Stedman v. Dept. of Forestry

502 P.3d 234, 316 Or. App. 203
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedDecember 8, 2021
DocketA173889
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 502 P.3d 234 (Stedman v. Dept. of Forestry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stedman v. Dept. of Forestry, 502 P.3d 234, 316 Or. App. 203 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).

Opinion

Argued and submitted February 23, affirmed December 8, 2021

Clifford STEDMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE OF OREGON, acting by and through Department of Forestry, a state agency, Defendant-Respondent. Tillamook County Circuit Court 19CV21735; A173889 502 P3d 234

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment dismissing his negligence claim for personal injuries on state land, which he sustained in an accident on his all- terrain vehicle (ATV). The trial court granted the state’s motion for summary judgment based on the state’s claim of recreational immunity under ORS 105.682(1). Plaintiff assigns error to that ruling, arguing that an exception to the recreational immunity doctrine applies because his purchase of an ATV oper- ating permit was a charge, as defined in ORS 105.672(1), for permission to use the land for recreational purposes under ORS 105.688(3). Held: The fee for an ATV operating permit is not a charge for use of the land where plaintiff was injured but is instead in the nature of a vehicle registration fee. The trial court did not err in concluding that the state was entitled to recreational immunity or by granting summary judgment on that basis. Affirmed.

Mari Garric Trevino, Judge. Melissa Hopkins argued the cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Law Offices of Judy Snyder. Jon Zunkel-deCoursey, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General. Before DeVore, Presiding Judge, and DeHoog, Judge, and Mooney, Judge. DeVORE, P. J. Affirmed. 204 Stedman v. Dept. of Forestry

DeVORE, P. J. Plaintiff appeals from a judgment dismissing his negligence claim for personal injuries on state land. The trial court granted the state’s motion for summary judg- ment based on the state’s claim of recreational immunity under ORS 105.682(1). Plaintiff assigns error to that rul- ing, arguing that immunity does not apply because plain- tiff purchased an operating permit for an all-terrain vehicle (ATV), and, in his view, the fee for that permit constitutes a charge for permission to use the land for purposes of ORS 105.672(1), which renders immunity inapplicable under ORS 105.688(3). We set forth those provisions later. We conclude that the fee for an ATV operating permit is not a charge for the use of the land where plaintiff was injured but is instead in the nature of a vehicle registration fee. We affirm. Summary judgment is permitted when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ORCP 47 C. We view the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the non- moving party, and we review a decision allowing summary judgment for legal error. Towe v. Sacagawea, Inc., 357 Or 74, 95-96, 347 P3d 766 (2015). We state the facts in light of that standard. Our task here is a matter of statutory construc- tion, which we review for errors of law. State v. Hunt, 270 Or App 206, 210, 346 P3d 1285 (2015). Plaintiff bought an ATV operating permit from the Oregon Parks and Recreation Department (OPRD) for his ATV. He received an ATV-permit sticker which he affixed to the rear of his Raptor 660 ATV. He also bought an ATV permit for his mini dirt-bike; and he had bought a separate ATV permit when he had a sandrail ATV. He understood that “you have to have like ATV permits and for [sic] any vehicle you ride.” On August 19, 2017, plaintiff entered the Beaver Dam Stockpile area of the Tillamook State Forest. He did not pay anything on that day to go into the area. The area features trails designated for recreational ATV use. A notice posted on a display board at the entrance indicated that all motorized trail users were required to have an Oregon ATV Cite as 316 Or App 203 (2021) 205

Permit. Plaintiff rode his ATV past a gravel pile, which was “coned off,” and up a second gravel pile, which was not. He was unable to stop at its crest, fell 15 to 20 feet, and seri- ously injured his shoulder. Plaintiff filed this action alleging the state’s negligence in failing to warn, “cone off,” or close the area. After a hearing on the state’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court considered the nature of the charge for an ATV operating permit and plaintiff’s argument that it was a “charge” within the meaning of the exception to the statute’s provision for recreational immunity. The court determined “that Plaintiff’s ATV operator’s [sic] permit was not a ‘charge’ to use the land for recreational purposes, but simply a permit to operate his ATV.” The court concluded that recreational immunity applied and dismissed plain- tiff’s claim. To allude to the statutes to be reviewed, we describe the question presented as whether a fee for a permit that allows the use of an ATV on lands open to ATVs can be char- acterized as a “charge” paid “in return for granting permis- sion” to go upon “the land” where plaintiff was injured. In effect, we must determine whether an ATV operating per- mit is a fee paid for permission to use “the owner’s land” or, instead, the permit is a form of registration of off-road vehicles for use on lands open to their use. The difference determines the viability of the state’s defense of recreational immunity under ORS 105.682. Our starting point is the legislature’s policy to pro- vide immunity to owners who allow recreational use of their land. In relevant part, ORS 105.682(1) provides: “[A]n owner of land is not liable in contract or tort for any personal injury, death or property damage that arises out of the use of the land for recreational purposes, gardening, woodcutting or the harvest of special forest products when the owner of land either directly or indirectly permits any person to use the land for recreational purposes, garden- ing, woodcutting or the harvest of special forest products.” The exception, on which plaintiff relies, appears in ORS 105.688(3), which provides, in relevant part: 206 Stedman v. Dept. of Forestry

“[T]he immunities provided by ORS 105.682 do not apply if the owner makes any charge for permission to use the land for recreational purposes, gardening, woodcutting or the harvest of special forest products.” (Emphases added.) The term “charge” is defined by ORS 105.672, which provides: “As used in ORS 105.672 to 105.696: “(1) ‘Charge’: “(a) Means the admission price or fee requested or expected by an owner in return for granting permission for a person to enter or go upon the owner’s land.” (Emphases added.) The emphasized language makes express that a “charge” is a part of a quid pro quo arrangement.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
502 P.3d 234, 316 Or. App. 203, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stedman-v-dept-of-forestry-orctapp-2021.