Steele v. Turner

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Steele v. Turner

282 S.E.2d 365, 158 Ga. App. 838, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2437

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedMay 28, 1981

Docket61412

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 282 S.E.2d 365 (Steele v. Turner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Steele v. Turner, 282 S.E.2d 365, 158 Ga. App. 838, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2437 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981).

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Opinion

Sognier, Judge.

Turner, a real estate broker, brought this action to recover his commission for the sale of Steele’s farm. The jury returned a verdict for Turner and Steele appeals. He contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict, and by entering judgment on the verdict. Steele contends there was no evidence to show either negotiations with Turner, or that Steele had knowledge of any negotiations with a prospective purchaser by Turner to sell the farm. In substance, he is appealing on the general grounds.

1. In regard to Steele’s motion for a directed verdict, Code Ann. § 81A-150 provides that such a motion will be granted where there is no conflict in the evidence and a verdict is demanded. See State Farm &c. Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 125 Ga. App. 352 (187 SE2d 878) (1972). As there is a sharp conflict in the evidence in the instant case, the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion.

2. “In determining whether or not a [real estate] broker was the procuring cause of the sale where there is no exclusive contract to sell, it must be established that (i) the negotiations were still pending between the broker and the prospective purchaser; and (ii) the owner was aware that the negotiations were still pending at the time he consummated the sale.” Hodges-Ward Assoc. v. Ecclestone, 156 Ga. App. 59, 61 (273 SE2d 872) (1980). While there was a conflict in the evidence, it was sufficient to authorize a finding by the jury that Turner met these two requirements. “ ‘ “It is our duty to construe the evidence to uphold the verdict instead of upsetting it. [Cit.]” Hieber v. Watt, 119 Ga. App. 5, 9 (165 SE2d 899).’ [Cit.] The evidence here, though conflicting in some aspects, was sufficient to support the verdict.” Bell v. Brewton, 139 Ga. App. 463, 464 (1) (228 SE2d 600) (1976). Hence, we will not disturb the trial court’s entry of judgment on the verdict.

Judgment affirmed.

Shulman, P. J., and Birdsong, J., concur.

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Sognier, Judge.

Turner, a real estate broker, brought this action to recover his commission for the sale of Steele’s farm. The jury returned a verdict for Turner and Steele appeals. He contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict, and by entering judgment on the verdict. Steele contends there was no evidence to show either negotiations with Turner, or that Steele had knowledge of any negotiations with a prospective purchaser by Turner to sell the farm. In substance, he is appealing on the general grounds.

1. In regard to Steele’s motion for a directed verdict, Code Ann. § 81A-150 provides that such a motion will be granted where there is no conflict in the evidence and a verdict is demanded. See State Farm &c. Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 125 Ga. App. 352 (187 SE2d 878) (1972). As there is a sharp conflict in the evidence in the instant case, the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion.

2. “In determining whether or not a [real estate] broker was the procuring cause of the sale where there is no exclusive contract to sell, it must be established that (i) the negotiations were still pending between the broker and the prospective purchaser; and (ii) the owner was aware that the negotiations were still pending at the time he consummated the sale.” Hodges-Ward Assoc. v. Ecclestone, 156 Ga. App. 59, 61 (273 SE2d 872) (1980). While there was a conflict in the evidence, it was sufficient to authorize a finding by the jury that Turner met these two requirements. “ ‘ “It is our duty to construe the evidence to uphold the verdict instead of upsetting it. [Cit.]” Hieber v. Watt, 119 Ga. App. 5, 9 (165 SE2d 899).’ [Cit.] The evidence here, though conflicting in some aspects, was sufficient to support the verdict.” Bell v. Brewton, 139 Ga. App. 463, 464 (1) (228 SE2d 600) (1976). Hence, we will not disturb the trial court’s entry of judgment on the verdict.

Judgment affirmed.

Shulman, P. J., and Birdsong, J., concur.

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282 S.E.2d 365, 158 Ga. App. 838, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2437, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/steele-v-turner-gactapp-1981.

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