Steer v. City of Missoula

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: March 25, 1976
• Docket: 13129
• Status: Published

Opinion

No. 13129

I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O MONTANA OR F F

M. J. STEER,

P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,

CITY OF MISSOULA, MONTANA, a municipa 1 Corpora t i o n , THE POLICE COMMISSION OF THE C I T Y O F MISSOULA and t h e members t h e r e o f i n t h e i r o f f i c i a l capacity a s P o l i c e Commissioners e t a l . ,

Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable J a c k L. Green, Judge p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel of Record:

For Appellant :

C. W. Leaphart argued, Helena, Montana

For Respondents:

Root and V a l g e n t i , Missoula , Montana V i c t o r F. V a l g e n t i argued, Missoula, Montana

Submitted: March 3 , 1976

Decided : l!Ihl? 2 6 1976 Filed : M&E 8 6 6916 Mr. J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e C o u r t .

T h i s a p p e a l i s from a judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ,

Missoula County, a f f i r m i n g t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e Missoula P o l i c e

Commission whereby p l a i n t i f f w a s d i s m i s s e d from h i s employment

as a p o l i c e o f f i c e r .

On September 27, 1971, t h e C i t y o f Missoula h i r e d a p p e l -

l a n t , M. J. S t e e r , as a probationary patrolman. Upon s u c c e s s f u l

c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e p r o b a t i o n a r y p e r i o d , a p p e l l a n t w a s confirmed

a s a p a t r o l m a n on March 28, 1972. On A p r i l 1 6 , 1973, t h e t h e n

Chief of P o l i c e G i l b e r t Hansen, b e l i e v i n g a p p e l l a n t g u i l t y o f

misconduct, gave him t h e c h o i c e of b e i n g f i r e d o u t r i g h t o r sub-

mitting h i s resignation. Appellant submitted h i s r e s i g n a t i o n .

Thereafter appellant f i l e d i n d i s t r i c t court an application

f o r a w r i t o f mandate a l l e g i n g h i s d i s m i s s a l w a s c o n t r a r y t o t h e

M e t r o p o l i t a n P o l i c e L a w , Chap. 1 8 , T i t l e 11, R.C.M. 1947, i n t h a t

he was d e n i e d t h e r i g h t t o answer p r e f e r r e d c h a r g e s i n a h e a r i n g

b e f o r e t h e p o l i c e commission p r i o r t o h i s d i s m i s s a l . Following

a c o n t i n u a n c e , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t o n A p r i l 8 , 1974, i s s u e d a

w r i t of mandate o r d e r i n g a p p e l l a n t ' s r e i n s t a t e m e n t .

Whereupon t h e new Chief o f P o l i c e Ray Roehl by l e t t e r t o

a p p e l l a n t acknowledged h i s r e i n s t a t e m e n t , b u t announced h i s

immediate s u s p e n s i o n pending r e s u l t s o f a h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e

p o l i c e commission on c h a r g e s o f m i s c o n d u c t , d i s h o n e s t y , and

f a i l u r e t o obey a l a w f u l o r d e r of a s u p e r i o r o f f i c e r . The s t a t e -

ment of c h a r g e s came on f o r h e a r i n g on May 2 , 1974, and a f t e r

p r e s e n t a t i o n of evidence t h e hearing w a s continued without d a t e .

On J u l y 1 5 , 1974, Chief Roehl s e n t a n o t h e r l e t t e r t o a p p e l l a n t

c o n t a i n i n g a s t a t e m e n t of two a d d i t i o n a l c h a r g e s c o n c e r n i n g f a l s e

i n f o r m a t i o n i n h i s employment a p p l i c a t i o n and s t a t i n g t h a t s i n c e

a p p e l l a n t w a s on v a c a t i o n s t a t u s no s u s p e n s i o n was deemed neces-

sary. The p o l i c e commission reconvened on August 1 3 , 1974, and after the presentation of further evidence, found appellant guilty of failure to obey a lawful order of a superior officer, one charge of conduct unbecoming an officer and falsification of his application for employment. Pursuant to sections 11-1805 and 11-1806(5), R.C.M. 1947, the police commission, with the approval of Mayor Robert E. Brown, ordered appellant's dismissal from the Missoula Police Department effective August 13, 1974. Until the time of his final dismissal, appellant received full salary and benefits. In October 1974, appellant filed the complaint involved in this proceeding seeking review of the police commission order, pursuant to section 11-1806(7), (8), R.C.M. 1947. On May 29, 1975, the district court affirmed the decision of the Missoula Police Commission. Steer appeals from that order and judgment. The one issue presented on appeal is whether or not in discharging appellant, the chief of police and the police commis- sion of the City of Missoula denied appellant procedural due process of law. Appellant's main argument in this regard centers around the contention that once he was summarily fired the first time, "the die had been cast" because the decision to fire had already been made final. Therefore, in appellant's view, all administra- tive actions subsequent to his reinstatement were mere ex post facto attempts to provide due process so as to justify his dis- charge and as such they were procedurally defective. Upon review of the facts and case law cited by appellant, we cannot agree with this contention. Appellant relies on several cases for his position that a procedurally improper firing cannot be cured by any kind of subsequent action of the dismissing authority. Opheim v. Fish & Game Comm., 133 Mont. 362, 323 P.2d 1116; State ex rel. Ford v. Fish & Game Cornm'n, 148 Mont. 151, 418 P.2d 300; S t a t e ex r e l . Lease v . W i l k i n s o n , 59 Mont. 327,

196 P. 878; S t a t e e x r e l . Nagle v . S u l l i v a n , 98 Mont. 425, 40

P.2d 995. However w e f i n d t h e c a s e s s o c i t e d a r e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e

from t h e c a s e a t b a r . I n t h o s e c a s e s , none o f t h e i l l e g a l l y

d i s m i s s e d employees a c t u a l l y r e c e i v e d r e i n s t a t e m e n t and r e s t i -

t u t i o n of b e n e f i t s p r i o r t o i n s t i t u t i o n of formal charges through

proper channels. I n t h e i n s t a n t case, following t h e procedurally

improper d i s m i s s a l , a p p e l l a n t s e c u r e d r e i n s t a t e m e n t and a p p a r e n t l y

enjoyed v a c a t i o n w i t h pay s t a t u s pending t h e outcome o f a n e a r i n g

on f o r m a l c h a r g e s . Such r e i n s t a t e m e n t and r e s t i t u t i o n of b e n e f i t s

i s t h e c o n t r o l l i n g f a c t o r i n disposing of a p p e l l a n t ' s ex p o s t

f a c t o argument b e c a u s e where such a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a c t i o n h a s

o c c u r r e d t h e e f f e c t s of any p r i o r i l l e g a l p r o c e d u r e s t a n d c o r r e c t e d

and c a n have no i n f l u e n c e on f u t u r e p r o c e d u r a l a c t i o n s . Thus, t h e

i n i t i a l i l l e g a l d i s c h a r g e becomes i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e i s s u e a t hand.

Turning t o t h e proceedings i n s t i t u t e d a g a i n s t a p p e l l a n t

a f t e r reinstatement, t h i s Court has recognized t h a t a d e c i s i o n

f a v o r a b l e t o a d i s c h a r g e d p u b l i c employee b e c a u s e o f p r o c e d u r a l

d e f i c i e n c i e s i n h i s d i s m i s s a l w i l l n o t i n s u l a t e t h a t employee,

a f t e r r e i n s t a t e m e n t , from f u r t h e r p u b l i c employer a c t i o n i f ap-

p r o p r i a t e s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e s a r e employed. This Court i n S t a t e

e x r e l . Ford v . F i s h & Game Comm'n, 148 Mont. 151, 1 6 5 , 418 P.2d

300, s a i d :

" * * * W e e x p r e s s no o p i n i o n a s t o whether cause e x i s t s o r does n o t e x i s t f o r r e l a t o r ' s removal and d i s c h a r g e . Our d e c i s i o n h e r e i n i s s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d t o t h e i l l e g a l manner i n which r e l a t o r ' s d i s c h a r g e w a s accomplished. Nor i s t h i s d e c i s i o n t o be i n t e r p r e t e d o r c o n s t r u e d a s any l i m i t a t i o n whatever on any f u t u r e a c t i o n t h a t may be t a k e n e i t h e r by t h e D i r e c t o r o r t h e Commission i n t h e p r e m i s e s c o n c e r n i n g r e l a t o r and h i s employment s t a t u s w i t h t h e Department s o l o n g a s such f u t u r e a c t i o n i s t a k e n i n t h e manner p r o v i d e d by law."

Our f i n a l i n q u i r y t h u s f o c u s e s on t h e q u e s t i o n of whether

a p p r o p r i a t e s t a t u t o r y procedures w e r e followed i n t h e f i n a l d i s m i s s a l of a p p e l l a n t . A p p e l l a n t makes s e v e r a l a l l e g a t i o n s of d u e p r o c e s s

v i o l a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e p r o c e e d i n g s which c u l m i n a t e d i n h i s f i n a l

discharge. These a l l e g a t i o n s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n t u r n .

A p p e l l a n t a l l e g e s t h e s u s p e n s i o n immediately f o l l o w i n g

r e i n s t a t e m e n t w a s c o n t r a t o t h e M e t r o p o l i t a n P o l i c e Law i n t h a t

t h e c h i e f o f p o l i c e d i d n o t s e c u r e t h e a p p r o v a l o f t h e mayor.

S e c t i o n 1 1 - 1 8 0 6 ( 1 0 ) , R.C.M. 1947, s t a t e s :

"The mayor o r c h i e f o f p o l i c e , s u b j e c t t o t h e a p p r o v a l o f t h e mayor, s h a l l have t h e power i n a l l c a s e s , t o suspend a policeman, o r any o f f i c e r , f o r a period of n o t exceeding t e n (10) days i n any o n e (1) month, such s u s p e n s i o n t o be w i t h o r w i t h o u t pay a s t h e o r d e r o f s u s p e n s i o n may d e t e r m i n e . "

Nowhere i n i t s b r i e f o r o r a l argument d i d t h e r e s p o n d e n t s p e c i f i c -

a l l y answer t h i s a l l e g a t i o n . However, a f t e r examining t h e d i s t r i c t

c o u r t f i l e , it a p p e a r s a p p e l l a n t was n o t on s u s p e n s i o n , b u t r a t h e r

paid vacation s t a t u s . True t h e l e t t e r of A p r i l 9, 1974 from t h e

c h i e f o f p o l i c e t o a p p e l l a n t c o n c e r n i n g r e i n s t a t e m e n t mentioned

t h e word " s u s p e n s i o n " and t h e a u t h o r i t y t o s o suspend under sec-

t i o n 11-1806. But a l a t e r l e t t e r from t h e c h i e f o f p o l i c e t o

a p p e l l a n t i n r e f e r e n c e t o new c h a r g e s , d a t e d J u l y 1 5 , 1974, s t a t e d

a p p e l l a n t was " * * * c u r r e n t l y on v a c a t i o n s t a t u s * * *." and

would n o t be suspended a t t h a t t i m e . Thus it would s e e m t h a t

any v i o l a t i o n of s t a t u t o r y d i r e c t i v e s was r e n d e r e d h a r m l e s s by

s u b s e q u e n t placement on v a c a t i o n s t a t u s w i t h f u l l pay u n t i l t h e

time of f i n a l discharge.

A p p e l l a n t n e x t c o n t e n d s t h e p o l i c e commission s h o u l d have

been e q u i t a b l y e s t o p p e d from p r e f e r r i n g c h a r g e s i n r e f e r e n c e t o

f a l s e s t a t e m e n t s on a p p e l l a n t ' s employment a p p l i c a t i o n t h r e e y e a r s

a f t e r s u c h a p p l i c a t i o n w a s s u b m i t t e d and two y e a r s t h r e e months

a f t e r h e had completed h i s p r o b a t i o n a r y p e r i o d . W e f i n d no m e r i t

i n t h i s contention. S e c t i o n 11-1805, R.C.M. 1947, i n p e r t i n e n t

p a r t , states:

"Any a p p l i c a n t who s h a l l make any f a l s e s t a t e m e n t t o t h e p o l i c e commission a s t o h i s a g e o r o t h e r q u a l i f i c a t i o n s r e q u i r e d , a t h i s examination before t h e p o l i c e commission, s h a l l be s u b j e c t t o s u s - p e n s i o n o r d i s m i s s a l from t h e p o l i c e f o r c e , a f t e r trial. "

N mention i s made i n t h i s s e c t i o n o f any s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s o

a s t o a c t i o n s stemming from f a l s e i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e employment

application.

F i n a l l y , a p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t i n t h e i n t e r e s t of

f a i r n e s s , r u l e s of c r i m i n a l p r o c e d u r e s h o u l d g u i d e t h e f i l i n g

of c h a r g e s and under such r u l e s t h e p o l i c e commission s h o u l d be

p r e c l u d e d from f i l i n g a d d i t i o n a l c h a r g e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e employ-

ment a p p l i c a t i o n , once p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t a p p e l l a n t had been

initiated. H e l p f u l t o o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s B a i l e y v . Examining

and T r i a l Board, 45 Mont. 1 9 7 , 199, 122 P . 572. Though ~ a i l e y

s t a n d s merely f o r t h e r u l e t h a t t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of c h a r g e s a s t o

d e t a i l s , d e s i g n a t i o n of o f f e n s e s , e t c . i n p o l i c e commission

p r o c e e d i n g s a r e n o t t o be t e s t e d by t h e r i g i d r u l e s o f c r i m i n a l

procedure, we b e l i e v e t h e r a t i o n a l e o f f e r e d i n t h a t d e c i s i o n i s

of persuasive value i n t h e i n s t a n t case. I n Bailey t h i s Court

said :

" * * * The o n l y r e q u i r e m e n t of t h e s t a t u t e i s t h a t t h e c h a r g e s h a l l be reduced t o w r i t i n g * * * and i f i n s u b s t a n c e it makes o u t any o n e of t h e t r i a b l e o f f e n s e s mentioned, it i s s u f f i c i e n t . And even i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h i s q u e s t i o n t h e c o u r t s w i l l a p p l y t h e most l i b e r a l r u l e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n , and n e c e s s a r i l y s o . The members o f t h e P o l i c e T r i a l Board a r e n o t r e q u i r e d t o be l e a r n e d i n t h e law of p l e a d i n g and p r a c t i c e ; i n f a c t many board members a r e laymen e n t i r e l y u n f a m i l i a r w i t h c o u r t p r o c e d u r e . N e i t h e r i s it demanded n o r contem- p l a t e d t h a t t h e person p r e f e r r i n g charges a g a i n s t a policeman s h a l l s p e c i f y t h e d e t a i l s o f t h e charge, g i v e a p a r t i c u l a r d e s i g n a t i o n t o t h e o f f e n s e , o r employ a n a t t o r n e y t o d r a f t t h e com- plaint. To i n s i s t upon s t r i c t n e s s i n c o n s t r u i n g a w r i t t e n c h a r g e of t h i s c h a r a c t e r would d e f e a t t h e purpose of t h e l a w and r e n d e r members of t h e p o l i c e f o r c e immune from d i s c i p l i n e . * * *."

Recognizing t h e l i m i t e d , n o n c r i m i n a l n a t u r e o f such p o l i c e commis-

s i o n h e a r i n g s and t h e u n d e r s t a n d a b l e l a c k of l e g a l e x p e r t i s e on

t h e p a r t o f t h e members o f t h e p o l i c e commission, t h i s C o u r t d o e s n o t impose r u l e s of c r i m i n a l p r o c e d u r e t o a h e a r i n g

of t h i s t y p e .

The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s a f f i r m e d .

n\We c o n c u r :

Justices

s i t t i n g i n p l a c e o f M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. H a r r i s o n .