State, William D. Taylor v. Health Commr. of Conn.

15 Conn. Super. Ct. 468
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedAugust 17, 1948
DocketFile No. 46368
StatusPublished

This text of 15 Conn. Super. Ct. 468 (State, William D. Taylor v. Health Commr. of Conn.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State, William D. Taylor v. Health Commr. of Conn., 15 Conn. Super. Ct. 468 (Colo. Ct. App. 1948).

Opinion

This is an action for a mandamus to compel the defendant, Stanley H. Osborn, health commissioner of the state of Connecticut, to issue, pursuant to General Statutes, § 2767, a certificate of registration to the plaintiff, William D. Taylor, as a person entitled to practice natureopathy in this state.

On Nov. 14, 1946, the Connecticut state board of natureopathic examiners certified that William D. Taylor, N. D., having appeared before the board and having been duly examined according to law, had been found qualified to practice natureopathy in the state of Connecticut, all pursuant to General Statutes, § 2770, as amended by § 1127c, Cum. Sup. 1935, and § 545g, Sup. 1943. Thereafter, on December 20, 1946, the plaintiff filed with the state department of health duplicate certificates of approval and on December 28, 1946, paid a $2 registration fee, all as required by § 2767. The defendant, as health *Page 470 commissioner and administrative head of the state department of health has refused to issue to the plaintiff the certificate of registration for which the statute provides and without which the plaintiff cannot practice natureopathy in this state. These facts are undisputed on the first defense of the defendant's return.

The allegations of the substituted second defense to defendant's return seek to invoke the discretionary power of the court. Defendant claims that the facts proven under the allegations of this defense establish a sufficient basis for the court to refuse its aid in these proceedings by way of mandamus.

This defense alleges in paragraph 1 that the certificate of approval obtained by the plaintiff from the Connecticut state board of natureopathic examiners was "obtained illegally and through fraud and deceit," and that the plaintiff "perpetrated a fraud upon the State of Connecticut" as set forth in paragraphs 2-10 inclusive.

Paragraph 2 alleges that the certificate of approval granted to plaintiff by the Connecticut board of natureopathic examiners was based upon a reciprocity agreement with another state under § 2770, as amended by §§ 1127c and 545g. This is an undisputed fact. Paragraphs 3-8 inclusive allege in substance that in January, 1943, the state of Tennessee first established laws regulating the practice of natureopathy in that state and established a board of examiners; that a president and a secretary-treasurer of said board engaged in a fraudulent racket involving the solicitation and sale of licenses to practice natureopathy in the state of Tennessee to persons who did not qualify under the laws of that state; that said president and said secretary-treasurer were indicted and convicted in Tennessee for fraudulent and corrupt acts in connection with the conduct of their official duties and that the plaintiff was one of many who obtained a license in Tennessee while they were in office. Paragraph 9 alleges that the plaintiff was a knowing beneficiary of these corrupt practices. Paragraph 10 alleges that the plaintiff fraudulently obtained his license to practice natureopathy in South Carolina that upon this license he fraudulently obtained his Tennessee license and that the certificate of approval obtained in Connecticut in 1946 was based on these licenses fraudulently obtained in South Carolina and Tennessee. *Page 471

The certificate of approval granted by the Connecticut board of natureopathic examiners was issued to the plaintiff without examination based upon an agreement of reciprocity existing between the state of Connecticut, represented by said board, and the state of South Carolina under the authority of § 2770 as amended by § 1127c and § 545g. It is to be presumed that such certificate was issued in accordance with the applicable provisions of statute law. The action of the board in this respect is not subject to collateral attack. State ex rel. Lacerenza v. Osborn,133 Conn. 530, 535. The defendant's duty to issue the certificate of registration under the provisions of § 2767 was ministerial and not discretionary. Rosenthal v. State Bar ExaminingCommittee, 116 Conn. 409, 416; State ex rel. Lacerenza v. Osborn, supra. Although the health commissioner has no discretion in the performance of the act demanded of him, there is a discretionary power in the court in a mandamus proceeding, which is "a remedial process and may be issued to remedy a wrong, not to promote one, to compel the discharge of a duty which ought to be performed, but not to compel the performance of an act which will work a public or private mischief, or to compel a compliance with the strict letter of the law in disregard of its spirit or in aid to a palpable fraud. The relator must come into court with clean hands." State ex rel. Lacerenza v. Osborn, supra, 534. It was also held in the Lacerenza case at page 535, quoting fromState ex rel. Hansen v. Schall, 126 Conn. 536, 543, that "if it should appear that the right was to be asserted contrary to the public interest, the court might refuse its aid in mandamus proceedings."

The undisputed facts in the alternative writ in the instant case set out the necessary elements essential to obtaining relief by mandamus (State ex rel. Lacerenza v. Osborn, supra, 534). However, the establishment of the strict legal right is not of itself conclusive of the right to relief by mandamus because "the writ is not issued as a matter of right, but in the exercise of a judicial discretion which takes into account other considerations than the legal right of the relator." Lacerenza case at pages 534, 535, and other cases cited therein.

The substituted second defense alleges facts, proof of which are claimed to constitute fraud on the part of the plaintiff in obtaining the certificate of approval granted to him by the Connecticut state board of natureopathic examiners. This certificate *Page 472 was based upon a reciprocity agreement with the board of natureopathic examiners of the state of South Carolina, in which state the plaintiff was licensed in 1938. Defendant has alleged that plaintiff obtained his license to practice natureopathy in South Carolina by fraud and deceit and without compliance with the laws of that state. The evidence before this court fails to establish this claim. It does disclose that plaintiff was licensed in South Carolina in 1938 by the natureopathic examining board of that state after taking and passing written examinations and practical demonstration, pursuant to the laws of that state, on subjects comparable and even more extensive than those required by the state of Connecticut by General Statutes, § 2768. Plaintiff had completed a four-year course at the U.S. School of Natureopathy at Newark, New Jersey, where he attended classes for nine consecutive months during each of the four years. He graduated in June, 1925, with the degree of doctor of natureopathy. His prior schooling complied with statutory standards and he has also engaged in postgraduate studies. There is no evidence that the plaintiff obtained his South Carolina license except through proper procedure and adequate qualifications. In 1943, plaintiff was licensed to practice natureopathy in the state of Tennessee without examination, based upon his licensure in South Carolina.

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Related

State Ex Rel. Lacerenza v. Osborn
52 A.2d 747 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1947)
Demarest v. Zoning Commission
59 A.2d 293 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1948)
Brein v. Connecticut Eclectic Examining Board
130 A. 289 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1925)
Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Committee
165 A. 211 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1933)
State Ex Rel. Hansen v. Schall
12 A.2d 767 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1940)
Hart v. Board of Examiners of Embalmers
26 A.2d 780 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1942)

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Bluebook (online)
15 Conn. Super. Ct. 468, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-william-d-taylor-v-health-commr-of-conn-connsuperct-1948.