Steiner v. USA

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: August 3, 2023
• Docket: 2:20-cv-01580
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 TARA STEINER, an Individual, No. 2:20-cv-01580-JAM-CKD 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DISMISSAL 12 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., 13 Defendants. 14 15 The matter before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to set 16 aside the Court’s judgment dismissing her claims and closing this 17 case for failure to prosecute. See Mot. to Set Aside (“Mot.”), 18 ECF No. 20; Judgment, ECF No. 18. The United States opposes 19 Plaintiff’s motion. See Opp’n, ECF No. 23. Plaintiff replied. 20 See Reply, ECF No. 24. For the reasons stated below, the Court 21 DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the Court’s judgment.1 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 In August 2018, Plaintiff Tara Steiner and her son, John 24 Steiner, collided with a United States Postal Services vehicle. 25 Mot. at 2. Two years later, John Steiner initiated suit against 26

27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled 28 for May 9, 2023. 1 the United States, naming himself and his mother as plaintiffs in 2 two separate cases. Opp’n at 1. John Steiner, however, passed 3 away in December 2020, leaving his mother to continue her case. 4 Id. at 1-2. At that time, Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Brian Turner, 5 indicated to the United States that he intended to withdraw from 6 the case. See Decl. of W. Dean Carter ¶ 4, ECF No. 16-2. As a 7 result, the parties agreed to extend time for Plaintiff to serve 8 her initial disclosures until January 2021. Id. ¶ 5. Over the 9 next two years, Plaintiff’s counsel neither withdrew nor answered 10 the United States’ discovery requests. The United States at last 11 filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute on March 14, 12 2022. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 16. Plaintiff did not file an 13 opposition. Accordingly, the Court entered judgment on April 18, 14 2022, dismissing the case for failure to prosecute. ECF No. 18. 15 Plaintiff brings this motion now to vacate the Court’s final 16 judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), arguing that she failed 17 to file an opposition for reasons of “excusable neglect.” Mot. 18 at 1. 19 II. OPINION 20 A. Legal Standard 21 Rule 60(b)(1) allows a court to vacate a final judgment that 22 is based on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 23 neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). To assess whether missing a 24 filing deadline constitutes excusable neglect, courts use a four- 25 factor test. Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd., 26 507 U.S. 380 (1993). The Pioneer test is “an equitable one, 27 taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the 28 party’s omission,” including (1) the danger of prejudice to the 1 defendant, (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact 2 on judicial proceedings, (3) the reason for the delay, including 3 whether it was within the reasonable control of the plaintiff, 4 and (4) whether the plaintiff acted in good faith.” Id. at 395 5 (internal citation omitted). The Supreme Court has emphasized 6 that “inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes 7 construing the rules do not usually constitute ‘excusable’ 8 neglect.” Id. at 392. In the Ninth Circuit, the Pioneer 9 standard applies to Rule 60(b)(1) motions. Briones v. Riviera 10 Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 381 (9th Cir. 1997). 11 Rule 60(c) imposes a further restriction that motions under 12 Rule 60(b) must be brought within a “reasonable time,” and if 13 justified by mistake, inadvertence, surprise, neglect, new 14 evidence, or fraud, a “reasonable time” cannot exceed one year. 15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). The length of a “reasonable time” differs 16 from case to case and depends on the reasons offered for the 17 delay, the moving party's practical ability to learn the basis of 18 the court's decision, any prejudice that might result to the 19 other litigants, and the general interest in the finality of 20 litigation. Lemoge v. United States, 587 F.3d 1188, 1196–97 (9th 21 Cir. 2009). 22 B. Discussion 23 Plaintiff contends relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) 24 is appropriate based on her counsel’s excusable neglect for 25 “fail[ing] to file an opposition to the [Government’s] motion to 26 dismiss based on a calendaring error.” Mot. at 2. The Court 27 disagrees. 28 As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s motion was not brought 1 within a “reasonable time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). There is an 2 eleven-month delay between April 18, 2022, when the Court’s 3 judgment was entered, and March 24, 2023, when Plaintiff brought 4 her motion. See Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d 517, 5 520-21 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a motion for relief from 6 judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) may be denied, although it was 7 filed within the one-year period, if the moving party 8 unreasonably delayed bringing the motion). 9 While an eleven-month delay is not per se unreasonable, the 10 circumstances of the delay make it so. After the Court’s 11 judgment was entered, Plaintiff’s counsel waited five months to 12 inform his client of the Court’s decision. Mot. at 2. And, 13 because Plaintiff moved in the interim, Plaintiff’s counsel did 14 not successfully inform his client her case had been dismissed 15 until January 21, 2023, nine months after the fact. Id. at 3. 16 Plaintiff took another two months to bring this motion, for a 17 total delay of eleven months. To explain the first nine months, 18 Plaintiff’s counsel offers only that he “wrestled with how to 19 proceed and rectify [his] error [while] dealing with an emotional 20 client who had tragically lost her son.” Id. at 2. There is no 21 authority to suggest that an attorney’s reluctance to give his 22 client bad news is “reasonable” within the meaning of Rule 60(c). 23 It is undeniably an attorney’s duty to keep his client informed 24 of developments in her case so she may make informed and timely 25 decisions about its progress, especially when the developments 26 are negative. 27 Even without a denial on procedural grounds, however, 28 Plaintiff’s motion fails under the substantive test of 1 Rule 60(b). For one, there is a great risk of prejudice to the 2 Defendants. As the United States argues, due to the lengthy 3 delays both before and after the case’s dismissal, “key witnesses 4 will likely be unavailable or unable to provide testimony and 5 crucial evidence may no longer be available.” Opp’n at 3. 6 Should the motion be granted, “defendants would likely suffer the 7 costs of delayed, uncertain, and stale discovery concerning 8 events” that occurred five years ago. Hassan v. Credco, et al., 9 No. 2:13-cv-01942-KJM-KJN, 2016 WL 8731108, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar 10 18, 2016). 11 Further, the Court does not consider Plaintiff’s counsel’s 12 failure to abide by the Court’s filing deadline “excusable 13 neglect” under Rule 60(b). The Court’s deadline for opposition 14 briefs is clearly set out in its local rules. See E.D. Cal. 15 L.R. 230(c). As the Ninth Circuit held, in the absence of “a 16 persuasive justification for [counsel’s] misconstruction of 17 nonambiguous rules . . . there is no basis from deviating from 18 the general rule that a mistake of law does not constitute 19 excusable neglect.” Kyle v. Campbell Soup Co., 28 F.3d 928, 931- 20 32 (9th Cir. 1994). This general rule keeps faith with the 21 Supreme Court’s emphasis in Pioneer that “inadvertence, ignorance 22 of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually 23 constitute ‘excusable’ neglect.” Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 392. A 24 litigants’ failure to research, read, and follow clear and 25 unambiguous rules is only excusable neglect when countervailing 26 circumstances allow for it in equity. See Briones, 116 F.3d 379 27 (vacating and remanding a district court’s denial of a Rule 28 60(b)(1) motion where the litigant was pro se and had difficulty 1 with English); Bateman v. United States Postal Serv., 231 F.3d 2 1220 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding excusable neglect where a lawyer 3 was out of the country and jetlagged upon return); Lemoge, 587 4 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding excusable neglect where a 5 lawyer delayed due to injury requiring multiple surgeries and 6 extensive surgery). It is plainly the exception and not the rule 7 that a lawyer’s neglectful behavior is excusable under the 8 auspices of Pioneer. 9 Plaintiff argues that her son’s death is a countervailing 10 circumstance that the Court should consider in its equitable 11 decision. Reply at 2. The Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s 12 loss and grief. There is a point, however, when leniency must 13 give way to considerations of limited court resources and 14 fairness to litigants who comply with the Court’s rules. 15 Plaintiff’s son passed in 2020 and the record shows that 16 Plaintiff has received multiple extensions from Defendants to 17 accommodate Plaintiff’s loss and Plaintiff’s counsel’s pending 18 withdrawal, which has been pending since 2020. See Decl. of W. 19 Dean Carter ¶¶ 2-14, ECF No. 16-2. The United States filed its 20 motion to dismiss the case after two years of Plaintiff’s failure 21 to prosecute. 22 Moreover, Plaintiff’s counsel refers repeatedly to 23 “extenuating circumstances which created communication 24 difficulties with his client,” but the same extenuating 25 circumstances have existed since 2020. Mot. at 5. Plaintiff has 26 not indicated to the Court that any progress has been made to 27 mitigate these circumstances. And so, though Plaintiff’s 28 circumstances were extenuating in 2020, they do not continue nee en nen en ne nnn nn nn nnn nn OE OO NO

1 justify Plaintiff’s delays in 2022 and 2023. Plaintiff’s delays 2 have impacted judicial proceedings, stalling the case for two 3 years after filing, despite Defendants’ efforts to move the case 4 forward. While the Court finds Plaintiff did not delay in bad 5 faith, Plaintiff’s unexplained and persistent inability to remedy 6 the communication problems between herself and counsel bar the 7 Court from concluding she acted in good faith. 8 As such, weighing the four Pioneer factors, the Court finds 9 that Plaintiff’s calendaring error is not “excusable neglect” 10 | within the meaning of Rule 60(b) (1). Plaintiff has demonstrated 11 a persistent failure to prosecute her case, beginning with her 12 failure to provide initial disclosures until threatened with 13 dismissal, to her failure to respond to the United States’ 14 Request for Admissions, and culminating in her failure to oppose 15 the United States’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiff’s proffered 16 reasons for delay do not outweigh the prejudice to Defendants and 17 the general interest in finality in judgment. Thus, considering 18 all relevant circumstances, the Court finds there is no excusable 19 neglect to provide relief from final judgment. 20 Til. ORDER 21 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES 22 Plaintiff’s Motion to Set Aside the Dismissal. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 Dated: August 2, 2023 25 cp, JOHN A. MENDEZ 27 SENIOR UNITED*STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28