Stead v. Serrano

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Stead v. Serrano

2017 NY Slip Op 8871, 156 A.D.3d 836, 67 N.Y.S.3d 244

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 20, 2017

Docket2015-11239

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 2017 NY Slip Op 8871 (Stead v. Serrano) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Stead v. Serrano, 2017 NY Slip Op 8871, 156 A.D.3d 836, 67 N.Y.S.3d 244 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2017).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Santorelli, J.), dated September 8, 2015, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff Margaret Stead did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

The defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff Margaret Stead (hereinafter the injured plaintiff) did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The papers submitted by the defendants failed to adequately address the injured plaintiff’s claims, set forth in the bill of particulars, that she sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d 969 [2011]; Rouach v Betts, 71 AD3d 977 [2010]; Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]). Since the defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden, it is unnecessary to consider whether the plaintiffs’ opposition papers were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d at 969).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the injured plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Dillon, J.P., Sgroi, Hinds-Radix and Iannacci, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Santorelli, J.), dated September 8, 2015, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff Margaret Stead did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

The defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff Margaret Stead (hereinafter the injured plaintiff) did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The papers submitted by the defendants failed to adequately address the injured plaintiff’s claims, set forth in the bill of particulars, that she sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d 969 [2011]; Rouach v Betts, 71 AD3d 977 [2010]; Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]). Since the defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden, it is unnecessary to consider whether the plaintiffs’ opposition papers were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d at 969).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the injured plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Dillon, J.P., Sgroi, Hinds-Radix and Iannacci, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

2017 NY Slip Op 8871, 156 A.D.3d 836, 67 N.Y.S.3d 244, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stead-v-serrano-nyappdiv-2017.

Opinion

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