Staub v. City of New York

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Staub v. City of New York

29 A.D.2d 756, 287 N.Y.S.2d 935, 1968 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4528

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 29, 1968

StatusPublished

This text of 29 A.D.2d 756 (Staub v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Staub v. City of New York, 29 A.D.2d 756, 287 N.Y.S.2d 935, 1968 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4528 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1968).

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Opinion

Order entered on or about September 30, 1966, unanimously reversed, on the law and on the facts, without costs or disbursements and the motion denied. It was an improvident exercise of discretion to grant the application of the infant to file a notice of claim some 11 months after the cause of action accrued. (General Municipal Law, § 50-e). The infant was 17 years of age and relief was sought primarily on the familiar allegation that neither he nor his father knew of the necessity for filing a claim within the statutory period of 90 days. There has been a complete failure to show a cognizable relation between the fact of infancy and the failure to file a claim within the statutory time limitation. (Sehnee v. City of New York, 285 App. Div. 1130, affd. 1 N Y 2d 697.) Concur — 'Stevens, J. P., Steuer, Tilzer, Rabin and Bastow, JJ.

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Order entered on or about September 30, 1966, unanimously reversed, on the law and on the facts, without costs or disbursements and the motion denied. It was an improvident exercise of discretion to grant the application of the infant to file a notice of claim some 11 months after the cause of action accrued. (General Municipal Law, § 50-e). The infant was 17 years of age and relief was sought primarily on the familiar allegation that neither he nor his father knew of the necessity for filing a claim within the statutory period of 90 days. There has been a complete failure to show a cognizable relation between the fact of infancy and the failure to file a claim within the statutory time limitation. (Sehnee v. City of New York, 285 App. Div. 1130, affd. 1 N Y 2d 697.) Concur — 'Stevens, J. P., Steuer, Tilzer, Rabin and Bastow, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

29 A.D.2d 756, 287 N.Y.S.2d 935, 1968 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4528, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/staub-v-city-of-new-york-nyappdiv-1968.

Opinion

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