Steiner v. Peterman

63 A. 1102, 71 N.J. Eq. 101, 1 Buchanan 101, 1906 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 96
CourtNew Jersey Court of Chancery
DecidedMarch 11, 1906
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 63 A. 1102 (Steiner v. Peterman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Steiner v. Peterman, 63 A. 1102, 71 N.J. Eq. 101, 1 Buchanan 101, 1906 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 96 (N.J. Ct. App. 1906).

Opinion

Pitney, V. C.

The complainants and the defendants are the owners, respectively, of adjoining premises in the city of Newark, and the com plain ants claim the right for the tenants and occupants of their premises to an easement over the adjoining tenement of the defendants of stretching clothes lines across the lands of the defendants and hanging and drying laundried clothing thereon.

The circumstances are these:

In the year 1892 tire complainants were the owners, as tenants in common, of a house and lot known as No. 299 West Kinney street, on the corner of Boyd street, being twenty-five feet front on West Kinney street and one hundred feet deep on Boyd street.

Later on in the same year of 1892 Steiner became the owner of the adjoining lot facing on West Kinney street, known as No. 297, and having the same dimensions, namely, twenty-five feet front by one hundred feet deep.

On the corner lot there stood or was erected shortly'after the acquisition of the title above mentioned the following buildings: On the front part of the corner lot a four-story frame tenement-house, twenty-five feet wide and about fifty-five feet deep; on the rear of the lot, and covering about twenty feet of its width, was a three-story tenement-house, reaching within a few feet of tire front lot, leaving a small yard between the two buildings and a small passageway between the rear building of the corner lot and the line of the adjoining lot. At that point the lots were divided by a low fence.

Upon the adjoining lot, No. 297, was a two-and-one-half-story house, about forty feet deep, leaving about sixty feet of the rear of the lot open.

For the convenience of the tenants occupying these several buildings a large wash line pole was erected in the rear of lot 297, and as far away as practicable from lot 299, leaving, however, a passageway between it and the farther side of the lot, as appears by the map hereto annexed.

The several families occupying these premises (they were used as ordinary tenement-houses and rented by the month) were in the habit of' stretching their clothes drying lines from [103]*103the windows of their several tenements across tire open space on lot 297, and attaching .them by pulleys to the pole above mentioned and using the lines so stretched for drying their clothing.

This state of tilings continued until the year 1901, a period of nearly nine years.

On the 29th of March of that year the complainant Steiner, together with his wife, conveyed No. 297 AVest Kinney street to one Barnett Super, by an ordinary deed of conveyance, which was immediately afterwards duly recorded, and which contained a reservation in the following words:

“The said parties of the first part hereby reserve the right to connect wash lines from the yard of the property at No. 299 West Kinney street, now owned by them, with the yard of the property hereby conveyed.”

Subsequently, in December of 1901, Super and his wife conveyed 297 AArest Kinney street to Jacob Finkelstein by a deed of conveyance which states that it is made subject to the same conditions mentioned in the deed from Steiner to Super.

Later on, in January, 1905, .Finkelstein conveyed the premises 297 A¥est Kinney street to Louis Peterman, the defendant herein, by a deed which makes no mention of the reservation in question.

Peterman swears that through failure to examine the title to the premises he had no actual notice of the reservation.

Shortly before the Fling of the bill Peterman and his wife, being annoyed by the great extent to which the privilege so reserved was used, took means to abridge it, and, apparently, to confine it within what they thought and claim was a reasonable use.

They built a vertical addition to the fence dividing the two lots, whereby they made it difficult and impracticable, if not impossible, for the tenants of 299 to cross over and have access to the rear of 297 to readjust or reaffix the clothes line, if necessary, and also to recover any article which might drop from the lines to the ground.

They further erected a high wire fence diagonally across their lot, which will and does, unless broken down, prevent the ten[104]*104ants of 299 from reaching the base of the pole. They also displaced several of the wash lines connected with 299 and forbade, with threats of violence, the tenants of 299 to enter upon 297. Whereupon complainants filed their bill praying for relief.

The situation of the premises and of the wash pole and obstructions are shown on the diagram annexed to the bill and hereto annexed on page 108.

Counsel for defendants, in his argument, took two principal gr bunds.

First, that the reservation in question did not reserve or create an easement proper.

lie argued that there was no such easement known to the law as an easement of stringing clothes lines across one piece of land for the benefit of another piece of land.

And second, that the reservation here was merety a license to the complainants individually, for their personal benefit, which was not transferable by them to their tenants, and that as the affidavits show that neither of the complainants occupied the premises in person they could have no relief.

As to the first point, I find in the fourth edition of Gale’s valuable treatise on easements (Gale Easem. (Gibbons’ ed., 1868) 20, 21), a list of examples in England of affirmative and negative easements, and among them (s.tp. 21) is “right to hang-clothes on lines passing over neighboring soil,” supported by the case of Grewell v. Towler, 3 Barn. & Ad. 735.

That was a case of special pleading, in which the very right was set up in a pleading, and the jury found that the right existed, but not so broadly as set out in the pleading. Counsel argued that it was sufficiently broad to cover the trespass complained of, and that the pleader should be permitted to amend. The court at bar, after hearing counsel, held that while counsel’s contention was - probably right, yet they would order a nonsuit and let tire plaintiff begin again.

The validity of such an eásement was not disputed.

That case, like the case in our own courts of Lee v. Hagerty, 45 N. J. Eq. (18 Stew.) 1, 255; 54. N. J. Law (25 Vr.) 580; 48 N. J. Eq. (3 Dick.) 98; 50 N. J. Eq. (5 Dick.) 464, shows [105]*105the great convenience and propriety of having the rights of parties in such cases settled and distinctly defined in advance, thereby saving the necessity and costs of doing some act to provoke an action at law. In Hagerty v. Lee, I have never been able to perceive why the same court, which ultimately, in 5J¡. N. J. LjO/w, decided the rights of tide owner of the dominant tenement, might not have as well decided it when it was before it in Jf5 N. J. Eg.

In this case the question whether the right here in question is an easement, as distinguished from a mere license, depends on the language of the reservation, and that seems plain enough. The right is to connect wash lines from the yard of 299 with the yard of 297. It is a right from a given place to- a given place, and mentions no individual whatever.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

McCoy v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co.
176 Iowa 139 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1916)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
63 A. 1102, 71 N.J. Eq. 101, 1 Buchanan 101, 1906 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 96, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/steiner-v-peterman-njch-1906.