Filed 7/22/15 Steiger v. Steiger CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
LEE STEIGER, as Cotrustee, etc., D066774
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2013-00072651- PR-TR-CTL) PAUL STEIGER, as Cotrustee, etc.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Julia C. Kelety,
Judge. Affirmed.
Lee Steiger, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Van Dyke & Associates, Richard S. Van Dyke and James A. Bush for Defendant
and Respondent.
The trial court found that a document appearing to amend the Louise A. Steiger
Trust Dated May 11, 1990 (Trust) had not been properly delivered pursuant to the Trust's
requirements and thus, was not a valid amendment. If valid, it would have made Lee Steiger (Lee) the Trust's sole beneficiary as opposed to beneficiaries in equal shares with
his brother, Paul Steiger (Paul). Lee, appearing in propria persona, appeals contending
there were procedural irregularities leading to the trial court's decision and the
amendment was effectively delivered. We reject Lee's contentions and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The relevant facts are undisputed. In 1990, Louise A. Steiger (Louise) created the
Trust through a written agreement, defining herself as the Donor and Trustee. The
agreement generally provided for payments of income to Louise during her lifetime and,
at her death, distribution of the remaining estate "in equal shares to her issue," i.e., her
sons Lee and Paul. Louise reserved the right to amend the Trust "at any time or times, by
notice in writing delivered to the Trustee, and such amendment or modification shall be
effective immediately upon delivery to the Trustee. . . ." The Trust agreement further
provided, "The word 'Trustee' as used herein shall be interpreted to mean Trustee or
Trustees, whichever shall be appropriate[,]" and it "shall be construed for all purposes in
accordance with the laws of the State of New Jersey."
The Trust was amended in 2000 and 2006. Under the 2000 amendment, Paul
became a cotrustee with Louise. Under the 2006 amendment, Louise resigned as
cotrustee, and Lee became a successor cotrustee with Paul. Neither amendment affected
the beneficiaries of the Trust.
In March 2010, Louise signed a document titled, "Official Instruction For Trusts
and Funds in the Name of Louise A. Steiger" (2010 Instruction). It partially instructed
2 for the Trust to "have Lee F. Steiger as the only beneficiary." Prior to Louise's death, the
2010 Instruction was delivered to Lee, but not Paul. In April 2011, Louise died.
In November 2013, Lee filed a petition in San Diego County Superior Court to
determine the Trust beneficiaries, which was the first time the 2010 Instruction was
delivered to Paul. The case proceeded with both parties represented by counsel. In early
July 2014, the court set a September 18, 2014, hearing for oral argument on the legal
issue of whether the 2010 Instruction constituted a valid Trust amendment, and ordered
briefs to be filed on the issue by September 15, 2014. Both Lee and Paul timely filed
briefs. As scheduled, the court heard argument by counsel and issued an order, which
found in part: (1) the Trust's amendment requirements must be construed under New
Jersey law; (2) any amendment was required to be delivered to Paul; (3) the 2010
Instruction was not timely delivered to Paul, who was cotrustee; and therefore, (4) it was
not a valid amendment to the Trust.1
DISCUSSION
I
Lee asserts a litany of "irregular circumstances" surrounded the trial court hearing,
including: (1) his counsel did not file a brief, (2) the hearing occurred in the context of a
case management conference rather than a "trial," (3) the court ordered simultaneous
briefs, (4) he was not asked to sign a "verification" in connection with the hearing, (5) he
1 Lee also appeals a second order dated September 18, 2014, where, following the trial court's rejection of Lee as the sole beneficiary, it directed a preliminary distribution to each beneficiary, Paul and Lee. Lee assigns no separate error to the court's second order apart from his contention that the 2010 Instruction was an effective amendment. 3 did not attend the hearing because his counsel did not inform him of it, (6) he had
insufficient time to research New Jersey law, (7) there was no court reporter present, and
(8) he was not allowed to present an argument, due to judicial impartiality or corruption.
Lee's assertions are frivolous, contradicted by the record, and/or do not constitute
grounds for reversal. The court was well within its discretion to set the briefing schedule
and hearing that it did, which provided sufficient notice of the legal issue to be decided
and over two months of preparation time. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).)
Indeed, Lee's counsel signed and filed a coherent six-page brief entitled, "Lee Steiger's
Memorandum on Issue of Whether March 7, 2010 Instrument Satisfied Technical
Formalities for an Amendment to the Trust."2 A "verification" of the brief was not
required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 446, subd. (a).) Further, Lee admits his counsel appeared
at the hearing and, therefore, his personal attendance was not necessary. Finally, it was
the parties' responsibility to arrange for a court reporter if one was desired. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 2.956(c) [court reporting services in civil cases].) Lee has failed to establish
any reversible error on procedural grounds.
II
We now consider whether the 2010 Instruction was a valid amendment to the
Trust. The interpretation of a trust instrument is a question of law subject to independent
2 The memorandum was submitted as part of Paul's motion to augment the record on appeal. Lee filed a "Motion to Deny Respondent's Motion to Augment the Record," arguing that the augmented record was fabricated. Lee's "motion" is meritless and denied. The documents attached to Paul's motion to augment are deemed a part of the record on appeal. 4 review when the relevant facts are undisputed. (Johnson v. Greenelsh (2009) 47 Cal.4th
598, 604.) On appeal, the parties agree the Trust's provisions are to be construed under
New Jersey law.
When called upon to interpret a trust, New Jersey courts aim to ascertain the
settlor's intentions. To do so, the " 'primary inquiry' must be directed to 'the language of
the instrument itself.' " (In re Trust Created by Agreement Dated December 20, 1961
(N.J. 2001) 765 A.2d 746, 755.) If the trust language is clear, and no ambiguity is
asserted, the court confines itself to giving effect to the language used. (Ibid.; see also
Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Parfner (N.J. Ch. 1944) 37 A.2d 675, 678 ["The intention of the
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Filed 7/22/15 Steiger v. Steiger CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
LEE STEIGER, as Cotrustee, etc., D066774
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2013-00072651- PR-TR-CTL) PAUL STEIGER, as Cotrustee, etc.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Julia C. Kelety,
Judge. Affirmed.
Lee Steiger, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Van Dyke & Associates, Richard S. Van Dyke and James A. Bush for Defendant
and Respondent.
The trial court found that a document appearing to amend the Louise A. Steiger
Trust Dated May 11, 1990 (Trust) had not been properly delivered pursuant to the Trust's
requirements and thus, was not a valid amendment. If valid, it would have made Lee Steiger (Lee) the Trust's sole beneficiary as opposed to beneficiaries in equal shares with
his brother, Paul Steiger (Paul). Lee, appearing in propria persona, appeals contending
there were procedural irregularities leading to the trial court's decision and the
amendment was effectively delivered. We reject Lee's contentions and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The relevant facts are undisputed. In 1990, Louise A. Steiger (Louise) created the
Trust through a written agreement, defining herself as the Donor and Trustee. The
agreement generally provided for payments of income to Louise during her lifetime and,
at her death, distribution of the remaining estate "in equal shares to her issue," i.e., her
sons Lee and Paul. Louise reserved the right to amend the Trust "at any time or times, by
notice in writing delivered to the Trustee, and such amendment or modification shall be
effective immediately upon delivery to the Trustee. . . ." The Trust agreement further
provided, "The word 'Trustee' as used herein shall be interpreted to mean Trustee or
Trustees, whichever shall be appropriate[,]" and it "shall be construed for all purposes in
accordance with the laws of the State of New Jersey."
The Trust was amended in 2000 and 2006. Under the 2000 amendment, Paul
became a cotrustee with Louise. Under the 2006 amendment, Louise resigned as
cotrustee, and Lee became a successor cotrustee with Paul. Neither amendment affected
the beneficiaries of the Trust.
In March 2010, Louise signed a document titled, "Official Instruction For Trusts
and Funds in the Name of Louise A. Steiger" (2010 Instruction). It partially instructed
2 for the Trust to "have Lee F. Steiger as the only beneficiary." Prior to Louise's death, the
2010 Instruction was delivered to Lee, but not Paul. In April 2011, Louise died.
In November 2013, Lee filed a petition in San Diego County Superior Court to
determine the Trust beneficiaries, which was the first time the 2010 Instruction was
delivered to Paul. The case proceeded with both parties represented by counsel. In early
July 2014, the court set a September 18, 2014, hearing for oral argument on the legal
issue of whether the 2010 Instruction constituted a valid Trust amendment, and ordered
briefs to be filed on the issue by September 15, 2014. Both Lee and Paul timely filed
briefs. As scheduled, the court heard argument by counsel and issued an order, which
found in part: (1) the Trust's amendment requirements must be construed under New
Jersey law; (2) any amendment was required to be delivered to Paul; (3) the 2010
Instruction was not timely delivered to Paul, who was cotrustee; and therefore, (4) it was
not a valid amendment to the Trust.1
DISCUSSION
I
Lee asserts a litany of "irregular circumstances" surrounded the trial court hearing,
including: (1) his counsel did not file a brief, (2) the hearing occurred in the context of a
case management conference rather than a "trial," (3) the court ordered simultaneous
briefs, (4) he was not asked to sign a "verification" in connection with the hearing, (5) he
1 Lee also appeals a second order dated September 18, 2014, where, following the trial court's rejection of Lee as the sole beneficiary, it directed a preliminary distribution to each beneficiary, Paul and Lee. Lee assigns no separate error to the court's second order apart from his contention that the 2010 Instruction was an effective amendment. 3 did not attend the hearing because his counsel did not inform him of it, (6) he had
insufficient time to research New Jersey law, (7) there was no court reporter present, and
(8) he was not allowed to present an argument, due to judicial impartiality or corruption.
Lee's assertions are frivolous, contradicted by the record, and/or do not constitute
grounds for reversal. The court was well within its discretion to set the briefing schedule
and hearing that it did, which provided sufficient notice of the legal issue to be decided
and over two months of preparation time. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).)
Indeed, Lee's counsel signed and filed a coherent six-page brief entitled, "Lee Steiger's
Memorandum on Issue of Whether March 7, 2010 Instrument Satisfied Technical
Formalities for an Amendment to the Trust."2 A "verification" of the brief was not
required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 446, subd. (a).) Further, Lee admits his counsel appeared
at the hearing and, therefore, his personal attendance was not necessary. Finally, it was
the parties' responsibility to arrange for a court reporter if one was desired. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 2.956(c) [court reporting services in civil cases].) Lee has failed to establish
any reversible error on procedural grounds.
II
We now consider whether the 2010 Instruction was a valid amendment to the
Trust. The interpretation of a trust instrument is a question of law subject to independent
2 The memorandum was submitted as part of Paul's motion to augment the record on appeal. Lee filed a "Motion to Deny Respondent's Motion to Augment the Record," arguing that the augmented record was fabricated. Lee's "motion" is meritless and denied. The documents attached to Paul's motion to augment are deemed a part of the record on appeal. 4 review when the relevant facts are undisputed. (Johnson v. Greenelsh (2009) 47 Cal.4th
598, 604.) On appeal, the parties agree the Trust's provisions are to be construed under
New Jersey law.
When called upon to interpret a trust, New Jersey courts aim to ascertain the
settlor's intentions. To do so, the " 'primary inquiry' must be directed to 'the language of
the instrument itself.' " (In re Trust Created by Agreement Dated December 20, 1961
(N.J. 2001) 765 A.2d 746, 755.) If the trust language is clear, and no ambiguity is
asserted, the court confines itself to giving effect to the language used. (Ibid.; see also
Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Parfner (N.J. Ch. 1944) 37 A.2d 675, 678 ["The intention of the
settlor, as expressed in the trust instrument, governs."].)
Here, the Trust agreement provided as follows: "Donor reserves the right to
amend, modify or revoke this trust, in whole or in part, or to withdraw assets therefrom,
at any time or times, by notice in writing delivered to the Trustee[s], and such
amendment or modification shall be effective immediately upon delivery to the
Trustee[s]. . . ." Although Lee concedes that the Trust's language required any
amendment to be delivered to Paul (a cotrustee), he argues delivery can be made "at any
time," including in 2013 well after Louise's death. We disagree, and find that Louise's
power of amendment had to be exercised in the manner specified during her lifetime.
Notably, the Trust agreement expressly required the Trustees make an estate
distribution "[u]pon the death of the Donor," which, as a corollary, necessitated the
beneficiaries be ascertained as of that time. We are mindful of the Trust's overriding
purpose, which was to sustain Louise's lifetime income and, at her death, provide an
5 orderly estate distribution to her surviving children. This purpose would be entirely
frustrated if amendments could go into effect years after her death. In comparable New
Jersey cases involving inter vivos trusts, donors were required to exercise the right of
revocation or modification during their lifetimes. (See, e.g., In re Estate of Kovalyshyn
(N.J. Super. 1975) 343 A.2d 852, 856-857 [where change in beneficiary required a
delivered instrument in writing to the bank, right to modify trust was an inter vivos power
that could not be exercised by an executed will]; In re Estate of Henning (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1971) 282 A.2d 786, 788 [a will that did not have legal efficacy until after
donor's death could not revoke or modify trust].)
Moreover, to the extent the 2010 Instruction purported to direct payments from the
Trust estate solely to Lee, it was required to comply with Article Second of the Trust
agreement, which granted Louise a right to direct payments from principal (in whole or
part), "by instruments in writing, signed by the Donor and delivered by the Donor to the
Trustee[s] during the lifetime of the Donor." Naturally, directing the payment of
principal could also have operated as a revocation or modification of the Trust, and any
such instruction had to be delivered to the Trustees during Louise's lifetime.
Louise did not deliver the 2010 Instruction to Paul during her lifetime, and Lee
admits it was not delivered to Paul until several years after Louise's death. Accordingly,
the 2010 Instruction was not an effective direction or amendment to the Trust. For the
first time on appeal, Lee makes unsubstantiated factual arguments concerning why he
was obligated to keep it secret from Paul prior to Louise's death. We do not consider
6 those arguments, and even if they were substantiated, would only confirm that the 2010
Instruction was purposely withheld from delivery during Louise's lifetime.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed. Defendant is awarded costs on appeal.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, J.
MCINTYRE, J.