will suffer prospectively if the TRO is not issued. See United States v. W.T. 8 Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953) (“The purpose of an injunction is to prevent future 9 violations . . . .”). Here, Plaintiff points to past injury. 10 Plaintiff suggests that the TRO he seeks is necessary because Defendants Attorney 11 General Bonta and Judge Bubis are protected by “absolute immunity” and cannot be sued 12 “for damages.” (Pl.’s Mem. at 18–19.) However, the remedy for adverse legal judgments 13 is appeal, not a suit for damages against the judge issuing the judgment and executive 14 branch officials implementing it. Plaintiff's remedy, if any, is through the California state 15 appellate courts. Cf. More v. Child Support Recovery, 383 F. App'x 574 (8th Cir. 2010); 16 see also In re Marriage of Brinkman, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 722, 731 (Ct. App. 6th Dist. 2003) 17 (explaining the process by which a party may seek a modification of child support orders 18 due to “changed circumstances” under California law). As this Court has previously 19 explained, Plaintiff may not come to federal court seeking a de facto appeal of state court 20 decisions. See Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) 21 (explaining that “state-court losers” may not bring an action in federal court “complaining 22 of injuries caused by state-court judgments” rendered before the federal action is 23 commenced). 24 IV. CONCLUSION 25 Plaintiff has failed to show irreparable harm. A showing of irreparable harm is 26 required for a federal court to grant injunctive relief. Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1132 (9th Cir. 27 2011). In the absence of irreparable harm, there is no need to review the balance of the 28 | || Winter factors. Plaintiff's ex parte application for TRO or preliminary injunction is 2 || therefore DENIED. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 || Dated: March 15, 2023 5 6 2 □□□ 7 Hon. Dana M. Sabraw, Chief Judge United States District Court
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