Opinion
DUPONT, C. J.
The statewide grievance committee (committee) appeals from the judgment of the trial court ordering a reprimand of the defendant Daniel B. Glass. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[473]*473The relevant facts are those that follow. The defendant was an associate in the law firm of Spirer, Nasser and Marcus in Westport. The firm represented Comfed Savings Bank, Comfed Mortgage Company, and the Swiss Conservative Group (Swiss). Various members of the firm developed a scheme whereby financially distressed homeowners could refinance their homes through what purported to be a sale of the property.
The transactions organized by the defendant’s law firm involved situations where a “buyer” who was not a bona fide purchaser, but instead a friend or relative of the “seller,” would purport to “buy” the property from the “seller” and would lease the property back to the “seller.” Swiss was responsible for providing a “buyer” if the “seller” did not have one ready. Swiss would arrange a new mortgage such that the “buyer’s” monthly lease payment would equal the amount of the mortgage payment on the property. The “seller” and the “buyer” would execute four agreements: a contract for the sale of real property, a lease, an option agreement, and a three party agreement between the “seller,” the “buyer” and Swiss. The contract of sale, which was the only one of the four agreements that the mortgagee bank was ever given, described the purported sale. The lease arranged for the “buyer” to pay the mortgage as the lease payment. The option agreement gave the “seller” the ability to retain title to the property. Finally, the third party agreement provided for a fee to Swiss equaling 20 percent of the “sale price” of the property. In effect, the mortgagee bank was led to believe that it was lending to a bona fide purchaser, when in fact there was no actual sale being made.
The defendant’s firm participated in several transactions of this kind between February, 1988, and May, 1989. The firm was required by the Comfed Savings Bank to fill out a United States Department of Housing [474]*474and Urban Development Statement, Form HUD-1 (HUD-1). The defendant, as the closing attorney, certified on this form that the funds shown as distributed were a true and accurate accounting of the transaction.
The defendant’s involvement in this scheme was primarily as a closing attorney. He did not prepare any of the HUD-1 forms himself, but he reviewed and signed them, thus certifying that the figures on the forms were accurate, when in fact they were not, and he knew that they were not. When the defendant expressed concern to his superiors about the propriety of the scheme, he was assured that it was legitimate.
The defendant was charged in federal court with the crime of making a false statement in connection with a federal loan application after a residential real estate closing that occurred in February, 1989. On December 29, 1994, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1014, a felony under federal law.1 The court, Dorsey, J., sua sponte departed from the federal sentencing guidelines, and gave the defendant a reduced sentence due to his cooperation with his own prosecution. He was sentenced to three years probation and to three months of home confinement, and was ordered to perform 300 hours of community service and to make restitution in the amount of $20,000.
[475]*475Subsequently, the committee filed a presentment and petition for interim suspension in the trial court pursuant to Practice Book § 28B. I2 in order to seek the defendant’s suspension from the practice of law. The committee requested a minimum suspension of six months. The trial court, after having heard the evidence before it, did not suspend the defendant, but instead issued a reprimand. The committee then filed this appeal, claiming the sanction was not severe enough.3
[476]*476Hearings concerning the eligibility to practice law of attorneys who have been convicted of a felony in Connecticut are governed by General Statutes § 51-9 la and Practice Book § 28B.4 The statute gives the trial court the power to determine, under the circumstances [477]*477of each case, what sanction is appropriate. Under the statute, an attorney convicted of a felony in Connecticut may be disbarred, suspended, or disciplined in some other manner, at the discretion of the trial court. If suspension is deemed appropriate, the court must suspend for a period of at least seven years for a class A felony and for a period of at least five years for a class B felony. The statute on its face does not apply to attorneys who are convicted of felonies in other jurisdictions, as is the case here.
Practice Book § 28B.1, although recognizing that felonies may be committed and prosecuted in other jurisdictions, does not speak to particular sanctions, but to the procedure for a presentment proceeding to determine the extent of the discipline to be imposed. We have concluded that § 51-91a should be applied to attorneys who commit out-of-state felonies. See Statewide Grievance Committee v. Spirer, 46 Conn. App. 450, 460, 699 A.2d 1047 (1997). That statute has both precatory and mandatory language. Its mandatory provisions arise only “if the court suspends the attorney,” and there has been a conviction of a class A or class B felony.5 Otherwise, the court may dismiss the matter, suspend the attorney for some discretionary period of time if the felony conviction does not involve a class A or B felony, disbar the attorney, or impose such other discipline as the court deems appropriate, at the discretion of the trial court.
In this case, the court did not impose any period of suspension, and we, therefore, conclude that this case does not involve the statutory provision relating to mandatory suspensions. We, therefore, review the court’s judgment to determine whether the court abused its [478]*478discretion in this case in ordering a reprimand.6 Both parties argue in their briefs that this is the standard under which the review should be conducted. On the facts of this case, we agree.
“The trial court ha[s] inherent judicial power, derived from judicial responsibility for the administration of justice, to exercise sound discretion to determine what sanction to impose in light of the entire record before it. . . . Long ago, we stated that courts are, as they should be, left free to act as may in each case seem best in this matter of most important concern to them and to the administration of justice. . . . However, [although our review of grievance proceedings is restricted, we recognize the seriousness of the interests that we must safeguard. We have a continuing duty to make it entirely clear that the standards of conduct, nonprofessional as well as professional, of the members of the profession of the law in Connecticut have not changed, and that those standards will be applied under our rules of law, in the exercise of reasonable discretion . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v. Shluger,
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Opinion
DUPONT, C. J.
The statewide grievance committee (committee) appeals from the judgment of the trial court ordering a reprimand of the defendant Daniel B. Glass. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[473]*473The relevant facts are those that follow. The defendant was an associate in the law firm of Spirer, Nasser and Marcus in Westport. The firm represented Comfed Savings Bank, Comfed Mortgage Company, and the Swiss Conservative Group (Swiss). Various members of the firm developed a scheme whereby financially distressed homeowners could refinance their homes through what purported to be a sale of the property.
The transactions organized by the defendant’s law firm involved situations where a “buyer” who was not a bona fide purchaser, but instead a friend or relative of the “seller,” would purport to “buy” the property from the “seller” and would lease the property back to the “seller.” Swiss was responsible for providing a “buyer” if the “seller” did not have one ready. Swiss would arrange a new mortgage such that the “buyer’s” monthly lease payment would equal the amount of the mortgage payment on the property. The “seller” and the “buyer” would execute four agreements: a contract for the sale of real property, a lease, an option agreement, and a three party agreement between the “seller,” the “buyer” and Swiss. The contract of sale, which was the only one of the four agreements that the mortgagee bank was ever given, described the purported sale. The lease arranged for the “buyer” to pay the mortgage as the lease payment. The option agreement gave the “seller” the ability to retain title to the property. Finally, the third party agreement provided for a fee to Swiss equaling 20 percent of the “sale price” of the property. In effect, the mortgagee bank was led to believe that it was lending to a bona fide purchaser, when in fact there was no actual sale being made.
The defendant’s firm participated in several transactions of this kind between February, 1988, and May, 1989. The firm was required by the Comfed Savings Bank to fill out a United States Department of Housing [474]*474and Urban Development Statement, Form HUD-1 (HUD-1). The defendant, as the closing attorney, certified on this form that the funds shown as distributed were a true and accurate accounting of the transaction.
The defendant’s involvement in this scheme was primarily as a closing attorney. He did not prepare any of the HUD-1 forms himself, but he reviewed and signed them, thus certifying that the figures on the forms were accurate, when in fact they were not, and he knew that they were not. When the defendant expressed concern to his superiors about the propriety of the scheme, he was assured that it was legitimate.
The defendant was charged in federal court with the crime of making a false statement in connection with a federal loan application after a residential real estate closing that occurred in February, 1989. On December 29, 1994, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1014, a felony under federal law.1 The court, Dorsey, J., sua sponte departed from the federal sentencing guidelines, and gave the defendant a reduced sentence due to his cooperation with his own prosecution. He was sentenced to three years probation and to three months of home confinement, and was ordered to perform 300 hours of community service and to make restitution in the amount of $20,000.
[475]*475Subsequently, the committee filed a presentment and petition for interim suspension in the trial court pursuant to Practice Book § 28B. I2 in order to seek the defendant’s suspension from the practice of law. The committee requested a minimum suspension of six months. The trial court, after having heard the evidence before it, did not suspend the defendant, but instead issued a reprimand. The committee then filed this appeal, claiming the sanction was not severe enough.3
[476]*476Hearings concerning the eligibility to practice law of attorneys who have been convicted of a felony in Connecticut are governed by General Statutes § 51-9 la and Practice Book § 28B.4 The statute gives the trial court the power to determine, under the circumstances [477]*477of each case, what sanction is appropriate. Under the statute, an attorney convicted of a felony in Connecticut may be disbarred, suspended, or disciplined in some other manner, at the discretion of the trial court. If suspension is deemed appropriate, the court must suspend for a period of at least seven years for a class A felony and for a period of at least five years for a class B felony. The statute on its face does not apply to attorneys who are convicted of felonies in other jurisdictions, as is the case here.
Practice Book § 28B.1, although recognizing that felonies may be committed and prosecuted in other jurisdictions, does not speak to particular sanctions, but to the procedure for a presentment proceeding to determine the extent of the discipline to be imposed. We have concluded that § 51-91a should be applied to attorneys who commit out-of-state felonies. See Statewide Grievance Committee v. Spirer, 46 Conn. App. 450, 460, 699 A.2d 1047 (1997). That statute has both precatory and mandatory language. Its mandatory provisions arise only “if the court suspends the attorney,” and there has been a conviction of a class A or class B felony.5 Otherwise, the court may dismiss the matter, suspend the attorney for some discretionary period of time if the felony conviction does not involve a class A or B felony, disbar the attorney, or impose such other discipline as the court deems appropriate, at the discretion of the trial court.
In this case, the court did not impose any period of suspension, and we, therefore, conclude that this case does not involve the statutory provision relating to mandatory suspensions. We, therefore, review the court’s judgment to determine whether the court abused its [478]*478discretion in this case in ordering a reprimand.6 Both parties argue in their briefs that this is the standard under which the review should be conducted. On the facts of this case, we agree.
“The trial court ha[s] inherent judicial power, derived from judicial responsibility for the administration of justice, to exercise sound discretion to determine what sanction to impose in light of the entire record before it. . . . Long ago, we stated that courts are, as they should be, left free to act as may in each case seem best in this matter of most important concern to them and to the administration of justice. . . . However, [although our review of grievance proceedings is restricted, we recognize the seriousness of the interests that we must safeguard. We have a continuing duty to make it entirely clear that the standards of conduct, nonprofessional as well as professional, of the members of the profession of the law in Connecticut have not changed, and that those standards will be applied under our rules of law, in the exercise of reasonable discretion . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v. Shluger, 230 Conn. 668, 678-79, 646 A.2d 781 (1994).7
[479]*479In attorney grievance cases, in the absence of mandatory statutory sanctions, a reviewing court must defer to the discretion of the fact finder, whether it be the trial court or the committee, because the fact finder is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the demeanor of the parties. See Practice Book § 27N (f); Silver v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 42 Conn. App. 229, 235-36, 679 A.2d 392, cert. granted, 239 Conn. 948, 686 A.2d 125 (1996).
Thus, our opinion as to what should have been the appropriate sanction for the defendant is not at issue. We must determine, rather, whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the appropriate sanction was a reprimand. The abuse of discretion standard is such that it usually precludes the overturning of a trial court’s judgment in such cases.8 “The scope of review by this court on a claim that the trial court abused its discretion is well settled. [E]very reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling. . . . Reversal is required only where an abuse of discretion is manifest or where injustice appears to have been done. ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Higgins v. Karp, 239 Conn. 802, 808, 687 A.2d 539 (1997).
“Abuse of discretion is synonymous with a failure to exercise a sound, reasonable, and legal discretion. It is a strict legal term indicating that appellate court is of opinion that there was commission of an error of law by the trial court. It does not imply intentional wrong or bad faith, or misconduct, nor any reflection on the [480]*480judge but means the clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment—one is that clearly against logic and effect of such facts as are presented in support of the application or against the reasonable and probable deductions to be drawn from the facts disclosed upon the hearing; an improvident exercise of discretion; an error of law. ... A discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by and clearly against reason and evidence. Unreasonable departure from considered precedents and settled judicial custom, constituting error of law. . . .A judgment or decision by an administrative agency or judge which has no foundation in fact or in law. Abuse of discretion by trial court is any unreasonable, unconscionable and arbitrary action taken without proper consideration of facts and law pertaining to matter submitted.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court’s decision was unreasonable, unconscionable or arbitrary.
In considering an appropriate sanction for the defendant, the trial court weighed evidence concerning his prior record as an attorney, the degree of his involvement in the mortgage scheme, and letters from people who knew him personally and wrote to the court on his behalf. The court also measured the defendant’s conduct against rules of professional conduct. The professional conduct of attorneys in Connecticut is governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct, as found in the Practice Book.9 Although the Rules of Professional Conduct define misconduct; see Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4;10 they do not provide guidance for [481]*481determining what sanctions are appropriate. For this reason, Connecticut courts reviewing attorney misconduct have looked to the American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (Standards), which do provide guidance. The Standards, which were officially promulgated in 1986, have not been officially adopted in Connecticut. They are, however, used frequently by the Superior Court in evaluating attorney misconduct and in determining discipline, as they were by the trial court in this case. See Statewide Grievance Committee v. Shluger, supra, 230 Conn. 673 n.10.
Standard 5.0, Violations of Duties Owed to the Public, and the Standards that follow, are relevant to this case. These Standards apply to situations where the attorney has committed a criminal act that involves misrepresentation, fraud or dishonesty. Standard 5.1, Failure to Maintain Personal Integrity, provides guidance as to the circumstances that indicate the general appropriateness of disbarment, suspensions, and reprimands. 11 “In imposing a sanction after a finding of misconduct, a [482]*482court should consider the following factors: the duty violated, the lawyer’s mental state, and the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.” Standard 3.0. The Standards define aggravation12 and mitigation,13 and provide examples of each.
[483]*483The trial court in this case chose not to follow the sanction guidelines of Standard 5.1. These state that disbarment or suspension is generally appropriate after the commission of a criminal act. Instead, the trial court focused on the evidence that follows as mitigating factors pursuant to Standard 9.32. Although the defendant was involved in the illegal closings, he did not prepare any of the HUD-1 forms himself. The defendant testified that he never believed that he was committing a crime, nor did he ever intend to do so. His participation in the scheme was not for any personal gain, and he did not have a prior disciplinary record. He cooperated fully with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States Attorney, and the committee. At the time of the closings, he was an inexperienced attorney with no experience in real estate closings other than the scheme involved in his crime. Since his early school days, he had suffered from a learning disability that had made obtaining his education, including successfully completing law school, difficult. Although the defendant was involved in a pattern of misconduct, the trial court found that this aggravating factor was offset by the mitigating ones, particularly the defendant’s cooperation with the authorities.
[484]*484Our thorough review of the record leads us to the conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Although Standard 5.1 can be read to mean that a reprimand is not appropriate when an attorney has been convicted of a felony, or any crime, the standard is persuasive, but not binding upon the trial court. Section 51-91a, which we have determined can be applied in situations such as this, provides that “such other discipline [lesser than disbarment or suspension or greater than dismissal] as the trial court deems appropriate,” may be imposed. Reprimand was a statutory option and the trial court chose that option.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion SCHALLER, J., concurred.