Steinhorst v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Steinhorst v. State

438 So. 2d 992, 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 22498

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedOctober 11, 1983

DocketNo. AR-226

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 438 So. 2d 992 (Steinhorst v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Steinhorst v. State, 438 So. 2d 992, 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 22498 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983).

Pincite

Opinion

THOMPSON, Judge.

Defendant appeals a trial court order denying his motion to substitute counsel for the attorney appointed by the trial court pursuant to § 925.035(4), Fla.Stat. to represent him in his application for executive clemency. We affirm.

An indigent criminal defendant does not have the right to decide which counsel the court should appoint to represent him. See Drago v. State, 415 So.2d 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Nelson v. State, 274 So.2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); Wilder v. State, 156 So.2d 395 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963). We see no reason why this same principle should not apply to counsel appointed, at the state’s expense, to represent an indigent in his application for executive clemency. Additionally, there has been no suggestion that the counsel appointed by the trial court to represent defendant in his application for executive clemency is not competent to do so.

This decision should not be considered as prohibiting the firm which sought to be substituted as defendant’s counsel from appearing pro bono in the executive clemency proceeding, absent some restriction by the Office of Executive Clemency, if defendant chooses to request the firm to appear on his behalf.

AFFIRMED.

ERVIN, C.J., and NIMMONS, J., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

THOMPSON, Judge.

Defendant appeals a trial court order denying his motion to substitute counsel for the attorney appointed by the trial court pursuant to § 925.035(4), Fla.Stat. to represent him in his application for executive clemency. We affirm.

An indigent criminal defendant does not have the right to decide which counsel the court should appoint to represent him. See Drago v. State, 415 So.2d 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Nelson v. State, 274 So.2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); Wilder v. State, 156 So.2d 395 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963). We see no reason why this same principle should not apply to counsel appointed, at the state’s expense, to represent an indigent in his application for executive clemency. Additionally, there has been no suggestion that the counsel appointed by the trial court to represent defendant in his application for executive clemency is not competent to do so.

This decision should not be considered as prohibiting the firm which sought to be substituted as defendant’s counsel from appearing pro bono in the executive clemency proceeding, absent some restriction by the Office of Executive Clemency, if defendant chooses to request the firm to appear on his behalf.

AFFIRMED.

ERVIN, C.J., and NIMMONS, J., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

438 So. 2d 992, 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 22498, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/steinhorst-v-state-fladistctapp-1983.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack