NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1788-23
STEEL WORKS LLC,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
NAJIBA HAKIMA, AKHTAR M. MAHBOB and ESMAIL MAHBUB,
Defendants-Appellants. _________________________
Submitted April 2, 2025 – Decided July 3, 2025
Before Judges Marczyk and Torregrossa-O'Connor.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Docket No. LT-006077-23.
Esmail Mahbub, appellant pro se.
Griffin Alexander, PC, attorneys for respondent (William Rodriguez, on the brief).
PER CURIAM In this residential landlord-tenant action, defendants Najiba Hakimi,
Akhtar M. Mahbob, and Esmail Mahbub (collectively defendants) appeal the
January 3, 2024 judgment of possession issued in favor of plaintiff Steel Works,
LLC. Because defendants relinquished possession of the property at issue, we
dismiss the appeal as moot.
I.
On December 16, 2021, defendants signed a lease agreement with plaintiff
for an apartment beginning on December 18, 2021 and ending in February 2023.
Per the agreement, defendants owed plaintiff $2,185 in monthly rent due on the
first day of each month. The agreement included a clause indicating defendants
would incur late charges for failure to pay rent by the fifth day of each month,
and that "[a]ll charges due pursuant to any provision of th[e] [l]ease . . . are
'additional rent.'" On December 23, 2022, defendants renewed the lease
agreement with plaintiff, this time for a term between February 2023 and May
2024. The second agreement contained the same late fee and additional rent
provisions but increased the rent to $2,214 per month.
Plaintiff filed a complaint on August 28, 2023 to evict defendants for
nonpayment of rent, alleging $3,690.15 in unpaid rent spanning between June
A-1788-23 2 and August 2023, indicating that sum could rise while the action was ongoing.
The landlord-tenant court conducted a trial over two days. 1
On the first day of the hearing, Carla Arizaga, the "Resident Account
Manager" for plaintiff's property, testified regarding the property's Department
of Community Affairs registration. Arizaga confirmed defendants leased the
apartment, the amount of defendants' monthly rental and other fee obligations,
including garage and amenity fees. Arizaga noted that a ten percent late fee
would be charged on rent balances, and the leases each provided "[i]f [tenant]
do[es not] pay all rent on or before the [fifth] day of the month, [tenant will] pay
a late charge . . . [which] will be . . . a flat rate . . . or [ten percent] of [the] total
rent due." She confirmed that "garage fees, utility fees, and amenity fees [are]
all considered additional rent."
Arizaga testified defendants had been making monthly payments, but fell
behind, providing insufficient funds on three occasions and carrying a "balance
due at the end of every month." Plaintiff introduced a certificate alleging
defendants' then-outstanding obligation of $4,823.40, consisting of $1,561.80 in
1 Only defendant Esmail Mahbub appeared on both hearing days, explaining the remaining tenants, his parents, were sick. Because the record reflects confusion regarding the correct spelling of Esmail's and Akhtar's last names, we use their first names to distinguish them, intending no disrespect.
A-1788-23 3 rent, $854.95 in late fees, $1,000 in attorney's fees, $67 in court fees, $900 in
garage fees, $200 in amenity fees, $164.65 in utility fees, and $75 in return
check fees.
Esmail insisted that he paid on time every month, claiming plaintiff closed
its online payment portal, causing the delay. The court sought clarification
regarding when defendants failed to pay their base rental obligation, paused the
hearing, and requested: (1) defendants provide documentation of past payment;
and (2) plaintiff provide "a better breakdown of exactly what[ was] due and
owing."2
On the next hearing date in January 2024, plaintiff indicated the amount
of rent due had increased to $4,883.82. Plaintiff provided ledgers reflecting
defendants' payment history from both its previous and current management
companies, and offered testimony from Francesca Marshall, who was employed
at both management companies. Marshall referenced the ledgers and testified
regarding defendants' deficient payments through January 2024. The records
demonstrated that even when defendants made full monthly rental payments,
they failed to satisfy the total outstanding balance and late fees accrued.
2 The court also directed plaintiff to file an amended complaint correcting an anomaly in the landlord's name to correspond with the other documents. A-1788-23 4 During the hearing, Esmail never testified but informed the court that he
made timely payments each month. He again challenged the late fees,
attributing the delay to plaintiff's online portal. The court addressed with Esmail
the arrears and fees reflected in the ledgers. It observed:
If my rent is $1,000, and I pay you $500 for January, the next month I pay you the whole thing on time. So in February, I pay you $1,000 on time, that [$]1,000 . . . [is] not really a full payment because they take half of that money, the [$]500 that was missing from the last month, and put it to the other month.
After reviewing the evidence and testimony, the court, in an oral decision,
expressed its satisfaction that, based on plaintiff's documentary evidence,
defendants owed plaintiff $4,451.82. The court indicated it found the testimony
from both Arizaga and Marshall credible. The court explained it reviewed the
lease agreement and "painstakingly went through[] not only the prior ledger of
the prior management company, but [also] the current ledger[,] to determine the
amounts due and owing with such particularity that no one can[]not understand
the amounts due and owing." Although questioning the records concerning
certain late fee entries, the court recognized that defendants "at one point fell
behind in . . . rent payments, and by falling behind[,] . . . this created an ongoing
balance" beginning in November 2022.
A-1788-23 5 The court struck one improper legal fee entry in the records, decreasing
the total amount owed to $4,451.82, and indicated it was "satisfied by a
preponderance of the evidence that the amount alleged by the landlord, including
attorney['s] fees and court costs, [wa]s proper and appropriate," and therefore
entered a judgment for possession with an outstanding amount of $4,451.82 and
permitted plaintiff to file for a warrant of removal. The court thereafter issued
a January 3, 2024 written judgment of possession reflecting its decision granting
plaintiff possession of the premises.
It is undisputed that defendants voluntarily vacated the apartment and
returned their keys on January 15, 2024, before the execution of the warrant for
removal.
II.
On appeal, defendants argue that (1) plaintiff provided no statutory good
cause to evict defendants, (2) defendants' eviction was illegal and plaintiff's use
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1788-23
STEEL WORKS LLC,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
NAJIBA HAKIMA, AKHTAR M. MAHBOB and ESMAIL MAHBUB,
Defendants-Appellants. _________________________
Submitted April 2, 2025 – Decided July 3, 2025
Before Judges Marczyk and Torregrossa-O'Connor.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Docket No. LT-006077-23.
Esmail Mahbub, appellant pro se.
Griffin Alexander, PC, attorneys for respondent (William Rodriguez, on the brief).
PER CURIAM In this residential landlord-tenant action, defendants Najiba Hakimi,
Akhtar M. Mahbob, and Esmail Mahbub (collectively defendants) appeal the
January 3, 2024 judgment of possession issued in favor of plaintiff Steel Works,
LLC. Because defendants relinquished possession of the property at issue, we
dismiss the appeal as moot.
I.
On December 16, 2021, defendants signed a lease agreement with plaintiff
for an apartment beginning on December 18, 2021 and ending in February 2023.
Per the agreement, defendants owed plaintiff $2,185 in monthly rent due on the
first day of each month. The agreement included a clause indicating defendants
would incur late charges for failure to pay rent by the fifth day of each month,
and that "[a]ll charges due pursuant to any provision of th[e] [l]ease . . . are
'additional rent.'" On December 23, 2022, defendants renewed the lease
agreement with plaintiff, this time for a term between February 2023 and May
2024. The second agreement contained the same late fee and additional rent
provisions but increased the rent to $2,214 per month.
Plaintiff filed a complaint on August 28, 2023 to evict defendants for
nonpayment of rent, alleging $3,690.15 in unpaid rent spanning between June
A-1788-23 2 and August 2023, indicating that sum could rise while the action was ongoing.
The landlord-tenant court conducted a trial over two days. 1
On the first day of the hearing, Carla Arizaga, the "Resident Account
Manager" for plaintiff's property, testified regarding the property's Department
of Community Affairs registration. Arizaga confirmed defendants leased the
apartment, the amount of defendants' monthly rental and other fee obligations,
including garage and amenity fees. Arizaga noted that a ten percent late fee
would be charged on rent balances, and the leases each provided "[i]f [tenant]
do[es not] pay all rent on or before the [fifth] day of the month, [tenant will] pay
a late charge . . . [which] will be . . . a flat rate . . . or [ten percent] of [the] total
rent due." She confirmed that "garage fees, utility fees, and amenity fees [are]
all considered additional rent."
Arizaga testified defendants had been making monthly payments, but fell
behind, providing insufficient funds on three occasions and carrying a "balance
due at the end of every month." Plaintiff introduced a certificate alleging
defendants' then-outstanding obligation of $4,823.40, consisting of $1,561.80 in
1 Only defendant Esmail Mahbub appeared on both hearing days, explaining the remaining tenants, his parents, were sick. Because the record reflects confusion regarding the correct spelling of Esmail's and Akhtar's last names, we use their first names to distinguish them, intending no disrespect.
A-1788-23 3 rent, $854.95 in late fees, $1,000 in attorney's fees, $67 in court fees, $900 in
garage fees, $200 in amenity fees, $164.65 in utility fees, and $75 in return
check fees.
Esmail insisted that he paid on time every month, claiming plaintiff closed
its online payment portal, causing the delay. The court sought clarification
regarding when defendants failed to pay their base rental obligation, paused the
hearing, and requested: (1) defendants provide documentation of past payment;
and (2) plaintiff provide "a better breakdown of exactly what[ was] due and
owing."2
On the next hearing date in January 2024, plaintiff indicated the amount
of rent due had increased to $4,883.82. Plaintiff provided ledgers reflecting
defendants' payment history from both its previous and current management
companies, and offered testimony from Francesca Marshall, who was employed
at both management companies. Marshall referenced the ledgers and testified
regarding defendants' deficient payments through January 2024. The records
demonstrated that even when defendants made full monthly rental payments,
they failed to satisfy the total outstanding balance and late fees accrued.
2 The court also directed plaintiff to file an amended complaint correcting an anomaly in the landlord's name to correspond with the other documents. A-1788-23 4 During the hearing, Esmail never testified but informed the court that he
made timely payments each month. He again challenged the late fees,
attributing the delay to plaintiff's online portal. The court addressed with Esmail
the arrears and fees reflected in the ledgers. It observed:
If my rent is $1,000, and I pay you $500 for January, the next month I pay you the whole thing on time. So in February, I pay you $1,000 on time, that [$]1,000 . . . [is] not really a full payment because they take half of that money, the [$]500 that was missing from the last month, and put it to the other month.
After reviewing the evidence and testimony, the court, in an oral decision,
expressed its satisfaction that, based on plaintiff's documentary evidence,
defendants owed plaintiff $4,451.82. The court indicated it found the testimony
from both Arizaga and Marshall credible. The court explained it reviewed the
lease agreement and "painstakingly went through[] not only the prior ledger of
the prior management company, but [also] the current ledger[,] to determine the
amounts due and owing with such particularity that no one can[]not understand
the amounts due and owing." Although questioning the records concerning
certain late fee entries, the court recognized that defendants "at one point fell
behind in . . . rent payments, and by falling behind[,] . . . this created an ongoing
balance" beginning in November 2022.
A-1788-23 5 The court struck one improper legal fee entry in the records, decreasing
the total amount owed to $4,451.82, and indicated it was "satisfied by a
preponderance of the evidence that the amount alleged by the landlord, including
attorney['s] fees and court costs, [wa]s proper and appropriate," and therefore
entered a judgment for possession with an outstanding amount of $4,451.82 and
permitted plaintiff to file for a warrant of removal. The court thereafter issued
a January 3, 2024 written judgment of possession reflecting its decision granting
plaintiff possession of the premises.
It is undisputed that defendants voluntarily vacated the apartment and
returned their keys on January 15, 2024, before the execution of the warrant for
removal.
II.
On appeal, defendants argue that (1) plaintiff provided no statutory good
cause to evict defendants, (2) defendants' eviction was illegal and plaintiff's use
of late fees was "illegitimate" because most states, including New York, permit
a maximum late fee of $50, (3) the lease agreement's provision incorporating
fees as "additional rent" is a "predatory practice by [plaintiff] to overcharge
tenant[s]," (4) plaintiff improperly renewed the lease in 2022 without informing
A-1788-23 6 defendants of their unpaid balance, and (5) defendants asked for, but plaintiff
failed to provide, a source clarifying their remaining balance due and owing.
Plaintiff contends the appeal is moot because defendants "voluntarily
vacated the apartment." It alternatively contends defendants' appeal lacks merit,
as the trial court's entry of the judgment of possession was supported by
"competent, relevant, and reasonably credible evidence," including the ledgers
proving defendants' nonpayment. Plaintiff adds that defendants' arguments on
appeal were not raised below and should not be considered for the first time on
appeal.
III.
This court reviews the validity of a judgment of possession for abuse of
discretion. See Cmty. Realty Mgmt., Inc. v. Harris, 155 N.J. 212, 236 (1998).
"In reviewing a trial court's conclusions in a nonjury civil action, we are bound
to grant substantial deference to the trial court's findings and conclusions."
Fromet Props., Inc. v. Buel, 294 N.J. Super. 601, 615 (App. Div. 1996) (citing
Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974)).
This court leaves undisturbed factual findings supported by substantial, credible
evidence. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Northfield Med. Ctr., P.C., 228 N.J. 596, 619
(2017). Conversely, this court reviews de novo the trial court's legal
A-1788-23 7 conclusions. See Clark v. Nenna, 465 N.J. Super. 505, 511 (App. Div. 2020).
"Mootness is a threshold justiciability determination rooted in the notion
that judicial power is to be exercised only when a party is immediately
threatened with harm." Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Cnty. of Bergen, 450
N.J. Super. 286, 291 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp.,
415 N.J. Super. 301, 311 (App. Div. 2010)). "An issue is 'moot when our
decision sought in a matter, when rendered, can have no practical effect on the
existing controversy.'" Redd v. Bowman, 223 N.J. 87, 104 (2015) (quoting
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 221-22 (App. Div.
2011)).
In a summary landlord-tenant action, "where a tenant no longer resides in
the property, an appeal challenging the propriety of an eviction is moot."
Sudersan v. Royal, 386 N.J. Super. 246, 251 (App. Div. 2005); see also Daoud
v. Mohammad, 402 N.J. Super. 57, 61 (App. Div. 2008) (holding that "[b]ecause
the [Special Civil Part]'s jurisdiction is limited to determining the issue of the
landlord's right to possession of the premises, and . . . the tenant vacated the
premises," dismissal of the appeal was appropriate due to mootness). However,
when an "eviction carries residual legal consequences potentially adverse to" a
former occupant, courts may entertain a landlord-tenant matter that is otherwise
A-1788-23 8 moot. Sudersan, 386 N.J. Super. at 251.
The undisputed facts before us demonstrate defendants vacated the
premises in January 2024. Defendants do not refute that they no longer reside
in the apartment; nor do they allege adverse legal consequences beyond the
termination of their tenancy with plaintiff. Defendants assert only that the
"[e]viction order . . . damages [their] ability . . . to acquire [a] new place for rent
due to [plaintiff's] history of biased eviction."
Appellate courts do not decide moot issues unless "the underlying issue is
one of substantial importance, likely to reoccur but capable of evading review."
Wisniewski v. Murphy, 454 N.J. Super. 508, 519 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting
Zirger v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 144 N.J. 327, 330 (1996)). Here, without any
particularized argument or information as to how defendants have been
adversely affected beyond the universal impact of eviction, we determine
defendants' appeal is now moot and decline to reach the substance of defendants'
claims on appeal.
Affirmed.
A-1788-23 9