320 Ga. 184 FINAL COPY
S24A1245. STEEL v. THE STATE.
PETERSON, Presiding Justice.
A trial court found attorney Brian Steel in contempt of court
for refusing to tell the court how he learned about the court’s ex
parte hearing with a witness and prosecutors in a case in which
Steel is representing one of the defendants. Steel appeals from that
contempt order, arguing that the evidence did not support a
contempt finding because he did not interfere with the court’s
administration of justice, his information was protected by attorney-
client privilege, and due process required the judge to recuse from
the contempt proceeding. Because the court delayed punishment,
the alleged disobedience was directed toward the court, and the
court was involved in the controversy that formed the basis of the
contempt, due process required the judge to recuse from the
contempt proceeding. We therefore reverse the judgment of
contempt imposed by the trial court. 1. The record shows the following. Steel represents a
defendant, Jeffery Williams, in an ongoing criminal case charging
multiple defendants with, among other things, participation in a
criminal street gang and conspiracy to violate Georgia’s Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.1 In June 2024, Fulton
County Superior Court Chief Judge Ural Glanville was presiding
over the trial. During the trial, Judge Glanville found one of the
State’s witnesses in contempt for exercising his Fifth Amendment
privilege against compelled self-incrimination — essentially
refusing to testify — despite having been given immunity from
prosecution. Judge Glanville adjourned the trial on a Friday and
stated he would resume the trial the following Monday and ask the
witness, outside of the jury’s presence, whether the witness would
testify.
The following Monday morning, Judge Glanville held an ex
parte meeting with the witness, the witness’s counsel, and State
1 Although several of the defendants were charged with murder, Williams was not. 2 prosecutors and investigators to discuss whether the witness would
testify for the State. The meeting, taken down by a court reporter
and transcribed for the record, took place in Judge Glanville’s
chambers and comprised most of the morning, at the end of which
the witness said he would testify. The witness gave limited
testimony before a lunch recess was taken.
Following the recess, Steel informed Judge Glanville that Steel
had learned about the ex parte meeting and moved for a mistrial.
Judge Glanville stated that he was “disturbed because that is ex
parte” and repeatedly asked Steel to reveal the source of his
information, informing Steel that “if you don’t tell me how you got
this information, then you and I are going to have some problems.”
Steel refused to reveal his source, and Judge Glanville told Steel
that it was “disturbing that somehow you have surreptitiously
gotten information in regard to the Court’s private ex parte
conversation with a party.” Judge Glanville repeatedly told Steel
that he was going to hold him in contempt if Steel did not tell him
who disclosed the ex parte meeting. Steel claimed that the
3 information was covered by attorney-client privilege; challenged by
Judge Glanville, Steel also said it was attorney work product. Judge
Glanville then took a recess.
Upon returning to the bench, Judge Glanville told Steel that
there was “only one way you could have gotten” the information and
that it was not work product. Judge Glanville again asked Steel to
reveal his source, and said he was going to hold Steel in contempt if
Steel refused. Steel said he did not want to be held in contempt, and
Judge Glanville responded, “I don’t want to hold you in contempt but
you — this is so sacrosanct to have a conversation in my chambers
parroted to you and others. It is that serious.” Steel asserted that he
could not comply with the court’s order without violating Rule 1.6 of
the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“Rule 1.6”), which states
in part that a lawyer “shall maintain in confidence all information
gained in the professional relationship with a client[.]” Judge
Glanville rejected this argument and stated, “I’m going to hold you
in contempt and you can think about it[,]” adding that “at 5:00
today[,] we’ll see where you are, where you stand on that point[.]”
4 Judge Glanville told Steel that he was not asking for the “sum and
substance of what was said,” only for how Steel learned about the
meeting. Steel responded, “I can’t do that.”
Judge Glanville then told Steel, “I don’t want to hold you in
contempt but this is that serious. . . . You cannot eavesdrop and get
information that was not meant for you to hear[.]” Steel said he
would “do whatever you want until 5:00 or thereafter,” but
maintained that the matter was serious enough to warrant a
hearing and then moved for a mistrial. When Steel said he wanted
to get to “the substance [of the ex parte conversation] first,” Judge
Glanville responded that Steel would “be in custody until [5:00 p.m.]
because you need to tell me how you got the information.” There was
a brief back and forth about how Steel possibly learned of the
information and whether it was privileged before Judge Glanville
said, “I’m not going to have any further conversation . . . with you
about this. I want to know — the question still remains. I want to
know how — who gave you this information.” Judge Glanville then
said, “He can go into custody at this point in time.”
5 Steel was not immediately taken into custody. He made
additional arguments in support of a mistrial and repeated his
argument that he could not disclose his source without breaching
Rule 1.6. Judge Glanville told Steel that he could not “hide behind”
Rule 1.6. Steel said he was not “hiding behind anything” and
continued to ask why he was excluded from the ex parte hearing.
The prosecutor then made several arguments as to why the ex parte
meeting was not improper and why the information at issue was not
protected by Rule 1.6.
Steel’s co-counsel then addressed Judge Glanville, informing
him that co-counsel was also in possession of the same information
Steel received, and that the trial should not continue until the court
resolved the ex parte issue. Steel’s co-counsel renewed the motion
for mistrial, which other defendants joined. Judge Glanville denied
all of those motions and said he was going to proceed with the trial.
Steel’s co-counsel said he would not participate in the trial without
Steel and without the court addressing the ex parte issue. Judge
Glanville responded, “Sir, you-all are really getting yourselves cross-
6 purposes at this point in time. . . . You made some things out of
nothing. I think that you are on very precarious ground at this point
in time.” Judge Glanville said that he would continue with the trial
and co-counsel could represent Williams. Co-counsel again asked
Judge Glanville to address the ex parte issue, but Judge Glanville
refused. Judge Glanville then ordered Steel to be taken into custody.
As he was being taken away, Steel asked to say “one thing,”
clarifying that Judge Glanville was denying Williams his right to
counsel and again moved for a mistrial.
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320 Ga. 184 FINAL COPY
S24A1245. STEEL v. THE STATE.
PETERSON, Presiding Justice.
A trial court found attorney Brian Steel in contempt of court
for refusing to tell the court how he learned about the court’s ex
parte hearing with a witness and prosecutors in a case in which
Steel is representing one of the defendants. Steel appeals from that
contempt order, arguing that the evidence did not support a
contempt finding because he did not interfere with the court’s
administration of justice, his information was protected by attorney-
client privilege, and due process required the judge to recuse from
the contempt proceeding. Because the court delayed punishment,
the alleged disobedience was directed toward the court, and the
court was involved in the controversy that formed the basis of the
contempt, due process required the judge to recuse from the
contempt proceeding. We therefore reverse the judgment of
contempt imposed by the trial court. 1. The record shows the following. Steel represents a
defendant, Jeffery Williams, in an ongoing criminal case charging
multiple defendants with, among other things, participation in a
criminal street gang and conspiracy to violate Georgia’s Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.1 In June 2024, Fulton
County Superior Court Chief Judge Ural Glanville was presiding
over the trial. During the trial, Judge Glanville found one of the
State’s witnesses in contempt for exercising his Fifth Amendment
privilege against compelled self-incrimination — essentially
refusing to testify — despite having been given immunity from
prosecution. Judge Glanville adjourned the trial on a Friday and
stated he would resume the trial the following Monday and ask the
witness, outside of the jury’s presence, whether the witness would
testify.
The following Monday morning, Judge Glanville held an ex
parte meeting with the witness, the witness’s counsel, and State
1 Although several of the defendants were charged with murder, Williams was not. 2 prosecutors and investigators to discuss whether the witness would
testify for the State. The meeting, taken down by a court reporter
and transcribed for the record, took place in Judge Glanville’s
chambers and comprised most of the morning, at the end of which
the witness said he would testify. The witness gave limited
testimony before a lunch recess was taken.
Following the recess, Steel informed Judge Glanville that Steel
had learned about the ex parte meeting and moved for a mistrial.
Judge Glanville stated that he was “disturbed because that is ex
parte” and repeatedly asked Steel to reveal the source of his
information, informing Steel that “if you don’t tell me how you got
this information, then you and I are going to have some problems.”
Steel refused to reveal his source, and Judge Glanville told Steel
that it was “disturbing that somehow you have surreptitiously
gotten information in regard to the Court’s private ex parte
conversation with a party.” Judge Glanville repeatedly told Steel
that he was going to hold him in contempt if Steel did not tell him
who disclosed the ex parte meeting. Steel claimed that the
3 information was covered by attorney-client privilege; challenged by
Judge Glanville, Steel also said it was attorney work product. Judge
Glanville then took a recess.
Upon returning to the bench, Judge Glanville told Steel that
there was “only one way you could have gotten” the information and
that it was not work product. Judge Glanville again asked Steel to
reveal his source, and said he was going to hold Steel in contempt if
Steel refused. Steel said he did not want to be held in contempt, and
Judge Glanville responded, “I don’t want to hold you in contempt but
you — this is so sacrosanct to have a conversation in my chambers
parroted to you and others. It is that serious.” Steel asserted that he
could not comply with the court’s order without violating Rule 1.6 of
the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“Rule 1.6”), which states
in part that a lawyer “shall maintain in confidence all information
gained in the professional relationship with a client[.]” Judge
Glanville rejected this argument and stated, “I’m going to hold you
in contempt and you can think about it[,]” adding that “at 5:00
today[,] we’ll see where you are, where you stand on that point[.]”
4 Judge Glanville told Steel that he was not asking for the “sum and
substance of what was said,” only for how Steel learned about the
meeting. Steel responded, “I can’t do that.”
Judge Glanville then told Steel, “I don’t want to hold you in
contempt but this is that serious. . . . You cannot eavesdrop and get
information that was not meant for you to hear[.]” Steel said he
would “do whatever you want until 5:00 or thereafter,” but
maintained that the matter was serious enough to warrant a
hearing and then moved for a mistrial. When Steel said he wanted
to get to “the substance [of the ex parte conversation] first,” Judge
Glanville responded that Steel would “be in custody until [5:00 p.m.]
because you need to tell me how you got the information.” There was
a brief back and forth about how Steel possibly learned of the
information and whether it was privileged before Judge Glanville
said, “I’m not going to have any further conversation . . . with you
about this. I want to know — the question still remains. I want to
know how — who gave you this information.” Judge Glanville then
said, “He can go into custody at this point in time.”
5 Steel was not immediately taken into custody. He made
additional arguments in support of a mistrial and repeated his
argument that he could not disclose his source without breaching
Rule 1.6. Judge Glanville told Steel that he could not “hide behind”
Rule 1.6. Steel said he was not “hiding behind anything” and
continued to ask why he was excluded from the ex parte hearing.
The prosecutor then made several arguments as to why the ex parte
meeting was not improper and why the information at issue was not
protected by Rule 1.6.
Steel’s co-counsel then addressed Judge Glanville, informing
him that co-counsel was also in possession of the same information
Steel received, and that the trial should not continue until the court
resolved the ex parte issue. Steel’s co-counsel renewed the motion
for mistrial, which other defendants joined. Judge Glanville denied
all of those motions and said he was going to proceed with the trial.
Steel’s co-counsel said he would not participate in the trial without
Steel and without the court addressing the ex parte issue. Judge
Glanville responded, “Sir, you-all are really getting yourselves cross-
6 purposes at this point in time. . . . You made some things out of
nothing. I think that you are on very precarious ground at this point
in time.” Judge Glanville said that he would continue with the trial
and co-counsel could represent Williams. Co-counsel again asked
Judge Glanville to address the ex parte issue, but Judge Glanville
refused. Judge Glanville then ordered Steel to be taken into custody.
As he was being taken away, Steel asked to say “one thing,”
clarifying that Judge Glanville was denying Williams his right to
counsel and again moved for a mistrial. Judge Glanville denied the
motion and said the court was going to take a five-minute recess.
When proceedings resumed without Steel present, Judge
Glanville ordered co-counsel to continue representing Williams and
said co-counsel could consult with Steel on breaks. Co-counsel said
he would not although he “respect[ed] the Court has to do whatever
it believes appropriate.” One of the State’s prosecutors suggested to
Judge Glanville that he fashion a contempt punishment that would
still allow Steel and co-counsel to continue representing Williams,
so as not to interfere with Williams’s right to counsel. Judge
7 Glanville agreed.
Other defendants continued to press for a transcript of the ex
parte meeting, refusing to accept the representations of the trial
court and the State that nothing inappropriate happened. Judge
Glanville responded that an appellate court could tell him if he was
wrong and that there were “other bodies in Georgia” that could
review his conduct.2 Judge Glanville then said Steel could return to
the courtroom, took a recess, and following the recess reminded
Steel that he was still being held in contempt and could purge the
contempt if he revealed the source of his information. Judge
Glanville told Steel that he would go into custody at the end of that
day’s proceedings if Steel did not reveal who disclosed the ex parte
meeting. Judge Glanville then stated that he might “make some
other remedies depending upon what information I find later.” The
jurors were then brought back into the courtroom, and the trial
2 See, e.g., Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. I (creating the Supreme Court of Georgia); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Par. I (creating the Court of Appeals of Georgia); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VI (creating the Judicial Qualifications Commission). 8 resumed.
At the end of the day, after jurors were released, Judge
Glanville asked Steel if he was willing to reveal who disclosed the ex
parte information. Steel informed the court that the Georgia
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers sent an attorney to
represent Steel because the court accused Steel of eavesdropping,
which is a crime. Judge Glanville informed Steel’s attorney that he
was “about to enter” an order of contempt, was offering Steel another
chance to purge, and that was “the only thing I’m trying to do at this
point in time.” Steel’s counsel argued that due process required
Judge Glanville to refer the matter to another judge since Steel was
entitled to a hearing and Judge Glanville would be a witness at that
hearing. Judge Glanville rejected those arguments, sentenced Steel
to 20 days in jail to be served on weekends, and stated that Steel
was not entitled to a supersedeas bond. The written order reflecting
this sentence did not provide Steel an opportunity to purge the
9 contempt. This appeal ensued.3
2. Steel challenges the contempt order on several grounds. We
do not reach most of those arguments, because we agree with Steel
that to afford Steel due process, Judge Glanville was required to
recuse himself.
Our precedent makes clear that individuals facing criminal
contempt are entitled to due process.4 See Hedquist v. Hedquist, 275
Ga. 188, 189 (563 SE2d 854) (2002) (“The constitutional right to due
3 Steel filed his notice of appeal in the superior court and an emergency
motion for supersedeas with the Court of Appeals, which transferred the emergency motion to this Court. We pretermitted whether the matters fell within our jurisdiction over “cases in which a sentence of death was imposed or could be imposed,” see Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III (8), and took the case under our certiorari jurisdiction, granting a writ of certiorari as to both the emergency motion and the appeal of the contempt order. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. V (“The Supreme Court may review by certiorari cases in the Court of Appeals which are of gravity or great public importance.”). 4 Although the initial contempt finding was likely civil, as Judge
Glanville initially offered Steel the opportunity to purge the contempt, Judge Glanville’s ultimate ruling, as reflected by the written contempt order on appeal here, was criminal in nature because it punished Steel for his past conduct and offered no opportunity to purge. See Ford v. Ford, 270 Ga. 314, 315-316 (509 SE2d 612) (1998) (“The distinction between criminal and civil contempt is that criminal contempt imposes unconditional punishment for prior acts of contumacy, whereas civil contempt imposes conditional punishment as a means of coercing future compliance with a prior court order.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). 10 process applies in criminal contempt proceedings because a
conviction can result in the loss of liberty and the levy of a penal
fine.” (citation omitted)). What process is due depends in part on
whether the contumacious conduct occurred in the court’s presence
and whether a court announces punishment immediately.
When the contumacious conduct occurs in the presence of the
court, a trial court has the power when necessary to maintain order
in the courtroom to declare the conduct to be contemptuous and
announce a punishment summarily without further notice or
hearing so long as the contemnor has been given an opportunity to
speak in his own behalf.5 See Dowdy v. Palmour, 251 Ga. 135, 141-
142 (2) (304 SE2d 52) (1983); accord Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488,
498 (94 SCt 2697, 41 LE2d 897) (1974) (“Even where summary
punishment for contempt has been imposed during trial, the
contemnor has normally been given an opportunity to speak in his
own behalf in the nature of a right of allocution.” (citation,
5 Although the punishment must be announced immediately, it need not
be served immediately and may be postponed until after trial. See Dowdy v. Palmour, 251 Ga. 135, 142 (2) (304 SE2d 52) (1983). 11 punctuation and footnote omitted)). These situations are typically
limited to conduct that occurs in open court, because such conduct
generally threatens the “court’s immediate ability to conduct its
proceedings, such as where a witness refuses to testify, or a party
disrupts the court.” Ramirez v. State, 279 Ga. 13, 14 (2) (608 SE2d
645) (2005) (citation and punctuation omitted). Such summary
proceedings are tolerated because of a trial court’s “substantial
interest in rapidly coercing compliance and restoring order[.]” Id. at
14 (citation and punctuation omitted). If a trial judge was required
to recuse or hold separate contempt proceedings every time a
proceeding was disrupted, unruly litigants, lawyers, or members of
the public would essentially possess a heckler’s veto, and trial judges
would have no way to restore order and proceed with court in a
timely fashion.
The situation is different when the contemnor's conduct does
not interfere with the court's proceedings and thus need not be
punished immediately. In those cases, where the court delays
punishment or the conduct occurs outside the court's presence, more
12 process is due. If the announcement of punishment is delayed, a
court must give the contemnor reasonable notice of the specific
charges and hold a hearing. See Dowdy, 251 Ga. at 142 (2). If the
punishment is delayed and “the contumacious conduct was directed
toward the judge or where the judge reacted to the contumacious
conduct in such manner as to become involved in the controversy,”
that hearing “must be conducted by another judge.” Id.6
Here, Judge Glanville did punish Steel summarily for his
refusal in open court to comply with Judge Glanville’s order, as he
held Steel in contempt, placed him in custody, and had him removed
from the courtroom. But that punishment is not the subject of this
appeal.
Steel was allowed to return to the courtroom to continue
representing Williams and was given until the end of that day to
6 Similarly, for conduct that occurs outside the court’s presence, “the
considerations justifying expedited procedures do not pertain,” and due process requires that a person “be advised of [the contempt] charges, have a reasonable opportunity to respond to them, and be permitted the assistance of counsel and the right to call witnesses.” Ramirez, 279 Ga. at 15 (2) (citations and punctuation omitted). 13 comply with the court’s order. Judge Glanville made clear that Steel
was still in contempt, but he did not announce what specific
punishment he would impose.
Because the announcement of a specific punishment was
delayed by the trial court, Steel was entitled to additional process.
In particular, he was entitled to have the matter heard by a different
judge. Steel’s repeated refusal to comply with Judge Glanville’s
direct order was conduct directed toward the judge. Steel continued
to challenge the propriety of the ex parte meeting and asserted that
he could not legally comply with Judge Glanville’s order to disclose
his source. The exchange between Steel and Judge Glanville makes
clear that Judge Glanville was involved in the controversy. For these
reasons, a different judge should have presided over the contempt
hearing, and the failure to do so requires reversal. See Dowdy, 251
Ga. at 142 (2) (reversing contempt order on due process grounds
because contempt action should have been heard by a different
judge, where announcement of punishment was delayed and
allegedly contumacious conduct — an attorney’s failure to stand and
14 respond to the court — was conduct directed at the judge and the
judge became involved in the controversy); cf. Mayberry v.
Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 463-464 (91 SCt 499, 27 LE2d 532)
(1971) (“Where [a judge] does not act the instant the contempt is
committed, but waits until the end of the trial, on balance, it is
generally wise where the marks of the unseemly conduct have left
personal stings to ask a fellow judge to take his place.”).
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.
15 Decided October 22, 2024.
Contempt. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Glanville.
The Steel Law Firm, Colette R. Steel; The Merchant Law Firm,
Ashleigh B. Merchant; R. Alexander Susor; Strickland Webster,
Leigh A. Webster; Barron Law, Lynsey M. Barron, for appellant.
Fani T. Willis, District Attorney, Kevin C. Armstrong, Assistant
District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Beth A.
Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Clint C. Malcolm, Meghan H. Hill,
Senior Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
Cook & Tolley, Edward D. Tolley; Garland Samuel & Loeb,
Donald F. Samuel, Amanda R. Clark Palmer; Hunter J. Rodgers,
Mazie L. Guertin, Jessica Jones, Greg A. Willis, amici curiae.