Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Jordan

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Jordan

643 So. 2d 35, 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 8830, 1994 WL 497307

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedSeptember 14, 1994

DocketNo. 93-2276

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 643 So. 2d 35 (Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Jordan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Jordan, 643 So. 2d 35, 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 8830, 1994 WL 497307 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994).

Pincite

Opinion

ALLEN, Judge.

The employer/servicing agent appeal a workers’ compensation order, challenging the amount of an attorney’s fee award. We reject the contention that in the circumstances of this ease the award must be limited to the percentage formula in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1989). However, in departing from the percentage formula the judge referred to certain factors which do not comport with the standards announced in cases such as Regal Wood Products v. Baschansci, 603 So.2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). See also Bowe Septic Tank Service v. Grooms, 397 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Among other pertinent concerns, these cases indicate that an attorney’s fee should not be based on time and labor expended on unrelated claims, or in connection with benefits which are voluntarily provided without the necessity of the attorney’s intervention. Because the judge did not limit consideration of the attorney’s time and labor to that which pertained to the underlying benefits award upon which fee entitlement was predicated, we reverse the appealed order and remand for reconsideration as to the amount of the attornéy’s fee.

KAHN and MICKLE, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

ALLEN, Judge.

The employer/servicing agent appeal a workers’ compensation order, challenging the amount of an attorney’s fee award. We reject the contention that in the circumstances of this ease the award must be limited to the percentage formula in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1989). However, in departing from the percentage formula the judge referred to certain factors which do not comport with the standards announced in cases such as Regal Wood Products v. Baschansci, 603 So.2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). See also Bowe Septic Tank Service v. Grooms, 397 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Among other pertinent concerns, these cases indicate that an attorney’s fee should not be based on time and labor expended on unrelated claims, or in connection with benefits which are voluntarily provided without the necessity of the attorney’s intervention. Because the judge did not limit consideration of the attorney’s time and labor to that which pertained to the underlying benefits award upon which fee entitlement was predicated, we reverse the appealed order and remand for reconsideration as to the amount of the attornéy’s fee.

KAHN and MICKLE, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

643 So. 2d 35, 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 8830, 1994 WL 497307, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/steel-fabricators-inc-v-jordan-fladistctapp-1994.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack