[Cite as Stedke v. Hume Contracting, L.L.C., 2025-Ohio-323.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT ALLEN COUNTY
DAVEN E. STEDKE, ET AL., CASE NO. 1-24-07 PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,
v.
HUME CONTRACTING, LLC, ET AL., OPINION
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. CV 2021 0339
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: February 3, 2025
APPEARANCES:
Zachary D. Maisch and Andrea M. Bayer for Appellants
Neil Fairweather and Aaron L. Bensinger for Appellees Case No. 1-24-07
ZIMMERMAN, J.
{¶1} Plaintiffs-appellants, Daven E. Stedke (“Stedke”) and Hume Supply,
Inc. (“Hume Supply”) (collectively, “plaintiffs”), appeal the December 20, 2023
judgment of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas granting (partial) summary
judgment in favor of defendants-appellees, Hume Contracting, LLC (“Hume
Contracting”) and Ryan D. Smith (“Smith”) (collectively, “defendants”), and
dismissing their breach-of-contract claim. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} This case stems from a dispute over Stedke’s employment with Hume
Contracting following the sale of a majority of Hume Supply’s assets to Hume
Contracting. Hume Contracting is owned by Smith, while Stedke retained
ownership of Hume Supply. Following the sale of Hume Supply’s assets to Hume
Contracting, Stedke executed an employment agreement with Hume Contracting.
{¶3} However, on May 23, 2021, Smith provided Stedke with a letter of
termination in which Smith indicated that Stedke’s employment was being
terminated for “direct breaches of [his] obligations under [his] Employment
Agreement.” (Doc. No. 74, Ex. 2). Specifically, the letter states that Stedke
“continue[d] to make negative statements about the Company to third parties,”
which “violates [Stedke’s] obligation not to make disparaging comments about the
Company.” (Id.). In addition, the letter describes that Stedke “entered the Company
property and argued with Company employees about [his] intent to remove certain
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equipment from the property” and that Stedke later returned to the property “and
aggressively berated and threatened these same employees for reporting the
dispute.” (Id.).
{¶4} On October 28, 2021, the plaintiffs filed a complaint for replevin and
breach of contract in the trial court. Hume Contracting filed its answer on December
15, 2021 along with counterclaims for breach of contract, breach of the goodwill
agreement, recoupment, tortious interference with business relations, and replevin.
The plaintiffs filed their answer to Hume Contracting’s counterclaims on December
27, 2021.
{¶5} Smith filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint under Civ.R.
12(B)(6) on December 15, 2021. The plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition
to Smith’s motion to dismiss on December 27, 2021. On January 3, 2022, Smith
filed his reply to the plaintiffs’ memorandum in opposition to his motion to dismiss.
On January 4, 2022, the trial court denied Smith’s motion as to the plaintiffs’ breach-
of-contract claim, granted Smith’s motion as to the plaintiffs’ replevin claim, and
dismissed the plaintiffs’ replevin claim against Smith.
{¶6} On March 28, 2022, because Smith did not file an answer to the
plaintiffs’ complaint, the plaintiffs’ filed a motion in the trial court requesting
default judgment against Smith. Smith filed a memorandum in opposition to the
plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment on April 8, 2022. That same day, Smith filed
a motion for leave to file an answer. On April 20, 2022, the trial court denied the
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plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment and granted Smith’s motion for leave to file
an answer. Smith filed his answer that same day.
{¶7} After being granted leave by the trial court, Stedke filed a supplemental
complaint on August 12, 2022, alleging a claim for breach of a promissory note. On
October 21, 2022, because the defendants did not file an answer to Stedke’s
supplemental complaint, Stedke filed a motion in the trial court requesting default
judgment against the defendants. That same day, the trial court granted Stedke’s
motion for default judgment and awarded him a judgment in the amount of
$59,450.14 “with interest at six percent (6%) per annum from May 1, 2022.” (Doc.
No. 38).
{¶8} Notwithstanding the trial court’s judgment in favor of Stedke as to his
supplemental complaint, the defendants filed an answer to Stedke’s supplemental
complaint on October 24, 2022. Thereafter, the defendants filed a motion for relief
from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B) on November 4, 2022. Stedke filed a
memorandum in opposition to the defendants’ motion for relief from judgment on
November 9, 2022. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for relief from
judgment on November 29, 2022.
{¶9} After being granted leave by the trial court, Smith filed an amended
answer on July 26, 2023.
{¶10} On November 17, 2023, after being granted leave by the trial court,
the defendants filed a motion for (partial) summary judgment. In their motion, the
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defendants requested that the trial court grant summary judgment in their favor as
to the plaintiffs’ claim for breach of contract. The plaintiffs filed a memorandum in
opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on December 14, 2023.
On December 18, 2023, the defendants filed their reply to the plaintiffs’
memorandum in opposition to their motion for summary judgment. On December
20, 2023, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and
dismissed the plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract claim.
{¶11} Even though the plaintiffs’ replevin and breach-of-a-promissory-note
claims and the defendants’ counterclaims remain pending, the trial court certified
that there is no just reason for delay under Civ.R. 54(B). Thus, on January 18, 2024,
the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal. They raise one assignment of error.
Assignment of Error
The Trial Court Erred In Granting Partial Summary Judgment And Dismissing Appellant’s Claim For Breach Of Contract.
{¶12} In their sole assignment of error, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court
erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to their breach-
of-contract claim. In particular, the plaintiffs argue that genuine issues of material
fact remain as to whether Stedke was wrongfully terminated from his employment
with Hume Contracting.
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Standard of Review
{¶13} We review a decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Doe v.
Shaffer, 90 Ohio St.3d 388, 390 (2000). “De novo review is independent and
without deference to the trial court’s determination.” ISHA, Inc. v. Risser, 2013-
Ohio-2149, ¶ 25 (3d Dist.). Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine
issue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
and reasonable minds can reach but one conclusion when viewing the evidence in
favor of the non-moving party, and the conclusion is adverse to the non-moving
party. Civ.R. 56(C); State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn.,
69 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1994).
{¶14} “The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of
producing some evidence which demonstrates the lack of a genuine issue of material
fact.” Carnes v. Siferd, 2011-Ohio-4467, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.). “In doing so, the moving
party is not required to produce any affirmative evidence, but must identify those
portions of the record which affirmatively support his argument.” Id. “The
nonmoving party must then rebut with specific facts showing the existence of a
genuine triable issue; he may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his
pleadings.” Id.
Analysis
{¶15} In this case, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by granting
summary judgment in favor of the defendants after concluding that there is no
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genuine issue of material fact that the defendants did not breach the employment
agreement by terminating Stedke’s employment with Hume Contracting. That is,
the plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by concluding that no genuine issues of
material fact exist regarding whether Stedke’s employment was terminated for just
cause.
{¶16} “A cause of action for breach of contract requires the claimant to
establish the existence of a contract, the failure without legal excuse of the other
party to perform when performance is due, and damages or loss resulting from the
breach.” Lucarell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2018-Ohio-15, ¶ 41.
{¶17} The parties agree that Stedke’s employment agreement “was for a
definite term of three years” and that it “contained no provisions regarding
termination and was silent as to a definition of ‘just cause.’” (Appellee’s Brief at
3); (Appellant’s Brief at 4). Indeed, Stedke’s employment agreement describes the
term of his employment as “a period of three (3) years commencing” on May 1,
2019. (Doc. No. 1, Ex. 2). Yet, contrary to the parties’ suggestion that the
agreement does not contain any “provisions regarding termination,” the agreement
contains a non-disparagement clause, which rudimentarily discusses the issue of
termination. (Appellant’s Brief at 5). That clause provides, “During Stedke’s
employment and after termination of that employment, for any or no reason, Stedke
shall not make to any person or entity, by any mode of communication, any negative
or disparaging comments with respect to the Company, its practices and procedures,
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or its products and services.” (Emphasis added.) (Doc. No. 1, Ex. 2). However,
that clause notwithstanding, the employment agreement does not define “just cause”
for termination.
{¶18} “‘A court’s primary objective in the construction of any written
agreement is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties by examining
the language that they chose to employ.’” United Gulf Marine, LLC v. Continental
Refining Co., LLC, 2019-Ohio-666, ¶ 20 (3d Dist.), quoting O.E. Meyer Co. v. BOC
Group, Inc., 2000 WL 234549, *5 (6th Dist. Mar. 3, 2000). “First, a court must
determine whether the disputed language is plain and unambiguous.” Id. “‘The
language is unambiguous if, from reading only the four corners of the instrument,
the language is clear, definite, and subject to only one interpretation.’” Id., quoting
Beverly v. Parilla, 2006-Ohio-1286, ¶ 24 (7th Dist.). “Contract language is
ambiguous ‘if it is unclear, indefinite, and reasonably subject to dual
interpretations.’” Mulchin v. ZZZ Anesthesia, Inc., 2006-Ohio-5773, ¶ 36 (6th
Dist.), quoting Beverly at ¶ 24. See also Bay Coast Properties, Inc. v. Natl. City
Bank, 2006-Ohio-2348, ¶ 15 (6th Dist.) (noting that “[t]he test for determining
whether contract terms are ambiguous” is: “Common words appearing in a written
instrument will be given their ordinary meaning unless manifest absurdity results,
or unless some other meaning is clearly evidenced from the face or overall contents
of the instrument”), quoting Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241
(1978), paragraph two of the syllabus.
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{¶19} “‘If it is clear and unambiguous, the court need not go beyond the plain
language of the agreement to determine the rights and obligations of the parties’ and
‘[t]he interpretation of a written agreement is . . . a matter of law for the court,’
which an appellate court reviews de novo.” United Gulf Marine at ¶ 21, quoting
O.E. Meyer Co. at *5. As we previously stated, “[d]e novo review requires us to
conduct an independent review of the record without deference to the trial court’s
decision.” Matrix Technologies, Inc. v. Kuss Corp., 2008-Ohio-1301, ¶ 11 (6th
Dist.). “When a court finds an ambiguity in the contract language, the intent of the
parties becomes a question of fact; in order to ascertain such intent, the trier of fact
may rely on extrinsic evidence.” Mulchin at ¶ 36. See also Inland Refuse Transfer
Co. v. Browning-Ferris Industries of Ohio, Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 321, 322 (1984)
(“However, if a term cannot be determined from the four corners of a contract,
factual determination[s] of intent or reasonableness may be necessary to supply the
missing term.”).
{¶20} “The parol evidence rule prohibits a party from contradicting or
supplementing a written, fully-integrated contract with extrinsic evidence of prior
or contemporaneous agreements, whether oral or written.” Bottomline Ink, Corp. v.
Huntington Bancshares, Inc., 2008-Ohio-2987, ¶ 11 (6th Dist.). “Only when the
language of a contract is unclear or ambiguous, or when the circumstances
surrounding the agreement invest the language of the contract with a special
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meaning will extrinsic evidence be considered in an effort to give effect to the
parties’ intentions.” Huff v. FirstEnergy Corp., 2011-Ohio-5083, ¶ 12.
{¶21} Because the parties’ agreement does not define “just cause,” “we look
at common sources to define its ordinary meaning.” In re Klingenberg, 1993 WL
48746, *2 (3d Dist. Feb. 23, 1993). See Ma v. Cincinnati Children’s Hosp. Med.
Ctr., 2023-Ohio-1727, ¶ 18 (1st Dist.) (recognizing that “ambiguity can arise when
‘“a material phrase in the provision is undefined”’”), quoting Ma v. Cincinnati
Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 2020-Ohio-1471, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.), quoting Career &
Technical Assn. v. Auburn Vocational School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2014-Ohio-1572, ¶
18 (11th Dist.).
{¶22} “Unlike an at-will employment relationship, an employer who is a
party to an employment contract of definite term may properly discharge the
employee only for ‘just cause.’” Zimmerman v. Eagle Mtge. Corp., 110 Ohio
App.3d 762, 773 (2d Dist. 1996). See also Williams v. Case W. Res. Univ., 2006-
Ohio-6190, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.) (noting that “where the parties have entered into a
written employment contract with a stated term of duration, the employee may not
be terminated at will, but may be terminated only for ‘just cause’”). “Conduct which
gives rise to ‘just cause’ for termination is that kind of conduct which an ordinarily
intelligent person would regard as a justifiable reason for discharging an employee.”
Piqua Mem. Med. Ctr. v. Butsch, 1996 WL 185342, *2 (2d Dist. Apr. 19, 1996).
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{¶23} “To justify the discharge of an employee for just cause, ‘it is sufficient
for the employer to show that the employee was guilty of a default in duty whose
natural tendency was to injure [its] business, and actual injury thereto need not be
shown.’” McElroy v. Snider Co., 2000 WL 868469, *3 (8th Dist. June 29, 2000),
quoting Beckman v. Garrett, 66 Ohio St. 136 (1902), syllabus. “Negligence, neglect
of duty, misconduct, injury to the employer’s business, dishonesty, or disloyalty are
all grounds for termination for just cause regardless of the existence of an
employment contract.” McCormac v. Ackerman Corp., 1987 WL 11972, *7 (8th
Dist. June 4, 1987). See also Dayton Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Brown, 116 Ohio St. 373,
374 (1927) (“[N]eglect of duty, insubordination, and disloyalty are sufficient
grounds for terminating employment.”).
{¶24} In this case, the defendants contend that they are entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law because there is no genuine issue of material fact that Stedke’s
employment was terminated for just cause. Specifically, in his termination letter,
Smith asserted that Stedke made “negative statements about the Company to third
parties” and instigated a verbal altercation with other employees of Hume
Contracting. (Doc. No. 74, Ex. 2). In other words, Smith alleged that his just cause
for terminating Stedke’s employment was that Stedke engaged in conduct that had
a propensity to injure Hume Contracting. That is, Stedke engaged in misconduct,
injury to the employer’s business, and disloyalty.
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{¶25} In support of the defendants’ assertion that Stedke’s employment was
terminated for just cause, the defendants not only submitted the affidavit of Smith,
but also submitted the affidavits of Craig Eisert (“Eisert”), the employee that Stedke
threatened, and Daniel Schoder (“Schoder”), an employee who witnessed the
altercation between Stedke and Eisert.
{¶26} Chiefly, in his affidavit, Eisert averred that he observed Stedke on May
14, 2021 “taking materials and equipment that did not belong to him.” (Doc. No.
72, Ex. B). Eisert stated that he knew that those materials and equipment did not
belong to Stedke because he “had just purchased some of the materials for the
business and [he] knew they were company property.” (Id.). Consequently, Eisert
reported his observation to Smith. According to Eisert, Stedke, who was apparently
“upset at [Eisert] for reporting the situation to management,” returned to the
business on May 18, 2021 and “threatened to ‘take [Eisert] out to the grass.’” (Id.).
Eisert averred that Stedke “wanted to attack [him] physically” and was “unsure
whether he was going to physically attack [him] right there inside the shop since
[he] refused to go outside.” (Id.). Further, Eisert averred that Stedke “threatened to
‘ruin [him] financially.’” (Id.).
{¶27} Likewise, Smith averred that Eisert reported Stedke’s conduct to him.
According to Smith, Eisert told him “that he felt Daven Stedke had verbally abused
him and [he] was in fear for his safety as he felt there was an immediate threat to
his safety.” (Doc. No. 72, Ex. A). Smith further averred that he “conducted an
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investigation into the facts and circumstances” of the incidents and that he “spoke
with those who had observed the interaction between” Stedke and Eisert. (Id.).
Relevantly, Schoder averred that he “heard a highly hostile conversation between
Daven Stedke and Craig Eisert, which based on [his] observations was an
inappropriate way to speak to another . . . employee.” (Doc. No. 72, Ex. C). In
particular, Schoder averred that “[f]rom what he heard[, Stedke] was hostile towards
Craig Eisert and Craig Eisert was attempting to deflate the situation.” (Id.).
According to Schoder, Eisert “appeared visibly upset” following the altercation.
(Id.).
{¶28} Even though the defendants further alleged that Stedke’s employment
was terminated for just cause (or as a result of a breach of his employment
agreement) based on disparaging statements that he allegedly made about Hume
Contracting, the defendants did not provide any evidence supporting that allegation.
{¶29} In response to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the
plaintiffs’ provided only the self-serving affidavit of Stedke without any
corroborating materials. Specifically, in that affidavit, Stedke averred that he did
not “threaten Craig Eisert or any other employee of Hume Contracting, LLC.”
(Doc. No. 75). According to Stedke, “[t]he story outlined by Craig Eisert and Daniel
Schoder in their affidavits is a complete fabrication and an obvious attempt to gain
favor in the eyes of their employer.” (Id.).
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{¶30} “‘Generally, a party’s unsupported and self-serving assertions, offered
by way of affidavit, standing alone and without corroborating materials under
Civ.R. 56, will not be sufficient to demonstrate material issues of fact.’” Cornell v.
Rudolph Foods, Inc., 2011-Ohio-4322, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.), quoting TJX Cos., Inc. v.
Hall, 2009-Ohio-3372, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.). “‘Otherwise, a party could avoid summary
judgment under all circumstances solely by simply submitting such a self-serving
affidavit containing nothing more than bare contradictions of the evidence offered
by the moving party.’” Id., quoting TJX Cos. at ¶ 30. However, “a party’s affidavit
is competent to create a genuine issue of material fact if the relevant factual
assertions are made on personal knowledge.” Patel v. Krisjal, L.L.C., 2013-Ohio-
1202, ¶ 35 (10th Dist.).
{¶31} In this case, the plaintiffs failed to corroborate Stedke’s self-serving
affidavit with any evidence and Stedke’s affidavit does not include any specific facts
(made on personal knowledge) which would create a triable issue. See Wischt v.
Heirs of Mourer, 2017-Ohio-8236, ¶ 29 (5th Dist.) (concluding that the appellant
did not corroborate “affidavit with any evidence or include[] in her affidavit any
specific facts which establishes the existence of an issue of material fact. Rather,
her affidavit contains bare contradictions of the evidence offered by appellees”).
See also Findley v. Union Cty. Mem. Hosp., 2014-Ohio-3547, ¶ 29 (3d Dist.)
(concluding “that Gloria’s affidavit and deposition testimony merely reiterate her
complaint and do not demonstrate any material fact”). Instead, Stedke’s affidavit
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reflects bare contradictions of the evidence offered by the plaintiffs. See JPMorgan
Chase Bank, NA v. Carroll, 2013-Ohio-5273, ¶ 26 (12th Dist.) (“Appellants’ bald
assertions that they ‘do not know’ Brown, that JPMorgan is ‘a complete stranger’
to them, and that they ‘deny owing’ JPMorgan ‘anything’ are insufficient to
overcome the evidence presented by JPMorgan. The fact that such assertions are
couched in an affidavit by Glenn is also insufficient to overcome JPMorgan’s
evidence.”).
{¶32} Nevertheless, in contradiction to this conclusion, the dissenting
opinion contends that Stedke’s affidavit is sufficient to combat the defendants’
motion for summary judgment. In support of this position, the dissenting opinion
advocates for this court to provide clarifying precedent regarding the admissibility
and weight afforded to self-serving statements at the summary judgment stage.
{¶33} Specifically, the dissenting opinion advocates that we follow the Tenth
District Court of Appeals’ holding in Kiser v. United Dairy Farmers that “‘self-
serving’ testimonial evidence that conforms to the requirements of Civ.R. 56(C)
must be considered by the trial court and treated as any other evidence in the record
at summary judgment.” 2023-Ohio-2136, ¶ 24 (10th Dist.). There is no justification
for departing from our established precedent or for creating a new legal rule. Indeed,
our holding in this case does not diverge from the standing precedent of this court
(or from our sister appellate districts for that matter) pertaining to self-serving
affidavits containing bare contradictions. Decisively, as we previously
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acknowledged (also relying on a case from the Tenth District), a self-serving
affidavit can be used to defeat an opponent’s motion for summary judgment if it
contains factual assertions that are made on personal knowledge. Patel, 2013-Ohio-
1202, at ¶ 35 (10th Dist.). This is the Civ.R. 56 standard. See Kiser at ¶ 23.
Importantly, a close review of our sister appellate district’s decision in Kiser reveals
that the presence of specific factual assertions based on personal knowledge is the
hallmark of its analysis. Accordingly, the absence of such assertions in Stedke’s
affidavit is dispositive of the issue presented here. As a result, by overlooking the
correct standard, the dissenting opinion creates a flawed deviation from the
established jurisprudence of this court (as well as our sister courts of appeal) by
determining that a self-serving affidavit, without more evidence, can defeat a motion
for summary judgment.
{¶34} Applying this established standard to the present case demonstrates
the flaw in the dissenting opinion’s analysis. Resolutely, Stedke’s 15 word denial
(in his affidavit) fails to create a genuine issue of material fact. That is, there is no
evidence in the record before this court showing that Stedke responded to the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment with any specific details (based on his
personal knowledge) about his conversation with Eisert to create a genuine dispute.
Accordingly, there is no doubt that Stedke’s words are self-serving and lack
corroborating evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact.
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{¶35} Based on the foregoing, the only evidence that the trial court could
consider was Stedke’s short, self-serving denial of the threats. That is, the only
evidence in opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment that the
trial court had to go on was Stedke’s statement that he did not threaten Eisert.
Clearly, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of the
defendants since, most notably, Stedke never specifically denied being in a “heated
argument” with Eisert.
{¶36} Furthermore, an important point bears emphasis: Because Stedke’s
affidavit fails to present any evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact,
the resolution of this case does not require any credibility determination. The
inquiry before this court is not whether Stedke or the defendants are credible, but
rather whether their affidavits satisfy the evidentiary requirements of Civ.R. 56.
Having failed to present any evidence beyond a bare denial, Stedke’s affidavit does
not meet that threshold.
{¶37} For these reasons, we conclude that Stedke’s self-serving affidavit is
insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. See
Wells Fargo Bank v. Blough, 2009-Ohio-3672, ¶ 18 (4th Dist.) (“His self-serving
affidavit that denies his agreement is insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact.”). As a result, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate
specific facts showing the existence of a triable issue. Therefore, the trial court did
not err by granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
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{¶38} The plaintiffs’ assignment of error is overruled.
{¶39} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellants herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
MILLER, J., concurs.
WILLAMOWSKI, J., DISSENTS.
{¶40} I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion for two reasons. First,
how self-serving affidavits are to be considered at summary judgment is in need of
clarification. See Kiser v. United Dairy Farmers, 2023-Ohio-2136, ¶ 24 (10th Dist.)
(holding that “‘self-serving’ testimonial evidence that conforms to the requirements
of Civ.R. 56(C) must be considered by the trial court and treated as any other
evidence in the record at summary judgment.”); Crockett Homes, Inc. v. Tracy,
2024-Ohio-1464, ¶ 114-115 (7th Dist.) (“A party may be in the best position to offer
testimony in support of [his or] her cause.”).
{¶41} Second, the resolution of this issue in this case relies on a credibility
determination. To defeat summary judgment, Stedke would have to prove a
negative: he has to establish that he did not threaten Eisert. If Stedke did not threaten
Eisert, what evidence could he produce to corroborate his position under the facts
of this case? Given the circumstances in this case, a trier of fact should determine
whether Eisert’s account or Stedke’s account of these events is credible. Kiser at ¶
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16 (“At summary judgment, it is not the role of the court to resolve a disputed fact
or weigh the credibility of the evidence * * *”).
/hls
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