[Cite as State v. Young, 2026-Ohio-2236.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WOOD COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. {87}WD-25-070 {87}WD-25-071 Appellee Trial Court No. 2021 CR 0254 2025 CR 0288 v.
James Young DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: June 12, 2026
*****
Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kristofer Kristofferson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Jeffrey P. Nunnari, for appellant.
MAYLE, J.
{¶ 1} In this consolidated appeal, appellant, James A. Young, appeals the October
23, 2025 judgments of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to 12
months imprisonment after he pled guilty to one count of theft, a felony of the fifth
degree, in case No. 2021CR0254; and to 18 months imprisonment after he pled guilty to
one count of failure to appear, a felony of the fourth degree, in case No. 2025CR0288.
The court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for a total aggregate sentence
of 30 months imprisonment. {¶ 2} At issue on appeal is whether Young’s consecutive sentences are contrary to
law. For the following reasons, we find that the trial court failed to make the requisite
findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Accordingly, we reverse the October 23, 2025
judgments of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas and remand this matter to the
trial court for resentencing.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 3} The origins of this case date back to 2021 when Young was arrested after he
was seen walking out of a Home Depot with his son and approximately $1,545 worth of
stolen tools. Young was charged with theft in case No. 2021CR0254. While he was out
on bond, Young repeatedly failed to appear for his arraignment. The court revoked
Young’s bond and issued a county-wide warrant. After being served, Young appeared in
court on August 10, 2021. At that hearing, the warrant was withdrawn, Young was
granted an own recognizance bond, and a pretrial was set. On November 9, 2021, Young
failed to appear for pretrial, and the court revoked his bond and issued a statewide
warrant. That same day, an indictment was filed and Young was charged with failure to
appear as required by recognizance.
{¶ 4} Nearly four years passed. On July 29, 2025, Young appeared in court for the
first time on his failure to appear charge. On September 2, 2025, Young pled guilty to the
charges in both of his cases—theft in case No. 2021CR0254 and failure to appear in case
No. 2025CR0288. The court accepted Young’s pleas and set both cases for a joint
sentencing hearing.
2. {¶ 5} On October 21, 2025, the court proceeded to sentencing and sentenced
Young to 12 months imprisonment for the theft charge, and 18 months imprisonment for
the failure to appear charge. The court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively
for a total aggregate sentence of 30 months.
{¶ 6} Young filed a consolidated appeal and assigned the following error for our
review:
APPELLANT’S CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES ARE CONTRARY TO LAW. II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 7} We review sentencing challenges under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). The statute
allows an appellate court to increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence or vacate
the sentence and remand the matter for resentencing only if it clearly and convincingly
finds either of the following:
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant; (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).
{¶ 8} The term “contrary to law” means “‘in violation of statute or legal
regulations at a given time.’” State v. Grashel, 2025-Ohio-580, ¶ 20 (4th Dist.), quoting
State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 34, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 328 (6th Ed.1990).
{¶ 9} To impose consecutive sentences, a trial court is required to make three
findings: “(1) consecutive sentences are ‘necessary to protect the public from future
3. crime or to punish the offender * * *;’ (2) imposition of consecutive sentences is not
‘disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the
offender poses to the public * * *;’ and (3) one of the factors in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a) to
(c) applies.” State v. Johnson, 2023-Ohio-2008, ¶ 31 (6th Dist.), citing R.C.
2929.14(C)(4); State v. Beasley, 2018-Ohio-493, ¶ 252. The options for the third finding
under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) are:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense. (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct. (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender. {¶ 10} A sentencing court must make its findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the
sentencing hearing and incorporate them into the sentencing entry. State v. Bonnell, 2014-
Ohio-3177, syllabus. However, the trial court is not required to state its reasons that
support its findings and the court is not “required to give a talismanic incantation of the
words of the statute, provided that the necessary findings can be found in the record and
are incorporated into the sentencing entry.” Id. at ¶ 37. “Although a word-for-word
recitation of the language of the statute is not required, a reviewing court must be able to
discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis, and to determine that the
record contains evidence to support the trial court’s findings.” State v. Nelson, 2022-
4. Ohio-4308, ¶ 10 (6th Dist.), citing Johnson at ¶ 11-12, citing Bonnell at ¶ 29. If the trial
court fails to make these findings, the sentence is contrary to law. See Bonnell at ¶ 36-37.
{¶ 11} In this case, the trial court imposed the separate 12 and 18-month sentences
for Young’s charges and then stated the following:
The Court is going to also find pursuant to 2929.14(C)(4) that there are multiple offenses and that consecutive sentence is necessary to protect the public from future crime and to punish the offender, that the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and that the consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s longtime conduct in several theft offenses, numerous theft offenses, and previous non- appearances, the danger he poses to the public and continued crime. And because of his criminal history and to protect the public, the offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime from the offender. The Court is imposing those consecutively. The trial court’s sentencing entries provide:
In reviewing the statute with the facts of the case the Court found that a consecutive prison sentence was necessary in this case to protect the public from future crime of the offender and to punish Defendant.
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[Cite as State v. Young, 2026-Ohio-2236.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WOOD COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. {87}WD-25-070 {87}WD-25-071 Appellee Trial Court No. 2021 CR 0254 2025 CR 0288 v.
James Young DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: June 12, 2026
*****
Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kristofer Kristofferson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Jeffrey P. Nunnari, for appellant.
MAYLE, J.
{¶ 1} In this consolidated appeal, appellant, James A. Young, appeals the October
23, 2025 judgments of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to 12
months imprisonment after he pled guilty to one count of theft, a felony of the fifth
degree, in case No. 2021CR0254; and to 18 months imprisonment after he pled guilty to
one count of failure to appear, a felony of the fourth degree, in case No. 2025CR0288.
The court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for a total aggregate sentence
of 30 months imprisonment. {¶ 2} At issue on appeal is whether Young’s consecutive sentences are contrary to
law. For the following reasons, we find that the trial court failed to make the requisite
findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Accordingly, we reverse the October 23, 2025
judgments of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas and remand this matter to the
trial court for resentencing.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 3} The origins of this case date back to 2021 when Young was arrested after he
was seen walking out of a Home Depot with his son and approximately $1,545 worth of
stolen tools. Young was charged with theft in case No. 2021CR0254. While he was out
on bond, Young repeatedly failed to appear for his arraignment. The court revoked
Young’s bond and issued a county-wide warrant. After being served, Young appeared in
court on August 10, 2021. At that hearing, the warrant was withdrawn, Young was
granted an own recognizance bond, and a pretrial was set. On November 9, 2021, Young
failed to appear for pretrial, and the court revoked his bond and issued a statewide
warrant. That same day, an indictment was filed and Young was charged with failure to
appear as required by recognizance.
{¶ 4} Nearly four years passed. On July 29, 2025, Young appeared in court for the
first time on his failure to appear charge. On September 2, 2025, Young pled guilty to the
charges in both of his cases—theft in case No. 2021CR0254 and failure to appear in case
No. 2025CR0288. The court accepted Young’s pleas and set both cases for a joint
sentencing hearing.
2. {¶ 5} On October 21, 2025, the court proceeded to sentencing and sentenced
Young to 12 months imprisonment for the theft charge, and 18 months imprisonment for
the failure to appear charge. The court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively
for a total aggregate sentence of 30 months.
{¶ 6} Young filed a consolidated appeal and assigned the following error for our
review:
APPELLANT’S CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES ARE CONTRARY TO LAW. II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 7} We review sentencing challenges under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). The statute
allows an appellate court to increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence or vacate
the sentence and remand the matter for resentencing only if it clearly and convincingly
finds either of the following:
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant; (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).
{¶ 8} The term “contrary to law” means “‘in violation of statute or legal
regulations at a given time.’” State v. Grashel, 2025-Ohio-580, ¶ 20 (4th Dist.), quoting
State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 34, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 328 (6th Ed.1990).
{¶ 9} To impose consecutive sentences, a trial court is required to make three
findings: “(1) consecutive sentences are ‘necessary to protect the public from future
3. crime or to punish the offender * * *;’ (2) imposition of consecutive sentences is not
‘disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the
offender poses to the public * * *;’ and (3) one of the factors in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a) to
(c) applies.” State v. Johnson, 2023-Ohio-2008, ¶ 31 (6th Dist.), citing R.C.
2929.14(C)(4); State v. Beasley, 2018-Ohio-493, ¶ 252. The options for the third finding
under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) are:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense. (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct. (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender. {¶ 10} A sentencing court must make its findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the
sentencing hearing and incorporate them into the sentencing entry. State v. Bonnell, 2014-
Ohio-3177, syllabus. However, the trial court is not required to state its reasons that
support its findings and the court is not “required to give a talismanic incantation of the
words of the statute, provided that the necessary findings can be found in the record and
are incorporated into the sentencing entry.” Id. at ¶ 37. “Although a word-for-word
recitation of the language of the statute is not required, a reviewing court must be able to
discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis, and to determine that the
record contains evidence to support the trial court’s findings.” State v. Nelson, 2022-
4. Ohio-4308, ¶ 10 (6th Dist.), citing Johnson at ¶ 11-12, citing Bonnell at ¶ 29. If the trial
court fails to make these findings, the sentence is contrary to law. See Bonnell at ¶ 36-37.
{¶ 11} In this case, the trial court imposed the separate 12 and 18-month sentences
for Young’s charges and then stated the following:
The Court is going to also find pursuant to 2929.14(C)(4) that there are multiple offenses and that consecutive sentence is necessary to protect the public from future crime and to punish the offender, that the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and that the consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s longtime conduct in several theft offenses, numerous theft offenses, and previous non- appearances, the danger he poses to the public and continued crime. And because of his criminal history and to protect the public, the offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime from the offender. The Court is imposing those consecutively. The trial court’s sentencing entries provide:
In reviewing the statute with the facts of the case the Court found that a consecutive prison sentence was necessary in this case to protect the public from future crime of the offender and to punish Defendant. Consecutive sentences in this case are not disproportionate to the seriousness of Defendant’s conduct and the danger he presents to the public. Further, Defendant’s criminal history shows that a consecutive term is necessary to protect the public from future crime by the defendant. {¶ 12} Young argues that at the sentencing hearing, the trial court improperly
relied on his past conduct when making its proportionality decision. He contends that
under the Supreme Court of Ohio’s recent decision in State v. Glover, 2024-Ohio-5195, ¶
53, when a trial court considers whether consecutive sentences are “not disproportionate
to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct,” it is strictly limited to consider only the
conduct for which a defendant is being sentenced. Id. Therefore, when the trial court
found that Young’s consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to “the seriousness of
5. the offender’s longtime conduct in several theft offenses, numerous theft offenses, and
previous non-appearances,” (emphasis added.), it impermissibly relied on his previous
conduct and exceeded the scope of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Young believes that had the
court only considered his current offenses—a low grade theft offense and failure to
appear—the outcome “might very well have been different.”
{¶ 13} The State responds that (1) the trial court made the required determinations
in its sentencing journal entry, and therefore, because “a trial court’s judgment is
expressed solely through its journalized entries, not through oral pronouncements, docket
notations, or informal communications,” “any lack of precision in the oral
pronouncement does not undermine the validity of the sentence where the journalized
entry properly sets forth the required statutory findings”; (2) even if this court were to
consider the pronouncements from the sentencing hearing, the trial court does not have to
engage in a “word-for-word recitation” of R.C. 2929.14(C) in order to comply with the
statute; and (3) the trial court’s reference to “longtime conduct in several theft offenses”
and “numerous theft offenses” concerned the offenses at issue in this case. Therefore, the
State argues that the trial court properly made and journalized the required findings under
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
{¶ 14} In order to determine whether Young’s sentence is contrary to law, we must
examine whether the trial court made each of the findings required by R.C.
2929.14(C)(4). Johnson, 2023-Ohio-2008, at ¶ 31 (6th Dist.). First, neither party argues
that the trial court’s findings under the first and third requirements of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)
were improper—that consecutive sentences are “necessary to protect the public from
6. future crime or to punish the offender,” and that the “offender’s history of criminal
conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from
future crime by the offender.” Therefore, the only remaining question in this analysis is
whether the trial court made the finding that the imposition of consecutive sentences is
not “disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the
offender poses to the public.”
{¶ 15} Under Glover, the Supreme Court found that R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)’s
proportionality prong focuses on a defendant’s current conduct, not their criminal history.
Glover, 2024-Ohio-5195, at ¶ 53. The court explained that the “reference to the
‘offender’s conduct’ is to the conduct for which the defendant is being sentenced.” Id. It
distinguished this from R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c), which looks at a defendant’s criminal
history, stating that to “make a defendant’s criminal history a required part of the
proportionality finding would render R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c) superfluous.” Id.
{¶ 16} While Glover is a plurality opinion, meaning it does not carry precedential
value, see State ex rel. Elmore v. Franklin Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 2025-Ohio-2585, ¶ 19
(“[a] plurality opinion does not constitute binding authority, but a court may rely on a
plurality opinion if it finds the opinion to be persuasive.”), this court has routinely applied
it. See e.g., State v. Sweet, 2026-Ohio-1082, ¶ 11 (6th Dist.); State v. Hammons, 2024-
Ohio-6128, ¶ 22 (6th Dist.); State v. Anderson, 2025-Ohio-5732, ¶ 26 (6th Dist.).
Moreover, this court has specifically recognized Glover’s conclusion that a trial court’s
finding under the proportionality prong concerns only the conduct underlying the instant
convictions. See State v. Smith, 2025-Ohio-1290, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.) (acknowledging that
7. under Glover, a court’s finding under the proportionality prong concerns the conduct
underlying the instant convictions and the danger the offender poses to the public at the
time of sentencing based on that conduct.) Accordingly, we agree with Young that the
trial court was required to only consider his sentencing offenses—theft and failure to
appear—when making its proportionality finding.
{¶ 17} Here, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that the “consecutive
sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s longtime conduct
in several theft offenses, numerous theft offenses, and previous non-appearances.” After
reviewing the record of the sentencing hearing, we find that the trial court failed to make
the required proportionality finding when it exclusively referenced Young’s criminal
history in its proportionality findings and failed to address the crimes that Young was
being sentenced for.
{¶ 18} While we are mindful that the trial court need not give a “talismanic
incantation” of the words of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, at ¶ 37, the
trial court is required to engage in the correct analysis. It did not do so here.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s failure to make all of the required findings for
the imposition of consecutive sentences renders Young’s sentence contrary to law.
Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, at ¶ 36-37.
{¶ 19} The State attempts to rectify the trial court’s error by arguing that the court
made the correct findings in its sentencing entry. It claims that a court speaks only
through its judgment entries, not oral pronouncements, therefore the written judgment
constitutes the official findings of the court and supplies the controlling basis for
8. appellate review. State v. Brooke, 2007-Ohio-1533, ¶ 47. While the State is generally
correct that courts speak through their judgment entries, it is mistaken in its application of
that principle to this case. The law for consecutive sentences is clear—a “‘trial court
must make the requisite findings both at the sentencing hearing and in the sentencing
entry.’” (Emphasis in original.) Hammons, 2024-Ohio-6128, at ¶ 26 (6th Dist.), quoting
Beasley, 2018-Ohio-493, at ¶ 253, citing Bonnell at ¶ 37. Therefore, despite the trial
court’s clerical correction in the implementation of the sentence through its entry, its
failure to make the required findings and engage in the correct analysis at the sentencing
hearing is reversible error. See State v. Petty, 2017-Ohio-1062, ¶ 86 (10th Dist.) (finding
that under Bonnell, a “trial court’s inadvertent failure to make its findings in the
sentencing entry is merely a clerical error that may be corrected by a nunc pro tunc entry.
However, a ‘nunc pro tunc entry cannot cure the failure to make the required findings at
the time of imposing sentence.’”).
{¶ 20} Having determined that the trial court failed to make the requisite findings
under R.C. 2929.14(C), we must hold that the order of consecutive sentences is contrary
to law. Bonnell at ¶ 36-37. Accordingly, we remand the matter to the trial court “‘to
consider whether consecutive sentences are appropriate, pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4),
and, if so, to make the proper findings on the record at the sentencing hearing and
incorporate those findings into its sentencing entry.’” Petty at ¶ 94 (citations omitted).
Young’s sole assignment of error is well-taken.
9. III. Conclusion
{¶ 21} Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court’s imposition of
consecutive sentences is contrary to law, and therefore, we reverse the October 23, 2025
judgments of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas and remand this matter to that
court for resentencing. The State is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to
App.R. 24.
Judgment reversed and remanded.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Christine E. Mayle, J. JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J. JUDGE
Charles E. Sulek, J. CONCUR. JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
10.