Stein v. The City of San Diego

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedJune 26, 2025
Docket3:24-cv-00953
StatusUnknown

This text of Stein v. The City of San Diego (Stein v. The City of San Diego) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stein v. The City of San Diego, (S.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 24-cv-00953-DMS-AHG NICK STEIN,

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 14 CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 On May 31, 2024, Plaintiff Nick Stein, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint against 20 the City of San Diego; various police officers, including Chief of the San Diego Police 21 Department, David Nisleit; and unnamed individuals (collectively, “Defendants”). (ECF 22 No. 1). Plaintiff concurrently filed a Motion to Proceed Informa Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant 23 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2). The Court found that Plaintiff was unable to pay the 24 filing fee but dismissed the case with leave to amend for failure to state a claim under 28 25 U.S.C. § 1915(e)’s screening requirement. (ECF No. 4 at 2, 4). Plaintiff then filed his First 26 Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on October 25, 2024, which is the subject of a second sua 27 sponte review here. (FAC, ECF No. 5). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS 28 Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP. 1 II. SECOND SUA SPONTE SCREENING 2 A complaint filed by any person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is 3 subject to mandatory sua sponte review and dismissal by the Court. “[T]he court shall 4 dismiss” a case filed IFP “at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is 5 frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) 6 seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 7 1915(e)(2). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or 8 malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 9 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 10 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). 11 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 12 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 13 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 14 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the 15 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint 16 fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 8 if the factual assertions in it, taken as true, are 17 insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the 18 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 19 (2009). When a judge assesses plausibility, he must draw on “judicial experience and 20 common sense.” Id. at 664. 21 Plaintiff’s FAC is clearer than his first Complaint. It is more concise and lays out 22 the relevant allegations in a sensical order. (FAC 8–22). Plaintiff also designates eleven 23 causes of action. (Id. at 22–32). On a liberal reading of the FAC alone, the Court finds 24 that Plaintiff’s allegations are “sufficient to warrant . . . an answer”. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 25 680 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2012); see also id. at 1121 (“We construe pro se complaints 26 liberally and may only dismiss a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim if it appears 27 beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would 28 entitle him to relief.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because Plaintiff’s 1 |} FAC pleads factual content that, if accepted as true, broadly states a claim to relief, 2 || Plaintiffs claims—which can be parsed through at a later juncture—survive. 3 Ht. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 4 For the reasons explained above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed 5 || IFP and orders as follows: 6 |{ 1. The United States Marshal shall serve a copy of the FAC, summons, and the Court’s 7 || Orders with respect to Plaintiff's IFP Motion upon Defendants. All costs of service shall 8 || be advanced by the United States. 9 Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, 10 |/upon Defendants’ counsel, a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted 11 consideration of the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed 12 || with the Clerk of the Court a certificate stating the manner in which a true and correct copy 13 |}of any document was served on Defendants or counsel for Defendants and the date of 14 ||service. Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge which has not been 15 || filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a Certificate of Service will be disregarded. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 18 || Dated: June 26, 2025 <\ 19 Jrrn Yn « 0 Hon. Dana M. Sabraw United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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Related

Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Wilhelm v. Rotman
680 F.3d 1113 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Gove v. Career Systems Development Corp.
689 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2012)
United States v. Fraser Verrusio
762 F.3d 1 (D.C. Circuit, 2014)

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Bluebook (online)
Stein v. The City of San Diego, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stein-v-the-city-of-san-diego-casd-2025.