Stein Hall & Co. v. Sealand Dock & Terminal Corp.

2 Misc. 2d 727
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 20, 1956
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2 Misc. 2d 727 (Stein Hall & Co. v. Sealand Dock & Terminal Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stein Hall & Co. v. Sealand Dock & Terminal Corp., 2 Misc. 2d 727 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1956).

Opinion

Francis L. Valente, J.

The plaintiff, an importer of tapioca flour and seed, instituted this action to recover a money judgment from the defendants herein named. The claim in part arises out of the nondelivery of a portion o’f a cargo of tapioca imported from Brazil for the account of the plaintiff and in part for the loss of a number of bags of flour and seed stored for the plaintiff’s account with the Sealand Storage and Warehouse Corporation.

The case was tried before me without a jury and findings of fact and conclusions of law have been waived.

The defendants, Sealand Dock and Terminal Corporation and Sealand Storage and Warehouse Corporation, hereinafter respectively designated as the “Dock Co.” and “ Storage Co.”, are domestic corporations having common officers and occupying the same office space.

On November 17, 1951 and prior thereto, the Dock Co. was the lessee of several piers in the borough o'f Brooklyn, which it operated, maintained and controlled as a deepwater terminal for the receipt and discharge of merchandise from marine vessels. One of these piers was located at the foot of Huron Street, Brooklyn, New York, a part of which the Storage Co. [729]*729used to warehouse plaintiff’s tapioca flour and seed. Both the Dock Co. and the Storage Co. utilized the floor space of this pier interchangeably for the discharge of cargo and for warehouse purposes as convenience and space required and permitted.

On November 17, 1951, and at the times herein mentioned, the defendant Angf. A/B Tirfing, hereinafter referred to as Tirfing ”, was the owner and operator of the vessel M/S Bardaland, engaged in the carriage o'f merchandise on the high seas and the carrier of the cargo — the subject matter of the first cause of action — from the port of Itajai, Brazil, to New York.

The evidence reveals the aforesaid vessel carrying a quantity of tapioca flour for ultimate delivery to the plaintiff arrived in New York on November 11, 1951 and the Dock Co. was hired by the defendant Tirfing for the express purpose of unloading and discharging its cargo of tapioca flour. The discharge was accomplished between the 13th and 15th days of November, 1951 at the open India Street pier and transferred by the Dock Co. to the Huron Street pier. At the time there were in storage on said pier for the account of the plaintiff other bags of flour and seed — the subject o'f the second and third causes of action — for which appropriate warehouse receipt had been issued by the Storage Co. to plaintiff.

Some time during the night of November 16 and early morning of November 17, 1951 a portion of the Huron Street pier collapsed, precipitating into the East River 11,326 bags of tapioca flour stored thereon. Of this number 4,242 bags represented part of the cargo discharged from the Bardaland, and 7,084 bags part of the flour and seed previously warehoused with the Storage Co. for the account of the plaintiff.

Testimony adduced by witnesses established that the pier was built between the years 1906 and 1909; that it was a timber structure resting on rows of piles running the width of the pier; that it was 475 feet long on the north side, 430 feet long on the south side, and approximately 75 feet wide, with a wooden deck and a 25-foot high shed made o'f corrugated steel. The collapsed portion was approximately 120 feet by 40 feet located on the northerly or upstream side of the pier.

The amended complaint sets forth four causes of action upon which the plaintiff predicates its respective claims.

In the first cause of action recovery is sought against all of the defendants for nondelivery of 4,242 bags of the tapioca flour carried by the Bardaland; the second cause of action charges the Storage Co. with nondelivery — arising out of [730]*730negligence — of 7,084 bags of tapioca flour stored with the Storage Co. by the plaintiff; the third cause of action seeks recovery against the Dock Co. for nondelivery of the aforementioned 7,084 bags of tapioca flour arising out of negligence; and the fourth cause of action seeks recovery from the Storage Co. and Dock Co. for the cost of removal and restorage of the flour and seed which became exposed to the elements as a result of the collapse of the pier.

The defendant Tirfing, as part of its defense, prays that should it be found liable as a common carrier for nondelivery it be indemnified by the Dock Co., asserting that if any liability be imposed against it the same was occasioned by the negligence and carelessness of the Dock Co., and demands that the ultimate rights between it and the Dock Co. be determined pursuant to the provisions of section 264 of the Civil Practice Act.

Concerning the first cause of action as it pertains to the facts peculiar to this litigation, it has been satisfactorily established, and I find, that Tirfing failed to deliver 4,242 bags of tapioca flour, part of a shipment delivered to it in Brazil for transportation to New York. That the Bardaland was a common carrier and she and her owner were insurers of the safety of the goods (Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397, 437; The Ella Pierce Thurlow, 300 F. 103, 105, affd. 300 F. 106). I further find that at the time the pier collapsed the 4,242 bags of flour had been discharged onto the Huron Street pier by the Dock Co. hired for that purpose by Tirfing; that there was a six-day period of free time exclusive of Saturdays and Sundays in defendant Tirfing’s tariff; that at the time the pier collapsed the free period had not expired; the goods were still in transit and in Tirfing’s custody, the plaintiff not having taken delivery thereof, and that Tirfing’s responsibility as an insurer was still in existence.

There is no merit to Tirfing’s contention that there was constructive delivery of the flour carried by the M/S Bardaland. (Rosenstein v. Vogemann, 184 N. Y. 325.)

The defendant Tirfing is liable to the plaintiff for the nondelivery of the 4,242 bags of the tapioca flour and plaintiff is entitled to judgment against defendant Tirfing in the sum of $30,393.72, together with interest from November 17, 1951.

Concerning the second and third causes of action, considered jointly herein, the adduced evidence established that 7,084 bags of tapioca flour and seed were received by the Storage Co. from the plaintiff prior to November 17, 1951 for which warehouse receipts were issued, and that said bags of flour were destroyed by submersion in the East River as a result of the pier collapse.

[731]*731The gravamen of both of these causes of action is predicated in negligence and I am satisfied that the plaintiff has established by a fair preponderance of the evidence the negligence of both defendants.

It is conceded that the Dock Co. operated, maintained and controlled the Huron Street pier. Therefore, the duty was imposed upon it to keep and maintain said structure in a good and safe condition.

I find from all of the adduced testimony that the Dock Co. failed in this duty and that the sole proximate cause of the collapse of the pier was occasioned by such failure.

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Bluebook (online)
2 Misc. 2d 727, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stein-hall-co-v-sealand-dock-terminal-corp-nysupct-1956.