Steen v. Polyclinic

81 P.2d 846, 195 Wash. 666
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedAugust 5, 1938
DocketNo. 26357. En Banc.
StatusPublished

This text of 81 P.2d 846 (Steen v. Polyclinic) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Steen v. Polyclinic, 81 P.2d 846, 195 Wash. 666 (Wash. 1938).

Opinions

*667 Robinson, J.

On August 28, 1930, H. J. Davidson, hereinafter referred to as defendant or respondent, removed the tonsils of Sylvia Daniels, who was then thirteen years of age. On August 25, 1933, almost three years thereafter, this action was brought by her parents and guardian ad litem to recover ten thousand dollars, on grounds of negligence alleged as follows:

“That the said negligence and carelessness and unskilled conduct on the part of the said defendants in the performance of said medical services consisted in cutting or causing to be cut and/or infected the vocal cords and nerves that control the vocal cords, or the organs and nerves that control the voice, in such a manner as to cause the loss of the voice; and in the performance of said operation at a time when said child had an infection in her throat commonly known as a ‘cold,’ and which was known to said defendants at the time of the performance of said operation; and performing said operation and treating the said child’s tonsils in such an unskilled and careless manner as to permanently cause the loss of the said child’s voice.”

The case did not come on for trial until January 7, 1935, moré than four years after the operation. The jury returned a verdict for ten thousand dollars; and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, in the alternative, for a new trial was promptly made, but did not come on for hearing until March, 1936. A judgment was entered for the defendants notwithstanding the verdict on June 12, 1936; the court, also, in accordance with the rule in such cases, passing upon the motion for a new trial. This appeal was taken on July 2', 1936, but, for some reason, was not argued in this court until September 27, 1937. A reargument En Banc was thereafter ordered, which, due to the protracted and ultimately fatal illness of appellants’ *668 chief counsel, did not take place until May 2nd of this year.

In asking this court to set aside the judgment appealed from and direct the entry of a judgment on the verdict, appellants correctly contend that the trial court was not warranted in entering judgment notwithstanding the verdict unless it can be said that there was neither evidence nor reasonable inference from evidence to sustain it. Where the evidence is conflicting upon an issuable fact, and where minds of reasonable men may differ with respect thereto, the question is one for the jury to determine, and, in passing upon a motion for judgment notwithstanding a verdict, all evidence favorable to the party who received the verdict must be taken as true, and all reasonable inferences therefrom which are favorable to him must be drawn. These rules and principles are so firmly established that, as is said in the brief filed on behalf of the appellants, no citation of authority is necessary. The appellants’ contention, therefore, calls for a minute and painstaking examination of the statement of facts and the exhibits made a part thereof.

One of the allegations of negligence, that is, that the operation was performed at a time when Miss Daniels had a cold, resulting in infection causing loss of voice, was disposed of by the first witness, her mother, who testified that Dr. Davidson refused to operate for that reason and did not operate until Sylvia had recovered. The allegation that the defendant cut the vocal cords or the nerve that controls the vocal cords was subsequently amended, as to the manner of severance, by the introduction of evidence during the trial. •

Although Dr. Davidson testified that, when Miss Daniels came to him for the operation, her voice was “husky,” and his office records characterized it on October 1, 1930, a month after the operation, as “voice *669 husky;” on October 10, “hoarse, keeps clearing her throat;” December 6,1930, “voice improving;” and January 21, 1931, “voice improving, still slightly husky;” and he testified that she did not have a whispering, but only a husky, voice on July 25, 1931, and two of his office assistants testified that, when she came for the operation, her voice was merely husky, as if due to a cold, Miss Daniels herself, her mother, her stepfather, and no less than six neighbors and friends of the family testified that, previous to the operation, Miss Daniels had a beautiful, fine, normal, singing voice, and after the operation she was never known to sing or speak above a whisper. The jury was therefore warranted in finding for the plaintiff on that issue.

As tending to prove that the operation was performed in a rough manner, evidence was introduced to the effect that Miss Daniels had a hemorrhage two or three days after the operation, and that the blood “spurted” from her mouth like “water from a hose;” that she had another hemorrhage several days later, and a third on the eleventh day after the operation, so violent as to “soak three big bath towels” with blood and “the whole bed more or less;” and although Dr. Hartung, who was called in to stop the first hemorrhage and who testified for the plaintiff, said that it was no more than what one might call an “oozing,” which he easily stopped, and that it was a “nice, clean tonsillectomy,” and Dr. Davidson testified, as to the third occasion, that Miss Daniels’ pulse was normal, she had no fever, and that she merely spit out saliva mixed with blood, it was the duty of the trial court, in passing upon the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, to, resolve all conflicts in evidence in favor of the plaintiff.

Dr. Thomas Ratigan was called on behalf of the plaintiffs. Although a general practitioner, he had removed *670 as many “as thirty pairs of tonsils in a morning.” He testified that one hemorrhage after a tonsil operation was usual, but that three occurring in a period of seven or eight days after an operation were so unusual as to indicate that there had been a rough pulling or stretching.

Dr. Davidson testified .that hemorrhages from seven to ten days after the operation were of occasional occurrence where the tonsils were very large, as in this case; and Dr. Brugman, an eye, ear, nose, and throat specialist, testified that hemorrhages occurring as late as the tenth or eleventh day were.no reflection on the surgeon at all.

Early in the trial, the plaintiffs, in anticipation of an affirmative defense that Miss Daniels’ whispering voice was due to a growth on the vocal cords, introduced the evidence of Dr. Ratigan to the effect that he had examined Miss Daniels’ throat on the previous Saturday and found no growth on her vocal cords. During the interval between the operation and the trial, Miss Daniels had consulted, or been treated by, no less than twelve surgeons and laryngologists in Seattle and vicinity. Miss Daniels was asked on cross-examination:

“Q. Did any of those doctors tell you what was wrong with your voice? A. No. They said that there was a growth. Q. They said there was a growth on the vocal cords? A. Yes, sir.”

Later, she said that Dr. Winslow did not express an opinion, and that Dr. Chase did not.

Dr.

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Bluebook (online)
81 P.2d 846, 195 Wash. 666, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/steen-v-polyclinic-wash-1938.