Staub v. Alabama Power Co.

350 So. 2d 386, 1977 Ala. LEXIS 2200
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedSeptember 16, 1977
DocketSC 2225
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 350 So. 2d 386 (Staub v. Alabama Power Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Staub v. Alabama Power Co., 350 So. 2d 386, 1977 Ala. LEXIS 2200 (Ala. 1977).

Opinion

ALMON, Justice.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted in favor of defendant-appel-lee, Alabama Power Company. Mrs. Edwin Staub, Jr., filed suit against Alabama Power Company alleging that she, as the dependent widow of Edwin John Staub, Jr., is entitled to benefits under a company funded pension plan.1 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mr. Staub was employed by Alabama Power for approximately 22 years prior to his death on April 21, 1975, 15 days after turning age 54. Mr. Staub, on November 1, 1974, approximately 6 months before his death, had designated his wife as provisional payee under the provisions of the pension plan.2 Appellant acknowledges in her com[388]*388plaint that “[t]he plan provides that the designation of a ‘provisional payee’ will be.come effective one (1) year from the date of such designation or on the 55th birthday of [389]*389the employee whichever is later,” and that Mr. Staub’s unfortunate death “terminated Mr. Staub’s service to the defendant prior to his 55th birthday and prior to one (1) year after the designation.” In other words, appellant acknowledges that by the unambiguous term of the plan, she is not entitled to any benefits.

Section VII of the plan (see footnote 1) provides that an employee who has 20 years of service or 15 years of service and is over age 50 (either of which would cover Mr. Staub) may terminate his services for any reason other than death or transfer to an affiliated company and still receive, “commencing at Normal Retirement Date” (age 65), retirement income. Under Section VII the designation of a provisional payee becomes inoperative upon termination of the employee’s services unless the termination occurs within 10 years prior to Normal Retirement Date (age 65) and the termination occurred on or after the effective date of the provisional payee election. Thus, Mr. Staub could have terminated employment after reaching age 55 and his provisional payee designation would have been in ef-feet as the one year period would have elapsed.

The complaint alleges that Mr. Staub had “vested rights” and (1) that the requirements that an employee who has vested retirement benefits must live to a certain age or a certain time after his designation of a provisional payee bears no reasonable relation to the plan and is arbitrary and capricious, (2) that the pension plan is a form of compensation and to deprive the employee’s estate and dependents of vested benefits is inequitable and unjust,3 and (3) that the limitations and restrictions are null and void due to past arbitrary exceptions to the provisions of the plan. Appellant contends that his complaint has become the “law of the case” due to Judge Ingram Beasley’s overruling of Alabama Power’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, citing, inter alia, In re Midwest Milk Monopolization Litigation, 380 F.Supp. 880 (W.D.Mo.1974); the motion for summary judgment was later granted by Judge Russell McElroy. According to appellant, she need now only show a scintilla of evidence to support a reversal.

[390]*390This is not the case. On appeal we will affirm a decision of a trial judge if it is correct, though it be for the wrong reason.

“Plaintiff contends that Judge Miner erred in overruling Judge Sullivan’s decision, D.C., 144 F.Supp. 480, denying defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Plaintiff’s counsel speak of Judge Sullivan’s opinion as ‘the law of the case’. . The action of Judge Miner was the entry of a summary judgment and involved not merely the complaint which was before Judge Sullivan, but also offers of proof and evidence submitted only to Judge Miner.
.“Regardless of the impact of my law-of-the-case rule, our duty is to determine whether the judgment of Judge Miner is correct. In fact, we should sustain any judgment from which an appeal has been taken if it is supported by the record and the law, regardless of whether the lower court has ruled erroneously or has ruled at all on that ground. Jaffke v. Dunham, 352 U.S. 280, 281, 77 S.Ct. 307, 1 L.Ed.2d 314. Obviously we cannot be expected to reverse a correct decision by one district judge simply because we find that it is contrary to a prior ruling by another district judge in the same case, i. e. contrary to the ‘law of the case’ ”. Parmelee Transportation Company v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794, 797 (7 Cir. 1961).

Being actuarially based, the plan assumes that a certain portion of the employees will die without receiving any benefits or at least without receiving as many benefits as others. Without deciding whether the appellant has stated a cause of action, we see nothing arbitrary, as a matter of law, in the requirement that an employee reach a certain age — in this case, age 55— before he or his spouse, under the provisional payee provision, may receive retirement income.

Nor is the requirement unreasonable that a provisional payee be designated one year in advance of the date such designation becomes operative. If a provisional payee provision were immediately effective, the employee could make a deathbed designation and in effect require the funding of the plan to be based not only on the actuarial lives of the employees, but also their spouses.

The effective designation of a provisional payee lowers the amount of retirement benefits the employee may receive during his retirement years. 'In essence, the benefits the employee is actuarially likely to receive is spread over actuarial combined lives of him and his spouse. As we read Section VI, paragraph 2, a spouse will receive benefits if the employee dies with an effective provisional payee designation even if the employee had not retired, but were of retirement age. By paragraph 4 of Section VI, if the employee rescinds his designation of a provisional payee, his retirement income is reduced to reflect the added protection he had and the added risk the fund had during the time the provisional payee designation was in effect.

In our judgment, what this court said in Avondale Mills v. Saddler, 292 Ala. 134, 290 So.2d 173 (1974) applies equally well here:

“It is our conclusion that the integrity of the trust indenture as written must be upheld. We cannot and should not rewrite it. First National Bank of Birmingham v. Adams, 281 Ala. 404, 203 So.2d 124 (1967). The rights of the beneficiaries of the trust must be determined by the trust provisions. See Bailey v. Rockwell Spring and Axle Co., 13 Misc.2d 29, 175 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1958); Green v. Copco Steel, 22 Mich.App. 16, 176 N.W.2d 690 (1970). The trust indenture clearly states the requirements which an employee must meet in order to qualify for retirement benefits. . . . ”

As an example of an arbitrary exception to the plan made by the Retirement Board, appellant points to the case of another employee who did not have “vested rights” under Section VI, but who was given a leave of absence with pay a few months before reaching age 65 so that he might accept another position and still be eligible [391]*391for retirement benefits upon reaching age 65.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Randolph County v. Thompson
502 So. 2d 357 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1987)
Bierley v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.
374 So. 2d 1341 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1979)
Jamestown Corp. v. Ward
373 So. 2d 1136 (Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, 1979)
Walker v. Amason
369 So. 2d 786 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1979)
Matter of Estate of Amason
369 So. 2d 786 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1979)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
350 So. 2d 386, 1977 Ala. LEXIS 2200, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/staub-v-alabama-power-co-ala-1977.